settled that the moment a s'ave, whether African, Indian, Jew or Gentile, sets his foot upon British soil, he is a freeman, and entitled to the protection of the laws as such."

And you will find that he quotes numerous authorities, to which my time will not allow me to refer.

Then if the gentleman will come back to the decisions of our own Court of Appeals, and look at a case in 4 Harris and McHenry, he will find there that not only was there an elaborate argument upon the part of distinguished lawyers of that day, among whom was Mr. Ridgely, Luther Martin, and others, laying down this same principle; but, taking up negro slavery from the time it was first established, and all other kinds of slavery down to the time when those cases were argued, which was in 1799, he will find that Judge Chase, after reviewing the arguments of the several counsel in that case, makes use of this language.

"Every villein is by prescription or confession in a court of record. *Co. Litt.* 117 b. The last confession of villeinage extant is in the 19 *Hen. VI.* (1441)—*Lofft*. 17, Lord Mansfield's opinion. In the time of Edward VI. (who was crowned in 1547) there was not a villein in gross in England. 2 *Blk*. 96. Charles was crowned in 1625—the charter of Maryland was in the 8th Charles (1633.) The laws relating to villeins do not respect this case, nor can they have any influence in deciding it. Joice, the ancestor of the petitioner, was emancipated as soon as she was brought to England, and her condition was changed from that of slavery into servitude for life; and when she was brought into Maryland by Lord Baltimore, she was only a servant, and the laws concerning slaves did not attach on her, and slavery was not resumed by her coming here, and consequently her issue are free. The numerous acts of parliament respecting the African trade being founded on policy, and having in view the transportation of negroes from Africa to the West Indies and the plantations, never contemplated the bringing slaves to England; and however inconsistent the parliament might be in sanctioning and promoting that inhuman and iniquitous commerce, and not protecting and securing the rights and property acquired under them in their fullest extent, they did not, they could not operate to change the common law of England, and to tolerate slavery in that country. In 2 *Salkeld*, 666, the decision by Lord Holt, chief justice, is full in point. It is not a new dictum, but a determination of the question before the court. Holt held, that as soon as a negro comes into England, he becomes free. One may be a villein in England, but not a slave. He directed the counsel to amend the declaration, and to declare that the negro was in Virginia at the time of the sale; and that by the laws of Virginia negroes were saleable as chattels. If they had been considered as property and saleable by the laws of England, the sale would have been valid if made there. In 2 *Salk*. 667 (Smith *vs.* Gould) *per curiam*—men may be the owners, but cannot be the subject of property by the law of England."

Now, I consider that these two authorities, if there were no others, both of them the authorities of slave States, one an authority from perhaps the most thorough-going slave State now in rebellion against the government of the United States, deciding that the common law of England did not recognize property in a negro slave, and the other the Court of Appeals of our own State. I consider these two authorities as amply sufficient to dispose of this whole question.

And suppose them to be true, what do they mean? They mean just exactly this; that when Lord Baltimore received his charter from king Charles II, this remarkable passage occurred in that charter; the charter is found in the second volume of Bozman's History of Maryland, at page 41. That charter gives Lord Baltimore power to make laws and ordinances for the government of the province, and in the concluding part of the paragraph it says:

"Which ordinances we will to be inviolably observed within the said province, under the pains to be expressed in the same, so that the said ordinances be consonant to reason, and be not repugnant nor contrary, but (so far as conveniently may be done) agreeable to the laws, statutes, or rights of our kingdom of England; and so that the same ordinances do not, in any sort, extend to oblige, bind, charge, or take away the right or interest of any person or persons, of or in member, freehold, goods or chattels."

That was the charter given by king Charles II to Lord Baltimore, when he settled Maryland. He carried with him the common law of England; and that common law declared that no slave could exist under it. And when the province of Maryland, in 1715, passed a law reducing a human being to slavery, that not only violated divine law, and human law, and national law, but it violated the common law of England, and the express terms of the grant made in the charter given by king Charles II to Lord Baltimore. If that be true, then I say that from 1715 down to the present time, the slaveholders of Maryland have banded themselves together under a false law for the purpose of keeping the negro race in bondage, and depriving them not only of their liberty, but of that property which they had in themselves, and which nature's God gave them. That right of property which existed in themselves at the time of their creation, at the time when God Almighty made all men equally free, was taken from them by the slaveholders of Maryland in 1715 against the common law of England,