Winter 2003

MARYLAND
Historical Magazine

The *Maryland Historical Magazine* welcomes submissions from authors and letters to the editor. Letters may be edited for space and clarity. All articles will be acknowledged, but only those accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope will be returned. Submissions should be printed or typed manuscript. Address Editor, *Maryland Historical Magazine,* 201 West Monument Street, Baltimore, Maryland, 21201. Include name, address, and daytime telephone number. Once accepted, articles should be on 3.5-inch disks (MS Word or PC convertible format), or CDs, or may be emailed to rcottom@mdhs.org. Guidelines for contributors are available on our Web site at www.mdhs.org.

ISSN 0025-4258
 Published as a benefit of membership in the Maryland Historical Society in March, June, September, and December. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life.* Periodicals postage paid at Baltimore, Maryland and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: please send address changes to the Maryland Historical Society, 201 West Monument Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201. Printed in the USA by The Sheridan Press, Hanover, Pennsylvania 17331. Individual subscriptions are $24.00. (Individual membership in the society with full benefits is $45.00, family membershp is $60.00.) Institutional subscriptions are $30.00 per year, prepaid.

MARYLAND
Historical Magazine

VOLUME 98, 4 (WINTER 2003)

CONTENTS

Smuggling Sotweed: Augustine Herrman and the Dutch Connection 389
WILLIAM G. DUVALL

"Far Short of Our Expectations":
Baltimore and the Atlantic World Trade in the Confederation Era 409
RICHARD S. CHEW

Spiro T. Agnew and Middle Ground Politics 441
JUSTIN P. COFFEY

Research Notes and Maryland Miscellany 456
Joseph E. Snodgrass and Freedom of the Press in Antebellum Maryland
by Elwood L. Bridner
A Tale of Two Park Plans: Olmsted's Vision for Baltimore and Seattle, 1903
by W. Edward Orser

Library Notices 484

Book Reviews 486
Meyers, *Common Whores, Vertuous Women, and Loveing Wives: Free Will Christian Women in Colonial Maryland,* by Elizabeth Crosman
Parent, *Foul Means: the Formation of a Slave Society in Virginia, 1660–1740,* by David Taft Terry
Glickstein, *American Exceptionalism, American Anxiety: Wages, Competition, and Degraded Labor in the Antebellum United States,* by James L. Huston
Penningroth, *The Claims of Kinfolk: African American Property and Community in the Nineteenth-Century American South,* by Elizabeth P. Stewart
Levy, *Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland,* by Tracy Miller
Fitzpatrick, *Gerald W. Johnson: From Southern Liberal to National Conscience,* by Maureen H. Beasley
Hurt, ed., *African American Life in the Rural South, 1900–1950,* by Lester P. Lee Jr.

Letters to the Editor 498

Notices 499

Index to Volume 98 502

Editor's Notebook

Just a Cigar

Sometimes history is moved by the smallest things—the equivalent of the butterfly in the Brazilian rain forest whose softly fluttering wings create the wind patterns that result in a hurricane. Take cigars, for example. Years of smoking cigars killed Ulysses S. Grant, who, before he died, left posterity what is widely hailed as the greatest memoir of the Civil War. Cigars were part of Mark Twain's impish image, and, who knows, perhaps inspiration. Inspired in the other direction was H. L. Mencken, who contemplated life in the cigar business and decided instead to dabble in newspaper work.

Then there is THE cigar, the one allegedly dropped by a careless gentleman (we presume), possibly on his way home from a saloon on the night of Saturday, February 6, 1904, or the wee hours of Sunday morning, the seventh. The terrible stub fell on the sidewalk around German and Liberty Streets, and, like the evil little thing that it was, found its way to a crack in a sidewalk deadlight that happened to illuminate the basement of the John E. Hurst & Co. dry goods firm. Through the crack it tumbled and slid, to alight on what dry good we can now only wonder. We only know that it smoldered alone in the dark for a time, before its sinister glow spread. By mid-morning smoke filled the basement and had risen to the fourth floor. Shortly before eleven the first alarms sounded. The neighborhood echoed with the sharp clatter of iron-shod fire horses and shouting firemen as the first companies deployed and broke into the building. Minutes later doors on the upper floors slammed shut. Firemen looked at one another and, sensing trouble, backed out of the building only minutes before a smoke explosion shattered the Sunday quiet across the city. Fiery embers and pieces of the Hurst Building exploded in every direction. For the next thirty hours, Baltimore's fire department, reinforced by companies from Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Harrisburg, Atlantic City, and all over Maryland fought for their lives. Businessmen emptied their shops. Neighbors rushed to help one another pack and evacuate. Newspapermen, chased from their buildings, got out the next morning's papers from offices in Washington. The fire raged all the way to the Jones Falls and the docks. By Monday afternoon, much of Baltimore, as its residents had known it, was gone.

The story of the Great Baltimore Fire of 1904 is told colorfully and well in a superb exhibition here at the Maryland Historical Society and in Peter B. Petersen's lively new history just issued by this press. Surely others, too, will publish, exhibit, and take walking tours as we honor Baltimore's courage and heart in the face of disaster. We will all be a little proud at what they did, and greatly amazed at the speed with which they rebuilt the city. We will acknowledge the wrongs of the

time, that not everyone could participate in the reconstruction—not African Americans at the height of Jim Crow, or Italian and Eastern European immigrants who were not yet entirely welcome in the rooms where power dealt wealth. We'll shake our heads at the mystery of the young mayor who took his own life.

As you enjoy this winter's journey through history we would leave you with one last thought. As Washington's influence edges ever northward and eastward, our corporations become branch offices, and our major newspaper teeters toward Chicago, let us not forget which city fought off the British, wrote the National Anthem, and rebuilt itself in just two years after somebody dropped a cigar. And we haven't even brought up "the greatest game ever played."

R.I.C.

Correction

On page 293 of the fall issue, in Dan Guzy's article, "Batteaux, Mills, and Fish Dams: . . ." we incorrectly printed the following: "Josias Thomson charged Harbaugh and Ragan with 'misconduct and mismanagement.'" The opposite is true. Harbaugh and Ragan made the charge against Thomson, which later was dropped. The editors regret the error, which occurred in our editing of the manuscript and not in the author's original draft.

Cover

View from the Water, 1904

The magnitude of the Great Baltimore Fire stunned the nation. In this photograph, taken from across the harbor probably on Monday afternoon, February 8, 1904, the fire has engulfed the waterfront. Within the roiling smoke, twenty-seven fire companies are battling desperately to halt it at the Jones Falls.

Over the next several years, tens of thousands of souvenirs and memorabilia, including books, postcards, goblets, lapel pins, medallions, and relics sifted from the debris circulated through the city and across the country. In September 1906 the city hosted a jubilee in celebration of their rapid and phenomenal progress in rebuilding the Burnt District. In less than two years, the area boasted new buildings, wider streets, modern lighting, and fire-proof construction. (Maryland Historical Society.)

P.D.A.

Augustine Herrman, Dutch immigrant and tobacco trader. (H. Arthur Stump Jr., Augustine Herrman, 1606–1686, Founder of Bohemia Manor 1661 *[Baltimore: Abrams Printing Company, 1929].)*

Smuggling Sotweed: Augustine Herrman and the Dutch Connection

WILLIAM G. DUVALL

In early spring 2003, two enterprising New York residents drove south to the Eastern Shore of Virginia, where they purchased significant quantities of cigarettes with the intent of transporting the merchandise back to New York. Cigarettes, priced $6.00 a pack higher in New York than in Virginia, provided ample economic incentive for the enterprise—notwithstanding the risks posed by its illegality. Maryland authorities were waiting north of the state line to confiscate the cargo, but all parties involved were probably unaware that this little drama replicated a pattern of tobacco trade that predates the republic itself by more than a hundred years.

In the spring of 1661, when the Delaware and Hudson River Valleys were under Dutch control, Maryland merchant, cartographer, and lord of Bohemia Manor, Augustine Herrman, noted that the groundwork had been laid for an audacious and ingenious effort to preserve and extend the thriving Dutch black market for Chesapeake tobacco. Herrman wrote to William Beeckman, the New Netherland vice director for the South (Delaware) River, that he had "discovered the most suitable place to carry on trade between here [the Bohemia River in Cecil County] and the South river." This is the story of how Herrman and his brother-in-law, Dr. George Hack, anticipating the coming English crackdown on the Dutch Chesapeake tobacco trade, crafted an effective means of evasion and circumvention with the vital participation and assistance of government and economic leaders in Virginia, Maryland, and New Amsterdam.

The foundation of the Chesapeake tobacco trade, and the increasingly significant Dutch participation in it, was laid in the third and fourth decades of the seventeenth century. At the beginning of the English Civil War, the European immigrant population in the Chesapeake and Delaware Bay regions was minuscule. The total Chesapeake population was approximately eight thousand, of which a mere six hundred lived in Maryland. The Delaware Swedish and Dutch settlements numbered no more than two hundred.[1]

Although the first reported Dutch trading ship appeared in Virginia in 1618, material growth of the Virginia tobacco trade did not occur until the mid-1620s, when tobacco began to fetch higher prices in London. In 1624, the English government granted the Virginia and Bermuda Companies exclusive rights to import

The author, a semi-retired attorney, lives in Salisbury, Maryland.

tobacco into England in exchange for customs revenue for the Crown. The market for Virginia tobacco grew in the 1620s without significant Dutch participation. Dutch efforts to get a foothold in the Chesapeake market were hampered by a paucity of local contacts. Experience in the fall of 1635 and spring of 1636 led David Petersen DeVries, a Dutch merchant mariner, to observe:

> Those who wish to trade here must keep a house here, and continue all the year, that he may be prepared, when the tobacco comes from the field, to seize it, if he would obtain his debts. It is thus the English do among themselves; so that there is no trade for us, unless there be an overplus of tobacco, or few English ships.[2]

The Dutch learned the lesson well and quickly. Whereas DeVries observed no non-English European ships trading in Virginia in 1635, eight years later he counted four Dutch ships in a total of thirty-four vessels. More significantly two Amsterdam merchants, Derrick and Arent Corsen Stam, moved themselves and their families to Virginia, patented land in 1638, and in 1640 exported more tobacco from Virginia than any single London merchant.[3]

The extent of the Dutch intrusion into the Virginia tobacco market sufficiently alarmed the English and attracted the attention of England's King Charles I. In 1637 the monarch ordered Virginia authorities to forbid trade with Dutch ships except in rare instances where a bond stipulated that the ship would deliver its cargo only to London. Virginia authorities, however, had already exhibited an unwillingness or inability to enforce such orders, and continued foreign participation in the Virginia trade led Charles to reiterate the royal edict in 1641.[4]

Eventually, the Dutch implemented the DeVries-inspired policy of placing their own people permanently in the colony and cultivated business relationships with Virginia's leaders. They particularly sought relationships with Englishmen who had spent time in Holland before immigrating to America, including many early seventeenth-century Puritans. By way of example, John Custis, of English origin but most recently a Rotterdam innkeeper, was a permanent resident of the Eastern Shore of Virginia by July 1640. Nonresident Dutch merchants employed county commissioners to act as their attorneys for debt-collection purposes. Some of these merchants became residents themselves and others became landowners and thus met the colony's trade requirements.[5]

The final factor in the Dutch pre–civil war buildup was the price activity of tobacco on the London market. As noted, relatively high wholesale prices prevailed in London in the early 1620s, but by 1637 sotweed glutted the market. The subsequent price drop led planters to use Dutch traders more often in an effort to realize higher returns.[6]

Maryland, settled twenty-seven years later than Virginia, came late to the

Chesapeake tobacco trade, and the colony's small population limited its initial participation. In contrast to the reluctance of the Virginia authorities to protect the English monopoly, Lord Baltimore imposed an export tax in 1638 on tobacco consigned to places other than England and Virginia. In 1643, Maryland prohibited the exportation of tobacco in non-English ships. A year later, with Dutch activity increasing and the Puritans in control, London merchants asked Parliament to bar the Dutch from Virginia.[7]

"It Shall be Free and Lawfull"

The English civil war disrupted that nation's shipping and provided opportunities for Dutch merchant shippers. The Indian wars of the mid-1640s afforded the Dutch additional advantages. The Dutch policy of courting local officials spanned the shipping network and included hiring Eastern Shore citizens to represent Dutch merchants and trading openly with Governor William Berkeley and his successor Richard Bennett.[8]

The Virginia Assembly specifically authorized trade with the Dutch in 1643. "It shall be free and lawfull for any merchant, factors, or others of the Dutch nation to import wares and merchandizes and to trade or traffique for the commoditys of the colony in any ship or shipps of their owne or belonging to the Netherland." All of the requisites for open defiance of British trade restrictions were in place, including the active participation of Virginia's local leaders, many of whom directly profited in partnership with the Dutch. Marylanders, however, remained obedient to English law, possibly because of Lord Baltimore's tenuous position as a Catholic, and imposed customs duties on Dutch vessels in 1649 and 1650.[9]

No area of Virginia was more attractive to the Dutch than the Eastern Shore peninsula. Settling there, beside English Puritans who had lived in Holland before coming to America, they constituted a formidable and significant group of inhabitants and traders. Dutch settlers forged commercial alliances with leading Eastern Shore Englishmen such as Nathaniel Littleton, Obedience Robins, and Stephen Charlton and enjoyed favored status with the county-level leaders. The relationship was not only profitable but led to a measure of protection during the forthcoming Dutch-English conflicts.[10]

As the war came to a close in the late 1640s, the Dutch trade approached its high point. By royal proclamation, act of Parliament, or pleas from the London merchant class, England had repeatedly sought to ban or severely restrict Dutch trade with the colonies—with only marginal success. The Virginia assembly openly condemned efforts by England to curtail it, and by December 1648, half the European vessels trading in Virginia were Dutch.[11]

That changed in 1649. The execution of Charles I that year marked the beginning of tighter English control. In the fall of 1650, the Long Parliament prohibited

trade with Virginia until the colony submitted to the Commonwealth of Oliver Cromwell. It also forbade foreign vessels from trading with the colonies and authorized the seizure of such vessels found in colonial waters. At least one Dutch vessel was seized in Virginia shortly thereafter. Maryland's position, a basic compliance with the law, was about to end. In the fall of 1649, Berkeley banished Richard Bennett, an active Puritan, and Maryland governor William Stone invited him to establish a settlement on the north shore of the Severn River. Two years later the Commonwealth ordered that Bennett replace Berkeley as governor of Virginia and in that position he brought, at least superficially, a higher level of enforcement of Virginia's rules. The first Navigation Act, passed in 1651, barred foreign ships from importing goods to Britain and intensified the conflict between the English and the Dutch. War broke out in June 1652 and the tightened security in the Chesapeake undoubtedly deterred, but did not eliminate, the Dutch trade.[12]

Dutch on the Chesapeake

Augustine Herrman, a native of Prague, had arrived in New Amsterdam on June 29, 1644, aboard the *Maid of Enckhuuysen* from Curacao. His early New Amsterdam mercantile activities were highly profitable, if scantily documented. His frequent travels back to Holland are evidenced by numerous powers of attorney for collection of Dutch debts. Records show that he received his first New Amsterdam land patent in 1647, and that same year he acted as attorney for his future mother-in-law, then in Holland, with respect to a dispute over legacies. He acquired thirty thousand acres of what is now South Amboy, New Jersey, a large portion of Yonkers, and lots on Manhattan Island. He experimented with the cultivation of indigo, served as an agent for an Amsterdam merchant firm, traded furs to Europe and slaves to Virginia, and imported European wines. He also coowned a privateer that preyed on Spanish shipping.[13]

In 1652, Herrman suffered severe losses in the tobacco trade after incurring the wrath, for political reasons, of Peter Stuyvesant, the West India Company's director of New Amsterdam. Bankrupt, Hermann was forced to make an assignment or the benefit of his creditors. Some charged that he attempted to defraud his creditors with transfers to his sister-in-law, Anna Hack, but in the spring of 1653 the court discharged him from his debts.[14]

Whatever Herrman's commercial activities may have been, no records exist to indicate that he had any personal or business relationship with residents of the Eastern Shore of Virginia, nor is he mentioned in any of the existing county court records prior to the arrival of the Hack family. Dr. George Hack, his wife, Anna, and his brother, Sephrin, took up residence sometime prior to January 1652 on the neck of land lying between Pungoteague and Nandua Creeks and filled Hermann's need for a Virginia presence.[15] Hack's and Herrman's wives were daughters of one

Casper Varlet (or Varleth), a "merchant of consequence" at Fort Good Hope on the Connecticut River as early as 1633, and George Hack, a Cologne-born physician, soon became a successful tobacco trader. The Hacks chose a site that provides a significant clue to the scope of the Hermann family's contemplated enterprise. With a depth of eleven feet, Pungoteague Creek was the deepest channel on the Eastern Shore bayside and one that permitted ships of oceangoing size to dock easily for loading. The site included a spit of land known to this day as Warehouse Point and had a protected deep-water inlet.[16]

Nevertheless, the timing of the Hacks' move to Virginia was less than propitious. Herrman's financial troubles in New Amsterdam led Stuyvesant to notify the Northampton County Court of the pending claims. The advent of the English-Dutch war in June, coupled with the takeover of Virginia's government by the Parliamentary commissioners, led to a decline in the fortunes of the Dutch tobacco traders. Notwithstanding his personal and family history of commercial alliances with the Dutch, Bennett, who owed his position as governor of the "Chesapeake plantations" to the London merchant class, mustered the Northampton militia and seized Dutch ships. Hack himself lost a ship to Edmund Scarburgh, a prominent Eastern Shore planter and trader, who successfully claimed it as a prize of war when Hack tried to recover it through the courts.[17] Allegations of Dutch-inspired Indian conspiracies and depredations inflamed passions, and the Eastern Shore Dutch complained to the county authorities of threats and acts of violence. Fortunately, the Northampton County commissioners remained loyal to their Dutch residents and certified their loyalty to the commonwealth government. Shortly after his arrival, Hack thought it desirable to distinguish himself from the Dutch and petitioned the county court to declare him a "High German."[18]

Swedes on the Delaware

Until the mid-1650s, Manhattan Island served as the center of Dutch operations. Fort Cassimer, controlled alternately by the Dutch and Swedes, stood on the western shore of the Delaware Bay. In August 1655, Peter Stuyvesant, with the timely and critical assistance of a man-of-war owned by the city of Amsterdam, broke Swedish control of the Delaware. The West India Company settled its debt to the city by granting it control of that portion of the Delaware lying south of Christina (Wilmington) and north of Bombay Hook, including, most importantly, Sandhoeck, soon to be renamed New Amstel.[19]

Little commerce between the Chesapeake and Delaware colonies took place before 1655. Settlers along the Delaware River were wary of English claims on the territory as evidenced in 1638 when the first Swedish settlement party lay at anchor for six and a half weeks in the Christina River and assessed possible conflict with the English.[20] In 1651, Governor Printz of New Sweden sent a delegation to Kent Island with a Susquehannock Indian guide to inquire about Maryland's

Herrman's tobacco network extended northward from the Virginia tidewater to the New York. (Stump, Herrman.*)*

claims on the Delaware. The governor's party was escorted to Providence on the Severn, where Commander Edward Lloyd told him at the conclusion of an apparently friendly nine-day visit that no such claims existed.[21]

Maryland's interest in the Delaware began to stir with the advent of the Puritan government and the Susquehannock Indian treaty of 1652. In March 1653, Governor Stone licensed Thomas Adams to trade with the Swedes on the river. In May 1654, Governor Johan Rising of New Sweden, newly arrived, instructed two Swedes traveling to Maryland for commercial reasons to demand the return of fugitive slaves. They carried with them letters to Richard Bennett, who with William Claiborne had been appointed Parliamentary commissioner over Maryland and Virginia, offering peace and friendship. Bennett, in turn, sent Kent County commissioner Thomas Ringgold to Christina to reciprocate. In June 1654, Maryland sent a delegation to New Sweden to assert Maryland's claims to land below the 40th parallel. Rising rejected the overture, together with Lloyd's arguments of original discovery and Lord Baltimore's grant. He countered the claim with a recitation of what he considered the "governing principles." These included possession by conquest or occupation of "deserted and desolate" land, donation by or purchase from the rightful owner, and continuous possession and occupation—to which "Lloyd answered not a word."[22]

The Sassafras River Land Rush

A number of forces coalesced in the late 1650s to encourage settlement of the Upper Chesapeake. Among these were stricter enforcement of the navigation laws, the treaty with the Susquehannocks in 1652, Bennett's renewed interest in com-

mercial opportunities to the north, consolidation of Dutch control of the Delaware River, the restoration of Lord Baltimore's proprietorship, and the "treaty" with Bennett in 1657. On November 30, 1657, a treaty between Baltimore and Bennett that restored control of the colony to the proprietor took effect. One of the terms of that agreement restored land patent rights to Bennett's followers—the same rights as those who had remained loyal to Lord Baltimore.[23] The principal grantees of early Upper Chesapeake patents included Philip Calvert, who had acquired the right to claim six thousand acres by grant from Lord Baltimore in November 1656. The Bennett family gained land (Bennett, his step-sons Nathaniel and George Utie, and in-laws George and Samuel Goldsmith) as did refugees from the Delaware River Swedish and Dutch settlements, and the Hack brothers. Only the Hacks had no known prior history with the area.[24]

The new year of 1659 witnessed the Sassafras River land rush. Nathaniel Utie, who lived on Spesutia Island, due west of the mouth of the Elk River, began acquiring parcels on the south side of the Sassafras in January. Delaware refugee Gottfried Harmer, a German who had come to New Sweden as a child, patented parcels on the north side of the Chesapeake that same month. His father-in-law accompanied him.[25] On February 10, 1659, Sephrin Hack received a patent for a parcel on the north side of the Sassafras River that he named Hackston. George Hack received his first Maryland patent for Anna Catharine Neck on the North East River on May 2 of that same year and filed his certificate of survey on July 20. Philip Calvert claimed one thousand acres on the north side of the Sassafras River that extended northward to the Bohemia—a transaction Hermann characterized as based on "an imaginary survey."[26]

Threatened by tightened enforcement of British restrictions, residual animosity from the English-Dutch war, and increased difficulties in shipping to non-English ports from established ports through the mouth of the Chesapeake, Dutch traders cast about for a viable alternative. Opportunities to reap the profits from successful smuggling depended upon the ability to make a quick exit from the Chesapeake at its northern terminus. The proximity of the Dutch-controlled Delaware Bay provided the obvious point of departure. The consolidation of Dutch control over New Amstel (New Castle) in 1655 provided a natural port and its proximity to the upper reaches of the Bohemia and Sassafras Rivers was inviting. It is clear that the patenting of land in 1658 and 1659 on the eastern shore of the upper Chesapeake was driven by trade prospects with the Dutch. Given the proximity of Utie's island of Spesutia to the Bohemia, Sassafras, and Elk Rivers, as well as his early patent activity on the upper Eastern Shore, the stage was set for a Utie-Herrman-Hack conflict. The Utie family's interests called for the ouster of the Dutch from the Delaware even though the Herrman-Hack forces needed the Dutch sanctuary to protect their contemplated smuggling activities.

Meanwhile, in the fall of 1659, the colony at New Amstel was falling on hard

times. Although its population had never exceeded three to four hundred people, losses from drought and pestilence, coupled with the loss of inhabitants, probably reduced the colony to no more than thirty families. Correspondence between the colony and Manhattan disclosed persistent problems of fleeing inhabitants, lack of food, and smuggling at the expense of the West India Company.[27] Then, in 1659, New Amstel began to pick up rumblings that the English were coming. Approximately a year earlier, Nathaniel Utie had been designated the commander of Lord Baltimore's northern regiment and received a patent for Spesutia Island. Multiple warnings were sent to Stuyvesant stressing that the settlement was in no position to defend itself. Rumors turned into fact on September 6, when a party led by Utie arrived in New Amstel and forcefully demanded the surrender of the settlement.[28]

Rumors flew fast and furious. A deserter from Maryland advised the Dutch that Utie was holding a force of five hundred at Spesutia ready for an attack. After ignoring the warnings through the summer of 1659, Stuyvesant suddenly reacted. He berated the Delaware leaders for not treating Utie more sternly and then, on September 22, dispatched a "military force" of sixty soldiers to South River. The next day he commissioned Herrman and Resolve Waldron as ambassadors to visit Maryland's governor Josias Fendall.[29] Stuyvesant was justifiably concerned. Notwithstanding the South River's orphan status in relation to Manhattan, it was a valuable buffer between the English settlements of the Chesapeake and the Dutch settlements in the Schuylkill Valley and the North (Hudson) River.

Herrman moved with alacrity. Utie's advance threatened his plans for a northern route out of the Chesapeake, plans predicated on Dutch control of nearby territory and navigable waters. These plans were well advanced, as evidenced by the Hack brothers' patent activity earlier in the year. Hermann left New Amstel on September 30 and kept a journal of his trip to St. Mary's, undertaken to fulfill his duties as anbassador. The ultimate goal was to defuse the Utie threat. The journal is sprinkled with hostile and derogatory remarks directed at Utie.[30]

This journal provides tantalizing clues of what Herrman envisioned for himself and his family. He apparently had little or no familiarity with the overland route west to the Elk, but his writings reveal a fairly detailed familiarity with place names and residents on both shores of the Chesapeake. Herrman also showed extensive familiarity with controversies concerning Dutch fugitives living on the Severn and the alleged role of Gottfried Harmer in enticing them there. He clearly knew Simon Overzee, a Dutch merchant, and apparently had made arrangements to stay with him while in St. Mary's.[31]

In Need of a Good Map

The journal and later correspondence also suggest that where to establish a portage route between the Delaware and Chesapeake puzzled Herrman, as it did

The Sassafras River, center, served as a critical waterway for the colonial tobacco traders. (Detail from Augustine Herrman's map, 1670, Maryland Historical Society.)

Philip Calvert. He and Calvert discussed a "large hill" lying east of the Sassafras, apparently located in what is now Blackbird State Park in Delaware, and implied that it stood as a significant obstacle. The scope of his expectations is also revealed in his observation that the Sassafras would be the navigable northern point for large ships. Hackston and Harmar's adjacent parcels, secured with early land patents on the north shore of the Sassafras, confirm that analysis.[32]

The events of October 12, 1659, suggest the origin of Herrman's idea for the map that subsequently made him famous. Herrman recorded that at the midday meal at Philip Calvert's house, "the minister, Mr. Doughty, accidentally dropped in." Doughty, already acquainted with Herrman, brought maps that Herrman believed inaccurately depicted the northern Chesapeake. The maps showed the bay skewed to the northeast, to the perceived detriment of the Dutch. The alleged error provoked a long discussion that drew on the extensive historical knowledge of both parties.[33] Herrman's journal lacks any mention of his forthcoming map, and it was not until his report to Stuyvesant that he broached the idea. That report, written in St. Mary's at the conclusion of the visit, makes it abundantly clear that although Herrman's first loyalty was undoubtedly to himself, his secondary allegiance was to New Amsterdam and not Maryland. He wrote, in part:

> Public service and your Honor's reputation require that I proceed hence to Virginia to the Governor there, to communicate the state of affairs in your Honor's name, and to inform and prevail so far on him, in opposition to the action of Maryland, if he will not take our part, that he will not oppose us,



Augustine Herrman's map, 1670. (Maryland Historical Society.)

> but if it cannot be otherwise, that he at least will remain neutral and our confirmed friend.

He also attempted, unsuccessfully, to engage Stuyvesant's interest in a proposed map.

> But, first of all, the South River and the Virginias, with the lands and kils [rivers or creeks] between them both, ought to be laid down on an exact scale as to longitude and latitude, in a perfect map, that the extent of country on both sides may be correctly seen, and the work afterwards proceeded with, for some maps the English have here are utterly imperfect and prejudicial to us.[34]

Lastly, he recommended arming the South River forts and reported that although he observed no preparations for invasion, a "sleeping enemy is not to be trusted."[35] He then advised that he was off to Virginia to assure, at a minimum, that colony's neutrality in the Maryland dispute, "to try to provoke a diversion"

between the Chesapeake colonies, and to disabuse Virginia of rumors that the Dutch were provoking the Indians against the English. His wife sailed to Jamestown in late 1659 and joined him for the winter.[36]

While he spent the winter of 1659–60 in Virginia visiting and adjusting his accounts with the Hacks, Hermann helped Nicholas Varlet (Anna Hack's brother) negotiate a New Netherland treaty of free trade with Virginia through the recently reinstalled Governor Berkeley. He also found time to sail to Curaçao. His activities in Maryland also increased. As a "foreigner" he was authorized to own land and had subsequently filed suit in Maryland by February 1660.[37]

Virginia's relationship with New Netherland remained ambiguous. Despite the new treaty the assembly reenacted its discriminatory export duty (applicable only to foreign ships) in March 1660 and at the same time passed statutes that implemented the agreement's provisions. The discriminatory export tax was repealed in 1661 for Dutch who paid for tobacco with slaves, but the Navigation Act of 1660 substantially tightened British control of colonial exports and effectively closed the colonial trade to non-English ships. The act required that exports be shipped exclusively to England and its territories. Smuggling was now the only way by which the Virginia trade with New Netherland, and directly with Holland, could continue. Although Virginia's dual policy with respect to the Dutch did not, on the surface, seem to concern Maryland's government, subsequent events demonstrated that the colony's leaders were anxious to join their Virginia brethren in pursuing personal profit through defiance of the English Navigation Acts.[38] Controversy quieted down until the spring of 1661, when the murder of Sephrin Hack and three others ignited a flurry of charges that the Dutch were providing sanctuary for the perpetrators.[39] Herrman, who was in Maryland at the time, wrote Beeckman that he had, discovered the most suitable place to carry on trade between here and South River:

> we shall be able to go overland to the Sandhoeck (New Amstel) in one half day, and also have a wagon road, because the Micquas Kill and the aforesaid Bohemia River come within one mile of one another. As a result, one shall soon be able to traffic by water, which will be of service to the inhabitants and an encouragement to New Netherland.[40]

Herrman wrote his letter to Beeckman while attending a meeting of the Maryland Council on Spesutia Island at which the Council considered a letter from Lord Baltimore authorizing a military force against the Dutch below the 40th parallel. Those in the Maryland colony did not share their proprietor's enthusiasm for the venture and were undoubtedly influenced by Herrman. Calvert speculated that New Amstel might not be below the 40th parallel and, more accurately, that he could expect no help from the English of Virginia and New England. The

"Dutch Trade [was] the Darling of the People of Virginea as well as this Province and indeed all other Plantacions of the English," he told the council.[41] The Bohemia-Appoquinimink route between the Chesapeake and the Delaware Bays roughly followed an Indian trail of long standing that had serviced travel from the Susquehanna to the Delaware Bay for many years.

