Nor is there any force in supposed precedents; unless the restrictions of our constitution are shown to be similar to those of the State, whose action is cited as an example for our guidance. Our Bill of Rights is part and parcel of the constitution as decided by the court of appeals, in Crane vs. Maginnis, 1st Gill & Johnson, 471, and the same case decides that the Bill of Rights is an emanation from the will of the people in their sovereign capacity. This supreme law, therefore, ought to stand fixed and immoveable, until the same people shall think proper to change it. No power short of the people or their duly authorised agents, can alter or abolish the organic law prescribed by that people, and it is because the undersigned regards the voice and will of the people as *omnipotent and supreme*, that he appeals to the unaltered organic law, which is the solemn manifestation of the popular will.

The people have said in the sixth section of the Bill of Rights, that the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the government should be forever separate and distinct from each other. And Mr. Madison, has said in the Federalist, that the separation of these powers in the Maryland constitution is more clear and explicit than in that of any other State. And the same people have said in the 30th article of the Bill of Rights, that "no chancellor or judge ought to hold any other office, civil or military, or receive fees or perquisites of any kind;" and in the 32nd article, they have also said, that "no person ought, at the same time, to hold more than one office of profit."

These are the three articles particularly referred to the committee. Do they apply to the members of this Convention, if any be found within those disabilities? If this Convention is uncreated by pre-existing law—if it springs from the popular masses, as the offspring of revolution, uncontrolled by any law but the will of the people—and if that people, in their sovereign capacity, have willed and declared that these disabilities should not apply to members of this Convention, then there is an end of the question, and no test of qualification is to be found in any pre-existing law whatever. But the undersigned cannot so view this Convention. He regards it not as the fruit of popular rebellion against the established government, as it might have been,—not as a body which is beyond the pale of existing government, but as a body elected by electors qualified under pre-existing laws. As a body elected not upon the basis of popular numbers, but upon an artificial territorial basis, which derived from pre-existing government denies to numbers their legitimate power and control. As a body, in fact, where the sovereignty of the people, as shown in the rule of the majority, is wholly impotent to accomplish the dearest wishes of the popular heart, because an organized basis of representation, drawn from the old constitution, enables a minority of the people, through their representatives, to sway and control this Convention. If a proceeding like this, and resting upon such a basis, can be resolved into a popular revolution, then it will be the very first instance of