

Treaties, by which a day is fixed, when it shall expire by its own limitations, is wholly omitted in this, and no other mode is provided by which it can be abrogated, than the reciprocal right of each, to terminate it, by giving notice to the other. This right is secured to each Nation by the express terms of the Treaty itself, and the exercise of it by either nation, can consequently, be no ground of offence to the other. Should Great Britain, contrary to the express stipulations of the convention, under any pretext whatever, construe the giving of notice by the United States of their intention to terminate the Convention, into an act of hostility on the part of the United States, she would undoubtedly stand convicted of a faithless disregard of her most solemn treaty stipulations, and would justly expose herself to the censure and indignation of the civilized world. Such a result, cannot as it seems to your committee, be anticipated for a moment, and should it take place contrary to all reasonable expectations, the United States would be consoled by the reflection that whatever disastrous consequences might follow, Great Britain alone would be answerable for them.

Your committee have already said that in their judgment, to the Executive Departments of the two governments should be confided the settlement of this perplexing controversy, but in view of the difficulties which have been thrown in the way of such adjustment, they have said, that but little hope can be expected under existing circumstances, of a satisfactory arrangement, through Executive negotiations; among the difficulties in the way of a settlement by Executive negotiations, to which allusion has already been made, this very convention of 1827 seems to your committee to present others of equal, if not more decided influence. As long as this Convention exists, no danger of any actual collision between the two countries can be expected to take place. Great Britain sees in its provisions an entrenchment, behind which she can safely and securely plant herself, without the apprehension of evil, or the chances of conflict. Is it probable then, that during the continuance of such exemption from danger, she will seriously contemplate the extent of the evils to which she may be exposed, or set to work, in good earnest, to avert them. Confiding in the security of her present relations, can she have any controlling motive to prompt a desire on her part to bring about a change in these relations? As long as the United States will consent to remain in her present position of peace and inactivity, under the stipulations of this Convention, Great Britain may naturally enough be supposed to look on all attempts at negotiation with distrust and indifference. Hence it may reasonably be expected, that no real effort to bring this question to final adjustment, will be made, until an absolute necessity is created either to close it by negotiation, or to appeal to the last resort of nations. That necessity does not now exist, and never will exist, until the United States shall abrogate the convention of 1827. A crisis will then have arisen between the two nations, when they will be obliged either to compromise on terms alike honorable to both, or appeals to arms. When such a