Negotiating Peace

Alexander D'Hinojossa, a freewheeling adventurer with experience in Brazil with the West India Company, had assumed command of the city colony at New Amstel in the fall of 1659. The tensions created by the murder of Sephrin Hack and his colleagues provided what can only be characterized as a pretext for a commercial rapprochement between D'Hinojossa and Philip Calvert's Maryland forces. Beeckman wrote to Stuyvesant that a meeting between Calvert and D'Hinojossa at Appoquinimink occurred when on September 13, 1661, D'Hinojossa sent Peter Alrichs and two Indian chiefs to Maryland to "negotiate a peace." The chiefs deserted immediately. Alrichs proceeded alone to Spesutia and returned to New Amstel with Philip Calvert and a delegation the following week.

The only Indian chief who appeared came from east of the Delaware Bay, an area identified by the Dutch as the vicinity of Passajonck, north of present-day Camden, New Jersey. The entire party retired to "Apoquenemigh," where "another stream . . . empties into the English river" (the eastern terminus of the Bohemia River). Here Calvert "made peace with the aforesaid chief and made merry with D'Hinojossa." The English "offered to transport yearly 2 or 3000 hogsheads of tobacco to our stream or Apoquenemingh, if they were supplied with Negroes and other merchandise."[42] The summary of the meeting found in the *Archives of Maryland* contains no hint of any purpose or activity other than the peace treaty. It attributes the murder of Sephrin Hack and his companions to the Passajonck tribe but does not link this episode to other Maryland complaints of Indian depredations on the Patapsco and points north. The terms of the treaty, which are not set forth in the Beeckman letter, gave the Indians virtually nothing, save a "Matchcoate" for each returned English fugitive.[43]

Although he probably was not yet aware of it, Philip Calvert's tenure as governor was about to terminate in favor of Lord Baltimore's young son, Charles Calvert, who was in St. Mary's by November 28, 1661. Charles Calvert wasted little time before issuing a proclamation that called for stepped-up enforcement of the Navigation Acts and noted their widespread avoidance and evasion. Maryland also enacted its first colony-wide port duty in 1662.[44]

The crackdown was not confined to Maryland. In Virginia, Berkeley was ordered to account for all exports and detail the name, destination, and master of each ship departing from the colony with tobacco. These measures were part of a series of Restoration policies that were more tightly enforced than the interreg-

num laws, primarily because the English decided to make colonial governors personally responsible for enforcing the laws. Although no enforcement measures could effectively curtail the smuggling of small, isolated cargoes, the effect on trade as contemplated by Herrman and Hack was predictable and contributed to the prospects for the Herrman-Hack northern smuggling enterprise.[45]

Herrman reaffirmed his opinion that Bohemia Manor was "the ideal place." He applied for and received a patent for the tract in 1662 and on it built a dwelling just west of the present-day bridge of Route 213, at a point where the river narrows before splitting into two branches just to the east. The point of land on the southern shore directly across the river is known to this day as Hack's Point. The site is commercially and militarily significant.[46]

D'Hinojossa stood behind no one in his use of public authority to pursue private profit. The burgomasters of Amsterdam appointed him to lead the city colony in the fall of 1660, and by the spring of 1662 reports that he was selling off city assets for personal gain were quite common.

Stuyvesant was advised that city property was being conveyed to Marylanders in exchange for tobacco, and was asked permission by Andries Hudde, the West India Company's commissary on the Delaware, to impound the tobacco in Maryland in an effort to thwart the scheme. Two days later Beeckman advised Stuyvesant that D'Hinojossa had stripped his fort of palisades "to burn under his brew kettle" and sold muskets to the Indians and millstones to the Marylanders for tobacco. Again, in October, Beeckman advised that D'Hinojossa had sold a galliot for fourteen hogsheads of tobacco and forty oxen and cows.[47]

It was widely believed in the Dutch colony, apparently with good reason, that D'Hinojossa was pursuing his personal agenda in collaboration with Herrman and the Maryland colony's leaders, perhaps in fulfillment of agreements reached at the September 1661 meeting. Governor Calvert summoned him to a meeting at Bohemia Manor in November. The purpose and results are not recorded, but the pillaging of New Amstel continued unabated. In February 1663, Beeckman observed that "D'Hinojossa is selling everything he can get his hands on, even the gunpowder and musket balls from the magazine. I know that a good deal has been sold to Augustyn Heermans, together with a lot of nails belonging to the City." By the end of 1663, D'Hinojossa revealed his plans to establish the city's principal town on the Appoquinimick for purposes of trade with the English.[48]

Shortly after the English took over the South River settlements in fall 1664, Philip Calvert instituted a rather curious proceeding, alleging that Herrman, Utie, Bennett, and others were indebted to the burgomasters of Amsterdam for goods that D'Hinojossa had unlawfully sold as their agent. Calvert charged that they had violated the Navigation Acts. All of the defendants were summoned to appear, with D'Hinojossa, before the provincial court during its February 1665 session. Nothing more appears to have occurred, and one can only speculate that

the proceeding was an effort to judicially declare the debts unenforceable because of the unlawful nature of the transactions.[49]

The English takeover of the South River in the fall of 1664 put an end to the Delaware phase of D'Hinojossa's colorful career. He sought and obtained asylum in Maryland. The Navigation Acts failed to end the smuggling trade in the northern Chesapeake, and George Hack's death in 1665 did nothing to deter the Virginia operation. In 1667, Herrman was on the Eastern Shore of Virginia to give a deposition for Anna Hack in a lawsuit concerning a sloop that was to have been constructed for her. The Herrman family's continuing interest in the trade route is evidenced in Casparius Herrman's 1674 application to cultivate land at Appoquinimick and Augustine Herrman's 1681 effort to extend the boundaries of Bohemia Manor east to Appoquinimick. The very nature of the enterprise precluded recording detailed transactions, but the available record does suggest considerable trade activity.[50]

Indeed, the observations of Maryland governor Frances Nicholson and Dr. Benjamin Bullivant in the mid-1690s indicate the broad scope of the enterprise. Chesapeake smugglers eventually charted eight separate portage routes, ranging in distance from five to thirteen miles. Ships laden with tobacco, some of which were large enough to undertake a transatlantic passage, were dragged across the portage on wooden sledges by teams of oxen. Improbable as this may seem to the modern observer, this mode of transportation, utilized since antiquity and depicted on Assyrian and Egyptian relief work, was introduced to the Delaware by the Swedes, who in all probability learned it from their Viking ancestors.[51]

By 1695 smuggling had become a two-way enterprise. Governor Nicholson observed that liquor was being smuggled into Maryland from Pennsylvania in casks disguised with flour, all loaded upon "indifferent large Sloopes, Shallops, & Boates" transported overland from New Castle to the Elk and Bohemia Rivers. He issued a proclamation requiring such vessels to report immediately to Oxford or Annapolis upon threat of confiscation for noncompliance with the laws. Two years later Nicholson reported to the Board of Trade that the cart road from the head of the Bohemia River to Opoquiraing Creek, "being only about 8 miles," was being utilized to carry "boats and shallops of 12 tons upon Sleys, or in great Carts, and illegal trade is much practiced that way, especially in carrying Tobaccoes into Delaware, from whence I suppose severall hundreds of hogsheads are carried into Scotland and other places."[52] And in 1697, Dr. Benjamin Bullivant recounted in his diary that "about 8 myles below n Castle is a Creeke, by which you may come to a neck of land 12 myles over Crosse which are drawn goods to & from Mary Land & Sloopes also of 30 tunns are carryed over land in this place on certaine sleds drawn by Oxen, & launched again into the water on ye other Side."

The successful introduction of the Chesapeake-Delaware connection did not appear to interfere with Herrman-Hack commercial activities elsewhere. Although

George Hack died in 1665, his wife continued the family business, principally from the Eastern Shore of Virginia. In 1667, Herrman was in Virginia to give a deposition in a civil dispute involving her ownership of a boat. In the same year, he was still litigating in New York. [53]

The idea that the Herrman-Hack venture could not have been instituted and maintained without the active assistance of the authorities in both Maryland and Delaware is persuasive. Express allegations of such conduct pepper the Dutch records. The Maryland record, albeit more circumstantial, is no less compelling in the final analysis.

Today, on the south side of Nandua Creek west of Pungoteague, Virginia, an obelisk dedicated to the memory of George and Anna Hack and their descendants graces the lawn of an old farmhouse. The peninsula to the north retains the name Hack's Neck. It is perhaps a fitting legacy to the Cologne physician and his able wife, who, in partnership with a Prague merchant, sailor, and cartographer, established the first viable transpeninsular trade route and successfully made a mockery of the British Navigation Acts.

NOTES

1. The author expresses appreciation to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Northampton County, Virginia, Dr. Kent Mountford, and Liz Duvall for her considerable editorial skills. Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., *Delaware Papers, Vol. I, New York Historical Manuscripts: Dutch. Vols. XVIII–XIX* (1981; repr., Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 2000), 231. For Maryland, see Russell R. Menard, "Immigrants and Their Increase: The Process of Population Growth in Early Colonial Maryland," in Aubrey C. Land, et al., editors, *Law, Society and Politics in Early Maryland* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 89. For the Chesapeake, see James Horn, *Adapting to a New World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 36. For the Delaware River settlements, see C. A. Weslager, *The Swedes and Dutch at New Castle* (Wilmington: Middle Atlantic Press, 1987), 77; C. A. Weslager, *New Sweden on the Delaware* (Wilmington: Middle Atlantic Press, 1988), 118.

2. Middleburg merchants stationed in South America since 1610 gained valuable experience that aided their interests in Chesapeake ventures. See Jan Krupp, "Dutch Notarial Acts," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 30 (1973): 653; John R. Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity in Mid-Seventeenth-Century Virginia," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* 90 (1982): 485–86; Lois Green Carr, et al., *Robert Cole's World: Agriculture and Society in Early Maryland* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 13; Wesley Frank Craven, *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century: 1607–1689,* Vol. I. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949), 147.

3. Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 485–88, 491; Nell Marion Nugent, *Cavaliers and Pioneers: Abstracts of Virginia Land Patents and Grants, 1623–1666,* Vol. I (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1969), 98, 104, 105; Susie M. Ames, ed., *County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia, 1632–1640* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for the Virginia Historical Society, 1973), 58.

4. Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 485–86.

5. Ames, *County Court Records*, 7; James R. Perry, *The Formation of a Society on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 1615–1655* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 150–54.
6. Carr, *Robert Cole's World*, 13; Horn, *Adapting to a New World*, 136; Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 486.
7. Menard, "Immigrants and Their Increase," 89; William Hand Browne et al., eds. *Archives of Maryland* (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1883–1972), 1:180, 3:144 (hereinafter cited *Arch.Md.*); Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 493.
8. Berkeley traded with Amsterdam; Bennett's port was Rotterdam. Ibid., 489–92.
9. William Waller Hening, ed., *The Statutes at Large; being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619*, Vol. I (Richmond, 1809–1823), 258; *Arch.Md.* 1:241–52.
10. Jennings Cropper Wise, *The Early History of the Eastern Shore of Virginia* (1911; repr. Baltimore: Regional Publishing Co., 1967), 71–72; Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 488–89.
11. Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 485–93.
12. Ibid., 493–95.
13. E. B. O'Callighan, ed., "Van Tienhoven's Answer to the Remonstrance," November 29, 1650, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, (Albany, 1856), 1:431; Augustine Herrman, Paul G. Burton Notebook 2, MS 437, Maryland Historical Society Library. It is entirely possible that Curaçao was an intermediate stop on a trip that began in Holland. Herrman sued Arent Corsen Stam on September 2, 1644, on a note given for passage "from Holland hither." See Arnold J. F. Van Laer, trans., *Dutch Register of the Provincial Secretary, 1642–1647, New York Historical Manuscripts*, Vol. II (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Secretary Co., 1974), Docs. c,d.. The presence of a Bohemian in New Amsterdam was not unusual. Stuyvesant's predecessor, Wilhelm Kieft, observed in 1643 that approximately 50 percent of the population of New Amsterdam was non-Dutch. Eighteen different languages and dialects were spoken in the town. See Theodore Roosevelt, *New York* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906), chap. 3. The date of Herrman's arrival in North America has been the subject of debate and confusion. This date appears to be more likely than earlier ones. See Van Laer, *Dutch Register*, II: Docs. 151 b, f, 157 h, 159 c, 162 f; III: Doc. 8 b; Earl L. W. Heck, *Augustine Herrman: Beginner of the Virginia Tobacco Trade, Merchant of New Amsterdam and First Lord of Bohemia Manor in Maryland* (Richmond: The William Byrd Press, Inc., 1941), 11–13, 20–23, 25, 27; Van Laer, *Dutch Register*, II: Doc. 131 c, 153 d; IV: Doc. 206.
14. F. Sims McGrath, *Pillars of Maryland* (Richmond: Dietz Press, 1950), 205; Heck, *Herrman*, 30–31. Stuyvesant's pursuit of Herrman's assets included a letter on behalf of his creditors, written in August 1652, to the Virginia authorities. See Howard Mackey and Marlene Groves, eds., *Northampton County Virginia Record Book: Orders, Deeds, Wills, etc., Vol. 5, 1654–1655*, (Rockport, Me.: Picten Press, 1999), 124; Van Lear, *Dutch Register*, 5:45, 71.
15. The earliest record of Hack on the Eastern Shore of Virginia is a deed for three hundred acres dated July 20, 1651. See Howard Mackey and Marlene Groves, *Northampton County Virginia: Orders, Deeds, Wills, Book 4, 1651–1654* (New York: Peter's Row, 1998),100.
16. James A. Mears, *Supplement to the Eastern Shore of Virginia in the 19th and 20th Centuries and the Pungoteague Creek Area, Accomac County, Va., 1659–1968* (Privately published, 1971), 84; Ralph T. Whitelaw, *Virginia's Eastern Shore* (1951; repr., Rockport, Maine: Picton Press, 2001), 1:694.
17. McGrath, *Pillars*, 206; O'Callighan, *Documents*, 1:326; 5:124, 251; Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 495–97; Wise, *Early History*,128; Mackey and Groves, *Northampton County*, 251.

18. Wise, *Early History,* 126, 132, 142; CCR-5:145.
19. *Delaware Papers* 1:xi; George Johnston, *History of Cecil County, Maryland and the Early Settlements Around the Head of Chesapeake Bay and on the Delaware River: With Sketches of Some of the Old Families of Cecil County* (1881; repr., Baltimore: Regional Publishing Company, 1967), 25.
20. "In the year 1638 Came into this Countrey from the Crown of Sweedland Governour Miivett, and in Case he should dye, Mounce Kling his deputy, with Heriques Hugen Marchant for the Sweeds Company with two shipps, Who anchored in Cristina Creek, & Lay there six weeks & three days, supplying themselves with wood & water only, Expecting that if any under the Crown of England had any just pretensions to the adjacent Lands, they might then have an Opportunity to Claime. At the expiration of the said six weeks & three days & no body Claiming nor hindering they went a shoare & built a fort. Therafter they agreed with the Susquahanna Indians & bought from them as much of the Adjacent Lands as they could shoot over with a Cannon bullet from Cristina." See A. R. Dunlap and C. A. Weslager, "More Missing Evidence: Two Depositions by Early Swedish Settlers," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography,* 91 (1967): 37–38.
21. Ibid., 39.
22. George A. Hanson, *Old Kent: The Eastern Shore of Maryland* (1876; repr., Baltimore, Regional Publishing Company, 1967), 70; Amandus Johnson, *The Swedes in America, 1638–1900* , Vol. I (Philadelphia, 1914), 286–87; Amandus Johnson, *The Swedish Settlements on the Delaware. 1638–1664,* Vol. II (Philadelphia, 1911), 572.
23. Land patent activity had been suspended for the duration of Parliamentary control of the province (1652–58) and thus provides an incomplete timeline of Upper Chesapeake settlement and development. Those seeking land had to assert their claims within nine months. See *Arch.Md.* 3:332 et seq.
24. Ibid., 3:329.
25. Maryland Land Patents, Liber Q, folios 301, 302, Maryland State Archives, Annapolis, Maryland; James Ehlen Moss, *Providence, ye lost towne at Severn in Mary Land: A documented relation, profusely illustrated, of those people who exiled from England & then Virginea were first to seat on ye Severn River in Anne Arundel County, anno 1649 : with an account of ye treaty with ye Susquehannock Nacõn 1652, battle of ye Severn 1655, founding of ye Friends in America, 1657, ye great battle between ye Susquehannock & Iroquois Nacõn, 1663, through all of which there is impleached ye true romance of Major General John Hammond and his lady Mary Howard of royal descent* (Maryland Historical Society, 1976), 256; Harmer (a.k.a. Gottfried Hermanson) arrived in New Sweden in 1641 on the ship Charitas. He was the assistant to the commissary, Hendrich Huygen, by 1648, subsequently deserted, established himself as an Indian trader on Palmer's Island at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, and served as an interpreter in the negotiations of the Treaty of 1652.
26. He completed the patent process with the filing of a certificate of survey on August 21. Land Records, Liber 4, folio 515; Liber Q, folio 457; Ibid.; Liber 4, folio 44; Liber Q, folio 456. He also obtained property west of the Elk River. See Land Records, Liber Q, folios 449, 450, Liber 4, folio 464. See also Johnston, Cecil County, 40. The return of a certificate of survey was an essential step in the patent process, and in the proprietary period generally took place before the grant of a patent. See John Kilty, *The Land-Holder's Assistant and Land Office Guide* (1808; repr. Arch. Md 73), 214–15.
27. *Delaware Papers,* 1:114, 124, 128–29, 134–38, 148–49; J. Thomas Scharf, *History of Delaware, 1609–1888* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1972), 63.
28. *Arch.Md.* 3:34; *Delaware Papers,* 1:143–45, 148–50; Weslager, *New Castle,* 175.

29. *Delaware Papers*, 1:155, 158–61; Scharf, *History of Delaware*, 64.
30. The original of the journal is in the New York State Archives in Albany. The original translation appears in *Delaware Papers*, 1:211–26. A subsequent revised translation appears in Hall, *Narratives*, 309–33.
31. Hall, *Narratives*, 316–21. Overzee moved from Rotterdam to Virginia in the late 1640s. His technique of ingratiating himself with local business and political leaders was to marry their daughters, two of whom he acquired before moving to Maryland in the early 1650s. In Maryland he acquired citizenship status notwithstanding his name, background, and lack of denization. He obtained a blanket order of protection from Governor Stone in 1653 and bought a house next door to Philip Calvert. See Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 490; Perry, *Formation of a Society*, 18.
32. Hall, *Narratives*, 316, 322.
33. Doughty was in all probability America's first itinerant preacher. His travels are an instructive lesson in the level of intercolony travel available to the financially destitute. A Presbyterian minister who bounced about two continents, Doughty found success only as a beneficiary of his daughter's marriages. Arraigned for heresy in England for contempt of His Majesty, Doughty was forced to move to America. An unsuccessful stint as a clergyman in Massachusetts was followed by service as a minister of the English Reformed Church in Manhattan, where his daughter met and married Adriaen Van der Donck, a New Amsterdam ally and friend of Herrman's. Doughty then ran afoul of Stuyvesant and moved to Flushing. He was fired in 1656 and moved to Northampton County, Virginia, with his recently widowed daughter. He preached there for a brief time, but was in Maryland with his daughter and her second husband by 1659. See Hall, *Narratives*, 323–25, n.2; Heck, *Herrman*, 56, n.25; Wise, *Early History*, 261, 270–71; Raphael Semmes, *Crime and Punishment in Early Maryland* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938), 298.
34. Herrman to Stuyvesant, October 21, 1659, in O'Callighan, *Documents*, 2:99; 1:99; Heck, *Herrman*, 62; O'Callighan, *Documents*, 2:97–98.
35. O'Callighan, Documents, 1:99; Heck, *Herrman*, 62.
36. Heck, *Hermann*, 54; *Delaware Papers*, 1:222; Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 498.
37. The Herrman-Hack venture apparently was not immune to the vicissitudes that afflict many family ventures. The two men found it necessary to formally appoint two arbitrators and publicly record a judgment in favor of Herrman and against Hack for 17,724 pounds of tobacco. See Mackey & Groves, eds., *Northampton County Virginia Record Book: Deeds, Wills, etc., Vol. 7, 1657–1666* (Rockport, Me.: Picton Press, 2002), 74–75; Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 498; *Arch.Md.* 3:398, 399, 401.
38. Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 497–98; Hening, *Statutes at Large*, 1:469, 536–37, 540; Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 499. On January 31, 1661, Charles Calvert issued a proclamation to step up enforcement of the Navigation Acts. See *Arch.Md.* 3:446.
39. *Arch.Md.*, 3:412–16, 425–26.
40. *Delaware Papers*, 1:231. Herrman's reference to the Micquas Kill is confusing. The name was normally applied to what is now known as the Christiana River. He undoubtedly referred to Appoquinimink Creek, which in fact became the outlet of choice to the Delaware.
41. *Arch.Md.*, 3:428.
42. *Delaware Papers*, 1:240–43. The "other merchandise" was beer. See Weslager, *New Castle*, 184.
43. *Arch.Md.*, 3:431–33.

44. Ibid., 3:439, 441, 446.
45. Pagan, "Dutch Maritime and Commercial Activity," 499; Arthur Pierce Middleton, *Tobacco Coast: A Maritime History of Chesapeake Bay in the Colonial Era* (Newport News, Va.: Mariners' Museum, 1953), 210ff.
46. Land Patents. Liber 4, folios 568, 572; Liber 5, folios 108,109; Johnston, *Cecil County*, 3, 38.
47. *Delaware Papers*, 1:274–75, 279, 310–11; Weslager, *New Castle*, 181.
48. *Delaware Papers*, 1:311–12, 316, 340.
49. *Arch.Md.*, 49:Preface, 18, 299, 341, 342.
50. D'Hinojossa spent some time at St. Mary's, then went to Holland, but returned to live on Poplar Island off the Dorchester County coast. He and other members of his family were naturalized in 1671. He returned to Holland and was court-martialed in the summer of 1672 for cowardice in surrendering the town of Wessel to the French. He was beheaded on August. 8, 1672. See Weslager, *New Castle*, 195; *Arch.Md.*, 2:282–83; Jo Ann Riley McKey, ed., *Accomac County Virginia Court Order Abstracts. 1660–1670*, Vol. 2. (Bowie, Md.: Heritage Books, Inc., 1996), 47; *Delaware Papers*, 2:56; *Arch.Md.*, 17:83–84, 484; New Amstel, renamed New Castle by the British in 1664, evolved from the impoverished village of fewer than thirty families in the summer of 1659 to a community of one thousand at the time of the English takeover. The settlement attracted significant private European investment, notwithstanding the dissipation of West India Company assets. See Weslager, *New Castle*, 189, 190.
51. Middleton, *Tobacco Coast*, 220; Weslager, *New Sweden*, 74; Johnson, *Swedish Settlements*, 1:364–65.
52. *Arch.Md.*, 20:279–81, 23:87.
53. The route described by Bullivant was farther north and longer than that first established to Appoquinimick Creek, with an eastern terminus roughly where Delaware City lies today. See Wayne Andrews, ed., "A Glance at New York in 1697: The Travel Diary of Dr. Benjamin Bullivant," *New York Historical Society Quarterly*, 40 (1956): 71. A maritime ton, in the sense used here, is a measure of internal capacity, the equivalent of 100 cubic feet. The first ship of consequence built in North America was the 30-ton pinnace *Virginia*, which sailed to England after being built in Maine. Pinnaces of the period were generally 30 to 60 feet long, with a 10- to 14-foot beam. It has been estimated that a 30-ton ship carried a median 50 hogsheads of tobacco, weighing an average of 600 pounds each. See V. J. Wycoff, "Ships and Shipping of Seventeenth Century Maryland," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 33 (1938): 348, 34(1939): 355. See also Hermann petition for attachment, *Arch.Md.*, 41:353; Berthold Fernow, ed., *The Records of New Amsterdam from 1653 to 1674 anno Domini* (1897; repr. Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co), 6:126.

Baltimore, 1796. Port city merchants and investors sent ships laden with grains and tobacco to foreign ports during the early years of the new nation. (Detail from George Beck, View of Baltimore, *Maryland Historical Society.)*

"Far Short of Our Expectations": Baltimore and the Atlantic World Trade in the Confederation Period

RICHARD S. CHEW

Eager to take advantage of the commercial opportunities in Baltimore following the end of the Revolutionary War, hundreds of merchants descended upon the city in early 1783. Among them was Henry Johnson, recently arrived from Massachusetts to establish a branch of his Boston firm, Johnson, Johonnot & Company. Johnson hoped to expand the firm's interests in the West Indies trade, and the Chesapeake's rising port was the ideal location. An obscure and nearly forgotten village in the backwater of the British Empire in 1745, Baltimore had become the leading port for the Mid-Atlantic grain trade to the Caribbean and southern Europe in the 1750s and 1760s. By 1774 the city exported the equivalent of almost 800,000 bushels of wheat, or 25 percent of the total for all of British America.[1] During the war, the city's fortunes had risen even further. Unlike most major American ports, Baltimore had not been occupied by the British army or directly blockaded by the Royal Navy. Instead, the city served as a chief port of entry after 1781 for wartime trade with France. It was also a base of operations for a small squadron of French warships under Admiral Chevalier de La Villebrune and five hundred troops under the command of Brigadier General Chevalier de La Valette. The French presence boosted the city's economy and saturated Baltimore with specie. As the war drew to a close, Baltimore was poised to become a leading American port in the Atlantic economy, and Johnson knew it. Firmly established in the city by November 1783, he confidently wrote to James Demie, a merchant in Cape François, Santo Domingo, that "I am confident Balt[imore] will have its share of your trade as we are growing very fast here."[2]

Unfortunately for Johnson and his partners, the promise of prosperity vanished less than six months after he had written to Demie. By the spring of 1784, Johnson was disappointed, irritated, and out of patience. He complained to his half-brother Frank that it is "impossible to collect Cash from the [city's] retailers after we have trusted them. . . . If we had not two or three friends we should be obliged to hang ourselves." The turn-around was remarkable. The city had been flush with specie when Johnson arrived the previous spring; now, barely a year

The author received his Ph D. from the College of William and Mary in 2002 and is currently a post-doctoral fellow at the Library Company of Philadelphia's Program in Early American Economy and Society.



Ship captains flew colorful flags and pennants from their masts when they entered port. In Baltimore, the keeper of the Federal Hill Observatory hoisted a duplicate flag, alerting ship owners, consignees, and the business community that a new ship had arrived. (Maryland Historical Society.)

after the war's end, he was unable to collect so much as a shilling or a *livre tournais* from anyone.[3]

The embarrassed state of the American economy came as a surprise to those such as Johnson who believed that American independence would usher in a new era of prosperity. Freed from all the mercantile restraints of the British Empire, the new republic was supposed to enjoy an expanded export trade.[4] When the expected boom failed to materialize, most Americans were as bitter as Johnson about the commercial difficulties and quickly fixed the blame for their unforeseen troubles on Europeans generally and the British specifically. According to this popular interpretation, devious British merchants had tricked Americans into accumulating enormous debts between 1783 and 1785. The subsequent revival of mercantilist policies by the British, French, and Spanish governments then removed the only means by which Americans could repay those debts and consequently robbed the new republic of anticipated postwar prosperity.

