

increase of antagonist power and a fearful decrease of our own. how can we regard the Senate as a protection?

He thought the best and only protection for their political rights was to continue in their own hands all the political power they have. He had no faith in the ultra generosity which was willing to surrender a portion of its political power by a community. He believed such a thing never did occur, unless an equivalent in some other form was expected.

He was not disposed to repeat, what he had so often said, as to the imputed injustice to the large counties—and especially as to the city of Baltimore.

Experience growing out of the increase in their representation in 1836, had proved that it only occasioned still further extension of their demands. This Convention was one of its fruits. How or why we were to avoid another Convention, or "peaceful revolution," or some movement by whatsoever name it might assume, when this representation now proposed, should so materially increase their strength, he could not perceive.

He had no faith in any voluntary forbearance when the power was given them for further aggression. The city of Baltimore, with a representation not larger than the largest county, would still have an immense influence in the legislature—an influence fully equal to what she was entitled to exert.

Gentlemen talked here very strongly about representing a hundred and seventy thousand souls. How, he asked, is the fact? How many of these are voters? How many can claim to be citizens even? And of these, how many have no permanent interest there, and have not even a permanent residence? Again, of the number who had any claim to be represented, it must be remembered, that a large portion were not, in fact, represented either now, by the members on this floor from that city, or habitually in the legislature by the delegates elected. A very large portion differed with these representatives on most important and vital political questions and in so far were *misrepresented*.

The same was the case in some of the largest counties. Take Frederick for example, where the political parties were about equally divided. Now, if the whole number of votes cast should be ten thousand one hundred, and of these, there should be five thousand who expressed an unwillingness to be represented by a particular individual, they would neutralize that number of antagonist votes, and the member might be considered as representing but the excess—the one hundred.

Take, on the contrary, a smaller county where political opinion being almost entirely one way, the member had received nearly an unanimous vote, it could not properly be said that the constituency represented by these different members was to be determined by the proportion of the aggregate number of voters in their respective districts. If it should be said they represented each individual, then he would retort the question, why should

one individual in Baltimore be represented by ten delegates, and an individual in Kent by two only? There was no equality in this. You allow my neighbor to vote for ten members of the Legislature and allow me to vote for but two, and call this equality! No, no! That won't do. Well, if it be said these members represent communities, including all persons within certain geographical limits, to this he assented. They do represent communities—one set of them represent the city and the others represent the counties, and each county, being a separate and distinct community, is entitled to its separate and equal representation. This was exactly the primitive creed—the primitive practice and the true orthodox creed and practice. It was under this system the State had been exalted to its high condition of physical, moral and intellectual advancement—it was under this system that the city of Baltimore had made such gigantic strides to commercial wealth and eminence. That was the mode of distributing political power, by pursuing which we had made Maryland what she is. It was not by adopting and practising upon a false theory—the universal truth of political dogmas—broad and unqualified general principles—which, practically, are not true.

We hear much about the perfect, complete equality of political rights—we hear it—but do we see it? Is it *practically* so, that one man and every man, is politically equal to any other? Nay, can you by any human means make him so? If so: if one man, in a political sense, is equal to another, he has, or ought to have, as much political control in the affairs of government. Is this the case? Do we not daily see one man control ten, twenty, thirty, fifty voters? Are these voters thus controlled, each of them exercising the same influence on the government as the one who controls their votes? Station, intelligence, reputation, wealth and other accidental adventitious causes will, and do, and must make, as they always have made men unequal. You may impose all the restraints you can upon one class, grant all the indulgencies you please to the other, the inexorable law of human existence will render your legislation nugatory. Why, what is daily before our eyes—seen by us all? Are we all equal here, in political influence and control? We all have the same source of political being—we are all elected as members entitled to the same political power, we each give a single vote, on a question, and each vote counts alike. No human legislation can do more to give us equal political control here, and yet how is the fact? Is it not, that some experienced, intelligent members, long and favorably known as possessing the confidence of their political friends, can and do exert an influence upon others which the rest of us never may dare to look for? Certainly it is, and must be so, and should be so. Wise and judicious counsels should guide those of us who, though not able to make a way, may walk in it when discovered for us.

Now, in all this, let the city of Baltimore be considered as completely answered, when she complains of the small number, comparatively,