

Certainly it is not, and cannot, be necessary, before a conviction for treason, that the act of Congress, which they intended to resist, shall be read to the rebel army, as the "Lord Mayor of London" would read the riot act to a mob.

The Judge then proceeds to assert that, "previous to this transaction, no attempt had been made to arrest fugitives, under the new act of Congress, by a public officer; heretofore, arrests had been made not by the owner in person, or his agent properly authorized, or by an officer of the law. Individuals, without any authority, but incited by cupidity and the hope of obtaining the reward offered for the return of a fugitive, had heretofore undertaken to seize them by force and violence—to invade the sanctity of private dwellings at night, and insult the feelings and prejudices of the people."

Several of the transactions offered in evidence by the United States, and ruled inadmissible by the Court, as before stated, were cases where the master had gone into that very neighborhood, armed with process in the hands of a public officer, according to the terms of the Fugitive Slave Act, and yet found himself successfully resisted, and compelled to retreat, by an overwhelming display of force. We could, in all the succeeding cases, have introduced this evidence in chief, and thus have avoided the difficulty of the Court; but it would have availed us nothing, after the Court had proclaimed that "the conspirators were acting for private and local, not general or public purposes," and, especially, that "the parties must be acquitted, because there was no evidence that they knew there were such acts of Congress as they were charged with conspiring to resist."

Let the proof have been plenary and conclusive as to the preconcert and intentions of the parties, it would have been useless and idle to prosecute any more of these cases, unless the parties would admit, or we could prove that they had read the act of Congress.

But Judge Grier complains in the above extract from his charge that "individuals, without any authority, but incited by cupidity and the hope of obtaining the reward, had invaded the sanctity of private dwellings at night," and "had thus insulted the feelings and prejudices of the people."

This doctrine stripped of the words in which it is clothed, means simply, "that there was something culpable in men going at night to houses where runaway slaves were harbored, and arresting them to secure the reward advertised by the owner, and that the people who were the harborers of these slaves, had a right to feel themselves insulted."

The only instance in which this was done, so far as proved, was the transaction at Chamberlyn's, "where a black man, said to have come from Maryland, in the last eighteen months, was seized a little after candle light, by men residing in the neighborhood and carried off."

There was no proof to show, that this man, thus taken away,