It is tempting to simply echo this contemporary indictment and conclude that the confederation's problems originated in the backrooms of London's counting houses and the antechambers of the British Parliament. The hard times that Johnson experienced did, after all, follow closely on the heels of the European

restrictions. Yet this explanation of the confederation's commercial troubles is untenable. Despite the mercantilist measures, which were daunting on paper, American ships continued to trade freely throughout the West Indies. The Dutch, Danish, and Swedish islands remained open to American ships, and those ships were able to gain entry to many British, French, and even Spanish islands through a variety of quasi-legal and illegal means. As Thomas Jefferson reported to John Adams in 1785 when the two friends were serving as the American ministers in Europe, "all the late advices from the French West Indies are that they have now in their ports always three times as many vessels as there were before [the war], and that the increase is principally from our States."[5] The dramatic gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the confederation has lead some historians to conclude that contemporaries complained too much and that the early republic's economy may not have been in turmoil at all.[6] This interpretation must be dismissed as well. Indeed, a Baltimore ship captain of the 1780s would have considered it absurd. The traffic in and out of Baltimore's harbor may indeed have been brisk, but the real problems began when a schooner or a sloop entered a foreign port and its captain tried in vain to find buyers for the cargo. Mercantilist restrictions could be evaded, but there was no escape from the laws of supply and demand.[7]

The real cause of the city's commercial crisis during the confederation period was not the plotting of British merchants and politicians but a shift in market conditions within the Atlantic economy arising from the disruptions caused by the American Revolution itself. Throughout America most merchants expected that a fall in commodity prices would follow the cessation of hostilities once the Royal Navy's blockade ended, and that American exports would flood the Atlantic markets. What they did not anticipate was a significant expansion in the European production of wheat, flour, tobacco, and other commodities that began in 1776 (and in some cases earlier) and which continued into the 1780s. The increased supply effectively reduced demand for American grain and tobacco, and where there was a demand, merchant ship captains from all over the Atlantic world raced to meet it. No matter where they turned, American captains discovered that European captains had already engrossed the market or that the prices Americans asked exceeded what the market would bear. When unable to find buyers, captains had to return home with unsold cargoes or consign their cargoes to a local agent to wait for prices to improve. In both situations, American merchants typically experienced a loss, either from the eventual sale of their cargoes at clearance or auction prices or the wholesale loss of their cargoes because they could not be sold or even consigned. This miserable state of affairs confounded the efforts of even the craftiest captains.

In addition to the shift in market conditions in the Atlantic economy, some blame for the confederation's economic travails must be attributed to the prevalence of mercantilist ideas that most Americans clung to in the postwar years. In

the face of a sagging export trade, Americans had the opportunity to abandon overseas commerce and adopt a new proto-nationalist direction for the republic's political economy—one that ended the dependence on overseas trade and the Atlantic economy by embracing the expansion of the domestic market economy as the central feature of American economic development. A small minority cried out for just such a change in direction, but their voices were ultimately drowned out by a chorus that continued to see a modified form of mercantilism as the linchpin to the future prosperity of the United States. In the wake of the Revolution, the autocratic controls over both foreign and domestic commerce employed in Europe since the time of Colbert clearly represented an acceptable direction for the new republic. Yet many Americans of the confederation period still clung to the mercantilist dogma that the balance of trade was central to the wealth of the nation and that the guiding principle of the nation's political economy should be the primacy of overseas trade. In this modified form of mercantilism that most Americans championed after 1783, a positive balance of trade would not and could not be achieved through the use of extensive state regulations and protective tariffs. In the minds of most American mercantilists, a positive balance was inevitable because American products would be in high demand among Europeans and European colonials after the war.[8] Unfortunately, the combination of an Atlantic economy in which demand for many American products proved limited coupled with an insistence that Americans remain dependent on those markets spelled continued hard times for both the city and the new republic.

A study of Baltimore's export trade during the confederation period provides an excellent opportunity to show how the changes in the Atlantic economy played havoc with the commercial prospects of the newly independent United States. Situated on the Patapsco River at the northern end of the Chesapeake Bay, Baltimore served as an entrepôt for two different economic regions, the grain-producing farms of the Mid-Atlantic and the tobacco-growing plantations of the Upper South. Together, the exports from these two regions accounted for almost two-thirds of the value of all American exports between 1784 and 1789.[9] In addition, the export of grain and tobacco made Baltimore a shipment point to almost every area of the Atlantic World. Americans shipped most of their grain for export to the West Indies or southern Europe, while most of the Chesapeake's tobacco crop was destined for markets in Great Britain and western Europe. Baltimore's merchants thus shared the commercial frustrations felt by farmers and planters from southern New York to northeastern North Carolina. They also faced many of the same disappointments that merchants from Boston to Savannah experienced during the 1780s. A study of Baltimore also affords a window into the neo-mercantilist mind, as many of the city's merchants demonstrated a startling pertinacity to discover profitable trade routes in the Atlantic and beyond.



View of Baltimore, 1796, by George Beck. (Maryland Historical Society.)

A Post-War Euphoria

When news of the peace treaty with Great Britain arrived in Baltimore early in 1783, the sense of commercial optimism in the city was palpable. When British firms offered deep discounts—up to 25 percent below London prices on manufactured goods, as well as six-month's credit to pay for them—the terms proved irresistible to the city's consumers. Emboldened by the promise of a booming export trade, frustrated by wartime austerity, and flush with foreign specie, Baltimoreans confidently went on a spending binge. Between 1783 and 1785, Marylanders and Virginians imported almost £2.2 million in goods from England alone.[10] Although it is unknown what percentage of these imports went directly to Baltimore, the city figured prominently in the trade. Ships jammed the city's waterfront by summer 1783, and the massive number of seamen crowding the wharves caught the attention of Johann Schoepf, a German surgeon who served with the British during the Revolutionary War and who remained in America for several years after the end of hostilities. He observed that on an autumn day in 1783 fifty ships thronged the wharves at Fells Point and created a forest of masts where pennants fluttered in the breeze like leaves on so many trees. Henry Johnson reported that as many as seventy ships and smaller vessels crowded into the port

Map of the West Indies.(Robert Laurie, New and Elegant General Atlas, Chiefly Intended for Schools *[London: Robert Laurie and James Whittle, 1806].)*

on one day the following spring.[11] The speculative fervor was so intense that despite the initial availability of specie, many consumers and retailers went into debt to pay for the torrent of manufactures streaming into American ports.

Like other Americans, Baltimoreans plunged into this consumer frenzy based on the assumption that an expanded export trade would be sufficient to pay back the inevitable debts that would accrue from the profligate spending. Unfortunately, the boom never happened. Total American exports likely averaged £3.5 million between 1784 and 1789 compared to just £3 million between 1768 and 1772, a figure that does indicate improvement in the nation's aggregate exports compared to the prewar period. The nominal increase, however, was not enough to keep pace with either population growth or the value of the nation's imports. Certainly it fell short of American expectations. The grim reality was that exports per capita between 1784 and 1789 were consistently 20 to 30 percent below the levels recorded for the colonies between 1768 and 1772, and the cumulative U.S. trade deficit with England between 1784 and 1789 amounted to £7.6 million.[12]

Commercial difficulties were not limited to New England either, as a few historians have suggested.[13] Maryland and Virginia's cumulative trade deficit with

England between 1784 and 1789 exceeded £2.5 million, and Baltimore's trade with the rest of the Atlantic world was apparently insufficient to make up the shortfall. Additionally, Marylanders carried more than £3 million in various debts throughout the 1780s and had no way to remit them. Insolvencies throughout the state mounted and legal actions against debtors multiplied. As the decade wore on and the number of suits doubled and then tripled, Maryland courts became hopelessly clogged with cases. By early 1785 a pall shrouded the city's mercantile houses, and one by one many of them quietly dissolved—including several of its most successful firms. Clement Biddle & Company, on whom George Washington had relied, went bankrupt. Samuel and Robert Purviance, who played leading roles as bankers in the Revolution, soon joined Biddle. Dozens of other houses hovered on the brink of failure and struggled mightily to stay afloat.[14]

In all likelihood, most Americans would have regarded the British discount practices as inconsequential if the much anticipated export boom had occurred. When that did not happen, many Americans sensed that an insidious design was at work. In October 1783, Arthur Campbell confided to James Madison that "If my intelligence from a distant Correspondent, is right," British policy since the king's acknowledgement of American independence had aimed at the new nation's destruction by "draining our money, impairing public credit, and destroying public spirit." Others agreed that the mounting debt could easily wreck the republic—which seemed to be the British aim. Governor Benjamin Harrison of Virginia condemned the British merchants as "locusts that are crouding us here as so many emissaries" of that government, "sent to sound out [our] inclinations" and lure and trick Americans into further debt." He concluded that "the determinations of the French and English respecting our trade is really alarming and in the end will prove ruinous to us if not counteracted." John Adams agreed. If the British and French wished to embarrass American commerce, then Americans should return the favor. As he explained to Jefferson, "the French deserve" punitive actions "as much as the English; for they are as much Ennemies to our Ships and Mariners." Although the French "Navigation Acts are not quite so severe as those of Spain, Portugal and England . . . they are not much less so." Thomas Jefferson reported in 1784 that several members of Congress believed "our commerce is got & getting into vital agonies by our exclusion from the West Indies," and James Madison concluded in 1785 that "we have lost by the Revolution our trade with the West Indies, the only one which yielded us a favorable balance without having gained new channels to compensate it."[15]

At first glance it appears that contemporaries had a strong case for blaming Europeans for America's troubles. Hard times had followed closely on the heels of renewed British and French mercantilist policies, and these restrictions were severe, at least on paper. British Orders in Council of July 2, September 5, and December 26, 1783, excluded American ships from trading directly with the Brit-

ish West Indies. Americans could still transact business with Caribbean planters, but the trade itself, and thus the terms on which that trade was to be conducted, was reserved solely to British merchants and their ships. London, Bristol, Cowes, Liverpool, Whitehaven, and Greenock were opened to the American tobacco trade by Orders in Council of November 5, 1783, and subsequent Orders in Council opened Port Glasgow on November 19, 1783, Falmouth and Portsmouth on April 16, 1784, Hull on July 30, 1784, and Lancaster on November 24, 1784.

In France, the Council of State issued two *Arrêts* in May and August 1784 that opened the ports of L'Orient, Bayonne, Dunkirk, and Marseilles to American ships, compelled the Farmers General to show preference for American tobacco, established Isle de France [Mauritius] as an entrepôt for American trade in the Far East and greatly expanded the list of items that might be imported or exported. The *Arrêts* also increased the number of free ports in the French West Indies from two to seven, including Port-du-Cârenage in St. Lucia, St. Pierre on Martinique, Pointe-à-Pitre on Guadeloupe, and Scarborough on Tobago. On Santo Domingo, Cape Môle St. Nicholas was closed, and Cape François, Port-au-Prince, and Aux Cayes were opened to American ships. However, the *Arrêts* also limited American trade in the West Indies to timber, dye-woods, coal, livestock, salt beef, salt fish, rice, legumes, hides, and pitch. Wheat, flour, and corn were prohibited. The only exports allowed were rum and molasses. Sugar and coffee were prohibited. Salt fish entering the French West Indies from America was taxed and rendered uncompetitive for the West Indies market, and only ships of more than sixty tons were to be admitted to the free ports. The latter action effectively eliminated most of the sloops and schooners Americans employed for the West Indies trade. Worst of all, a series of further French actions mirroring the British Orders in Council had by 1787 eroded most of the concessions made in the *Arrêts* of 1784.

The terms of the mercantilist restrictions appeared especially difficult for Baltimore's trade. France's exclusion of American flour exports to the French West Indies, coupled with Britain's restrictions on American trade with the British West Indies, threatened the profitability of the grain trade, which was the city's most important export. The prospects for tobacco were no better. The French government instructed the Farmers General to show preference for trading directly with American merchants, but the monopoly continued to import most of the American crop through Glasgow and London because the Order in Council of December 26, 1783, allowed American tobacco destined for reexport to be admitted and warehoused in Great Britain duty free.[16]

Protestations to the contrary not withstanding, the revival of European mercantilist restrictions was in no way connected to Baltimore's commercial frustrations during the 1780s. Despite the British Orders in Council, the French *Arrêts,* and the various other limitations on American trade imposed by the other European states, Baltimore's ship captains had little trouble gaining entry into almost

any West Indian market at almost any time. The ease with which Americans accomplished this was thanks in large part to the actions of the islanders themselves. During the 1783 debate in the British Parliament over the American Intercourse Bill, merchants and planters from the British West Indies flooded Parliament with petitions imploring the members to support the bill or risk starvation and the collapse of trade in the Caribbean. After the Orders in Council were issued, the freeholders of Antigua complained that their provisions would not last two months without an unlimited trade with the United States. The Baltimore community kept a close watch on the growing dissatisfaction throughout the region.[17] When the hurricane seasons of 1784, 1785, and 1786 brought additional hardships to the islands, many colonial governors in the West Indies used their discretionary powers to open up their islands to American ships. Although special concessions such as these were only supposed to be made under extraordinary circumstances, at least one British island was open to American ships every year following the Revolution except 1787.

Jamaica proved the most consistent in relaxing British restrictions in the years immediately following the war. Lieutenant-Governor Alured Clark opened the island to American ships in October and November 1783, and again from July 1784 until January 21, 1785. Over the next two years devastating storms swept the island, and the situation compelled the governor to periodically reopen Kingston, Montego Bay, and other Jamaican ports to any ships carrying provisions—including those coming from the United States. The volume of American trade to Jamaica during these years was immense. Between October 1, 1785, and October 1, 1786, 249 American vessels totaling more than twenty thousand tons legally entered the island.[18] Yet Jamaica was not the only island in the West Indies to open its ports. Governor William Brown opened Bermuda to American trade in 1783, Governor John Maxwell opened several ports in the Bahamas in 1784, and Governor John Orde kept Dominica open throughout all of 1784. Between October 1, 1784, and October 1, 1785, eighty-eight American ships totaling 6,891 tons entered at Barbados thanks to the concession granted by Governor David Parry. Lieutenant-Governor Henry Hamilton opened Bermuda to provisions in March 1789, and Parliament itself allowed Americans to load salt at Turk Island in the Bahamas in 1788. Even Governor Thomas Shirley of the Leeward Islands, despite lodging furious complaints with the British foreign secretary in the early 1780s about the questionable decisions of West Indian governors and the collusive practices of American merchants to smuggle goods into the British islands, agreed to open St. Kitts to lumber imports. After 1787, Nevis and St. Kitts in the Leewards became the islands most frequently open to American ships. In the early 1790s, Santo Domingo, Grenada, the Grenadines, Jamaica, and Bermuda were each open for several months each year.[19]

When colonial governors did not allow entry to American ships, captains

presented forged papers and claimed French, Spanish, or British registry as needed. Customs officials in the West Indies regularly accepted the fraudulent papers in exchange for an appropriate bribe. Anticipating the renewal of mercantilist restrictions against Americans, Henry Johnson planned to make extensive use of this tactic, assuring James Demie, a merchant in Cape François, Santo Domingo, that "Should your port be shut against the Americans, you will have an opportunity of doing something clever here under the French flag." To Marie and Company in Port-au-Prince, he wrote that "whether we [Americans] have permission to enter your port . . . seems doubtful," but "Should your trade be carried to the Mole of St. Nicholas . . . vessels under the French Flag will bring the produce of your Island to this Continent much easier than the Americans." When the mercantilist restrictions were renewed, forging documents became a widespread and successful practice. In February 1784, Henry wrote his brother Frank that "You will not forget the proposition I made respecting the vessel under British colours. I do believe there is an opening there." He was confident that "If it [the voyage] could be done this quarter I would soon have a set of British papers." If conditions changed he was equally sure that they could "put the vessel again under American colours" without a problem.[20]

Failing all other options, ship captains simply smuggled cargoes ashore; the Royal Navy usually did nothing to stop the illicit American trade. Admiral Sir Richard Hughes, commander in the western Atlantic, prohibited his captains from interdicting it as he did not have an order in hand from either Parliament or the admiralty. The situation disgusted a young Horatio Nelson, recently arrived in the Caribbean as captain of the *Boreas.* Nelson and his fellow captains ultimately convinced Hughes in December 1784 that the clear intent of the Orders in Council gave him more than enough authority to act. Yet Hughes' subsequent orders still prohibited naval officers from interfering with an American ship when a colonial British governor deemed it proper to give it entry. The admiral's orders effectively handcuffed Nelson and allowed the American trade to continue without harassment. The young, headstrong Nelson finally took matters into his own hands on May 2, 1785, when he seized the American schooner *Eclipse.*

In the legal action that followed, Nelson prevailed and established the precedent for other British captains to interdict the American trade. Yet the victory proved short-lived. To avoid further seizures, American merchants thereafter avoided direct trade with the British and French islands in favor of an indirect trade through the Danish and Dutch colonies. American captains would consign their cargoes to a merchant in one of the Dutch, Danish, French, or Swedish West Indies, from whence the goods could then be re-exported legally to the British islands. The most popular landings for this indirect American trade with the British islands were Dutch St. Eustatius and Curaçao, the Danish island of St. Croix, and the French islands of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and St. Bartholomew's.

The Royal Navy could do little to stop the practice, and the British Committee of Trade struggled for years to find an effective solution to the problem.[21]

Foreign Stores

A far greater concern than mercantile restrictions was the international glut of grain and tobacco in Atlantic markets. The abundance of grain resulted initially from the efforts of several European nations to expand production during the American War of Independence to make up for shortfalls in American supply, and those shortages were considerable. Some Mid-Atlantic grain continued to be exported after 1776, but for the most part, exports dried up. General Henry Knox estimated that American mobilization likely reduced the normal farm surplus by at least 50 percent, and in some years wiped it out completely. Others in the army were not convinced. General Horatio Gates wrote to Washington in 1779 that "I cannot persuade myself there has been any Natural Scarcity." Rather, "Avarice and Monopoly, must have caused the emptiness of our Magazines of Bread." Either way, the evidence pointed to a scarcity of American grain. To address this problem, Congress determined to ban the export of wheat, flour, and bread in 1778 to insure an adequate domestic supply. When the ban took effect, however, farmers began forestalling their crops to wait for better prices, and the scarcity became worse. Even when Congress lifted the ban to allow agents to export grain to St. Eustatius and Havana for the purchase of military supplies, it was difficult for the merchants charged with this responsibility to find many sellers.[22] Thus, European merchants had to scramble to find alternative sources of grain to compensate for the loss of more than three million bushels of wheat and flour that they had been importing from North America.

Throughout Europe farmers cleared new land, recovered abandoned farmland, and converted lands previously used for grazing into arable fields. Widespread efforts to increase European grain production engaged investors in Lincolnshire and Warwickshire in England, Silesia and East Friesland in Germany, Thiérache and Burgundy in France, Friesland and Groningen in the Netherlands, Flanders in France, Ireland, and areas of Sweden and Spain. Many Europeans also invested in elaborate and capital-intensive reclamation schemes of coastal areas to drain marshes and create polders to restore farmland lost to soil erosion by the sea. Many of these efforts, especially those in the Mediterranean, East Friesland in Germany, and the Netherlands met with great success.[23] When Portugal's harvest failed in 1785, the nation's merchants turned to Sicily rather than Great Britain or America to relieve the shortfall. The Lisbon firm of Hudson and Harrison reported to Baltimore merchant Tench Tilghman that "we are abundantly supplied with every kind of grain . . . that should a further quantity arrive, prices must diminish very considerably." The Portuguese also developed a domestic flour milling capacity, eliminating the need to import refined flour from



Atlantic ports of call in the confederation era. (Laurie, New and Elegant Atlas, *1806.)*

America, and after 1786 the market at Lisbon was closed entirely to American flour imports.[24]

After the war a series of dry autumns were followed by very cold, dry winters and warm, dry summers in northern and western Europe. These conditions produced exceptional grain harvests in 1785 and 1786. Great Britain's imports of wheat and flour fell from more than 4.6 million bushels in 1783 to just 408,000 bushels in 1786, while exports advanced from 416,000 bushels to 1.6 million during the same period. Overall, Great Britain exported 2.4 million bushels more than it imported between 1784 and 1789. Prices in Europe were typically no lower than they had been prior to the war. At Amsterdam the price of wheat and flour imported from the Baltics was about the same in 1785 as it had been in 1775, yet there was little need for American grain.[25] For the moment, Europe had returned to the grain self-sufficiency it had experienced during the first half of the century. To make matters worse for American merchants, wholesale prices on wheat and flour in the Mid-Atlantic remained well above their prewar averages until August 1787.[26] This forced American captains to ask for higher prices than the markets would bear, making United States grain uncompetitive on Atlantic markets—a fact that was spelled out very clearly in the correspondence of Tench Tilghman, Robert Morris's partner in Baltimore.

Tilghman received the same bad news from merchants in almost every European port. From London, Charles Herries informed Tilghman that "at the prices you quote for your Produce there [is] no Encouragement for speculation." James Burn, also of London, concurred that American "prices are much too high for the markets in Europe—and there must be great alterations before anything can be undertaken." From Falmouth, George Fox claimed that "Prices being so low in Europe & high with you, nothing but evident loss must attend to it." From Coruna on the northwest coast of Spain, Teronimo Hixosa complained that "the price of Indian Corn was so high last season that it cou'd not turn to acc[oun]t." From Cadiz on the southwest coast of Spain, James Duff wrote that "prices of wheat in Spain are & mist continue high for some time." Duff also cautioned that "we have also reason to expect our receiving supply of soft wheat as well from the Baltick as from England to say nothing of your Quarter." This left no room at all for American produce at the Spanish market. Livingston & Turnbull of Gibraltar and De Larrard and Company of Barcelona confirmed that while grain prices in southern Spain had been high for a brief period in late 1784, supplies from England, France, the Levant, and the Barbary Coast had driven prices down the following year.[27]

The relatively high prices were due in part to postwar readjustment and recovery—an economic factor that limited production. Baltimore's flour exports amounted to just 50,700 barrels in 1784 compared to 120,000 in 1774, and the city did not surpass its prewar totals until 1788.[28] The Eastern Shore, which accounted for a considerable portion of Baltimore's exports, had been subjected to frequent raiding by British warships and Tory privateers throughout most of the war. The pesky British sloop-of-war Otter sailed into the upper Chesapeake Bay as early as March 1776 to disrupt patriot activities. In the wake of the destruction of Norfolk, Baltimore merchant George Woolsey believed that the cruise of the Otter was a prelude to a similar attack on Baltimore. The newly refitted Maryland cruiser *Defence* turned back the British raider, and Tory activity on the Eastern Shore was subsequently suppressed in the summer of 1776, and then crushed in early 1777. Unfortunately, the threat returned in May 1779 when British Major General Edward Mathew and Commodore Sir George Collier arrived in Hampton Roads, Virginia. After pillaging the shipyard at Portsmouth, burning the town of Suffolk, removing 518 formerly enslaved African Americans from the state, demolishing 137 vessels, and destroying tobacco and other goods valued at more than £2 million, Collier dispatched the *Otter* with a small flotilla of other British vessels to take similar actions against plantations and farms in the upper Chesapeake Bay. The renewed British offensive encouraged Tory agitation to swell up again in 1780, and for the next two years, the Chesapeake became a open theatre of warfare between British and Tory raiders and the armed barges of the Maryland and Virginia navies that opposed them.[29]

The privations caused by British and Tory raids made the postwar recovery

more difficult for farmers on the Eastern Shore and thus kept Mid-Atlantic grain prices high through the middle years of the 1780s. Free trade would not have helped this situation. Even if the British, French, and Spanish had formally and completely opened their ports and colonies to American vessels, it would not have made a difference until prices fell to competitive levels on the European market. And until European demand surged once more farmers and merchants in the Mid-Atlantic would continue to be frustrated by the state of their commerce.

The tobacco trade also suffered from market conditions in the Atlantic economy, though not always from the same problems that wheat and flour exporters faced. Unlike the grain trade, tobacco continued to be exported to Europe during the war. Between 1781 and 1783, France alone imported tobacco from America worth more than 3.2 million livres tournais (*l.t.*), a figure that accounted for more than 90 percent of all American imports into the country. Yet the Farmers General could not rely exclusively on American imports. Tobacco selling at Dunkirk for 20 *l.t.* per quintal in 1774 rose as high as 150 *l.t.* by 1777, and reached 180 *l.t.* by 1778. This presented a serious problem because the French tobacco monopoly, or Farmers General, had to pay their government 24 million *l.t.* per year for their exclusive rights, and they were bound by the terms of that agreement to government-mandated price levels. With prices on American leaf rocketing upward, the monopoly could not remain viable unless it could find alternative sources of supply.[30]

The Farmers General first considered building up a domestic tobacco supply in France, or importing new supplies from Cayenne, French Guiana, or Corsica. When these efforts proved fruitless, they decided to purchase tobacco from the Spanish monopoly. Spain had opened Louisiana to tobacco speculation and was eager for French investment, but the Farmers General was only interested in Cuban or Venezuelan leaf. The Spanish agreed to sell the French one million pounds of the latter in Seville in 1777, but when they raised their prices in 1778, the French ended the deal. Thereafter, the Farmers General leaned heavily on tobacco growers in the Ukraine, Poland, Prussia, Hungary, the United Provinces, the Austrian Netherlands, and Flanders to supply the French market. Tobacco production in these areas multiplied several times during the war as can be seen from fluctuations on the Amsterdam market. Prices of Virginia and Maryland tobacco increased steadily throughout the war and were 336 percent higher in 1782 than in 1774. Conversely, the price of Dutch tobacco at Amsterdam increased 250 percent between 1774 and 1778, then declined 55 percent between 1778 and 1783 to near its 1774 level. The most significant boost in production came from the Baltics. Russian exports of Ukrainian leaf to western Europe increased from 11,610 pounds in 1775 to more than 6 million pounds in 1777 and more than eighteen million pounds of tobacco passed through the Danish Sound from Russian ports between 1777 and 1780. French consumers, however, balked at the use of non-American tobacco in

the manufacture of snuff and were especially critical of the quality of Eastern European leaf. Consumers who could afford it paid the higher prices for Maryland and Virginia leaf. When the war ended, the Farmers General expected prices on Chesapeake tobacco to fall to just above their prewar levels. In Maryland and Virginia, however, costs for tobacco production remained very high because of the destruction by British armies and commerce raiders.[32]

The Merchants' Response

Faced with such dismal prospects, Baltimore merchant Matthew Ridley, Maryland's agent in France, conspired with merchants in the free French port of L'Orient as early as April 1783 to fix the price of tobacco at 42 *l.t.* per quintal. It seemed that such an arrangement would make Maryland's tobacco immediately profitable and Ridley guaranteed the procurement of 10,000 to 13,000 hogsheads of tobacco per year if the French would guarantee the price. The Comte de Vergennes, who was interested in insuring a commercial connection with the newly independent United States, liked the idea although he was unsure about the people involved. Ridley had served as Maryland's purchasing agent in France, but Vergennes did not know him personally. The French minister thus sought the advice of Benjamin Franklin, who served as an American envoy in Paris throughout most of the war and had won the universal respect and admiration of the French court. Franklin suggested that any such plan be carried forward by the firm of Morris and Willing in Philadelphia. Although initially interested, Robert Morris soon backed out, and Franklin directed Vergennes to consider his grandnephew, Jonathan Williams. Williams' father-in-law, William Alexander, had been the Farmers General's purchasing agent in Scotland. This blatant nepotism did not concern Vergennes, for such arrangements were common in monarchial governments. Vergennes thus approached Williams and Alexander, who proposed to supply the Farmers General with fifteen thousand hogsheads per year at just 30 *l.t.* per quintal. Unlike Ridley's proposal, the price set by Williams and Alexander was even lower than what the Farmers General had been offering—just slightly higher than the prewar price for tobacco. The plan seemingly doomed American planters to a less-than-favorable arrangement, and not surprisingly, Vergennes leapt on the deal and approved it October 3, 1783.[33]

Williams and Alexander did not believe that they had sold out their American suppliers. After all, if the arrangement remained unprofitable, there was no way to coerce the sale of tobacco from planters. Williams and Alexander made the arrangements because they fully expected the price of tobacco to plummet to near its prewar levels very soon. By pegging the commodity's price at 30 *l.t.* per quintal, both they and their American suppliers would achieve windfall profits. It was a high-risk strategy, but in March 1784, Robert Morris sensed that Williams and Alexander might be right. Morris thus joined the firm as a silent partner with a

one-third interest in the company. When the long-expected decline failed to materialize, however, Alexander was only able to buy one million pounds of tobacco, of which just 738,760 pounds, or approximately 740 of the fifteen thousand promised hogsheads, were shipped to France. Despite the setback, Morris was still convinced that a fall in prices was coming, and he offered a new contract to the Farmers General in 1784 guaranteeing delivery of an astounding twenty thousand hogsheads of tobacco at a price of 36 *l.t.* per quintal. By this point, the Farmers General had boosted their prices to nearly 45 *l.t.* per quintal, thus the Morris contract seemingly promised to manipulate the market to the detriment of Chesapeake merchants and planters. Thomas Jefferson, who was serving as the new U.S. minister to the French court, was livid about the arrangements, and complained vociferously to Vergennes. Nonetheless, the deal was struck. When prices in the Chesapeake once again failed to decline significantly in 1785, Morris was only able to procure 5,808 hogsheads of tobacco. When tobacco prices finally declined in 1786 to the long-anticipated levels, however, Morris was able to deliver more than the twenty thousand hogsheads promised in the agreement.[34]

Thomas Jefferson was convinced that the various price-fixing schemes had kept prices artificially low and had prevented a full recovery of the Chesapeake's tobacco trade. He was partially correct. Although these schemes did not directly cause a fall in tobacco prices they did raise French expectations of an impending fall and this in turn created a deflationary spiral that had the effect of retarding rather than encouraging trade. In this way, prices made a far greater difference in the commercial frustrations of the tobacco trade than they did in the grain trade. Nonetheless the outcome was the same—a relative lack of demand following the war.

