

"Sixth. If Congress have not the power, it is annihilated for the nation; a policy without example in any other nation, and not within the reason of the solitary one of our own.

"Seventh. If revenue be the sole object of a legitimate impost, and the encouragement of domestic articles be not within the power of regulating trade, it would follow that no monopolizing or unequal regulations of foreign nations could be counteracted.

"Eighth. That the encouragement of manufactures, was an object of the power to regulate trade, is proved by the use made of the power for that object, in the first session of the first Congress, under the constitution; when among the members present, were so many who had been members of the Federal Convention, which framed the constitution, and of the State Conventions, which ratified it."

"A further evidence in support of the constitutional power, to protect and foster manufactures by regulations of trade, an evidence that ought of itself to settle the question, is the uniform and practical sanction given to the power by the general government for nearly forty years; with a concurrence or acquiescence of every state government, throughout the same period; and it may be added through all the vicissitudes of party, which marked the period."

That a large majority of Union has hitherto approved the particular exercise of the power now in question, and complained of by South Carolina, will not be denied. A large majority of the Union believes such an exercise of power, necessary to the prosperity of the whole.

The General Assembly of Kentucky cannot admit the right of a minority, either of the states or of the people, to set up their opinion not only in opposition, but to overrule that of the majority. And it cannot but view with regret and surprise, the assertion of the state of South Carolina—"That the measures to be pursued, consequent on the perseverance in this system, are purely questions of expediency, and not of allegiance." The consequences of such a principle, if practically enforced, would be alarming in the extreme. Scarcely any important measure of the general government is ever adopted, to which one or more of the states are not opposed. If one state have a right to obstruct and defeat the execution of a law of Congress, because it deems it unconstitutional, then every state has a similar right. When the dissatisfied state opposes to the act of Congress its measures of obstruction, the alternative is presented,