States "should be considered a common fund," for the use and benefit of the United States, mean that the grantee in the deed should dispose of them, and make separate funds for each of the States in the confederacy; and the stipulations in the same deeds that the lands should be used for the benefit of the United States, according to their usual "respective portions in the general charge and expenditure," was made to signify, that Congress should have power to distribute to the several States, the money arising from land sales, not according to their respective portions in the general charge and expenditure, but to an arbitrary rule of distribution, to be found in the land bill. As to the vast domain purchased by money out of the common treasury, no power to distribute the proceeds of its sales being found in the several treaties, authority for that purpose was derived from that article of the Constitution intended only to clothe Congress with power to sell the lands, or dispose of them in the same manner as the other property of the United States may be, for the purposes of the general government.

The land bill, the creature of these constitutional doctrines has had its day. It has most signally failed to answer the purpose of its authors; and we are now to encounter, in another form, a temptation to give such an enlargement to the powers of the general government, as would ultimately consolidate under one head, all those now possessed and exercised by the several States.

The proposition to issue a government stock of several hundred millions of dollars, to be exchanged for State bonds, has as yet but few public advocates. It is however sufficiently countenanced to justify serious consideration. It is not designed to relieve the people of their obligation to pay annually the interest of their public debts, but, to have the taxes for that purpose levied by our representatives in Congress instead of by the members of the State Legislature. And it is intended to have the necessary taxes imposed on our wearing apparel, on our sugar, coffee and salt, instead of our

lands and personal property.

There is no power in Congress to levy taxes, duties, imposts or excises which shall not be uniform throughout the Union. There is now no surplus in the national treasury. It is then obvious, if the States' debts are to be assumed, that it will become necessary for Congress to levy heavy taxes, not only on the people of the indebted States, but upon those of the whole Union. How the States involved would be relieved by this process is not perceivable. The tax-gatherers it is true, would be placed out of sight, but their exactions would not be on that account the less exorbitant. And our constituents, without experiencing any alleviation of their own burthens, would have only such consolation as might be derived from the conviction that they had assisted to extort from their fellow citizens in other States, large amounts of their means, not needed for the purposes of their governments, and therefore destined to be wasted in extravagant projects of improvement, or on objects even less advantageous. Besides, no article of the Federal Constitution, even by the most forced construction, can be called in aid of