From Bayonne, David Alexander wrote to Tench Tilghman that "prices of Tob[acc]o have been so high in Y[ou]r Continent, no speculations could be made." From Paris, William Short, the American chargé d'affaires, related that "the experience of seven years has suffered to show" that trade between France and America was not profitable. Between 1784 and 1788, not a single "French house having undertaken that Commerce" did so "without losing by it" according to Short. Others echoed the observation. From Bordeaux, Tilghman received a letter complaining that American exports were "rated so amazingly high for our European markets, in short there has been no possibility of our speculating or transacting any business whatever with America but with the greatest certainty of loss."[35]

Despite the overwhelming evidence that profitable markets were few and far between, rumors nonetheless continued to circulate in the 1780s of places in need of American supplies. Part of the reason was poor communication, which limited American knowledge of prices and market conditions in Europe. As Robert Morris admitted to Tilghman in 1784, "the fate of the European crops cannot be ascertained so as to know the demand or the prices." Yet this admission did not stop Morris from speculating to Tilghman in 1786 that flour should fetch a good price

at Cadiz.[36] Morris's information apparently did not include the fact that Europe had recorded an excellent harvest in 1785 and was on the brink of a bigger one in 1786, which demonstrates that even well-connected and supposedly well-informed merchants such as Morris paid as much attention to rumor as reality. Throughout the 1780s, Americans blindly continued to send cargoes to the West Indies and Europe in search of profitable markets. Most of these voyages ended with disappointing if not ruinous results, but merchants continued to hold to the idea that overseas trade represented the best chance for prosperity. Baltimore merchant George Woolsey epitomized this neomercantilist view of the world. During the trying days of the Continental Association, Woolsey complained to his partner, George Salmon, that if business did not improve, he would quit the overseas trade and buy land. He was almost certainly being facetious, but it is interesting that for Woolsey, the alternative to foreign commerce was land speculation and not capital investment in the domestic market economy. For some Americans there were lingering fears after the Revolution about the corrosive effects of industrialization on public virtue.[37]

Sir James Steuart, a Scottish political economist, had established this standard axiom of eighteenth-century thought, stating that "when foreign demand begins to fail, so as not to be recalled, either industry must decline, or domestic luxury must begin." Yet few revolutionaries held so firm to this thinking as to exclude all attempts to develop the domestic market economy—least of all George Woolsey. Instead of a blind faith in republican abstractions, it was Woolsey's single-minded belief in the neo-mercantilist perspective that limited his imagination and kept him from recognizing domestic commerce as a viable alternative to foreign trade. There was a small and sometimes vociferous party that supported a proto-nationalist approach. These reformers hoped to transform the new republic's political economy from the Atlantic-oriented, export-led society of the past into a westward-directed society where the expansion of the domestic market was the central economic concern. The rise of a protectionist effort by mechanics and the creation of numerous societies for the promotion of manufacturing were both part of this proto-nationalist movement.[38]

"Such a Load of Difficulties . . ."

Paul Bentalou, who established a new mercantile house in Baltimore after the war and suffered many misadventures during the 1780s as he searched farther into the Atlantic world and beyond in pursuit of profit, demonstrates better than anyone the blind faith that many Americans had in a modified, less autocratic form of mercantilism. Born in Montauban, France in 1755, Bentalou joined the Royal French Dragoons at fifteen. Like several other young French idealists his age, Bentalou left his native land for the United States in 1776 to join the American crusade for independence. He received a commission as a lieutenant of cavalry

and at the Battle of Brandywine had the opportunity to meet Count Pulaski, the famed Polish cavalry hero of the Revolution. Pulaski was impressed with the young Frenchman and had Bentalou transferred to his command as a captain of cavalry. Bentalou spent the next two years of the war at the Count's side, and at the disastrous Battle of Savannah in 1779, it was Bentalou who carried the mortally wounded Pulaski from the field.[39]

Paroled by the British, Bentalou spent the rest of the war in Baltimore as a recruiting officer. It was there that he met and fell in love with Katharine Keeports, daughter of Baltimore merchant Jacob Keeports. The couple were married before Christmas 1780 and remained in Baltimore. After the war, Bentalou started a mercantile partnership with John Dumeste, the husband of Elizabeth Keeports, Katharine's sister. The firm began auspiciously. In July 1784, Bentalou purchased a three-eighths interest in the *General Washington*, a captured British sloop-of-war that Congress put up at auction as part of its dismantling of the navy. Unfortunately for Bentalou and Dumeste, the purchase of this fine vessel turned out to be the firm's only encouraging event for several years.[40]

Bentalou retained Richard Stevens as the captain of the *General Washington* and borrowed nearly £2,700 from fellow Baltimore merchants Richard Curson and Adrian Valck to purchase dry goods to supplement the ship's cargo of flour. In September 1784, Stevens set out for the Caribbean, but the voyage did not go well. He landed first at St. Thomas in the British Virgin Islands and later at the Dutch island of Curaçao, where, according to Bentalou, Stevens had "by a most unaccountable stupidity, disposed of his flour below Baltimore prices, whilst he well knew." In fact, Stevens had encountered the classic problem that ship captains faced after the Revolution, an inability to find buyers because of glutted markets. Hoping to salvage the expedition, he crossed the Atlantic to Spain in search of a market. His luck was no better in Europe than in the Caribbean, and he returned to Jamaica and Cuba to try once more, unsuccessfully, to sell his cargo. Bentalou suffered a loss of £695 13*s* on the voyage in addition to the debt owed Curson and Valck.[41] He blamed the failure of the voyage on Stevens and never again employed him. As time would prove, however, Stevens had taken the prudent course in minimizing the voyage's losses, and his venture for Bentalou ultimately proved one of the least disastrous of the firm's dealings in the 1780s.

When rumors swirled in the autumn of 1784 that flour was in short supply on Hispaniola, Bentalou's associate, Francis Casenave, sailed for Port-au-Prince in December 1784 with a hold full of flour in the sloop *Flying Fish.* Dumeste followed in the *General Washington* with more flour, as well as the unsold dry goods from Stevens's voyage. Casenave entered at Port-au-Prince, but when he was unable to find any buyers, he had to consign the cargo to a local merchant. Dumeste was denied entrance at Port-au-Prince and entered instead at Kingston, Jamaica. Like Casenave, he was unable to sell his cargo and consigned it to local merchant

Alexander Linde. In each place the agents for the consigned cargoes waited in vain for market conditions to improve and ultimately sold the flour at below cost before it rotted. In Port-au-Prince, Casenave's agent allegedly sold the cargo, which cost more than £2,500, for just £1,150. Casenave refused to give the agent's name, however, and Bentalou was sure that he had been swindled. According to Bentalou, the two men "mutually agreed to refer the settlement of the whole to arbitrators officially appointed by the French consul." Unfortunately for Bentalou, the arbitrators concluded that the low prices quoted by Casenave in his ledger were the result of bad judgement rather than fraud. In addition, Casenave claimed losses against Bentalou for his interest in Dumeste's consignment to Linde, and the arbitrators agreed. Bentalou ultimately suffered losses on these voyages of £1,321 for Casenave's cargo, and approximately £2,046 for Dumeste's consignment in Jamaica. To make matters worse, Dumeste also wrecked the *General Washington* on the return voyage to Baltimore in April 1785, bringing a tragic and unfortunate end to the celebrated vessel.[42]

Rumors once again circulated in August 1785 that Hispaniola needed flour. Bentalou quickly outfitted two brigs, the *Debonair* and *Prospect,* as well as the sloop *Polly* to carry flour to the island. When the ships arrived in September, their captains discovered that French vessels carrying flour from Bordeaux had already crowded into the port, and as Bentalou later related, "a ruinous depression on the prices of that article then followed." Dumeste, who commanded the *Debonair*, consigned the cargoes to a local agent, Cottineau, Chottard, & Company. Bentalou remained ignorant as to the fate of the cargoes until September 16, 1788, nearly three years later. On that day he received a letter from Henry Marchand, a Port-au-Prince merchant who had taken over the accounts of Cottineau, Chottard, and Company, and much to Bentalou's consternation, the 1785 voyage had ended in the same way as all the others. Bentalou wrote that he "had the mortification to find, that, far from being in our debt, as I had flattered myself, they, on the contrary, brought against us a balance" of more than £13,000.[43]

Bentalou was not alone in his troubles. Joshua Barney and John Stricker sent their first consignment of goods to Havana in late 1784, but the local agent squandered the profits. Another of the firm's cargoes spoiled when they could find no buyers, and as business continued to flounder in 1785, Barney slowly disengaged from the firm's activities. Henry Johnson met with similar frustrations and was pleased when his half-brother, George Johonnot, took over the Baltimore branch of their firm in May 1784. Johonnot struggled mightily to scurry up any business. None of his half-brother's letters had succeeded in establishing new commercial ties either in Europe or the West Indies, and thus Johonnot had to rely on the firm's meager coastal trade with New England and its unprofitable connections to trading partners in Havana. By July his frustration concerning the embarrassed situation of the city's commerce boiled over. Writing to Henry, he complained

that "Business is excessive dull . . . and such a quantity of Havanna Sugars we have had stor'd as to break the main beam of the second floor" of the warehouse. Not surprisingly, Johonnot soon rejoined the rest of his family back in Boston. After a flurry of speculation in flour in 1784 and 1785, merchant Christian Keener also faced rough times. In 1786, his commodities purchases fell from £1,647 the previous year to £483 in 1786, and continued falling to just £256 by 1788. By that time he seldom purchased large quantities of flour and no longer speculated in rum. The largest part of his business came from ninety-nine barrels of shad and herring worth just over £50.[44]

Even Robert Oliver, who eventually retired a millionaire, struggled mightily through these years. His partnership with Simm ended by February 1785 with little fanfare. The firm had imported goods from L'Orient and Cadiz in the previous year and likely made little profit as Oliver was only able to invest £1,000 Maryland currency in May 1785 into his new partnership with Hugh Thompson. The new firm focused on the tobacco and flour trade with the free French ports, where they sent twenty-seven of their eighty-four ships over the next three years. The value of the firm's trade with L'Orient reached £19,000 by 1788, but Oliver and Thompson realized a net loss on of £12 on this trade. Similar results plagued the firm's other export accounts. The value of the firm's total exports for 1785–89 was £46,875, but Oliver and Thompson barely managed to cover their costs on this trade. The firm's balance sheet as of March 3, 1789, showed net earnings of £8,625 for the previous four years, but net earnings from exports totaled just £232—a profit margin of less than one-half of one percent. Oliver was able to increase his initial investment in the firm from £1,000 to £3,336 by early 1789, and Thompson increased his net worth from £2,300 to £6,553 thanks to commissions earned for transactions completed for other merchants, and strategic investments in ship ownership and insurance.[45]

That other merchants faced miseries was not a source of comfort to Bentalou. By January 1786, the French emigre had reached a crossroads in his life. Almost £20,000 in debt and facing possible legal action by his creditors, he knew that his next voyage had to be a success. Otherwise, it appeared that he and Dumeste would share the same fate as so many other Baltimore firms in the second half of the 1780s. With "such a load of difficulties so frightfully accumulated," he thus "determined to have Dumeste at home and to try [his] own luck abroad." To secure a cargo of flour and tobacco, he had to post two bonds, one for £350 with the Baltimore firm of Usher and Donaldson, and a second for £687 10*s* with the Baltimore firm of Wilson and Stumps. In May 1786, Bentalou departed for Bayonne with his wife aboard the *Heartwigh*. Throughout "a most disagreeable, long & tedious passage," his firm's survival weighed heavily upon his mind.[46]

Arriving in Bayonne in August 1786, Bentalou found no buyers for his cargo and was forced to store it. Fortunately, Frederick Folger, whom Bentalou knew as

Baltimore merchant John Sterret's favorite ship captain, sent a letter asking Bentalou about procuring a cargo in Bordeaux suitable for the market in Charleston, South Carolina. The plan was to exchange the French goods for rice and return to Bordeaux in time for Lent. Folger offered Bentalou up to a half-interest in the cargo, but Bentalou did not have that kind of capital. Using his unsold tobacco as collateral, Bentalou was able to convince Pierre Changeur, an old family friend, to lend him more than 30,000 *l.t.* (the equivalent of approximately £1,250) to finance a share in the venture. Once again the firm was on the line and, once again, disappointment followed. After departing for Charleston in fall 1786, Folger did not return to Bordeaux until July 1787, months after Lent had ended. The normally reliable Folger had altered course to St. Eustatius, where he exchanged the French goods for rum and gin. He then proceeded to Charleston where he consigned the cargo to Robert Hazlehurst for a smaller supply of rice and tobacco than the French investors anticipated. Upon his return to Bordeaux, Bentalou's entire share of the Charleston cargo was turned over to Changeur to repay the loan. Once again the venture had failed, and by November, Bentalou had reached the end of his tether. Returning to Baltimore, he lamented that "Such was the truly disturbing situation in which I found our affairs . . . and so puzzled was I in that cruel dilemma, that having almost given myself up to despair, I could discover no way how to extricate myself, or how to continue going on."[47]

One last chance at commercial redemption was afforded to Bentalou thanks to the intervention of Dumeste's brother. A planter with significant estates and commercial interests in the Mascarene Islands, located north and east of Madagascar, Dumeste's brother desired to initiate a trade with America and looked to his family in Baltimore to facilitate it.[48] In November 1787, Bentalou was able to convince his friend and fellow merchant, William Vanwyck, to lend him $700 to gain a one-twelfth interest in the small 100-ton brig *Traveller* owned by Baltimore merchant James Clark and commanded by Captain Daniel Howland. The investment was embarrassingly small, but Bentalou considered himself fortunate to have received credit from anyone. Dumeste soon departed on the *Traveller* for the Cape of Good Hope and the French islands beyond, leaving Bentalou behind to await word of the voyage's fortunes and mull over his options if the commercial venture proved a failure.[49]

When the *Traveller* finally arrived in Baltimore in November 1788, Bentalou's faith in overseas trade and the neo-mercantilist perspective was restored. The venture turned out to be a tremendous success—the first truly good news for his struggling firm in more than four years. Bentalou's modest one-sixteenth share in the venture yielded a substantial profit and proved more than enough to satisfy his creditors in the short-run. He had managed to buy needed time to slowly climb out of the abyss of his debts. John Clark, the merchant who had helped finance Bentalou's share in the voyage, was so impressed with the success of the

voyage that he outfitted the *Traveller* and the ship *Betsy* to return to the French islands at once with tobacco and other goods "thought best to answer that market." Dumeste's brother supplied a substantial loan to Dumeste and Bentalou, enabling the firm to receive a three-sixteenths share in the *Betsy.* In February 1789, Clark's two vessels departed from Baltimore with Dumeste on board. Once again, Bentalou was forced to wait.[50]

Pending his partner's return, Bentalou decided "to live as economically as possible" and retired with his wife "to a garden we then had . . . and accommodated ourselves as well as . . . we could in a very small house." Over the next two years, Bentalou was mightily harassed by his creditors, but in May 1791, the *Betsy* finally returned. The *Traveller* had been sold, along with its cargo at Mozambique, and Dumeste had remained in Ile de France in the Mascarenes. The voyage was not a failure, but its success fell "far short of our expectations" according to Bentalou, and the *Betsy* had arrived in very poor condition. Yet Clark remained impressed with the commercial possibilities on the French islands and outfitted the ship *Sally* for a return voyage. Despite Bentalou's own complaints, the profits from his interest in the *Betsy* were enough to finance a one-fourth interest in the *Sally.* Saved from insolvency, any thoughts that he might have entertained about commercial alternatives faded away.[51]

The economic travails of the Confederation period finally ended when the French grain harvest failed in 1789, and the wars of the French Revolution opened up enormous opportunities for American merchants in the carrying trade. In this respect the economic history of the 1790s is markedly different from that of the previous decade—bust had turned to boom. Yet in terms of political economy, there was almost no difference between the two periods. In both the 1780s and 1790s, the United States remained an export-led society whose fortunes rose and fell with the rhythms of foreign markets—much as the colonies had been before the war. The Revolution secured political independence for the new nation, but the country remained deeply dependent on the Atlantic world, and in this sense, the interlude between the end of the war and the end of the century may be more accurately conceived as a *postcolonial* rather than an early national period. As Michael Warner has argued, "the structuring of the transatlantic economy as a colonial economy had deep consequences for almost every aspect of Anglo-American culture," and thus "the market culture of the [British] Atlantic may have been more responsible than anything else for the practical sense of belonging to an imperium." In this context, a colonial culture could persist after the Revolution because it could be "experienced in many indirect ways."[52] Until Americans stopped fixing their gaze across the ocean toward the horizon and the Atlantic markets beyond, they would continue to imagine themselves within the context of an imperium that now encompassed the Atlantic world as a whole. And as Paul Bentalou discovered while he awaited the return of the *Betsy,* it was not always possible to be an agent of your own destiny in that most volatile and uncertain world.

Appendix A

Estimates for Exports and Exports per Capita:
The Thirteen British North American Colonies (1768–1775) and the United States (1776–1790)

Year	Estimated Population: Schedule A	Estimated Population: Schedule B	Exports to England and Scotland	Total Exports Low Estimate (£)	Total Exports High Estimate	Total Exports per Capita (Low-High Est.)
1768	2,037,186	2,037,186	£1,484,555	£2,403,000	£2,403,000	£1.18
1769	2,092,631	2,092,631	1,329,055	2,947,000	2,947,000	1.41
1770	2,148,076	2,148,076	1,351,229	2,983,000	2,983,000	1.39
1771	2,211,305	2,253,458	1,714,312	3,252,000	3,252,000	1.44–1.47
1772	2,274,534	2,358,840	1,556,603	3,487,000	3,487,000	1.48–1.53
1773	2,337,764	2,464,222	1,602,282	2,592,689	3,590,950	1.05–1.54
1774	2,400,993	2,569,604	1,626,877	2,632,487	3,646,071	1.02–1.52
1775	2,464,223	2,674,987	1,945,143	3,147,481	4,359,352	1.18–1.77
1776	2,527,452	2,780,369	104,869	n/a	n/a	n/a
1777	2,590,681	2,780,369	48,172	n/a	n/a	n/a
1778	2,653,910	2,780,369	52,904	n/a	n/a	n/a
1779	2,717,140	2,780,369	83,205	n/a	n/a	n/a
1780	2,780,369	2,780,369	189,877	n/a	n/a	n/a
1781	2,780,369	2,895,254	247,415	n/a	n/a	n/a
1782	2,780,369	3,010,138	73,000	n/a	n/a	n/a
1783	2,780,369	3,125,023	422,694	n/a	n/a	n/a
1784	2,944,490	3,239,907	1,020,794	3,432,394	3,623,692	1.06–1.23
1785	3,108,610	3,354,792	1,005,174	3,379,872	3,568,243	1.01–1.15
1786	3,272,731	3,469,676	915,855	3,079,539	3,251,171	0.89–0.99
1787	3,436,852	3,584,561	1,000,342	3,363,625	3,551,090	0.94–1.03
1788	3,600,973	3,699,445	1,059,842	3,563,692	3,762,307	0.96–1.04
1789	3,765,093	3,814,330	1,082,189	3,638,833	3,841,636	0.95–1.02
1790	3,929,214	3,929,214	1,216,931	4,319,654	4,319,654	1.10

Sources and Methods for Population Estimates

The population figures in both Schedule A and Schedule B for 1770, 1780, and 1790 were taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 1:8, and 2:1168. The population estimates for 1768–69 assume an arithmetic annual increase of 55,445.1 between the recorded population figures for 1760 and 1770. Population estimates for 1771–79 and 1781–89 were derived using two methods. The first method assumes an arithmetic increase between the reported population figures for 1770 and 1780 and between the reported population figures for 1780 and 1790. For 1771–79, this yields an annual increase of 63,229.3, and for 1781–89, an annual increase of 114,884.5. The second method assumes there was zero population growth between 1776 and 1783, and that population otherwise increased arithmetically between 1770 and 1776 and between 1784 and 1790. This yields an annual arithmetic increase between 1770 and 1776 of 105,382.2, zero change for 1776–83, and an annual arithmetic increase between 1784 and 1790 of 164,120.7. Schedule A represents the lower estimate for that year (by either method) and Schedule B represents the higher estimate for that year (by either method).

Sources and Methods for Estimates of Total Exports

The figures for American exports to England and Scotland were taken from *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 2:1174, 1176, and the estimates of total exports for 1768–1772 were taken from James Shepherd and Gary Walton, *Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), table 1, which used the American Inspector-General's Ledgers (PRO, Customs 16/1) as a source. These figures are reprinted in from *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 2:1182–83.

The low estimates for total exports between 1773 and 1775 assumes that the reported exports to England and Scotland represented 61.80 percent of total exports, which was the actual percentage for 1768 (the high for 1768–72). The high estimates for total exports between 1773 and 1775 assumes that the reported exports to England and Scotland represented 44.62 percent of total exports, which was the actual percentage for 1772 (the low for 1768–72). The average percentage of total exports sent to Britain between 1768 and 1772 was 49.33 percent, thus the actual value of total exports between 1773 and 1775 were likely much closer to the high estimates.

The low estimates for total exports between 1784 and 1789 assumes that the reported exports to England and Scotland represented 29.74 percent of total exports, which was the actual percentage for 1790 based on the data provided in *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 2:886, 1174, 1176. The high estimates for total exports between 1784 and 1789 assumes that the reported exports to England and Scotland represented 28.17 percent of total exports, which was the actual percentage for 1791.

Total exports for 1790 were reported in *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 2:886 as $20 million. For comparative purposes, dollars were converted into pounds Sterling based on a fixed silver exchange rate of £1 to $4.63. See Stuart Bruchey, *Enterprise: The Dynamic Economy of a Free People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 168.

Method for Calculating Estimated Exports per Capita

The low estimate is the dividend of the low estimate for total exports divided by the high estimate for population. The high estimate is the dividend of the high estimate for total exports divided by the low estimate for population.

NOTES

1. Timothy Pitkin reported that total exports of bulk wheat from British America in 1770 amounted to 851,240 bushels, and bread and flour exports amounted to 45,868 tons. According to David Klingaman, it took 51.4 bushels of wheat to produce one ton of flour, thus the volume of flour and bread exports were equivalent to 2.36 million bushels of wheat, and total American exports were equivalent to 3.2 million bushels of wheat. Baltimore's share of the trade is based on the 1779 report to the British made by Robert Alexander, a Maryland Loyalist. Alexander stated that gross exports from Baltimore in 1774 amounted to 120,000 barrels of flour and 250,000 bushels of bulk wheat. These figures are consistent with the data provided by Pitkin. Assuming a conversion ratio of 11.43 barrels per ton (each barrel containing 196 pounds), the equivalent volume of flour exports was 10,499 tons, or approximately 539,633 bushels of wheat using Klingaman's conversion method. Baltimore's total exports of wheat and flour in 1774 were therefore equivalent to 789,632 bushels of wheat. See David Klingaman, "The Significance of Grain in the Development of the Tobacco Colonies," *Journal of Economic History*, 29 (1969): 272; Edward C. Papenfuse, "Economic Analysis and Loyalist Strategy During the American Revolution: Robert Alexander's Remarks on the Economy of the Peninsula or the Eastern Shore of Maryland," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 68 (1973): 193; and Timothy Pitkin, *A Statistical View of Commerce of the United States* (1835; repr. Woodbridge, Conn.: Research Publications, 1980), 21–23.

2. Henry Johnson to James Demie, November 8, 1783, in Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook, MS 498, Maryland Historical Society (hereinafter cited MdHS), and J. Thomas Scharf, *The Chronicles of Baltimore: Being a Complete History of "Baltimore Town" and Baltimore City from the Earliest Period to the Present Time* (Baltimore: Turnbull Brothers, 1874), 195–96, 199–203, 206–7. The observation that Baltimore was "flush with specie" is based on the observations of French General François Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de Chastellux. The general estimated that wartime spending by British troops had placed more than £10 million Sterling into circulation in the United States by the end of 1782 and that spending by French troops, not including monies spent by naval forces, added another 35 million livres tournais, or the equivalent of more than £1 million Sterling to the American economy. Much of the French spending occurred in the city, and, as historian Richard Buel observed, much of the "French money distributed in Virginia [also] flowed to Baltimore," and had "only a slight effect on the Virginia economy." See François Jean de Beauvoir, Chevalier de Chastellux, *Travels in North America in the Years 1780–1781–1782*, trans. Howard Rice (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), 2:572, and Richard Buel, *In Irons: Britain's Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 210.

3. Henry Johnson to Francis Johonnot, April 27, 1784, in Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook, MdHS. The firm's three members included George and Francis (Frank) Johonnot, who were brothers, and Henry Johnson, their half-brother. They were likely third generation descendants of Huguenot merchants. See Rhoda Dorsey, "The Conduct of Business in Baltimore, 1783–1785: As seen in the Letterbook of Johnson, Johonnot, & Co.," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 55 (1960): 230.

4. As late as mid-February 1783, Americans did have reason to expect that an export boom would follow the war. In France, Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, who served as both foreign minister and principal minister to King Louis XVI, desired to keep French ports open to American ships after the war. In Britain an unimpeded trade with America was also a preeminent concern of the new prime minister, William Petty Fitzmaurice, Earl of Shelburne.

See *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England: From the Norman Conquest in 1066 to the Year 1803* (London: T. C. Hansard, 1806–20), XXIII, colums 409–10; Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 16–23, 236–48; Jonathan Dull, *A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 38–39; Gregg Lint, "Preparing for Peace: The Objectives of the United States, France, and Spain in the War of the American Revolution," in Ronald Hoffman and Peter Albert, eds., *Peace and the Peacemakers: The Treaty of 1784* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986), 35–38; Charles Ritcheson, *The Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Toward the United States, 1783–1795* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969), 5–19; Charles Ritcheson, "The Earl of Shelburne and Peace with America, 1782–1783: Vision and Reality," *International History Review*, 5 (1983): 322–45; Esmond Wright, "British Objectives, 1780–83: 'If Not Dominion Then Trade,'" in Hoffman and Albert, eds., *Peace and the Peacemakers*, 18, 22, 27–28; and Jonathan Dull, "Vergennes, Rayvenal, and the Diplomacy of Trust," in ibid., 110–12.

5. Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, August 10, 1785, in *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams*, ed. Lester Cappon (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 1:52.

6. The classic statement of this view is Merrill Jensen, *The New Nation: A History of the United States during the Confederation, 1781–1789* (New York: Vintage Books, 1950).

7. On entrances and clearances from Baltimore harbor during the 1780s, see Rhoda Dorsey, "The Pattern of Baltimore Commerce during the Confederation Period," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 62 (1967): 119–34.

8. On the ways in which Americans redefined and modified mercantilism to fit their republican principles during and after the American Revolution, see John Crowley, *The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American Revolution* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 75–83; Drew McCoy, "The Virginia Port Bill of 1784," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 83 (1975): 288–303; and Lawrence Peskin, "To 'Encourage and Protect' American Manufactures: The Intellectual Origins of Industrialization, 1763–1830" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 1998), chapters 1 and 2.

9. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 2:1176. For the early development of Baltimore's Atlantic markets, see Richard Chew, "The Measure of Independence: From the American Revolution to the Market Revolution in the Mid-Atlantic" (Ph.D. diss., The College of William and Mary, 2002), chapter 1.

10. Maryland's population of 245,474 in 1780 accounted for 31.33 percent of the population of Virginia and Maryland combined. Assuming that Maryland's share of imports mirrored the population figures, the value of Maryland's total imports from England between 1783 and 1785 would have been approximately £675,000. See *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 2:1168, 1176.

11. Johann David Schoepf, *Travels in the Confederation, 1783–1784*, trans. and ed. by A. J. Morrison (Philadelphia: W. J. Campbell, 1911), 1:328; and Henry Johnson to Stephen Higginson, March 25, 1784, in Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook, MdHS.

12. *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 2:1176, 1182–83. For a discussion of the methodology used to estimate total American exports in the 1780s and exports per capita before and after the war, see Appendix A.

13. See Jensen, *The New Nation*, 195; Rhoda Dorsey, "The Resumption of Anglo-American Trade in New England, 1793–1794" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1956); and Dorsey, "The Pattern of Baltimore Commerce during the Confederation Period," 119–34.

14. Philip Crowl, *Maryland During and After the Revolution: A Political and Economic Study*

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1943), 83–110, and Maganzin, "Economic Depression in Maryland and Virginia," 177–202. Baltimore Town was not yet independent of the county at that point, thus suits brought against debtors in the city had to be heard in the county court which further delayed matters.

15. Louis Maganzin, "Economic Depression in Maryland and Virginia, 1783–1787" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1967), 19–22; *The Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 1:41 n.33; John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, August 7, 1785, in *The Adams-Jefferson Letters*, 1:51; Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, September 26 and October 3, 1783, Arthur Campbell to James Madison, October 28, 1783, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, May 8, 1784, and James Madison to Richard Henry Lee, July 7, 1785, in William Hutchinson and William Rachal, eds., *The Papers of James Madison* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962–), 6:377, 7:359, 366, 383, and 8:29, 145, 314.

16. Ritcheson, *The Aftermath of Revolution*, 5–19, 39–45; Frederick Nussbaum, "The French Colonial Arrêt of 1784," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 27 (1928): 69–70; Elizabeth Nuxoll and Mary Gallagher, eds., *The Papers of Robert Morris, 1781–1784* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995–99), 8:510–11, 681–85; Kathryn Sullivan, *Maryland and France, 1774–1789* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936), 137–43; Henry Sée, "Commerce between France and the United States," *American Historical Review*, 31 (1926): 734–35; David Ross and other Virginia merchants to Thomas Jefferson, October 18, 1785, in Julian Boyd, ed., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950–), 8:650–51; Lewis Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860* (Washington: The Carnegie Institute, 1933), 2:600; and Jacob Price, *France and the Chesapeake: A History of the French Tobacco Monopoly, 1674–1791, and of Its Relationship to the British and American Tobacco Trades* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973), 2:732.

