

tinue for some time, that from various causes they would be eagerly pressed upon the English market, and that the demand for capital in England would not immediately cease.

At the same time I believed that the state of the English market would gradually improve. The crops of grain were sufficiently large to prevent any material importations, and it was probable that in the course of the winter and spring, they would recover a sufficient amount of gold to place the bank at her ease. I may here observe, that subsequent events have gone as far as could be so soon expected, to justify these anticipations.

It, therefore, became important, in my view while I abstained from introducing the bonds into the market, to place them in a train of sale when circumstances should render it expedient.

I could not doubt that this would be best effected by an agency of such ability, character, and influence as would elevate the credit of the State, and, in the event of sale, procure the best price for the securities. It appeared to me, that, in the existing competition among the holders and sellers of American stocks,—likely rather to increase than diminish,—every consideration required that the Maryland bonds should be in the hands of competent agents, capable, in the first improvement, of ensuring them a ready sale at good prices.

I deemed it of no less importance to secure the option of moderate advances in anticipation of sales, in case the exigencies of the company should absolutely require their use. I did not anticipate an early necessity of using such option. On the contrary, looking to a reasonable payment of the city subscription, I considered the necessity of resorting to the option as a remote one, and I acted with a view of rendering it more so. I mainly desired, by obtaining from a house so eminent for its caution and sagacity, such an expression of confidence in the credit of the State and the value of the bonds, as the agreement to make advances upon them in a crisis so discouraging would imply, to separate the bonds in my hands from the general mass of discredited securities. The effect of the arrangement, so far as it regards this object, was quite apparent before I left England, and has been further evinced by subsequent events.

So far as the option of using the advances was designed to subserve unforeseen exigencies of the company, it was guarded with every reasonable precaution.

By the contract, the advances cannot be demanded until the month of March next, by which period it was hoped that sales to a moderate amount might be effected, so as entirely to dispense with them.

If demanded after that period, they cannot exceed fifty thousand dollars a month, and not more than two hundred thousand dollars in the whole, at any one time. The bills must be drawn at sixty days, and no part of the bonds can be sold to cover them at less than the company's limits, until the bills for the entire amount drawn, shall fall due. If, therefore, the drafts should com-