their duty. No one will deny that corporations are subject to law, yet they are daily permitted to violate it with impunity. So emboldened have they become by a legislative tolerance of their past omissions, that they assume the arrogant and contemptuous tone of a master, and boldly question the power of the legislature to interfere with their concerns. The safety of all demands that they should be made to succumb;—that they will be, eventually, is not questioned. The approach of this period should be accelerated by prompt and efficient legislation. With this view your committee have prepared a bill, making it obligatory on the banks to resume specie payments on or before the first of July next, and providing an effectual remedy against them in the event of their refusal to do so. The act of assembly of 1818 is by express provision applicable to the charters of the several banks of this State. This act was designed, and has always been understood as giving a remedy against the banks. This remedy can be altered without trenching upon the chartered rights of banks. It is proposed to alter it, so as to make it the imperative duty of the courts to decide upon an ascertained statement of facts in a particular and uniform manner. As the law now stands under the act of 1818, the judges are to determine what shall be the law as to the banks. This is not properly their duty. They should have no discretion, but be compelled to decide in a certain way, when certain facts are ascertained. That the Legislature have the right to alter the remedy as proposed, is clear to the mind of the committee. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Sturges vs. Crowninshield, say, "the distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the Legislature to enforce that obligation, exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy certainly may be modified as the wisdom of the nation may direct." In the Bank of Columbia vs. Okely, they say, that a summary power of judgment and execution granted to the Bank in its *charter*, is a mere remedial process provided by the legislature, and may be withdrawn or modified at its pleasure. This is their language.—"We attach no importance to the idea of this being a chartered right in the Bank. It is the *remedy* and not the right, and as such *we have no doubt* of its being subject to the will of Congress—the forms of administering justice and the DUTIES and POWERS of courts as incident to the exercise of a branch of sovereign power, must ever be subject to *legislative will*, and the power over them is *unalienable* so as to bind subsequent legislatures." In Young vs. The Bank of Alexandria, a similar power had been conferred upon that bank, and without appeal, by the Legislature of Virginia.

When Alexandria was ceded to the General Government, the rights of this corporation were expressly reserved as free from alteration by Congress, but notwithstanding this, the Supreme Court held that the law of Congress was competent to give an