17. Edmund Burnett, "Observations of London Merchants on American Trade, 1783," *American Historical Review*, 18 (1913): 769–73, and Alice Keith, "Relaxations in the British Restrictions on the American Trade with the British West Indies, 1783–1802," *The Journal of Modern History*, 20 (1948): 1–2. The complaints of the freeholders on Antigua appeared in the *Bahama Gazette* for October 6, 1783, and the story was reprinted in the *Maryland Gazette* (Annapolis) for December 18, 1783.

18. Keith, "Relaxations in the British Restrictions," 2–3, 6–7.

19. Ibid., 5, 7–9, and Lowell Ragatz, "'Upon Every Principle of True Policy': The West Indies in the Second Empire," in Charles Toth, ed., *The American Revolution and the West Indies* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1975), 183–95.

20. Henry Johnson to James Demie, November 8, 1783; Henry Johnson to Messrs. Marie & Co., November 8, 1783; and Johnson, Johonnot & Co. [Henry Johnson] to Frank [Francis Johonnot], February 21, 1784, in Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook, MdHS.

21. Ritcheson, *The Aftermath of Revolution*, 212–27. In 1787, Parliament sought a compromise by allowing single-decked American vessels of no more than 70 tons burden to enter in Jamaica at Kingston, Savanna-la-Mar, Montego Bay, and St. Lucia, St. George in Grenada, Roseau in Dominica, and Nassau in the Bahamas. However, the vessels were still not allowed to carry tobacco or grains, only cotton, indigo, livestock, timber products of various types, furs, and the produce of European colonies. See Keith, "Relaxations in the British Restrictions," 2, and Ragatz, "'Upon Every Principle of True Policy,'" 191, 194.

22. Buel, *In Irons*, 5–25, 47–52, 113; Harold Pinkett, "Maryland as a Source of Food Supplies During the American Revolution," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 46 (1951): 157–72; and Horatio Gates to George Washington, April 12, 1779, Horatio Gates Papers, Library of Congress, quoted in Buel, *In Irons*, 7.

23. E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson, *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume V: The Economic Organization of Early Modern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 66–71, 76. These methods had been employed since the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries to expand acreage used for grain production, and the major era of expansion had ended more than a century before the start of the American War for Independence. Nevertheless, there had been a decline during the early eighteenth century in the number of acres under cultivation in Europe, and while the amount of new land brought back under cultivation in the late eighteenth century by these means was relatively small compared to the increases of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, they were not inconsequential.

24. Hudson and Harrison to Tench Tilghman & Co., July 27, 1785, in Tench Tilghman Papers, MdHS, and Geoffrey Gilbert, *Baltimore's Flour Trade to the Caribbean, 1750–1815* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1986), 66–67.

25. J. Titow discovered the correlation between specific weather conditions and crop yields. His analysis was based on research on Winchester, England between 1209 and 1350, but it should be applicable to Europe as a whole as well as the latter period. See J. Titow, "Evidence of Weather in the Account Rolls of the Bishopric of Winchester, 1209–1350," *The Economic History Review,* 2d ser., 12 (1960), cited in Rich and Wilson, *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume V,* 59–60. For British grain exports see B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 94–95. For grain prices in Amsterdam, see Nicolaas Wilhelmus Posthumus, *Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1946–64), I, table 1.

26. Between January 1768 and December 1774, the average wholesale price for flour in Philadelphia was 17.5 shillings per hundredweight, and the average wholesale price for wheat was 6.65 shillings per bushel. Between January 1784 and August 1787, the average wholesale price for superfine flour was 25.2 shillings per hundredweight, and the average wholesale price for wheat was 7.75 shillings per bushel. Between July 1787 and January 1788, the wholesale price of superfine flour dropped from 24.3 to 17.4 shillings per hundredweight, and the wholesale price of wheat dropped from 7.25 to 5.25 shillings per bushel. The price for superfine flour rose above prewar averages once again in March 1788, though the price of wheat did not consistently exceed prewar averages again until after April 1789. See Anne Bezanson, Robert Gray and Miriam Hussey, *Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935), 408–14, and Anne Bezanson, *Prices and Inflation during the American Revolution: Pennsylvania, 1770–1790* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), 339–41.

27. Charles Herries & Co. to Tench Tilghman & Co., August 3, 1785; James Burn to Tench Tilghman & Co., July 9 1784; Teronimo Hixosa to Tench Tilghman & Co., April 27, 1785; George E. Fox & Sons to Tench Tilghman & Co., June 8, 1785; James Duff to Tench Tilghman & Co., August 2, 1784 and September 20, 1785; De Larrard & Co. to Tench Tilghman & Co., December 11, 1784 and October 22, 1785; and Livingston & Turnbull to Tench Tilghman & Co., October 10, 1785, in Tench Tilghman Papers, MdHS.

28. Gilbert, *Baltimore's Flour Trade to the Caribbean,* 66–67, Appendix D.

29. George Woolsey to George Salmon, January 26, 1776, Woolsey and Salmon Letterbook, Library of Congress; Myron Smith and John Earle, "The Maryland State Navy," in Ernest Eller, ed., *Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution* (Centreville, Md.: Tidewater Publishers, 1981), 216–46; Edwin Jameson, "Tory Operations on the Bay," in *Chesapeake Bay in the American Revolution,* 378–402; and John Selby, *The Revolution in Virginia, 1775–1783* (Williamsburg, Va.: Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1988), 204–8.

30. Price, *France and the Chesapeake,* 2:715, 717, 720–21. A quintal refers to 100 French pounds and a hundredweight refers to 100 English pounds. The English and French measured a

pound differently, however, and thus a price per quintal needs to be discounted by 8 percent when converting to a price per hundredweight. The currency must also be converted. In 1783, 24 French *l.t.* could be exchanged for £1 Sterling, thus one French *l.t.*. was worth approximately 0.83 shillings. This means a multiplier of 0.764 (0.92 × 0.83) should be used to convert tobacco prices from *l.t.* per quintal into shillings per hundredweight (*s*/cwt). To convert from *s*/cwt back into *l.t.* per quintal, a multiplier of 1.309 (1 / 0.764) should be used. Thus the price of Virginia and Maryland tobacco in France rose from 15*s*/cwt in 1775 to 115*s*/cwt in 1777 and reached 149*s*/cwt in 1778. This made the trade initially very profitable for Americans, as the price in the Mid-Atlantic rose to an average of 56*s*/cwt in 1777 and only reached 100*s*/cwt in June 1778. By September 1778, however, the price reached 150*s*/cwt and continued appreciating even further. See Price, *France and the Chesapeake,* 2:753, and Bezanson, *Prices and Inflation during the American Revolution,* 335–36.

31. The Farmers General paid 78.1 million *l.t.* for tobacco purchases totaling just more than 157 million pounds between 1777 and 1782. Thus the Farmers General's average wartime price was *l.t.* per quintal. See Price, *France and the Chesapeake,* 2:717–27, 852.

32. Indeed, prices on Maryland tobacco actually rose from 30 *s*/cwt, Maryland currency, in November 1783 (or the equivalent of about 24 *l.t.* per quintal) to 38*s*/cwt, Maryland currency, in May 1785 (or the equivalent of about 30 *l.t.* per quintal). Given the costs of freight, commissions, and duties, Maryland leaf had to be resold in Europe for at least 31 to 33 *l.t.* per quintal in November 1783, and 38 to 40 *l.t.* per quintal by May 1785 for a merchant to break-even. Unfortunately, the Farmers General were only willing to offer 35 *l.t.* per quintal. Jacob Price, *France and the Chesapeake: A History of the French Tobacco Monopoly, 1674–1791, and of Its Relationship to the British and American Tobacco Trades* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973), 2:728–31, 752–54. To convert *s*/cwt (Maryland currency) to *l.t.* per quintal, the price must be converted to Sterling using a multiplier of 0.6 (at par, £100 Sterling equaled £166 2/3 Maryland currency). The multiplier of 1.309 may then be used to convert the price in Sterling to *l.t.* per quintal.

33. Price, *France and the Chesapeake,* 2:741–43.

34. Ibid., 2:747–73.

35. David Alexander to Tench Tilghman & Co., October 4, 1785, and French & Nephew to Tench Tilghman & Co., November 12, 1785, in Tench Tilghman Papers, MdHS, and American State Papers, "Extract of a Letter from William Short, Chargé des Affaires of the United States at the Court of France," October 21, 1790, *Foreign Relations,* Class I, vol. I, 120–21, quoted in Maganzin, "Economic Depression in Virginia and Maryland," 94–95.

36. Robert Morris to Tench Tilghman, August 3, 1784, and Robert Morris to Tench Tilghman, January 3, 1786, in Robert Morris Papers, New York Public Library.

37. Sir James Steuart, a Scottish political economist, had established this standard axiom of eighteenth-century thought, stating that "when foreign demand begins to fail, so as not to be recalled, either industry must decline, or domestic luxury must begin." Yet few revolutionaries held so firm to this thinking as to exclude all attempts to develop the domestic market economy—least of all George Woolsey. Instead of a blind faith in republican abstractions, it was Woolsey's single-minded belief in the neo-mercantilist perspective that limited his imagination and kept him from recognizing domestic commerce as a viable alternative to foreign trade. See Sir James Steuart, *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy,* ed. Andrew Skinner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 2:237.

38. A contributor to the *Maryland Gazette* argued in 1784 that the nation should adopt tariffs because it should be "the policy of every nation, to encourage their own manufactory as much as possible." In 1785 advocates of the proto-nationalist approach proposed a massive new

road system for Maryland that included thirteen state roads and encompassed 504 miles of roadway at a projected cost of £20,800. Yet none of these efforts succeeded. Although protective measures were adopted by Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, the tariffs imposed by the first three legislatures were meant as much to force trade concessions from the British and French as they were intended for the promotion of nascent industries. In the case of the Virginia Port Bill, which was authored by James Madison, the real purpose was to augment the state's export trade by breaking the monopoly held by the British merchants over Virginia's markets. The most promising sign of a more nationalist turn in Maryland, the chartering of a bank in 1784, was mightily opposed by mechanics and manufacturers. The proposed bank would have offered short-term credit only, which was useful only to merchants, and made no guaranteed provision for a regular supply of currency, which would have been of benefit to the domestic market. Mechanics and farmers thus feared that the new bank would simply drain even more capital into the export trades and away from the countryside. It would not be until the early nineteenth century that Maryland would finally create a modern road system and charter commercial banks that directly served the needs of mechanics, farmers, and manufacturers. During the 1780s the neo-mercantilist view reigned supreme. For the mechanic protectionist movement and the creation of societies to promote manufacturing, see Lawrence Peskin, "To 'Encourage and Protect' American Manufactures: The Intellectual Origins of Industrialization, 1763–1830," (Ph.D., diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 1998), chapters 3 and 4. On the proposed roads and bank in Maryland, see Alfred Cookman Bryan, *History of State Banking in Maryland* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1899), 13, 17–19. For the debate over the bank, see *Maryland Journal and Baltimore Daily Advertiser,* November 9 and 19, and December 7 and 17, 1784. The contributor to the *Maryland Journal* demanding tariffs is also quoted in *Maryland Journal and Baltimore Daily Advertiser,* November 19, 1784. For the Virginia Port Bill, see Richard Chew, "A New Hope for the Republic," (M.A. thesis, The College of William and Mary, 1992).

39. Bentalou File in Dielman-Hayward File, MdHS. The file draws on newspaper reprints of Bentalou's life in *The Baltimorean,* January 22, 1881, and *Baltimore American,* November 10, 1903.

40. "Paul Bentalou," in Dielman-Hayward File, MdHS, and entry for July 1784, Paul Bentalou Journal, MS 125, MdHS. Francis Casenave and Thomas Burling held shares of three-eighths and a one-quarter in the *General Washington,* respectively. Bentalou referred to the ship he purchased from Congress as the *George Washington,* but it was the *General Washington* that Congress sold at auction and Bentalou bought in July 1784. The Continental navy also had a 32-gun frigate named the *Washington* that was destroyed in 1777, but there was no Continental warship ever named the *George Washington.* The *General Washington* was originally the British sloop-of-war *General Monk.* Joshua Barney captured the *General Monk* in 1782, subsequently refitted and renamed the prize vessel, and commanded it to victories over two British sloops and a schooner before the end of the war. See Louis Arthur Norton, *Joshua Barney: Hero of the Revolution and 1812* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 98–99; and Nathan Miller, *Sea of Glory: A Naval History of the American Revolution* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974), 528–29.

41. August to September 1784, and January 1786, Paul Bentalou Journal, MdHS.

42. December 1784 to April 1785, [early] 1788, and April 1789, Paul Bentalou Journal, MdHS. Linde provided a note to Bentalou in 1789 showing losses on Dumeste's consignment of $4,261, the equivalent of approximately £1,600. In addition, the arbitrators in the case between Bentalou and Casenave awarded the latter £448 2s 4d for his interest in Dumeste's consignment, thus bringing Bentalou's total losses on the voyage to approximately £2,046.

43. August to September 1785, and September 1788, Paul Bentalou Journal, MdHS.
44. Norton, *Joshua Barney*, 101–2; George Johonnot to Henry Johnson, July 13, 1784, in Johnson, Johonnot & Co. Letterbook, MdHS; and [Christian] Keener Account Book, MS 514, MdHS. Rhoda Dorsey is certain that all three brothers in the firm Johnson, Johonnot, and Co. returned to Boston, but she is unsure when. See Rhoda Dorsey, "The Conduct of Business in Baltimore, 1783–1785: As Seen in the Letterbook of Johnson, Johonnot, & Co.," 242.
45. Stuart Bruchey, *Robert Oliver, Merchant of Baltimore, 1783–1819* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), 52–73. Bruchey points out that many of these export accounts were still open on March 3, 1789. The closed accounts that showed net losses were L'Orient, Bordeaux, Liverpool, the West Indies, Boston, and Petersburg. Only Teneriffe, St. Croix, and Newry showed moderate gains. The accounts for Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Amsterdam, Marseilles, Nantes, Jamaica, and St. Thomas were still open. The final outcome of these ventures is unknown due to a gap in the firm's extant records, but Bruchey suggests that when closed, it is likely that the firm may have actually shown a net loss.
46. Bruchey, *Robert Oliver*, 62; January to May 1786, and September 1786, Paul Bentalou Journal, MdHS.
47. August 1786 to November 1787, Paul Bentalou Journal, MdHS.
48. The Mascarene Islands included the French colonies Ile de France, which is today the independent Republic of Mauritius, and Ile de Bourbon, which is today the French possession Réunion. The former was settled in 1638 by the Dutch, who introduced sugarcane as a cash crop. The French seized the island in 1721, introducing enslaved African labor, and changing the name of the island to Ile de France. The British seized the island in 1810, changing its name to Mauritius. The latter was occupied by the French in 1665 and thereafter remained a French colony. At the start of the twenty-first century, Réunion was France's most populous overseas possession and was represented by five deputies and three senators in the French Parliament.
49. November 1787, Paul Bentalou Journal, MdHS.
50. November 1787 to February 1788, Paul Bentalou Journal, MdHS.
51. February 1788 to May 1791, Paul Bentalou Journal, MdHS.
52. Michael Warner, "What's Colonial about Colonial America?" in Robert Blair St. George, ed., *Possible Pasts: Becoming Colonial in Early America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 59–60, 63.



Spiro T. Agnew (Courtesy Library of Congress.)

Spiro T. Agnew and Middle Ground Politics

JUSTIN P. COFFEY

Spiro Agnew is remembered today as a conservative Republican vice president who served as Richard Nixon's attack dog. Earlier in his political career as Baltimore County executive and governor of Maryland, Agnew waged an energetic battle to insure that the Republican Party followed "the moderate course of Republicanism represented by the successful Eisenhower administration."[1] When Agnew launched his campaign to maintain Dwight D. Eisenhower's "moderate course," the GOP was in the midst of an identity crisis. Throughout Eisenhower's presidency (1953–61), there were few overt ideological disputes. In 1960, Vice President Richard Nixon ran as the Republican nominee for president. Nixon was neither a conservative nor a liberal Republican, but very much a centrist who was acceptable to both wings of the party.

Nixon's narrow loss to Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts exposed the bitter rifts within the GOP. While Eisenhower was president and Nixon campaigned for the office, the two sides, for the most part, muted their differences. After Nixon's defeat a fierce intra-party war erupted, dividing the GOP and ultimately leading to a disastrous defeat in the 1964 election that left deep, slow-healing wounds.

Into this debate stepped Spiro Agnew, a newcomer who had first won elected office in 1962 and then attempted to influence the future of the Republican Party. The product of suburban Baltimore County, a milieu where pragmatism was valued over ideology, Agnew recoiled at the intense debate within the Republican Party. His first official foray into the political maelstrom dividing the GOP occurred in July 1963, when he issued a press release announcing that he was endorsing California's senior senator, Thomas H. Kuchel, for the 1964 Republican presidential nomination. This obscure Maryland politician brashly challenged his party's leaders to rally behind Kuchel, "a moderate Republican." Fearful that a burgeoning ideological split would serve only to reelect President John F. Kennedy, Agnew urged Republicans to avoid taking the party in either a conservative or a liberal direction. Such a course, Agnew warned, would destroy any chances of winning the general election. The party's only hope was to unite behind Kuchel, the man who could "lead a march of moderate Republicanism back to the White

The author is an adjunct professor of history at DePaul University in Chicago. He is currently at work on a biography of Spiro T. Agnew.

House."[2] Kuchel, though flattered, was not interested in running for president and politely put a halt to the draft movement. Disappointed but undeterred, Agnew turned his attention to other moderates he hoped would lead the Republican Party.[3]

Agnew was a bit player in a major battle for the heart and soul of the Republican Party. After Richard Nixon's narrow defeat in 1960, a struggle ensued over which direction the party should take. In the aftermath of that election a group of right-wingers led by New York attorney F. Clifton White, editor of the conservative magazine *National Review*, William Rusher, and Ohio congressman John Ashbrook began laying the groundwork for a conservative takeover of the GOP.[4] To Agnew's disgust the conservatives eventually triumphed. Arizona senator Barry Goldwater defeated New York governor Nelson A. Rockefeller for the nomination, only to eventually suffer one of the worst electoral drubbings in American history.

Agnew feared precisely this outcome when he first trumpeted Kuchel for the Republican nomination. Almost immediately after the Goldwater debacle, Agnew worked on plans to ensure the party did not repeat the mistake in 1968. This time he turned his affections toward Rockefeller, Goldwater's nemesis. It was a measure of Agnew's disdain for the conservative movement that he embraced the right wing's *bete noire*. So convinced was he that the Right was a danger to the Republican Party that he launched another draft movement to thwart the conservatives from nominating one of their own. Agnew did not want his party to move to the left any more than he wanted it to swing to the right. What he desired was a party devoid of almost any ideological tint whatsoever. At a time when party newcomer and former movie actor Ronald Reagan was proclaiming that it was a "time for choosing," Agnew was pleading that the GOP make no choice at all.[5]

Throughout his political career, Agnew remained deeply suspicious of ideology. He maintained that position as he climbed the political ladder to the vice-presidency, where he continued to rail against both liberal and conservative party ideologues. For example, he excoriated liberal Republicans such as New York senator Charles Goodell, who criticized the Nixon administration's Vietnam policies, including the incursion into Cambodia in May 1970, or voted against Supreme Court nominees Clement Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell, both of whom failed to be confirmed by the United States Senate. He did not treat the conservatives much better. In 1971 the conservative organization Young Americans for Freedom endorsed Agnew for the 1972 Republican presidential nomination. Agnew did not acknowledge it—it was still not a time for choosing.[6]

Agnew's refusal to choose sides reveals that the Republican Party had an alternative course. Most historians now describe how the right wing captured the party from the hands of the East Coast liberal Republicans, and there is much truth in this view. A number of conservatives talked quite openly about their determination to wrest control of the GOP. For example, Phyllis Schlafly, a con-

servative activist from Alton, Illinois, composed a short manifesto in the early months of 1964. She worked at a feverish pace and completed her manuscript in just two months so the book could be published before the Republican primary season ended in June. Schlafly sent the manuscript off to the printer in March and by the end of April twenty-five thousand copies were ready for distribution. Just two months later over 600,000 copies of *A Choice Not an Echo*, were in circulation across the country.[7]

Conservative Republicans rushed to buy copies. Schlafly had struck a chord with them and gave voice to their frustration—the Republican Party had been controlled for a generation by a small eastern elite that dictated the party's presidential nominee. Those nominees—Thomas Dewey, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Richard M. Nixon—were, in the minds of the right wing activists, no better than their Democratic opponents. Conservatives viewed them as liberals who supported New Deal programs and believed in an activist federal government. And in early 1964, to their horror, New York governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, the pillar of the establishment, stood next in line. Phyllis Schlafly and thousands of others were determined that this apostate, and all he stood for, would not triumph. They demanded that 1964 be a time for choosing, and their choice was Arizona senator Barry Goldwater.[8]

Agnew never did choose sides. According to some authors, he actually switched sides. The widespread belief is that the Maryland governor moved from the liberal wing to the conservative camp just prior to his selection as Richard Nixon's vice presidential nominee in 1968.[9] That was not the case. Throughout his political career he remained true to the ideas he had articulated in the statement announcing his support for Senator Kuchel. In that press release, Agnew lauded Kuchel's support for civil rights programs, praised Kuchel as a "courageous enemy of all political extremists," and noted Kuchel's belief in "our free competitive system." He could easily have been describing himself.

During his term as Baltimore County executive (1962–66), he spelled out some of his principles and formulated his ideas on the future of his country and his party. These jottings provide a glimpse into his political orientation. His world view was far removed from Goldwater's, but at the same time Agnew could hardly be described as a liberal. Throughout his public life, Agnew consistently resisted labels, and his political ideology defied any classification.

As county executive, international events did not fall under his domain and he remained for the most part silent on those issues. In that position, however, and later as governor of Maryland, he did confront some of the major domestic crises facing the nation, such as civil rights, education, and the environment. He also addressed partisan politics, in particular the future of the Republican Party.

One of the first issues he tackled was the ideological direction of the GOP. In January 1964, Agnew penned some thoughts on his "Political Philosophy." He

outlined five key elements, the first of which stated that the "moderate course of progressive Republicanism represented by the successful Eisenhower administration" was the path the party should take.[10] Next, Agnew wrote that the party needed candidates who disavowed either the liberal or conservative tag, and taking a shot at Goldwater, declared a "candidate should reserve the right to satisfy his own conscience on each issue without predetermined sets of directives and presuppositions."[11] Such candidates, he believed, stood the best chance of commanding widespread support from the electorate.

At the time Agnew was thinking about the upcoming 1964 primary season. In November 1963, John W. Steffey, who had recently been named chair of the Maryland Draft Goldwater Committee, wrote Agnew informing him of the progress of the movement in Maryland (though he did not ask Agnew for support). Agnew wrote back the following week and, thanking him for the update, also made clear that the chair knew he opposed Goldwater's nomination. "Although I have a high respect for Senator Goldwater," Agnew wrote, "I would much prefer a candidate of more moderate viewpoint."[12]

In reality, Agnew had little if any personal regard for the Arizona senator, despite his claim that he had "high respect and admiration" for Goldwater.[13] Agnew's action, including his initial attempt to nominate Kuchel, spoke clearly against his support for Goldwater. When Kuchel declined, Agnew next turned to Pennsylvania governor William Scranton, who formally jumped into the race only a month prior to the 1964 convention. Scranton had been reluctant to enter the campaign and only threw his hat into the ring after persistent urging by Republicans afraid of a potential Goldwater nomination. One of Scranton's biggest supporters was Newton I. Steers, chair of the Maryland Republican Party (Scranton and Steers had been classmates at Yale). Although he recognized that Scranton stood little chance of winning the nomination, Steers, along with other Marylanders, at least hoped to persuade the Pennsylvania governor to accept a candidacy. Scranton eventually decided to enter the race and he made his official announcement at the Maryland State Republican Convention in Baltimore in June 1964. Agnew was appointed Scranton's state committee chairman and went to the Republican Natinal Convention as a Scranton supporter.[14]

The Maryland delegation that arrived at the Cow Palace was divided along ideological lines. During his brief political career Agnew had warned that fights between the conservative and liberal camps only hurt the Republicans and his concerns were realized at the GOP convention. From the beginning the delegates battled over the platform, particularly the civil rights plank and what author Jonathan M. Schoenwald describes as the "anti-extremism" plank. Governor Scranton requested a plank that condemned the John Birch Society, a radical anti-communist group formed by a Massachusetts candy manufacturer that had some ties to the right wing of the GOP. They also fought bitterly over the nomina-

tion. Maryland's representatives took part in the contentious debates, including the fierce struggle concerning the civil rights plank. On the second night of the convention the Maryland delegates, including Agnew, voted 17 to 3 to liberalize the plank. Taking their lead from the Goldwater campaign, the Platform Committee had written a short, sixty-six word statement that did not include an endorsement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Members of the Maryland delegation fought to include such an endorsement. That movement failed, as did their effort to nominate Scranton, who received a scant 241 delegates compared to Goldwater's 883.[15]

After the Scranton bubble burst, Agnew and other disappointed Marylanders had to face the harsh reality of Goldwater's nomination. Against Scranton's wishes a few delegates chose to campaign against their party's nominee. Enraged by Goldwater's refusal to vote against cloture in the Senate debate on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, two African American delegates, along with four alternates, pledged not to support him.[16]

Although Agnew wrestled with his decision to back Goldwater, he endorsed him on July 24, 1964, a week after the convention. But as his notes demonstrated he still harbored serious reservations about the Arizona senator. In his public endorsement, Agnew made it clear that he strongly opposed "Au H_2O's brinksmanship" on foreign policy issues and his vote against the Civil Rights Act. The county executive lamented Goldwater's soon-to-be famous clarion call, "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice; moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue," because it was subject to differing interpretations. But unlike so many others in the party who bolted after the performance at the Cow Palace, Agnew stuck with his party if only because he found the alternative even more distasteful. He decided he would "take a chance with forthrightness [and] integrity even if mixed with the naivete, stubbornness, oversimplification of Goldwater."[17]

That fall Goldwater suffered the worst defeat to date in American history as President Lyndon B. Johnson won in a landslide, capturing 62 percent of the popular vote and 486 electoral votes. Maryland followed the pattern—65 percent of the voters cast their ballots for Johnson, while only 35 percent went for the Arizona senator, satisfying figures for Agnew.[18]

Much of what grated on Agnew was Goldwater's stance on civil rights. Prior to delivering an after dinner speech in May 1964, Agnew outlined his opposition to Goldwater's views. He listed nine points, the first being that "freedom, as established by our Constitution, is not compatible with discrimination in the use of facilities either privately owned but open to [the] general public or publicly owned." That was a direct slap at Goldwater, who voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Before casting his vote against the measure, Goldwater provided his rationale, which demonstrated his strikingly different interpretation of the Constitution. "I am unalterably opposed to discrimination of any sort. I believe that, though the

problem is fundamentally one of the heart, some law can help, but not the law that embodies features like these, provisions which fly in the face of the Constitution."[19] In points two and three, Agnew described these practices as "unlawful" and urged legislation to combat them. But just as he was sounding like a liberal, he abruptly turned right. The next five points mixed both liberalism and libertarianism. Point three stated that discrimination "should be eliminated by legislation if necessary," but point four claimed that "Privately owned facilities to which [the] general public [is] not invited are sacrosanct" and "discrimination long practiced here is legal."[20] Agnew ended with these thoughts: "For first class citizenship for all Americans," but "It should not be expected to lead to social compatibility among all Americans."[21]

Two years later Agnew reflected on crime, another issue that was quickly becoming intertwined with civil rights. Following the civil rights legislation of 1964 and 1965, many white Americans believed that the government had done enough to secure the rights of African Americans. This attitude hardened after a series of riots swept the country in 1965 and 1966. Thousands of urban blacks in ghetto housing destroyed what they believed that legislation could not change. Soon the word "backlash" entered the political lexicon, and not a few unsavory politicians capitalized on it. The most prominent among them was Alabama governor George H. Wallace. A one-time moderate on civil rights, Wallace won the governor's office in 1962 with a slogan of "Segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." He traveled north in 1964, entered the Wisconsin and Indiana presidential primaries, and surprised political pundits by winning more than 30 percent of the vote in both states.

