

per distinction between the free and slave portions of our population.

It has been said that this rule has no application to the internal affairs of our State. The objection is unfounded. There are as many reasons to recommend it in our system, as in the Constitution of the United States. By the census of 1840, there was in North Carolina one slave to about one and three-fourths freemen. In Arkansas, one to five freemen. In New Jersey, one slave to about thirty freemen, and so on, throughout all degrees of inequality. It was to this variety in classes of population, and to the double character of slaves as property and persons, that the rule of federal numbers is owing. With this interpretation, let us consider the case presented by the counties and city of Baltimore. Allegany has one slave to every thirty freemen. Anne Arundel one to every two freemen. In Calvert the classes are nearly equal. In Cecil there is one slave to every twenty-two freemen. In Prince George's the slaves are most numerous. In Frederick they are as one to twelve. In Carroll about one to twenty. In Washington as one to fifteen. In Somerset as one to three. In Baltimore city as one to about seventy-five. It will be at once seen, therefore, that all the questions which agitated the Federal Congress, and the Convention of 1787 are presented in this State.

In other States the principle of federal numbers has not been considered as applicable only to our relations to the general government; but has been adopted as a corrective to the irregularities in the distribution of the slave population. And the view is wisely taken. In the Convention of 1787, the several States were persuaded of the necessity of altering the rule of equality under the old confederation, and of making just allowance for difference in population in one branch of the National Legislature. It seems to me that the delegates from counties, which are united by a common bond, and are possessed in a great degree of a common interest, ought cheerfully to acquiesce in a rule adopted by communities differing in climate, soil, locality, and products, and in the whole character of their population.

The analogy presented to the relative condition of the states of our whole confederacy is more manifest when sections of the state are compared with each other. The counties of Allegany, Carroll, Washington, Cecil, Frederick and Caroline, with Baltimore city, have a slave population of only 12,300, out of a gross population of 312,890, which is more than one half of the population of the state. While the remaining counties have a slave population of 78,256, out of a gross population of 270,126. If federal numbers are not adopted, the counties first named acquire an increase in their representative number of 4920 only, and the latter of 30,302; so, it will be seen, that a computation of gross numbers, is manifestly injurious to the interest of those sections which have a large free population.

The abandonment of federal numbers also is not only a departure from the compromise of 1836, but it is inconsistent with the previous

opinions of the gentleman who has introduced this proposition. In 1808, he was a member of the House of Delegates, from the city of Baltimore. A bill had passed the House changing the Constitution of the Senate. It was returned with several amendments, among which was one giving one delegate in the lower House, for every five thousand "*federal numbers*," and the amendment containing this feature, received the support of the gentleman from Anne Arundel.* Then if federal numbers were acceptable to him when the free population of the State bore a less proportion than at present to the gross number, I am at loss to know what process of reasoning has altered his opinions.

It must be remembered also that the practice of all the Southern States has reprobated the idea of reckoning the slaves and free men as standing upon an equality in any computation of representative numbers. Nor is there any thing in our situation which requires the introduction of a theory so novel and injurious. Much indeed has been said with reference to the unequal distribution of slave property, and of the consequences properly following upon such a circumstance. But other states, more southern in position, more deeply interested in the institution itself—with more unequal interests—have set us an example which leaves no room for this species of argument.

The example of Virginia is a profitable study. In the old Constitution, adopted in 1776, the legislature was composed of a Senate and House of Delegate. In the first, the counties were arranged in districts, and in the second, each county had two delegates, and each city or borough one. The plan for this lower House was identical with that fixed by the law of 1716 in this state, with the difference only that it gave *four* to each county, and *two* to each city, or borough, then existing, or which should be created.

In 1829, the slave population east of the Ridge, (which is the line of division between the great interests of the State,) was 390,000, and the white 362,745. West of the Ridge, the slave population was 50,000 only, and the white 319,516. Eastern Virginia, however, paid *three-fourths* of the taxation of the State. The forty counties which lay west of the Ridge, drew from the treasury, more than they paid into it, (Virg. Deb. p. 112.) This immense disproportion was of serious moment in the distribution of political power. If the slaves of Eastern Virginia had been reckoned in gross, it would have possessed an aggregate representative population of 652,745, to oppose to an aggregate in Western Virginia of only 369,516. But if the *white* population only were considered, the two districts stood nearly upon an equality.

If population had remained in the position which it occupied in 1829, the East, with a white or federal basis, would have maintained the

* Proceed. H. of D. 19 Jan. 1808. The amendment is printed in an appendix. The bill and amendments were published by order of the House of the date above.