

illustrative of his position, and as descriptive of mine, he speaks of the gentleman from Frederick, (Mr. Thomas,) as my illustrious colleague, and reverberated the idea of "pride of opinion," "along side of Philip Barton Key." With regard to my allusion to Mr. Key, I have first to say, if I had the ambition to put myself in the ranks of great lawyers and great men, it would be gratified to its utmost measure by getting upon that elevated platform which Mr. Key had by common consent occupied. I referred more largely to Mr. Key's argument, not because there were not expressions in the arguments of other distinguished members quite as strong as those of Mr. Key, and not alone because his argument was more able and conclusive than others; but also because he was known to every body here, known from a personal intercourse with him by some, and known to others by the reputation he had justly acquired, and which was still cherished amongst the profession which he adorned. I need not say "the profession," for his character and standing were known to all.—But the gentleman says he acted in self defence. Well, the question is a simple, unmixed question of law—of Constitutional law. If the Constitution of the United States forbids the exercise of the power we are now asked to exercise, we are bound to refrain. It is the supreme law of this land over-riding our own Constitution and laws, and we have all of us on some occasions, and many of us on numerous occasions, solemnly appealed to the Searcher of hearts to witness our deliberate purpose to obey and respect it. Now, sir, I am at a loss to comprehend how, in a question whether we shall incorporate in the Constitution a provision contrary to the Constitution of the United States, any principle of self-defence is involved. Is an aggression upon the supreme law to be regarded in any way as self-defence? I believe the provision utterly at variance with that law to which I have sworn allegiance; can I violate that oath, and burden my conscience with the deep-stain of false swearing, because that gentleman or any other chooses to think it desirable for some supposed political advantage? What is the plain English of such an argument? Is it not this: here is a project suggested to secure a political advantage, but it is directly opposed to the Constitution of the United States, and we are solemnly bound by our oaths to support that Constitution; yet, in despite of this, we must sustain the proposition? Sir, as an Eastern Shore man, I go for no claim—I want to have none preferred which cannot be sustained without a violation of both constitutional and moral law. I say the argument does amount to this, because the moment the question of constitutional power is abandoned as untenable, and reliance is had upon any notions of expediency, it concedes the violation of the Constitution, and, of necessity, the violation of the oath. And, forsooth, for not doing this, my devotion to my country is to be impeached? Sir, no man on this floor can say with truth, that I have been recreant to the just claims of my Shore. While I have a heart to feel and a voice to express that feeling, every energy of soul and body shall be exerted to protect her just rights; but I will not load my conscience with the weight of a

deadly sin—the sin of perjury, to pursue what are not her rights.

And am I for this to have my attachment doubted? Sir, it is the spot of all on earth most dear to my affections. 'Tis there my first breath was drawn; 'tis there I have been nourished and cherished, for a life of three score years and more; mingled with its soil are the ashes of my sainted parents and ancestors; there lie the mortal remains of my children, in the silent sleep of the tomb, and there, by the side of these loved objects, I hope to find a resting place for all that is human of this frail tenement, when its immortal inmate shall have taken its flight, and left it to moulder with its mother earth. I love my home! my native home! Yes, sir; I love it from the very core of my heart, and ever shall, until that heart shall cease to pulsate; and this let no man doubt or deny.

Mr. Hicks said, he rose for the purpose of reminding the gentleman from Kent (Mr. Chambers) that in the outset of his (Mr. H's) remarks, he disclaimed any design to discuss the constitutionality of this question. He said, however, that he intended to speak to the reasonableness of the proposition, as he had a perfect right to do. He was to examine it on the common sense ground. And he said so yet. Although doctors were said to disagree, and lawyers, he knew, did disagree, he must confess he felt the force of the remarks of the gentleman from Prince George's, (Mr. Bowie;) and with the constitution on that subject, he would leave gentlemen to entertain their own views, without pledging himself to pronounce any just judgment of his upon the constitutionality. He never intended to impute any improper motive—any want of regard or affection on the part of the gentleman for the Eastern Shore. He should have been one of the last men to do that. But, as the gentleman from Kent happened to find himself connected with the gentleman from Frederick, (Mr. Thomas,) he must share the fate of those who keep bad company; and not being a lawyer himself—not understanding special pleadings—was obliged to take a plain, straight-forward course, and if the gentleman desired to compare with L. Martin, the Howards, or Barton Key, or others, he (Mr. H.) had no such pride, but professed to have some judgment, and he could and would exercise that judgment in relation to his duties here; and he would discharge them fearlessly, independently and honestly. He felt that he had a conscience, too, and he knew, as well as the honorable gentleman did, that he was responsible to God, and responsible to his fellow men. He would never have dreamt of intimating to his honorable friend from Kent that he had been derelict in his attachment to the Eastern Shore, for he knew he was a much more able advocate of the Eastern Shore interests than he (Mr. H.) was. But, taking a common sense view of the subject, he believed it was just as competent for this Convention to district the State for United States Senators as it was for members of Congress. He did not believe that the Constitution of the United States required that they should elect a United States Senator from Baltimore or Kent. By the by, they had been very lucky in