Wallace then announced his plans to enter the Maryland primary, a decision that shocked the state's Democratic leaders who believed they would deliver the vote to Lyndon Johnson without any problem. Governor J. Millard Tawes even went so far as to claim that Wallace would "be smothered."[22] Tawes and other top Democrats were soon disabused of that notion when Wallace began touring Maryland. He drew tremendous crowds wherever he went, and, perhaps more ominously, officials noticed that large numbers were registering to vote. Many of the new registrants openly admitted that they were planning to vote for Wallace.[23]

When he campaigned in Maryland, Wallace moderated his tone and rhetoric, using subtlety instead of an outright racist campaign. For example, he avoided racial epithets while talking about open housing and crime. His message resonated with many of the state's lower- and middle-class whites and on May 19, 1964, Maryland voters went to the polls in record numbers, including over half a million registered Democrats. To the surprise and dismay of many, George Wallace captured 43 percent of the vote and majorities in sixteen of Maryland's twenty-three counties.[24]

Even though Wallace had created problems in the Democratic Party that

could have led to a Republican advantage, Agnew took no comfort in Wallace's success.[25] During the campaign Agnew spoke at an event honoring Senator Daniel Brewster. Because Lyndon Johnson did not officially enter the primaries the Democrats needed a fill-in on the ballot. At the time Governor Millard Tawes was considered a risk after pushing through a tax hike. Therefore the Democrats, especially President Johnson, leaned heavily on Brewster to place his name on the ballot. Agnew urged the Democrats to reject Wallace. "Please, my Democratic friends, do not encourage hatred and bigotry by supporting Mr. Wallace."[26]

Yet however much Agnew disliked Wallace he could not ignore the governor's comments. By 1966 crime, according to the polls, was the most important issue in the country. Conservative Republican candidates such as Ronald Reagan in California, virtually rode into office on tough law-and-order platforms. At the same time, liberal Republicans such as Rockefeller talked about the "root causes" of crime and fretted that the party was exploiting crime to attract racists. Again, as he invariably did, Agnew came out squarely in the middle and issued a news release on crime February 22, 1966, in which he outlined four major concerns.

The first was that Maryland's criminal code needed revision. Secondly, too much effort had been expended, he wrote, on coddling criminals during the "greatest crime wave in [the] nation's history."[27] In the third point, Agnew urged that this be rectified by devoting more energy to law enforcement and protecting innocent citizens. Last, Agnew claimed that "wage earner [and] tax payer make government function, not the inmate of the penitentiary."[28]

Although Agnew came across as tough on crime he did not equate it with race. Unlike Wallace, he did not exploit the open housing issue. Wallace had attacked open housing legislation in his northern 1964 campaign swing, and his white, largely ethnic, middle-class audiences thunderously applauded his position. Many of the whites who supported Wallace feared that open housing would lead to a host of problems including falling property values, integrated neighborhoods, and crime. The issue cut deeply across national political lines. In California, for example, Lyndon Johnson outran Barry Goldwater by more than a million votes, but a referendum that repealed an open housing bill passed by over two million.[29]

The 1966 Maryland gubernatorial race centered on this issue, and candidate George P. Mahoney campaigned on the slogan "Your home is Your Castle: Protect It!" This overtly racist appeal carried Mahoney to victory in the Democratic primary. His message played well with the state's blue collar voters, and Agnew faced a tough challenge in the November election. Throughout the race, Mahoney stayed with the issue while his opponent struggled to find a consistent policy on the vexing question of fair housing.

Agnew had struggled with the question of open housing the year prior to the election and jotted down some notes on the subject in early 1966. He began on an optimistic note, claiming that "voluntary desegregation of housing in Balt[imore]

metropolitan area is far from hopeless."[30] He noted his opposition to segregation and wrote that local legislation could not solve the problem. Further thoughts demonstrated Agnew's ability to straddle an issue and thus find common ground with liberals and conservatives. Agnew favored, as did the liberals, federal legislation to combat discrimination in housing but then stated "no legislation to abridge individual discretion in right of sale justified."[31] That was an opinion shared by conservatives. As always, with any issue, Agnew staked out the middle ground.

When he ran for governor in 1966, Agnew positioned himself in the middle of the fray, between Mahoney and independent Hyman Pressman, an outspoken proponent of open housing legislation. The Agnew campaign sent a telegram to the Baltimore NAACP. "Ted Agnew is on record as offering to introduce fair housing legislation which would guarantee open housing in new developments and apartments."[32] The carefully worded statement never mentioned existing homes.

With that obfuscating policy, Agnew managed to win over African American voters without alienating the white support he needed. Agnew sailed to victory, taking in 50 percent of the vote to Mahoney's 41 percent. He saw his victory as an affirmation of the view that Republicans stood the best chance of winning when they staked out the middle ground. The new governor found that middle territory on open housing when he managed to win overwhelming black support and at the same time avoided alienating middle-class white voters.

Agnew made this balancing act possible by devoting countless hours to studying the issues. The positions he took in his 1966 campaign on open housing, race relations, and crime mirrored his private thoughts, the thoughts he put down on paper from 1963 to 1966. Agnew's aversion to ideology can be gleaned in his notes. When queried about his political philosophy, Agnew often issued the same answer: "It's possible to be liberal on one issue and conservative on another."[33] Throughout his career Agnew adopted both liberal and conservative policies. While county executive, he successfully pushed for a public accommodations bill, established a human relations council to deal with civil rights questions, and extended public services throughout the county. During his gubernatorial career, Agnew signed a bill legalizing abortions, ended the century-old anti-miscegenation laws, raised taxes, and increased spending on education.[34]

This record made Agnew appear as something of a liberal only because it is not the entire record. As governor he talked tough on crime and publicly attacked demonstrators, first in Cambridge and then, more notoriously, after the Baltimore riots. The disorders in Baltimore arose following the assassination of Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. in April 1968. Riots broke out in several major cities, including the nation's capital, but there were no disturbances for two days in Maryland, a development that heartened Governor Agnew. On April 6 he praised Marylanders' restraint in an official message. "I am indeed proud today of the citizens of our state, black and white, who have shunned the provocation to racial

violence that has swept the rest of the country." Agnew also announced that he planned to meet with prominent black leaders from across the state to "plan further steps towards racial progress."[35]

The calm, along with Agnew's optimism, was shattered later that night as Baltimore went up in flames. Rioting first broke out on Saturday afternoon, April 6, just hours after Agnew issued his telegram. Initially the problems were confined to the inner city, but over the course of four days they spread throughout Baltimore. Police from surrounding areas were called in, the National Guard was called out, and Agnew asked President Johnson to send in the army. The looting continued until April 11, the same day Agnew was in Baltimore for a prearranged meeting with some of the state's prominent civil rights leaders.[36]

Most of the invitees expected the governor to ask their help in ending the riots. Agnew quickly disabused them of that idea. Instead, he delivered a stern rebuke. His manner was, as always, deliberate and his demeanor calm. Yet his words were, at least to the assembled guests, highly inflammatory. The audience was shocked and half walked out before he finished his remarks. Unfazed, Agnew pressed on with his lecture. Under the glare of television cameras the governor of Maryland proceeded to tell the assembly that black civil rights leaders bore some, if not most, of the responsibility for the wave of violence in that state.[37]

As Agnew saw it, the match that lit the flame was Stokely Carmichael, one of the "twin priests of violence" (the other being Agnew's *bete noire* H. Rap Brown). Carmichael, according to Agnew, met surreptitiously with "local black power advocates and known criminals" in Baltimore three days prior to the riots. This was crucial, since it preceded King's murder by a day. Although most attributed the riots to the assassination, Agnew pointed to Carmichael's visit as the real cause. And why were the men and women in the room, those Agnew complimented as not being part of the "caterwauling, riot-inciting, burn-America-down type of leader," to blame? Because when confronted with demagoguery or threats from extremists, they "ran."[38]

Predictably, these remarks caused a furor. Agnew's relations with Maryland's black community deteriorated. Across the state civil rights leaders rushed to denounce the governor. About half of the group from the meeting gathered to refute Agnew's charges and to condemn his actions as "more in keeping with the slave system of a bygone era." Baltimore mayor Thomas D'Alesandro III, who had called on the black leadership for help during the riots, joined in, blasting Agnew for the content and timing of the speech. A member of Baltimore's Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance called Agnew "as sick as any bigot in America." Denunciations poured in from around the country, as men such as Roy Wilkins, who had earlier praised Agnew, now fiercely criticized him for being insensitive and even racist.[39]

Agnew refused to back down or recant any of his remarks. The adverse reac-

tion in some quarters did not rattle him. What he did find galling was that outsiders were coming into Maryland and fomenting violence. First H. Rap Brown in Cambridge and a year later Carmichael in Baltimore. Moderate civil rights leaders refused to stand up to them—but if they would not, he would.

Years later, after he had resigned the vice presidency in disgrace, Agnew published his account of the scandal that led to his downfall. Much, if not most of *Go Quietly . . . Or Else* should be read with skeptical detachment. Yet there are times when Agnew was frank and forthright. One of those instances is a brief discussion of the racial unrest during his gubernatorial career. Even then Agnew remained unapologetic about his April 11 speech and continued to place the blame for those troubles on H. Rap Brown and other militants. Although he did acknowledge that he had taken a strong stand, Agnew disputed the charge that he had "suddenly switched from liberal to conservative on the issue of race relations." On this he stood firm. "I have never been liberal when it comes to condoning violence and the intentional destruction of property." [40]

Agnew's stern reaction to the rioting garnered him national publicity and brought him to the attention of Richard Nixon. Strangely, Agnew had never turned his attention to this most prominent moderate Republican. For all of his fierce partisan rhetoric, Nixon was a man of the center who, like Agnew, had urged the GOP to position itself in the middle. Though Nixon endorsed Agnew in the 1966 race, Agnew did not return the favor and instead lined up behind Rockefeller. Not until Rockefeller humiliated Agnew did the latter gravitate toward Nixon. Even then Agnew evinced a distrust of Nixon that is not easily explained. Shortly after Rockefeller's announcement, Milton S. Eisenhower, the former president's younger brother and himself a past president of Johns Hopkins University, sent a letter to Agnew, imploring him to become a favorite son candidate so as to deny Nixon the nomination. Like his older brother, Milton Eisenhower harbored reservations about Nixon's suitability for the presidency. Unlike Dwight, who remained scrupulously neutral throughout the primary season, Milton acted upon his qualms, and not for the first time tried to stymie Nixon's career. Twelve years earlier, when President Eisenhower contemplated whether to keep Nixon on the ticket, Milton urged his removal and wondered why Nixon could not simply step aside. Disclaiming any personal dislike of Nixon (though he loathed him), Milton Eisenhower stated that his motivation in 1968 was simple—Nixon could not beat Lyndon Johnson or Robert Kennedy.[41]

Agnew responded within the week, and he appeared receptive to the idea of stopping Nixon. "I would very much like the opportunity to discuss with you the subject of your March 26th letter," he wrote Eisenhower.[42] The night before, the political world had received yet another jolt as President Lyndon Johnson announced to a national television audience he would not seek nor accept the Democratic nomination. That surprise announcement heightened Eisenhower's con-

cerns. Fearing that the "egocentric, power-hungry, immature, and dangerous" Bobby Kennedy might become the Democratic nominee, Eisenhower again urged Agnew to become the favorite son candidate.[43]

Agnew eventually announced his decision to go to the Republican National Convention as Maryland's favorite son, but not for the reason Milton Eisenhower hoped. Beginning in March 1968, Agnew and Nixon courted each other. Although Agnew remained publicly neutral he worked quietly for Nixon's nomination. On the second day of the convention Agnew finally threw his support, and that of the Maryland delegation, behind Nixon. The next day, August 11, 1968, Nixon announced that he had chosen the obscure governor of Maryland as his running mate. Both the liberal and conservative camps in the Republican Party found Agnew an acceptable choice.[44]

During the 1970s, Agnew's dream of a center-oriented Republican Party would not be realized when the liberal wing of the GOP withered away and the conservatives gained ascendancy. Phyllis Schlafly and other conservatives saw their dreams fulfilled in 1980 when Ronald Reagan won the presidential nomination. By that time, Agnew was a distant memory, and for many a bad one. As vice president, the former Maryland governor had won the accolades of many in the GOP for his colorful speeches denouncing intellectuals, anti-war protestors, and the news media. For a brief time it looked as though he might be the leading candidate for the 1976 nomination. Although he wanted the nod, unlike Ronald Reagan he had never fully embraced the conservatives. After the Nixon-Agnew landslide in 1972, Agnew and Reagan stood as the front-runners for 1976. A battle loomed that would have represented a true test of the Right's power in the Republican Party.[45]

That race never materialized due to Agnew's legal troubles. Although he had attempted to bring change to Baltimore County and Maryland, Agnew continued a long-standing tradition of taking kickbacks for political favors. In December 1972, just a month after the Nixon-Agnew landslide reelection victory, the United States Attorney's Office in Maryland opened an investigation into corruption in Baltimore County. The lead prosecutor was George Beall, a Republican and brother of incumbent Maryland senator J. Glenn Beall Jr. George Beall first investigated Agnew's county executive successor, Democrat Dale Anderson, but startling admissions from subpoenaed witnesses suggested that the payoffs went higher, all the way to the vice president of the United States.[46]

When the investigation became public in August 1973, Agnew denied all of the charges and pledged to fight any attempt to force him from office. The evidence against him, though, was overwhelming, and in October 1973 Agnew's political career ended when he resigned the vice presidency and entered a plea of *nolo contendere* to one charge of tax evasion.

Until his death in September 1996, Agnew avoided partisan politics, but he saw his fears realized as the Republican Party moved increasingly rightward. The

party's platforms on abortion, the environment, and other social issues were at odds with the positions he had taken back in the 1960s. His belief that candidates should be able to decide issues based upon their own conscience went by the wayside as the party turned sharply to the right.

Agnew's fears that a right turn would alienate white, middle- and upper-class voters proved prophetic in the 1990s as suburbanites, scared off by the Republicans' anti-abortion and pro-gun stance, elected Bill Clinton and gave Al Gore a majority of the votes cast in 2000. The quintessential suburban man, and the first suburban politician to rise to national power, Agnew instinctively knew how suburban voters would react to hard-line stances—they would vote against such candidates and their ideas.

Earlier, from the 1950s through the 1970s the majority of suburban voters had cast their ballots for the Republicans in national elections. An exception to the trend is the election of 1964—an excellent example of how suburbanites rejected ideological candidates. That year conservative GOP firebrand Goldwater suffered a crushing defeat, even in the suburban areas that had leaned Republican in previous presidential elections.[47] Later, in the age of Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey, when the GOP drifted even farther right, suburbanites deserted the Republican Party. According to pollsters, the GOP suffered in the hotly contested suburban areas primarily, if not exclusively, because of its conservative social ideology.[48]

This was an outcome Agnew tried to prevent. In the early years of his political career he told anyone who would listen—and few did—that the Republican Party should remain a center party. This put him at odds with many others, such as Schlafly, Goldwater, and to a lesser extent, Reagan, who demanded that the GOP reject the approach to issues characteristic of issues characteristic of Dewey, Eisenhower, and Nixon. According to the right wing, ever since 1940, when Wendell Wilkie captured the Republican nomination for president, the GOP presidential nominees had accepted New Deal and other liberal programs, an outcome the conservatives were determined to change.[49] But the East Coast Republicans led by Rockefeller and Senators Edward Brooke of Massachusetts and Mark Hatfield of Oregon urged the party to adopt an even more progressive platform.

Agnew stood between the two factions and waged an energetic battle in the mid-1960s to steer the Republican Party toward a centrist course. Although his efforts ultimately proved futile, they were not unimportant. The mid-1960s were a time for choosing for the Republican Party, as the party had an alternative between the liberal and conservative factions. But party activists for the most part ignored Agnew's calls to reject a right- or left-wing course. After a bitter fight the former group eventually took control of the GOP. In so doing, the party drove away the liberal camp, and perhaps more importantly, missed an opportunity to grab the broad center ground of American politics.

NOTES

1. "Political Philosophy," January 6, 1964, box 1 series 1, Spiro T. Agnew Papers, University of Maryland, College Park (hereinafter cited Agnew MSS).
2. "Statement by Spiro T. Agnew, Baltimore County Executive," July 30, 1963, public issues folder, box 1, series 1, Agnew MSS.
3. Thomas Kuchel to Agnew, August 1, 1963, public issues folder, box 1, series 1, Agnew MSS.
4. Mary C. Brennan, *Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 37.
5. In October 1964, Reagan delivered a nationally televised address titled "A Time For Choosing." Ostensibly an appeal to the public to vote for Barry Goldwater, the speech helped launch Reagan's political career. Reagan called for a rejection of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs and urged the United States to take a tougher line against communism.
6. In 1971, Young Americans for Freedom, a California-based group founded in the 1950s, endorsed Agnew for the Republican nomination in 1972. See Gregory L. Schneider, "The Other Sixties: The Young Americans for Freedom and the Politics of Conservatism" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Chicago, 1996), 237–38.
7. Rick Perlstein, *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of American Consensus* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 249; Carol Felsenthal, *The Sweetheart of the Silent Majority: The Biography of Phyllis Schlafly* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1981), 163–65.
8. Phyllis Schlafly, *A Choice Not an Echo* (Alton, Ill.: Pere Marquette Press, 1964).
9. See for example, Brennan, *Turning Right*, 127.
10. "Political Philosophy," Agnew MSS. The rest of the quotes in this article, unless otherwise noted, are taken from this file and will be designated by the title Agnew affixed to the page.
11. "Political Philosophy," Agnew MSS.
12. John W. Steffey to Agnew, November 6, 1963; Agnew to Steffey, November 12, 1963, Agnew MSS.
13. Agnew to Steffey, November 12, 1963, Agnew MSS.
14. *Baltimore Sun*, July 11, 1964; *Washington Post*, July 15, 1964.
15. *New York Times*, July 16, 1964; *Washington Post*, July 17, 1964.
16. *Washington Post*, July 15, 1964; *Baltimore Sun*, July 17, 1964.
17. "Goldwater Endorsement," Agnew MSS.
18. Alice V. McGillivray and Richard M. Scammon, *America at the Polls, 1960–1992: Kennedy to Clinton* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1994).
19. Barry M. Goldwater with Jack Casserly, *Goldwater* (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 172.
20. "Civil Rights," Agnew MSS.
21. Ibid.
22. Stephen Lesher, *George Wallace: American Populist* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993), 296.
23. Jody Carlson, *George C. Wallace and the Politics of the Powerlessness* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), 34.
24. Robert J. Brugger, *Maryland: A Middle Temperament, 1634–1980* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 611 and Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 212–15.
25. Spiro Agnew to Jay T. Cloud, May 14, 1964, personal correspondence folder, box 1, Agnew MSS.

26. Jules Witcover, *White Knight: The Rise of Spiro Agnew* (New York: Random House, 1972), 103.
27. "Crime," Agnew MSS.
28. Ibid.
29. Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 514; Matthew Dallek, *The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan's First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 60.
30. "Open Housing," Agnew MSS.
31. Ibid.
32. "Ted-A-Gram to Baltimore NAACP," October 7, 1966, box 1, Afelbaum Papers, MSA 4804, Maryland State Archives, Annapolis.
33. *Baltimore Sun*, December 16, 1962.
34. E. Jay Miller to Alice Fringer. Included in the letter from Miller was a "run-down of accomplishments of the Agnew Administration . . . in Baltimore County." 1953 to 1966 folder, box 1, series 1, Agnew MSS.
35. "News Release," April 6, 1968, box 14, Governor (General Files), MSA SC 1041-1713, Maryland State Archives.
36. *Washington Post*, April 9, 1968, A1, 2; Witcover, *White Knight*, 169; Telegram to the Governor of Maryland in Response to His Request for Federal Troops in Baltimore, April 7, 1968. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–1969*, Book 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), 184.
37. George H. Callcott, *Maryland & America, 1940 to 1980* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 166.
38. *Addresses and State Papers*, 758–63.
39. Kenneth D. Durr, "'Why We Are Troubled': White Working-Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940–1980" (Ph.D., Diss., American University, 1998), 284; Paul Hoffman, *Spiro!* (New York: Tower Publications, 1971), 26.
40. Spiro T. Agnew, *Go Quietly . . . or else* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1980), 64–65.
41. Milton S. Eisenhower to Agnew, March 26, 1968, personal correspondence folder, box 1, series 1, Agnew MSS. See also Jonathan Aitken, *Nixon: A Life* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), 240.
42. Agnew to Eisenhower, April 1, 1968, Agnew MSS.
43. Eisenhower to Agnew, April 24, 1968, Agnew MSS.
44. *Washington Post*, August 9, 1968. There was a minor revolt among some Eastern liberals to challenge the Agnew nomination, but it was quickly squelched. See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1962–1972* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 174–75.
45. President Nixon's own choice for the post was neither Agnew nor Reagan, nor was he even a Republican. Nixon wanted John Connally, a Texas Democrat, and Lyndon Johnson protégé, as either the Republican nominee or the choice of a new political party he hoped might comprise moderate and some conservative Republicans and southern Democrats. Connally joined the Nixon administration in 1970 as Treasury Secretary, and Nixon quickly grew infatuated with him, so much so that he spent a good amount of time plotting how he might replace Agnew with Connally in 1972. See Richard Reeves, *President Nixon: Alone in the White House* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
46. The standard account for Agnew's travails is Richard M. Cohen and Jules Witcover, *A Heartbeat Away: The Investigation and Resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew* (New York: The Viking Press, 1974).
47. A few of the suburban areas include Fairfield County in Connecticut, Westchester County

in New York, Baltimore County in Maryland, and Oakland County in Michigan. To see how these counties voted in the presidential contests see McGillivray and Scammon, *America at the Polls.*

48. For an insightful summary of the suburban vote in the 1996 election, see chapter 1, "Blue Tide" of Thomas, *The United States of Suburbia.*

49. Willaim Safire, *Safire's Political Dictionary* (New York: Random House, 1978), 415–16.

Research Notes & Maryland Miscellany

Joseph E. Snodgrass and Freedom of the Press in Antebellum Maryland

ELWOOD L. BRIDNER Jr.

The January sun had already started to disappear behind the trees in Annapolis to the west of the State House in 1846 when the incident began in the Senate Chamber. Rising from his seat to address his colleagues, George Clagett, Prince George's County democrat, paused and waited as the room's oil lamps were lighted before he started to speak. First, he asked the Sergeant-At-Arms to remove any "persons of color" who might be among the audience seated in the balcony. After being assured that there were no "blacks" in the gallery, Senator Clagett addressed the Senate. The veteran legislator requested support from his cohorts in using the provisions of an 1836 Maryland statute to stop the publication of a Baltimore newspaper, *The Saturday Visitor.* This was appropriate, Clagett suggested, considering the publication violated the intent of the ten-year-old law in printing "abolitionist" articles. He then deemed *The Visitor* "an incendiary paper . . . calculated to create discontent and stir up insurrection among the people of color of this state." Senator Clagett concluded his remarks and asked the Senate to authorize the appropriate state officials to institute legal action against Joseph E. Snodgrass, owner and editor of *The Saturday Visitor*. The senators cited the late hour and moved to adjourn the session. They did promise, however, to consider Clagett's request early the next day.[1]

As promised, Clagett was given the floor at the beginning of the Senate's next session. This time he read a proposed resolution that condemned Snodgrass for publishing three antislavery articles—a clear violation of the 1836 law. Specifically, he believed the newspaper's summary of a recent antislavery speech delivered by Cassius M. Clay in Kentucky, a reprint of a short tract describing the lifestyle of West Indian slaves, and a similar article describing the status of slavery in Virginia, all violated the Maryland statute. Before taking his seat, the Southern

The author teaches history at Howard Community College and is a past contributor to this journal.

Joseph Snodgrass graduated from the University of Maryland Medical College in 1836. (Maryland Historical Society.)

Maryland legislator reminded his colleagues that Snodgrass was a known friend of Charles Torrey, the noted Massachusetts abolitionist who had recently been arrested in Baltimore for allegedly helping local slaves to escape from their owner. After a brief discussion, the Senate voted to send the matter to a committee for additional study. Clagett's request marked the first time in the antebellum era that any government official proposed enforcing Maryland's "gag-law "to silence an antislavery publication.[2]

In the panorama of Maryland history, Joseph Evans Snodgrass was, and largely remains, an obscure figure. Described by contemporaries as being sickly and short, he did, nevertheless, involve himself in several aspects of Baltimore's community life in the1830s and 1840s. As a writer and editor he was affiliated with several of the city's literary journals and in that role, he generated controversy among his peers. As one nineteenth-century writer remembered, Snodgrass was someone "who believed in agitation, and to whose existence it was necessary."[3] Later he became deeply involved with several of the antebellum era's most popular reform impulses, including the temperance movement. As editor of the *The Saturday Visitor*, a literary sheet he purchased in 1842, Snodgrass made his paper the primary source of information for temperance and prohibition activity in the Mid-Atlantic States. He later abandoned temperance work in what he likened to a "religious revival" and became one of the stronger antislavery advocates below the Mason-Dixon Line.[4]

The purpose of this article is to examine the nature of Joseph Snodgrass's

involvement in various antebellum reform impulses and to trace his participation in the antislavery movement—activity that resulted in his confrontation with the State government in 1846. Attention will also be given to his importance in the abolitionist movement beyond Maryland's borders, specifically, in the northern United States.

Joseph Evans Snodgrass was born in 1813 on his family's farm in Berkeley County, Virginia. The Snodgrass family had owned the farm since 1732. Joseph was the oldest of four children and his father, Robert, held several elected positions in local government. This affluent family owned four slaves and could afford to pay a private tutor twelve cents a day to educate his children.[5] Snodgrass, like many other young males of his generation, enrolled in the University of Maryland's medical college in Baltimore. He spent the next three years earning his degree and during that time periodically took time from his studies to contribute articles to local literary magazines before receiving his diploma in 1836.[6]

In 1836, the new graduate moved to Williamsport, Washington County, and established a medical practice. Within two years he acknowledged that the life of a "village doctor was unfulfilling" and returned to Baltimore. Back in the port city, Snodgrass took up residence at 10 North Street and joined Nathan Brooks, an acquaintance from his college days, in establishing a new literary journal, *The American Museum of Science, Literature, and the Arts*. They published the magazine monthly, despite a very small subscription list. During the periodical's first year of publication, Brooks's byline appeared under several articles. Snodgrass, by comparison, only contributed one item, a seven-page tract entitled "Disclosures of Science." The essay, which described chemical reactions between various elements, may have been an expanded version of a college assignment. Rather than write for publication, he seems to have spent considerable time attending the numerous meetings of the city's literary societies. He took the opportunity at these events to talk with local authors such as John Pendleton Kennedy and encouraged them to publish their future work in *The American Museum.*[7]

This strategy seemed to be effective. Within the first year, 1839, the co-editors printed several of Edgar Allan Poe's stories. The magazine's circulation increased and Brooks and Snodgrass attributed its popularity to the appearance of Poe's work. Snodgrass and Poe corresponded with each other for over two years and established a friendship. Poe wrote he was "convinced . . . that you of whom I have long thought highly, had no share in the feelings of ill will towards me, which are somewhat prevalent in Baltimore."[8] Shortly after receiving this letter, Snodgrass wrote a profile of Poe for his magazine that appeared under the title of "Literary Small Talk." This column, highlighting a different author each month, became a regular feature in remaining issues of *The America Museum.*[9]

By 1841, Snodgrass, now married, decided he needed additional income and applied to the State for permission to again practice medicine in Maryland. His

request was granted but he also accepted a part-time position as a "local affairs" reporter for another Baltimore publication, *The Saturday Visitor*. The editor of *The Visitor*, John Beucamp Jones, was attempting to change his publication from a monthly literary digest to a weekly newspaper. In an attempt to establish a "niche" for his newspaper, Jones decided to stress anti-Catholic articles in his paper, a clear indication of rising anti-immigrant sentiment in the port city.[10] Apparently Snodgrass did not write any of these articles. Jones, as did editors nationwide, relied heavily on reprinted stories from other papers. Within a few months Jones would redirect the focus of his publication toward the temperance movement.

This transition was probably driven by the growing popularity of this movement in Baltimore during the early 1840s. Jones declared his new editorial stance shortly after the city's Washington Temperance Society announced they had received 1,000 new members in the past ten months. *The Saturday Visitor* became one of the first newspapers in the city to champion the temperance philosophy. In early 1842, Snodgrass had the opportunity to purchase the paper from Jones who was moving to Philadelphia to take control of a daily publication. Now twenty-nine years old, the new editor shared his philosophy with his reading audience:

> Tis the height of folly to expect a newspaper to prosper while its editor writes tamely, and in a noncommitted way . . . the true way is to fear God only and to speak one's mind honestly.[11]

To obtain temperance related news items for his paper, Snodgrass left Baltimore and attended various meetings of the Sons of Temperance chapters throughout Maryland and Delaware. He typically left his home each week and journeyed to a different meeting site in the Mid-Atlantic region where he took extensive notes on the proceedings. Snodgrass would then return to his office and prepare to have the type set for the story in the next edition of *The Visitor*. This routine continued uninterrupted for several months—until he met Lucretia Mott, the famed anti-slavery advocate.

As part of a lecture tour, Mott visited Baltimore in October of 1842 to deliver a talk explaining why she believed slavery should be abolished. Snodgrass attended the meeting with the intentions of publicly asking her several pointed questions about her abolitionist stance. Instead, he was so taken by her comments that he remained silent and "went back to his office that night an altered man." He likened his experience that night to a religious revival. "The seeds of truth scattered around her that evening with Christian earnestness, and sweetness sunk into [my] heart, and so found soil accepting its growth."[12]

This revival like experience was not unusual among southerners who started to oppose slavery in the 1840s. Upper South men such as John C. Vaugh, John C. Free, and Samuel M. Janney, each acknowledged the personal importance of a

heightened religious awareness in the development of their antislavery stance—a characteristic long associated with evangelical reformers. Collectively, they believed it was necessary to show their individual "moral independence" and questioned the indifference of organized religion on the slavery issue. It was not unusual for these leaders to challenge the various religious denominations on their unwillingness to fight slavery on an institutional level. Toward this end, Snodgrass told his readers that, after listening to Mott, he was concerned with "religious errors far too characteristic of the age."[13]

In early 1843, Snodgrass told his readers of his intention to test the "Christian position" of several of Baltimore's more prominent clergymen. Specifically, he announced that he was going to evaluate their position on slavery and various other antebellum social issues. He explained that he planned to visit various local churches and evaluate the sermons delivered by each minister. These evaluations would be based upon two criteria, the social involvement of each pastor and the relevance of each sermon to existing social issues. Every week, over the course of several months, he attended a different church for the Sunday morning service, sat in the congregation, and recorded passages from each sermon. Snodgrass then critiqued the sermon in the next issue of *The SaturdayVisitor*.[14]

These articles created some controversy within the community. Some Baltimoreans believed his analysis of the sermons were biased. These critics thought that any minister who was known as a temperance advocate received favorable commentary from Snodgrass. Other readers deemed *The Saturday Visitor*'s essays to be totally inappropriate and cancelled their subscriptions. Although stung by the financial realities of a reduced subscription list, Snodgrass capitalized on the controversy and reprinted all of the essays in a single volume that he published under the title of *Sketches of the Baltimore Pulpit*. Although it is impossible to determine the exact number of subscriptions he lost, Snodgrass resumed his medical practice at this time, undoubtedly in need of the money.[15]

Perhaps stung by public reaction, he once again focused his editorial attention on the temperance movement. He reiterated this position to his readers in January 1844 when he wrote it was again time to examine the "sins of drink [which] have stimied (sic) the pool of thought."[16] Eventually Snodgrass became discontented with just reporting information about the temperance movement and decided to seek election to the position of Secretary of the Baltimore District of the Sons of Temperance in the same year. He was unsuccessful in this effort and thought that two factors contributed to his defeat. First, he theorized that his recent "attack" on organized religion might have weakened his popularity with the members of the temperance community in Baltimore. Second, Snodgrass wondered if his recent public statements against the growing nativist tendencies of the Baltimore temperance chapters might be damaging to his popularity.[17] Nevertheless, Snodgrass continued to publicize the accomplishments of local temperance advo-

cates by printing information about chapter meetings, and regional rallies, and by reprinting various topical essays in *The Saturday Visitor*. He continued, however, to be apprehensive about the growing influence of nativism in the movement. In an 1845 editorial, he wrote:

> We cannot see how a reform of right feelings, one whose heart is warmed with this spirit of universal love, could give his consent to imperil the interest of a cause like temperance . . . by blending it with the revolting prospective course of nativism.[18]

Within a few weeks of this editorial, Snodgrass found both his personal life and his career as an editor of a small Baltimore newspaper changed by a series of events beyond his control. Charles Torrey, the former editor of the *Massachusetts Abolitionist*, was arrested in Baltimore and charged with helping a Maryland slave escape from his owner, William Hechrotte. Tried and found guilty, the court sentenced Torrey to a six-year prison term. During this entire episode, *The Saturday Visitor* remained silent on the "Torrey Affair" as it was known in the regional press. Also, there is no proof that the two men ever met or corresponded during the years that Torrey was active in the antislavery movement. Regional newspapers covered the arrest and court case in great detail, but none even tried to implicate Snodgrass in Torrey's Maryland activities. The Baltimore correspondent for the New York *Herald*, however, did suggest that the two men had conspired to help the slave escape. The resulting story in the New York paper pained Snodgrass. On June 23, he wrote to his friend Samuel Janney, a Virginia Quaker who opposed slavery, to summarize the *Herald's* claims which had "embroiled him in the Torrey Affair." Snodgrass expressed his displeasure at being "maliciously threatened in the New York *Herald* . . . [and] called an abolitionist, an agent of Torrey's friends." He told his Virginia acquaintance that:

> I believe a crisis in my affairs is at hand. Well, let it be so . . . if it is God's will! I am ready for trials, with Divine assistance. My Money—aye, my life world lies still sold to such a cause! I could not have done this a year ago, even—certainly not two years ago as you know—but thank God I can now. Therefore, come what will, I am ready.[19]

Shortly after this letter to Janney was posted, a second event impacted Snodgrass during the summer of 1845. In July, a large band of armed runaway slaves from various sections of Southern Maryland converged in Prince George's County, marched through Washington, D.C., and proceeded into Montgomery County. At Gaithersburg, a group of armed farmers and members of the state militia intercepted them. In a pitched battle, the slaves were defeated and several of them hanged. Rumors circulated in Southern Maryland that one of the escaped



Excerpt from Snodgrass' congratulatory letter to the citizens of Maryland upon ratification of the 1864 constitution in which the state abolished slavery. (Maryland Historical Society.)

slaves had a copy of *The Saturday Visitor* in his possession when captured. When local authorities investigated this abortive rebellion, they were never able to validate this charge. Within a few weeks, some Prince George's County's slaveholders held a meeting at which they expressed their concerns about these events and wondered about the existence of written materials that might cause "unrest" among their workers.[20]

In the context of these events, therefore, it was logical that Senator George Clagett would express the concerns of his constituents a few months later and requested that the state government investigate Snodgrass's activities. For his part, the Baltimore editor never printed any information about this slave rebellion in *The Saturday Visitor*. Nor did he write any editorials about Charles Torrey or, unlike other newspapers, reprint any of the imprisoned abolitionist's "Letters from Prison." In response to Clagett's request to the legislators, however, Snodgrass was very vocal.

Even as the Senate's special committee investigated Clagett's allegations, Snodgrass defended the news articles in question under the provisions of the first amendment. From his Baltimore office, he sent a written reply to the state government in which he acknowledged publishing the three stories Clagett cited, but he denied writing any of this material himself and attributed their authorship to an "unnamed correspondent." A copy of this letter was published in the January 31,1846 edition of *The Saturday Visitor*. He concluded his response by telling the legislators that any punitive action on their part would be a "direct threat to liberty, [freedom] of speech and press."[21]

The response of other regional newspapers to Snodgrass's plight was interesting. On the Eastern Shore, *The Worcester Shield* printed "Dr. Snodgrass has not violated any law of the State." In Philadelphia, the editor of the *Pennsylvania Freeman*, an antislavery journal, stated "abolitionists do not support that newspaper. . . . [*The Saturday Visitor*] is a literary journal." Another newspaper with an antislavery reputation, *The True American*, of Lexington, Kentucky, thought *The Saturday Visitor* "was a mild and Christian newspaper." A correspondent for the New York *Tribune* wrote "if permitted to preserve the tenor of his ways unmolested, he [Snodgrass] would have done little harm."[22]

Curiously, the members of the press in Baltimore remained silent on this incident. In their coverage of the General Assembly, they focused on other topics and ignored this episode. None of the state's major papers carried any editorials either condemning or defending Snodgrass. This silence was noteworthy. On one hand, it may be interpreted as editorial indifference as the publishers viewed this incident as not being important and not worthy of space in their journals or of reader interest. It is difficult to believe this stance would have been taken by the news media if they had perceived the situation as a valid threat to their first amendment rights. Papers such as *The Sun* and *The Clipper* were known for their tendencies of urging restraint to any event—local or national—that threatened to disrupt domestic tranquility and heighten sectionalism.[23]

Within three weeks of its formation, the special investigating committee presented its final report to the full Senate. The group concluded "that Dr. Snodgrass writes from impulse" but had not violated the 1836 statute and recommended the dismissal of Clagett's request.[24] Snodgrass explained his victory in terms of representing what was right and moral. He also alluded to receiving important "help from some of his friends in Annapolis" during this investigation. It is impossible to determine if this was true or if the challenged editor was simply trying to impress the readers of *The Saturday Visitor* with his personal political connections. Conceivably, John Pendleton Kennedy who at this time was Speaker of the House of Delegates, may have worked behind the scenes to assist Snodgrass. The two had known each for over for fifteen years. An examination of Kennedy's letter books for this timeframe, however, shows no recorded correspondence between the editor and the politician.[25]

This experience had a lasting impact on Joseph Snodgrass. Initially, the circulation of his paper increased. As one new Pennsylvania reader stated "the Legislature of your State has made *The Saturday Visitor* popular with many who scarcely knew that such a paper existed."[26] By April he started to sell copies of *The Liberator* from his office and he reprinted Torrey's letters in his newspaper—a practice he had previously ignored. Concurrently, he received several unsolicited financial donations from members of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. These gifts became increasingly important to Snodgrass. In June 1846, he wrote to famed

abolitionist Gerrit Smith that his subscription list had declined and that he could no longer continue to publish *The Saturday Visitor* without outside financial assistance. Less than one year after the legislature's investigation, Snodgrass announced that he would cease publication of his paper with the December 6 edition of *The Saturday Visitor*. In his farewell editorial, Snodgrass wrote, "My creed is that slavery is repugnant to God's holy word. . . . It is a system demoralizing to this land."[27]

Within weeks, the former subscribers to the paper were informed that their subscriptions had been transferred to Gamiel Bailey's new antislavery journal, *The National Era*, in Washington, D.C. At the same time, Bailey announced that Snodgrass had become a reporter for his paper. In this capacity, Snodgrass was able to take advantage of his newfound notoriety and travel throughout the Eastern United States over the next two years delivering antislavery speeches.[28] The opportunity to share his experiences and voice his antislavery opinions with northern audiences may have been the most significant result of Snodgrass' interaction with the General Assembly. Although he had not gathered "strong local support" for his actions in Maryland, Snodgrass, along with a few other antislavery advocates in the southern states helped create an image in the minds of northern abolitionists. "They provided tangible, if exaggerated, evidence of progress in the crusade against slavery in the South" during the 1840s.[29]

NOTES

1. *Maryland Journal of the Senate* (1845): 44–46.
2. Ibid. 126–27; *Maryland Journal of the House* (1845): 107–08; *Laws of Maryland, 1838*, Chapter 325; *The Saturday Visitor*, January 31,1848.
3. Henry Stockbridge, "Baltimore in 1846," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 31 (1911): 31.
4. A speech by Joseph Snodgrass to the New England Antislavery Convention printed in *The Liberator*, June 4, 1847; Stanley Harrold, *The Abolitionists and the South: 1831–1861* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1995), 138.
5. M. A. Gardiner, *Chronicles of Old Berkeley* (Durham: Seeman Press, 1938), 7, 25, 39; Max Grove, *The 1810 Census of the United States for Berkeley County, Virginia* (Hedgesville, West Virginia: The author, 1967), 74; Guy L. Keesecker, *Marriage Records of Berkeley, Virginia: 1781–1854* (Martinsburg, West Virginia: The author, 1969), 214.
6. Eugene F. Cordell, *The Medical Annals of Maryland* (Baltimore: Williams and Williams Co., 1903), 576: David C. Holley, *Baltimore in American Literature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), 361.
7. Nathan Brooks and Joseph Snodgrass, *The American Museum of Science, Literature, and the Arts* (1838), 370–77; Holley, *Baltimore in American Literature*, 361.
8. Edgar A. Poe to Joseph Snodgrass, September 11,1839, in John Ward Ostrom, "A Poe Correspondence Re-edited," *American Illustrated*, 34 (1940): 416–17.
9. Joseph Snodgrass, *The American Museum, 1839–40*, 133, 159, 290, 298, 317.
10. Ray Allen Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800–1860* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1939), 139; Cordell, *Medical Annals*, 576.

11. *The Saturday Visitor*, January 8, 1842.
12. Speech by Joseph Snodgrass printed in *The Liberator*, June 4, 1847.
13. *The Saturday Visitor*, January 21,1843; Ronald G. Walters, *The Antislavery Appeal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 6, 45; Harrold, *The Abolitionists and the South*, 132–33; Aileen S. Kraditor, "A Note on Elkins and the Abolitionists," in Ann J. Lane, editor, *The Debate over Slavery: Stanley Elkins and His Critics* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 91–99.
14. Joseph E. Snodgrass, *Sketches of the Baltimore Pulpit* (Baltimore, 1843), v–vi, 8, 9, 13, 17, 32, 74, 101, 103, 132, 143, and 153 for examples of Snodgrass' comments on the clergy and their sermons.
15. Ibid. Joseph E. Snodgrass to Samuel M Janney, June 23, 1845, Samuel M. Janney Papers, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania; Cordell, *Medical Annals*, 576.
16. *The Saturday Visitor*, January 16, 1844. Snodgrass' name never appeared as an office holder or official in any of the Maryland Sons of Temperance chapters from 1842 to 1860. See George Hand, *The Sons of Temperance in Maryland, 1842–1860* (unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of History, University of Maryland, 1941.)
17. Joseph E. Snodgrass to Samuel Janney, June 23, 1845, Friends Historical Library.
18. *The Saturday Visitor*, January 4, 1845.
19. Joseph Snodgrass to Samuel Janney, June 23,1845, Friends Historical Library; Hazel C. Wolf, "An Abolitionists Martyrdom In Maryland," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 47 (1952): 224–33.
20. *The Baltimore Sun*, July 14, 1845; *Niles Register*, July 12, 26,1845; Elwood L. Bridner Jr., "The Fugitive Slaves of Maryland," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 66 (1971), 48.
21. *The Saturday Visitor*, January 31, 1846.
22. *Worcester Shield*, *Pennsylvania Freeman*, and *The True American* in *The Saturday Visitor*, February 14, 1846; New York *Tribune in The Saturday Visitor*, February 7, 1846.
23. See editorials printed in both papers, July 24, 1848.
24. Maryland, *Journal of the Senate, 1845* , 44, 126–27.
25. MS Journal, *1845–1846*, John Pendleton Kennedy Papers, Pratt Library, Baltimore, Maryland; it can be proven that Snodgrass and Kennedy were acquainted as early as July 12, 1841. Edgar Allan Poe to Snodgrass in Ostrom, "A Poe Correspondence Re-edited," 440.
26. William T. Campbell to Joseph Snodgrass, *The Saturday Visitor*, February 21, 1846.
27. *The Saturday Visitor*, December 5, 1846; Joseph Snodgrass to Gerrit Smith, June 16,1846, No. 224, George Arents Research Library, Syracuse University; Patricia Hickin, "Gentle Agitator: Samuel M. Janney and the Antislavery Movement in Virginia, 1842–1851," *The Journal of Southern History*, 38 (1971): 174.
28. Example of Snodgrass' visits and lectures in northern states may be found in *The National Era* on April 15, 29, August 19, September 9, 1847, and May 4, September 14, 21, 1848.
29. Harrold, *The Abolitionists and the South*, 27–31, 128. Stanley Harrold viewed Snodgrass as one of the few southern abolitionists who played a symbolic role in the overall success of the antislavery movement.



A Tale of Two Park Plans: The Olmsted Vision for Baltimore and Seattle, 1903

W. EDWARD ORSER

In 1903 the Olmsted Brothers undertook major park plans on opposite coasts for two cities dramatically dissimilar in age, size, topography, and rate of growth—Baltimore and Seattle.[1] Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. (Rick), the younger senior partner and heir to his father's mantle, served as principal landscape architect for the Baltimore plan and worked through the early months of the year on a report he submitted to the Municipal Arts Society in November. John C. Olmsted, veteran senior partner in the firm founded by his famous stepfather, spent the period from the end of April until the first of June on site in Seattle (as well as consulting with nearby Portland) and presented his reports in June and July to the Board of Park Commissioners. On August 28 of that same year their illustrious father, Frederick Law Olmsted Sr., ailing since the late 1890s, died.

The 1903 Olmsted plans profoundly affected the shape of the urban landscape in both cities and marked each jurisdiction with distinctive elements that capitalized on existing conditions and laid the basis for future lines of growth and development. Remarkably, in the years immediately following both reports, additional consultation with the Olmsteds led authorities to activate major portions of those plans. As a result, the first decade of the twentieth century stands as the most significant era of park planning and park development for both cities. Baltimore historian Sherry Olson has written, "the Olmsted plan fostered a new reading of the landscape. . . . [that] changed Baltimore's vision forever. . . . The entire urban landscape of the piedmont would become a park—a labyrinth of drives and walks, a harmony of man and nature." And Seattle historian Roger Sale, in similar fashion, evaluated the impact of the Olmsted vision on his city during this incredibly dynamic era. "Olmsted's plan was perhaps the single most important product of this period. . . . Most of what Olmsted planned came into being and very shortly after he made his final design."[2]

Baltimore and Seattle were cities with very different trajectories in 1903. In 1900 Baltimore ranked sixth nationally in population with approximately half a million residents. Seattle ranked forty eighth with eighty-one thousand inhabitants. Although much smaller than Baltimore, Seattle experienced a rate of growth

Professor Orser teaches American Studies at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County.

in the first decade of the twentieth century nothing short of phenomenal. By 1910 its population had soared to six times its 1903 level and ranked twenty-first with 237,000 people. Meanwhile, Baltimore had grown only modestly, by fifty thousand, and its relative ranking slipped to seventh place.

Equally significant was the difference in their pasts. Baltimore, founded in 1729, was a relative latecomer among East Coast towns, but by 1800 it surpassed Boston in size and became the nation's third largest city (behind New York and Philadelphia). Capitalizing on its port location and pioneering railroad connections, Baltimore built up a considerable commercial and industrial base throughout the nineteenth century. By some measures, Baltimore's demographic and economic strength peaked as the city entered the twentieth century—a century in which its growth plateaued and then declined. Seattle, by contrast, had been a mere village as late as 1880 (population just 3,533). But the convergence of strategic port and transcontinental rail links, the exploitation of inland forest and agricultural resources, the dramatic impact of Yukon gold, and the growing importance of trade with Asia fueled a boom that continued well into the twentieth century.

Both cities had relatively diverse economies, though lumber and timber products accounted for one-third of all Seattle jobs.[3] Coincidentally, both cities experienced major downtown fires—Seattle in 1889 and Baltimore in 1904—which contributed to substantial rebuilding of their center cities with steel frame buildings. At the turn of the century both cities had experienced recent territorial annexations and anticipated additional land acquisition. Economic strength,

Druid Hill Park, 1900, the nation's third largest park. (Maryland Historical Society.)





"Baltimore's Niagra," 1900. Olmsted described this feature of the Gwynns Falls dam below Edmondson Avenue as "a landscape feature of permanent beauty and interest. (Baltimore Sun.)

physical expansion, increasing urban density, and new construction made leaders in both cities receptive to urban and park planning. Indeed, the 1893 Columbian World Exposition in Chicago launched a plethora of architectural and landscape plans for American cities, many associated with the City Beautiful movement. As to park planning, no firm was in more demand—or carried such cachet—as the Olmsted Brothers, its work carried on by the founder's sons as his health declined.

Finding Open Space

As early as 1860, Baltimore's provision for parks received a major boost when the city purchased a 579 acre estate north of the city boundary and created the nation's third largest park, Druid Hill, designed by Howard Daniels, a contemporary of Frederick Law Olmsted. The funding for Druid Hill and subsequent parks came from an ingenious plan that included a tax on horsecars and, later, electric trolleys. The numbers of trolleys increased as public transportation ferried customers to outlying park preserves. The fund and the parks it financed were administered by an independent Board of Park Commissioners who initiated a new round of park land purchases in the 1890s. In 1888 annexation tripled the city's geographic size, and in the early 1900s the city council contemplated another major annexation. [4]

Baltimore's growth prompted the Municipal Art Society, a City-Beautiful-inspired organization of civic leaders, to contact Rick Olmsted in early 1902 requesting a plan, funded by the society, for presentation to the Board of Park

Commissioners. Theodore Marburg, president of the society, requested that the report be comprehensive but should focus primarily upon Baltimore's "suburban zone," including outlying areas, in terms of "the reservation of park spaces and main lines of communication." Olmsted proposed $3000 for the comprehensive plan, a figure that he wrote "didn't seem to scare him [Marburg] very much."[5] Marburg may have had previous contact with Rick Olmsted when the landscape architect worked on the capital city's McMillan Commission, a group organized to carry forth City-Beautiful-style comprehensive planning. In 1902 he consulted with Edward Bouton on plans for Roland Park, an elite naturalistic suburb in north Baltimore.[6] Though only in his early thirties, Rick had been groomed as his father's successor, assisting at an early age in plans for the Chicago fair and for Vanderbilt's Biltmore estate. In 1899 he was one of the founders of the American Society of Landscape Architects, and in 1900 he established the first university curriculum for professional training in landscape architecture at Harvard University.[7]

The 1903 report filled 120 pages when published early in 1904 (hence, the Baltimore document is typically referred to as the 1904 plan) and began with lengthy general discussion of the nature, purposes, and rationale for parks. Olmsted Brothers placed Baltimore's needs in the context of world class cities such as London, Paris, New York, and Boston.[8] Its extensive consideration of topography noted the region's mix of lowland estuary (the tidal lands of the Chesapeake plain) and piedmont uplands, the latter dissected by stream valleys with open and forested uplands. The report made recommendations regarding such traditional park types as small parks that included squares and playgrounds and large parks (here it stressed the "beauty and value" of Druid Hill to serve the needs of most areas of the city). But its most innovative recommendations were for a series of stream valley parks along the four watersheds in the newer area and a series of parkways to connect the major park reservations. The planners advanced the case for public control of the streams and valleys and stressed their "charming scenery" for park purposes and also noted their lack of value for other uses. They cited, for example, the problems that might ensue if stream banks were developed and instead urged preservation of their function as natural conduits of storm water and means of flood control. Parkways (and boulevards), which the report noted were too few and too unrelated to parks, should "serve either as a means of approach to a large park or as a connection between large parks." The resulting comprehensive scheme for Baltimore centered upon Druid Hill Park, with radiating parkways extending to connect with other larger park tracts and with the newly-conceived stream valley parks (and, indeed, well into the surrounding countryside). Stream valley parks and parkways received considerable attention in the report and seemed its most innovative features, however the Olmsted firm recommended that the bulk of proposed new park acreage be developed into the more conventional small and large parks (523 vs. 60 acres).



Broadway Playfield, Seattle, 1910. The park provided athletic facilities in a densely populated area of Seattle. (Seattle Municipal Archives.)

Boomtown Seattle

Seattle's parks, like the city itself, bloomed late. The first small park tract, Denny, was donated in 1884, and a park board, reporting to the city council, was created in 1890. New park acquisitions in the 1890s included Kinnear Park on Queen Anne Hill, and City (later Volunteer) Park on the edge of Capitol Hill, Woodland Park at the turn of the century (considerably north of the city limits, but accessible by electric streetcar), and Washington Park. In the 1890s park superintendent E. O. Schwagerl proposed an ambitious plan for park and parkway development and George Cotterill, Assistant City Engineer, devised a twenty-five-mile system of bicycle paths to meet the needs of the city's bicycle craze. By 1900 a land boom promised to extend development toward Lake Washington to the east and Green Lake and Woodland Park to the north, particularly along the streetcar lines that often accompanied development plans.[9] Seattle's first inquiry to the Olmsted Brothers came in 1902 when J. D. Blackwell wrote to find out "if possible and under what conditions we could get Mr. Olmsted, or some [other?] good architect, to design a scheme for general improvement for the Parks here." Subsequent correspondence in late 1902 and early 1903 led to agreement between the park board and the Olmsted Brothers. The cost would be $1000 (the firm had offered a possible reduction if trips coincided with Portland planning), the visit would be for a short but not specifically limited time, and the firm's principal

John Charles Olmsted (1852–1920), undated. (National Park Service, Frederick Law Olmsted National Historic Site.)

would be John C. Olmsted, already engaged for the planning in Portland. The plan was to be for the improvement of park lands and "a series of roadways and parkways which will tie these isolated tracts together." Park board secretary Charles Saunders added that the project should be very interesting, "for it possesses not only peculiar and varied contour, but is also rich in natural scenery of mountains, lakes, and Sound, and the opportunities offered for a park system are certainly beyond the average of the cities throughout the United States."[10] John, Rick's stepbrother, was eighteen years older than his brother. Trained by the elder Olmsted, he became a partner in the firm in 1884 and assisted in park system planning for numerous cities, including Boston and Buffalo. Working in the shadow of his stepfather, John was credited with running the home office in Brookline efficiently. When the younger Rick became a partner, the two sons appeared to work effectively as a team, although Rick's more outgoing personality and family name made his the firm's more familiar public face.[11]

The Seattle report, eighty-five pages in typescript, provided very little of the introductory rationale contained in the one prepared for Baltimore. The limited statement on Seattle topography is in the glowing preface:

> Seattle possesses extraordinary landscape advantages in having a great abundance and variety of water views and views of wooded hills and distant mountains and snow-capped peaks. It also possesses within its boundaries, or close to them, some valuable remains of the original evergreen forests which covered the whole country.[12]

Unlike "many of the principal cities of the country," the report argued, Seattle did not need one or more large parks," due to the way the parkway system would make available access to "several large natural bodies of water," the existing parks,

and such semi-public grounds as the University of Washington and the U.S. Army's Fort Lawton. Therefore, the strategy for planning should be to secure the "advantages of water and mountain views and of woodlands," acquiring the borders of the bodies of water, enlarged where possible to include woods, and level ground for sports and meadow scenery. Clearly the report's most prominent feature was the proposal for a twenty-mile "continuous pleasure-drive" from Bailey Peninsula (later Seward Park) to Fort Lawton Reservation (later Discovery Park). The route around the eastern, northern, and northwestern periphery of the developing city connected the Lake Washington shore, Green Lake/Woodland Parks, Queen Anne Hill, and Magnolia Bluffs, with branches to Volunteer Park and Kinnear Park. In the southern section of the city, which the report acknowledged was under-served by parks, the logic of a naturalistic parkway seemed less certain, but the architects did outline a scheme connecting Lake Washington and Beacon Hill. The report also called for several small parks (Harbor View and South Lake Union, for instance) and playgrounds, specifically in areas with dense population and distant from other park opportunities.

A notable feature of the Seattle report is the acknowledgment that the cost would likely necessitate a "reduced scheme" (assuming bonds of c. $500,000). In fact, the Olmsted Brothers papers include John's notes on a May 29 meeting with his assistant P. R. Jones following discussion with park board members concerned about the high cost of the proposal. Jones made detailed calculations regarding the costs of the proposed plans and John Olmsted noted which elements were "in" and which were "out." Prominent on the omissions list was Bailey Peninsula which the report nevertheless urged acquiring before it was sold as the site for country

Mount Baker Boulevard, Seattle, 1910. (MSCUA, University of Washington Libraries.)

estates. Some parkways were deleted, others reduced in width, and several playgrounds were struck..[13] The report stated that the reduced scheme at least laid the basis for future plans and provided "the most immediate advantage" by securing the finest view points, preserving beautiful woods, providing continuous pleasure drives and paths, and serving areas not afforded access to parks or playgrounds.

Though the Seattle report was received positively by the park board and the City Council, John had strongly cautioned that it was doubtful the plan could be carried out without an alteration in the city charter to establish the independence of the board, "as is customary in most of the larger cities of the country."[14] The board agreed and placed the request for greater authority before Seattle voters in March, 1904. Board secretary Charles Saunders doubted the measure would pass, but he did take "pleasure" in reporting the next day that the measure had been approved—by a mere margin of 140 votes![15]

Distinctively Olmsted

Commonalities and differences in the two plans provide insight into the way in which the Olmsted Brothers addressed park planning at the turn of the new century. First, one is struck by the way in which both Rick and John took existing conditions–whether advantages or constraints–into account while also placing the distinctive Olmsted stamp upon them. In the case of Seattle, John clearly was building upon existing park holdings and prior plans, even though rudimentary, to devise the park and parkway "scheme." Earlier conceptions by Schwagerl and Cotterill no doubt played a significant role in shaping local expectations. Prior to his arrival John wrote that he had received a map upon which "someone" had sketched (in pencil) proposed parkways along Lake Washington through the University to Green Lake, and he noted "complications" for its continuation to Queen Ann Hill and Fort Lawton. And immediately upon arrival in Seattle board members accompanied Olmsted and Jones on extensive daily walks along stretches of the parkway route, as well as visits to existing and proposed parks.[16] In Baltimore, Rick was working with a larger and more fully developed system of park holdings. Unlike Seattle, most of Baltimore's larger tracts had been estates and that heritage shaped their landscape qualities in significant ways. The Baltimore report acknowledged, for example, that one "could not fail to be impressed with the beauty and value of many of the parks," notably Druid Hill, though it also frankly stated that it found the situation of the park system as a whole inadequate with parks poorly distributed, insufficient large parks, and parkways and boulevards having little connection to parks.[17] The two plans represented creative responses to differing topographies, circumstances, and expectations and provided distinctive, systematic statements to the urban landscape of the respective cities.

There is no question that both reports gave primacy to the values of naturalistic scenery, Rick and John clearly carrying on the legacy of their father in this

Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. (1870–1925), 1925. (National Park Service, Frederick Law Olmsted National Historic Site.)

regard. The Baltimore report stressed the "enjoyment of outdoor beauty" as a principal purpose of parks and a value that should govern the design of large parks whose "essential value lies in the contrast which they afford to urban conditions."[18] The Seattle report opened with its paean to the scenic advantages of water, mountain views, and woodlands and then proceeded to detailed consideration of the continuous "pleasure drive" that highlighted those features. The rationale for the "reduced scheme" urged that securing these assets become a priority. In a 1906 follow-up report that addressed competing demands for local parks and playgrounds versus scenic parks and parkways, John Olmsted argued strongly that it would be short-sighted and financially unwise to favor the former over the latter.[19]

At the turn of the last century the rapidly growing momentum for active recreation, embodied in the playground and athletic club movements, challenged the primacy of naturalistic parks, or, at least, demanded substantial inclusion among park priorities. The Olmsted brothers have been criticized for giving these needs insufficient attention in plans such as those for Baltimore and Seattle.[20] Although it is true that both reports appear to place secondary emphasis upon provision for active recreation, the situation may be somewhat more complex. The Baltimore report's discussion of the purposes of parks in fact gave first consideration to exercise for adults and children, including both playgrounds (for little children) and athletic fields (for "older boys and men"). Playgrounds and small parks represented one third of the recommended acres to be acquired. Moreover, plans developed by Rick Olmsted for Baltimore in the years following the 3 original report primarily dealt with the design of playgrounds, athletic fields, and accompanying facilities.[21] The Seattle report included only three playgrounds in

the "reduced scheme," though it argued strenuously for their value in heavily populated areas under-served by access to other park areas.[22]

Several major Olmsted Brothers concerns about playgrounds and athletic fields, however, do emerge from the record in the two cities. First, the brothers believed that playgrounds for small children served a local area and therefore should be located adjacent to schools. Moreover, they often lacked park-like features. For both of these reasons, the school board might be a more appropriate source of funding than the park board. Nevertheless, both Olmsteds provided ample designs where the inclusion of playgrounds in parks seemed suitable.[23] Second, the Olmsteds were concerned about keeping diverse park functions separate, particularly when it came to the more active requirements of athletic fields for older children and adults. In a 1904 follow-up report regarding athletic grounds in a number of Baltimore parks, Rick expressed considerable concern that the playing fields at Druid Hill Park were "unfortunately located" and created problems of access and interference with the "quiet rural landscape which it is the primary purpose of such a park to provide"[24] And in Seattle, John urged that the athletic fields at Lincoln Park be fenced off to protect other park users from danger and to permit other more passive recreational uses.[25] Lastly, both Rick and John Olmsted acknowledged circumstances, specifically in areas of population density, where active exercise facilities such as playgrounds and athletic fields were absolutely essential. For example, Rick found the impromptu basketball courts at Riverside Park in working-class South Baltimore "unsightly and disorderly" but argued that the value of improved courts and playgrounds "is so great in this neighborhood that there can be no question of the need of providing space for them at the expense of the city."[26] And in Seattle, where John had cautioned that pressure for local parks and playgrounds might be at the expense of a park system to benefit all, he too wrote about priorities in the newly-annexed districts in 1908:

> so important are these ballfield parks to the health and morality of the growing generation that if a complete system of parks cannot be accomplished all at once, the ballfield class should be the first to receive attention.[27]

Initiated primarily to address the needs created by growth on the urban periphery, the reports for the two cities made the case for acquisition of land for park purposes in advance of development to control costs, channel the course of development in positive ways, and enhance tax revenues. At the outset the Baltimore report addressed the matter of land costs for park acquisition in the suburban zone, explaining that if it was too far ahead of time, the investment would seem wasteful, but if the decision was not made until the need was critical, the result would be "enormous expense, as in numerous instances in the older parts of large cities" Additionally, new park areas should be chosen in such a way as not to

interfere with development, but rather to enhance it. Similarly, the case for stream valley parks moved quickly from scenic to development considerations. If land along streams could be purchased in advance of development, not only would acquisition costs be low, but bringing them under public control would prevent unwise private uses and save the city expensive infrastructure costs.[28]

Although Baltimore's land values apparently were somewhat flat, John Olmsted realized from the outset that Seattle was experiencing a real estate boom. Indeed, in a preliminary conference before arriving in Seattle he was informed that among those favoring a park and parkway system were the "land boomers," and that E. F. Blaine, also a member of the park board, owned "one of the largest of the land booming companies." The Seattle report, however, seemed less concerned with curbing development than in assuring that it happened in a way compatible with park plans, fostered desirable forms of development, and benefitted the tax revenues of the city. For example, the parkway land along Lake Washington near Bailey Peninsula could perhaps be purchased at low cost because "existing houses and improvements are of such slight market value that they are hardly worth considering," whereas construction of a parkway ["driveway"] with sidewalk upon which new houses could face would be more beneficial. Moreover, landowners anticipating development already had laid out streets in conventional straight lines deemed "ugly" and "hideous" when compared to the curving parkway. Worried that lakeside landowners might even block the route of a continuous "pleasure drive," Olmsted hoped that the residents would realize how such "long, wide, and handsome parkways" would enhance the value of their adjoining land. A little farther along the lake shore, at Rainier Heights, the report recommended acquisition of the slopes of the landslide. Development of the unstable land would likely result in perpetual infrastructure costs for the city Moreover, the likelihood that the hillside might attract "cheap houses" adjacent to nearby opportunities for "the best residential districts of the city" would reduce potential tax revenue. As with the Baltimore stream valley logic, the Seattle report recommended that the landslide be purchased and left undeveloped as parkland. Just to the north, the proposal for Crest Parkway, extending along the ridge to Madrona, further illustrated Olmsted's rationale regarding the way in which park designation could enhance tax revenues. Such a roadway "would undoubtedly become the most fashionable drive in the city," commanding "magnificent views." Significantly, its costs (even if seeming "at first as an extravagant outlay") would be more than justified by the increased tax revenue from the enhancement to adjacent property values.[30]

There is no doubt that the 1903 Olmsted reports did provide a framework for suburbanization at a moment when the trend toward out-migration of the more affluent was accelerating in both cities, leading to higher degrees of spatial separation along lines of socioeconomic class. Roland Park and Guilford in Baltimore

Volunteer Park, Seattle, 1913. (MSCUA, University of Washington Libraries.)

and the ridges and shores of Lake Washington in Seattle afforded opportunities for genteel living, enhanced by naturalistic development plans as well as the amenities afforded by parks and parkways.[31] It must be emphasized, however, that the plans for both cities were comprehensive in scope and articulated a sweeping vision of how parks conceived as systems might address the entire urban area. Even though the charge of the Baltimore plan was to concentrate on the suburban zone, its recommendations took account of the needs of the complete city. The bulk of recommended acres lay within the older city and its immediate edge. In the case of Seattle, cost constraints severely limited possibilities for park acquisition in settled areas. Nevertheless, the report went to considerable pains to address the needs of the city as a whole, acknowledged areas where park provision was insufficient, and attempted to devise ways to address that problem.

Legacy on the Land

The Olmsted Brothers played a significant role in implementation of the 1903 reports. Consultation with the firm and Olmsted Brothers remained continued over several decades—in Baltimore until 1947 and in Seattle to 1935. Rick returned to Baltimore frequently in the ensuing years, working on plans to balance the athletic and other functions of parks in older sections of the city (Swann, Latrobe, Federal Hill, Riverside), address the multiple needs of larger parks (Druid Hill, Carroll, Patterson, and Lake Clifton), and design new parks (Wyman). He also consulted on plans for the east-west parkways, though Baltimore officials soon

abandoned the broad, curvilinear scenic routes envisioned in the 1903 report, settling instead for straight-line, narrower tree-lined boulevards. And Olmsted Brothers representatives, including P.R. Jones who had assisted John in Seattle, advised the Board of Park Commissioners on appropriate boundaries for land acquisition and the design of roadways in the new stream valley parks.[32] In 1924 Rick declined an invitation to provide the keynote speech for a conference on parks in Baltimore, but in 1926 the firm completed an extensive new study that addressed needs for park extension in the city to the year 1950.[33] In the late 1930s, Rick responded to a request for continued involvement in systematic park planning for Baltimore by noting that he considered the 1903 report "one of the earliest (and I still think one of the best) comprehensive studies of a city park system which I ever made."[34] In 1939 he helped to resolve a municipal controversy by recommending that a major bequest (from Thomas Leakin) be used to extend the stream valley park in the Gwynns Falls Valley, and in 1941 the Olmsted Brothers under his guidance prepared its final comprehensive park report for the city.[35]

In the years following the 1903 Seattle report John continued to advise the park board, and undertook specific planning projects for a number of parks, including Washington, Lincoln, Volunteer, Frink, Cowen, Colman, Woodland, Green Lake, and Magnolia Bluff Parks.[36] During this same period, Seattle developed major portions of the parkway plan and made unprecedented park acquisitions, adding Cowen, Leschi, Madrona, Schmitz, Ravenna, and Seward (Bailey Peninsula) Parks.[37] John's Seattle affinity was further enhanced by major landscape design for the University of Washington campus and for the 1909 Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition.[38] Virgil Bogue incorporated many features of the Olmsted scheme into his grand City-Beautiful-style city plan in 1910. Its defeat at the polls apparently had little to do with the park provisions and a great deal to do with his vision of a major relocation and rebuilding of the civic center.[39]

The 1903 Olmsted reports for Baltimore and Seattle and the involvement of the Olmsted Brothers in their implementation made the first decade of the twentieth century the most momentous in terms of park planning and park development for both cities. Although the two locales differed in many ways, the Olmsted plans, as well as the ongoing involvement of the firm well into the first half of the twentieth century, profoundly shaped the urban landscapes of each, and left a distinctive and indelible heritage that we celebrate one hundred years later.

NOTES

1. The author extends special thanks for assistance in the research and in securing illustrations to Marianne Kreitner and Sandy Sparks of the Friends of Maryland's Olmsted Parks and Landscapes and to Jerry Arbes and Anne Knight of the Friends of Seattle's Olmsted Parks. This is an expanded version of a paper presented at the National Association of Olmsted

Parks Conference, Seattle, Washington, May 3, 2003. In 1903 plans for Portland also figured prominently for the Olmsteds. According to job correspondence records, the Olmsted firm was engaged in ongoing or new planning and consultation for parks and park systems in over thirty-three localities across the country during the first decade of the twentieth century. Major involvement included Chicago, Louisville, Boston, Brookline, the Massachusetts Park Commission, Worcester, Essex County (New Jersey), Rochester, Dayton, and Spokane, as well as Baltimore and Seattle. Charles E. Beveridge and Carolyn F. Hoffman, compilers, *The Master List of Design Projects of the Olmsted Firm, 1857–1950* (Boston: National Association for Olmsted Parks, in conjunction with the Massachusetts Association for Olmsted Parks, 1987). The records of the Olmsted Associates are in the Library of Congress. Numbers are assigned to specific job correspondence. In citations below, these records will be indicated by OA, followed by the job number.

2. Sherry Olson, *Baltimore: The Building of an American City* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 254–55; Roger Sale, *Seattle: Past to Present* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), 83. On the Baltimore report, see Kevin Zucker, "Falls and Stream Valleys: Frederick Law Olmsted and the Parks of Baltimore," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 90 (1995): 73–96. William H. Wilson places the Seattle parks plan in the context of the City Beautiful movement and discusses its politics in his chapter, "John C. Olmsted's Plan for Seattle," *The City Beautiful Movement* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

3. For Baltimore, employment leaders were clothing, metals, tobacco, meat products, foundries and machine shops, and printing; for Seattle, lumber and timber products, printing, foundries and machine shops, food processing, and metals. Statistics on both cities are from the *United States Census*, 1890–1910. On the economic growth of Seattle in the 1890s, see Neal O. Hines, *Denny's Knoll: A History of the Metropolitan Tract of the University of Washington* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980), 22–23; and Sale, *Seattle*, 50–93. By 1890, Seattle population surged more than 10 times (to 42,837) and by 1900 it nearly doubled (to 80,671).

4. The 1918 annexation, the city's last, tripled its size again. "A Brief History of Public Parks of Baltimore, December 10, 1940" (OA, 2400); *Baltimore's Public Landscapes: From Private Estates to the Public Domain* (Baltimore: Friends of Maryland's Olmsted Landscapes and Parks, 2002); Barry Kessler and David Zang, *The Play Life of a City: Baltimore's Recreation and Parks, 1900–1955* (Baltimore: Baltimore City Life Museums and Baltimore City Department of Recreation and Parks, 1989). On the 1888 and 1918 annexations, see Olson, *Baltimore*, 217, 302.

5. Notes by Rick state that Marburg was "interested in getting a good development for the whole suburban section in the way of a street system better than the gridiron and a park system." FLO Jr. notes, January 22, 1902; FLO Jr. to Theodore Marburg, Feb. 12, 1902 (OA, 2401).

6. Frederick Law Olmsted (senior) designed Sudbrook Park in the 1890s. See Melanie Anson, *Olmsted's Sudbrook: The Making of a Community* (Baltimore: Sudbrook Park, Inc., 1997).

7. On Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., see the biographical sketch by Susan L. Klaus in Charles Birnbaum and Robin Karson, eds., *Pioneers of American Landscape Design* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 273–76, and Susan L. Klaus, *A Modern Arcadia: Frederick Law Olmsted Junior and the Plan for Forest Hills Gardens* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002). On FLO (senior), the standard biographies are Laura Wood Roper, *FLO: A Biography of Frederick Law Olmsted* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) and Elizabeth Stevenson, *Park Maker: A Life of Frederick Law Olmsted* (New York: McMillan, 1977). The approach of senior and junior to landscape architecture and planning is compared in Jon A. Peterson, "Frederick Law Olmsted Senior and Frederick Law Olmsted Junior: The Visionary and the Professional," in Mary Corbin Sies and Christopher Silver, eds., *Planning the Twentieth-Century American City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). On FLO Jr. and planning for Edward Bouton's Roland

Park and Guilford in Baltimore, see James Waesche, *Crowning the Gravelly Hill: A History of the Roland Park-Guilford-Homeland District* (Baltimore: Maclay and Associates, 1987), 86–89.

8. *Report Upon the Development of Public Grounds for Greater Baltimore* (Baltimore: Municipal Art Society, 1904; reprint edition, published by the Friends of Maryland's Olmsted Parks and Landscapes, Baltimore, 1987).

9. Sale, *Seattle*, 80–83.

10. J. D. Blackwell to P. R. Jones, March 21, 1902; Olmsted Brothers to J. D. Blackwell, March 31, 1902 (Blackwell worked for the Seattle Electric Company, which was concerned with the location of its streetcar line through the tract which would become Woodland Park); Charles Saunders to FLO Jr., December 16, 1902; Olmsted Brothers to Charles Saunders, December 23, 1902; Charles Saunders to Olmsted Brothers, January 14, 1903; Olmsted Brothers to Charles Saunders, January 22, 1903 (OA, 2690). Regarding the assignment of a principal for the Seattle work, the Olmsted Brothers had not said Rick couldn't do it because of Baltimore; it had said that his engagement to teach at Harvard during the summer of 1903 might make a Seattle visit impossible, and the park board had replied it "didn't want to dictate which member."

11. On John C. Olmsted, see the biographical sketch by Arleyn Levee in Birnbaum and Karson, *Pioneers of American Landscape Design*, 282–85. See also works previously cited on FLO Senior for the relationship between the two.

12. Olmsted Brothers to E. F. Blaine, Chairman of the Board of Park Commissioners, July, 1903, page 1. Subsequent quotes below are from pages 2 and 10. The Portland plan did have a lengthy preface outlining a rationale for municipal parks and principal considerations regarding their development and administration. Report to the Board of Park Commissioners, Portland, Oregon (OA, 2640).

13. Notes by JCO and PRJ, May 29, 1903; Jones' notes were on Knickerbocker Hotel stationary (OA, 2690).

14. Olmsted Brothers to Charles Saunders, December 11, 1903 (OA, 2690). The report was approved by the City Council on October 19, 1903. For a discussion of the politics of the charter amendment see Wilson, *The City Beautiful Movement*, 156–60.

15. Charles Saunders to Olmsted Brothers, March 7 and March 11, 1903 (OA, 2690). Saunders reported that opponents included the city engineer and park superintendent, as well as the son of developer John McGilvra.

16. P.R. Jones, conference with JCO, March 19, 1903 (OA, 2690). An indication of the basis of a Seattle consensus about the general concept of a park and boulevard system is a *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* article summarizing the sentiment of the park commission and civic leaders in September, 1902 ("Let us Make a Beautiful City of Seattle," September 21, 1902); the article stated that what was needed was a landscape architect "whose very name in connection with the parks of Seattle would give them a reputation in all countries of the world."

17. Report on Baltimore Parks (1904), 18, 49.

18. Report on Baltimore Parks (1904), 36. The preference is also evident in a report by the Olmsted Brothers in 1904 which addressed competing functions at Druid Hill Park. "The tract is very well fitted to provide permanently just that aloofness from crowds and noisy activity which is so refreshing to tired, nerve-worn people, and which can be preserved ready to meet the needs of such people absolutely nowhere in a great city except in the more secluded parts of a large park." Olmsted Brothers, Report to the Hon. Richard Venable on Athletic and Playground Facilities in Riverside, Federal Hill, Carroll, Clifton, and Druid Hill Parks, May 7, 1904 (OA.2400).

19. Report on Seattle Parks (1903), 1, 14. The 1906 report urged acquiring Lake Washington shore line and Bailey's Peninsula before land values rose excessively. Olmsted Brothers (JCO)

to J. E. Shrewsbury, Report on Park and Playground Plans, November 28, 1906 (OA, 2690).
20. Wilson, *City Beautiful*, 160–63; Kessler and Zang, *The Play Life of a City*, 2–3, 14.
21. Baltimore report, 1904, 21–26. In the follow-up work, Rick's notes on a 1904 meeting with park commissioners regarding Swann and Latrobe Parks favorably noted comments by the president of the Baltimore Playgrounds Association ("I should judge that they do very good, effective work") and reported having a long talk with her the following day, in which he "got a very good many valuable ideas from her." FLO Jr., May 3–4, 1904 (OA, 2401).
22. It proposed that the Rainier Avenue playground include a wading pool and athletic ground. Seattle report, 1903, 62–65. Joan E. Draper argues that John's designs for "play-parks" for the most congested tenement areas of Chicago in 1902–1903 served as national models, representing an important early instance of the shift from the City Beautiful to the City Functional ideal. "The Art and Science of Park Planning in the United States: Chicago's Small Parks, 1902 to 1905," in Sies and Silver, *Planning the Twentieth-Century American City*, 98–119.
23. For example, John Olmsted expressed dismay that the board had adopted a policy (without consulting him) to establish a playground beside each of the city's schools. In his view these facilities would not be park-like and their costs would consume most of the board's park budget. These objections were raised in the context of his thorough report recommending the distribution of thirteen playgrounds throughout the city. JCO notes, May 3, 1910, and "Report upon a Comprehensive Scheme for Additional Sites of Playgrounds for the City," October 4, 1910 (OA, 2690).
24. Rick recommended that a new area for active recreation be acquired on the west side of the park. Olmsted Brothers, Report to Richard Venable, May 7, 1904 (OA, 2401).
25. Olmsted Brothers to Charles Saunders, July 20, 22, 1904 (OA, 2690).
26. Olmsted Brothers, Report to Richard Venable, May 7, 1904 (OA, 2401).
27. JCO to J. E. Shrewsbury, Report on Parks and Playgrounds, November 11, 1906; Olmsted Brothers to J. M. Frink, Recommendations for Parks and Parkways in the Recently Annexed Districts, January 1, 1908 (OA, 2690). A further note of constant concern was the high cost of land acquisition to create parks of any kind in central cities.
28. Baltimore Report, 1904, 11–12, 49. The report stressed that stream valleys "*can* be used to great advantage for park purposes, Ibid., 62–63.
29. The comments came from John Pratt of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, notes on a conference with JCO, March 19, 1903 (OA, 2690). Blaine served as chairman of the Board of Park Commissioners in 1903–1904.
30. Seattle Report, 1903, 19–21, 25–29. The Crest Parkway was one of the elements of the Olmsted plan not implemented.
31. Sale refers to this as a period of socioeconomic "sorting out" in Seattle's residential patterns, *Seattle*, 84–86. Regarding Baltimore at the same time, Rick noted of Edward Bouton, for whom the Olmsted Brothers did plans for Roland Park and, later, nearby Guilford, that his goal seemed to be to "practically catch the whole of the better class suburban development of the city," cited in Waesche, *Crowning the Gravelly Hill*, 86.
32. Job File Correspondence, Baltimore Parks (OA, 2400, 2403–2446). On parkway modifications, the Olmsted Brothers responded to Baltimore's proposal that the east-side "boulevard" from Wyman to Clifton Parks follow a straight line (instead of the curving parkway recommended in the original report) and have only a width of 100 feet by urging that it be at least 200 feet wide. Olmsted Brothers to Richard Venable, May 9 and 11, 1906; regarding plans for the Gwynns Falls Parkway on the west, FLO Jr. notes, March 22, 1906 (OA, 2401). Following the great Baltimore fire of 1904, Rick also provided a report on street plans for the "burned district" in the city's center, and in 1906 he served with two others as consultants on the city

plan. FLO Jr. to Charles K. Lord, Feb. 18, 1904 (OA, 2410) and Theodore Marburg to FLO Jr., January 20, 1906 (OA, 2420).

33. "Report and Recommendations on Park Extension for Baltimore" (1926; OA, 2400; reprinted by Friends of Maryland Olmsted Landscapes and Parks, Baltimore, 2001). The report's preface stated "every citizen of a closely settled town can no longer provide for himself certain good things which he could have owned privately if he were living outside of town. Perhaps chief among these is access to ample and unspoiled outdoor areas and the opportunity for exercise and recreation in the open air" (9). It provided detailed plans for the extension of the stream valley parks and a limited set of parkways.

34. FLO Jr. to Douglas Gordon, Dec. 2, 1937 (OA, 2400).

35. Olmsted Brothers, Report and Recommendations Regarding Leakin Park, June 12, 1939 (OA, 2446); Olmsted Brothers, Report with Recommendations as to an Adequate Park System for the City of Baltimore and Its Immediate Environs, July 16, 1941 (OA, 2400).

36. Job correspondence on Seattle parks, 1904–1921 (OA, 2690, 2693-2728); Report on Playgrounds (November 28, 1906); Recommendations Regarding Parks and Parkways in the Recently Annexed Area (January 25, 1908) (OA, 2690). Other parks mentioned in the job correspondence included Alki, Interlaken Boulevard, Schmitz, Bailey Peninsula, and Ravenna, as well as numerous playgrounds throughout the city. In early stages of the follow-up work, the relationship was far from smooth: in a confidential letter regarding appointment of a park superintendent, Charles Saunders wrote of the board's conviction that he should not be a Roman Catholic, "a prejudice which seemingly absurd is fixed"; John objected to efforts by the park board to limit the firm's planning to portions of the parks, rather than considering them as a whole; and at one point John received a warning from Saunders that one of the park commissioners (E. F. Blaine) was insisting that he, rather than Olmsted, stake out the plans for the Washington Park roadway. Charles Saunders to JCO, March 21, 1905, and n.d. [c. April/May, 1904]; JCO to Charles Saunders, September 22, 1904 (OA, 2690).

37. Sale states that Seattle approved $4 million in bonds to finance park and parkway recommendations between 1905 and 1912; among the additions, he lists Cowen Park (gift, 1907), Leschi Park (purchase, 1908); Schmitz Park (gift, 1908); Ravenna Park (condemnation, 1911); and Bailey Peninsula [renamed Seward Park] (condemnation, 1911). *Seattle*, 82.

38. See Norman J. Johnston, "The Olmsted Brothers and the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition: 'Eternal Loveliness,'" *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 75 (1984): 50–61; George A. Frykman, "The Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, 1909," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 53 (1962), 89–99. In addition to the 1903 parks plan for Portland, John also developed the landscape plan for the 1905 Lewis and Clark Exposition; see Carl Abbott, *Portland: Planning, Politics, and Growth in a Twentieth-Century City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

39. John Olmsted died in 1920, but the Olmsted Brothers firm remained involved in Seattle another decade and a half. See William E. Wilson's chapter, "The Collapse of the Civic Dream in Seattle," in *The City Beautiful Movement*, 213–33; Mansel Blackford, "Civic Groups, Political Action, and City Planning in Seattle, 1892–1915," *Pacific Historical Review*, 49 (1980), 557–80; and Sale, *Seattle*, 95–105.

Library Notes

The proclamation at right is the inaugural document in a new feature in the *MdHM* intended to highlight the holdings of the H. Furlong Baldwin Library of the Maryland Historical Society. This rare broadside, a recent gift to the library from Maryland Historical Society Trustee William Chaney, is now part of the library's special collections.

The outbreak of the Civil War in April 1861 and President Abraham Lincoln's subsequent call for volunteers to put down the rebellion badly divided Maryland. As efforts at peace collapsed, pro-Confederate feelings galvanized in the state, running especially high in southern Maryland, on the Eastern Shore, and for a time in Baltimore. Union sympathizers were stronger in central and western Maryland, and many Baltimoreans, including numerous businessmen, the German community, and the city's large free black population, supported the Union. Others in the city, especially those highly influential in society and politics, favored the South. On April 19, 1861, a week after the opening shots were fired at Fort Sumter, Baltimore residents clashed with Massachusetts militia—among the first of Lincoln's volunteers—as they made their way to Washington.

The riot of April 19, 1861, colored subsequent federal policy toward Maryland. Given the state's strategic location between the nation's capital and the rest of the North, Lincoln could not permit it to fall under the control of pro-southern sympathizers. He ordered the army to occupy Baltimore and protect key transportation routes, and he suspended the writ of habeas corpus in parts of the state. Federal troops began to arrest, without formal charges or trials, hundreds suspected of sympathy or support for the South. Among those arrested were members of the General Assembly and government officials, including some from Baltimore City.

By the time the state elections approached in November 1861, Union supporters clearly had the upper hand. Arrests, real and threatened, and the departure of thousands of young men who had chosen to enlist in the Confederate army, deprived the southern cause in Maryland of its most ardent followers. Yet rumors abounded that many who had gone south to enlist intended to return home to vote for governor and the state legislature. Those rumors prompted General John A. Dix, the Union commander of the Middle District, to issue this proclamation, ordering the arrest of any who returned. In the ensuing election, the Union party, with federal bayonets casting long shadows over the polls, elected Augustus G. Bradford to the governorship and secured an overwhelming majority of seats in the legislature.

HEADQUARTERS,

BALTIMORE, Nov. 1st, 1861.

To the U. S. Marshal of Maryland,

AND THE

Provost Marshal of the City of Baltimore.

Information has come to my knowledge that certain individuals, who formerly resided in this State, and are known to have been recently in Virginia bearing arms against the authority and the forces of the United States, have returned to their former homes, with the intention of taking part in the election of the 6th of November inst., thus carrying out at the polls the treason they have committed in the field.

There is reason also to believe that other individuals, lately residents of Maryland, who have been engaged in similar acts of hostility to the United States, or in actively aiding and abetting those in arms against the United States, are about to participate in the election for the same treacherous purpose, with the hope of carrying over the State by disloyal votes to the cause of rebellion and treason.

I, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me to arrest all persons in rebellion against the United States, require you to take into custody all such persons, in any of the election districts or precincts in which they may appear at the polls to effect their criminal attempt to convert the elective franchise into an engine for the subversion of the Government and for the encouragement and support of its enemies.

In furtherance of this object, I request the Judges of Election of the several Districts and Precincts of the State, in case any such person shall present himself and offer his vote, to commit him until he can be taken into custody by the authority of the United States.

And I call on all good and loyal citizens to support the Judges of Election, the United States Marshal and his Deputies, and the Provost Marshal of Baltimore, and the Police, in their efforts to secure a free and fair expression of the voice of the people of Maryland, and, at the same time, to prevent the ballot boxes from being polluted by treasonable votes.

JOHN A. DIX,

MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDING.

Book Reviews

Common Whores, Vertuous Women, and Loveing Wives: Free Will Christian Women in Colonial Maryland. By Debra Meyers. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, 261 pages. Notes, selected bibliography, indexes. Cloth, $40.00.)

Controversially titled, *Common Whores, Vertuous Women, and Loveing Wives: Free Will Christian Women in Colonial Maryland* explores the lives of English women living in seventeenth-century colonial Maryland. Debra Meyers makes an old story—the importance of religion in shaping colonial women's lives—new through a comparative approach. Unlike most historians, she divides colonial Christians into two groups, based on their beliefs about the means of salvation. She treats Catholics, Anglicans, and Quakers together based on their "universal belief that any person could choose to work for eternal salvation" a belief that "tended to place women on a more level playing field with their male kinfolk" (5). In contrast, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists believed in predestination and stressed the physical and moral frailty of women. In support of this division, she examines wills, legal proceedings, houses of worship, and the public roles of women in the church. She concludes that in all respects, Free Will Christians' theology led them to grant women more freedom and respect in the private and public sphere than that enjoyed by their Predestinarian sisters.

Meyers begins with a discussion of the Calvert family and the founding of Maryland. Her version of the founding stresses the Calvert family's emphasis on tolerance and religious diversity, setting up a vision of Maryland as a place where many forms of Christianity happily coexisted. She then examines the private lives of Maryland couples, particularly as they engaged with the legal system in matters of marriage and death. The remainder of the book focuses on women's private, public, and legal lives in colonial Maryland, always viewed through the comparative framework she established in her introduction.

Meyers draws on wills, public legal proceedings, and worship spaces and practices to support her conclusions. Her best evidence comes from her reinterpretation of Maryland wills. Although many historians have concluded that colonial wills followed set forms and thus overlooked them, Meyers found that Maryland wills varied greatly depending on the personal beliefs of their authors. By mining a source others have overlooked, she discovered significant differences between her Freewill Christians and Predestinarians.

Meyers is less persuasive when looking at churches and meeting houses. Basing her division of Christians partially on the design of worship spaces and the practices of various groups, she argues that Catholic, Anglican, and Quaker forms

of worship were very similar. Although Catholic and Anglican churches shared many physical and theological traits, Quaker and Puritan meeting houses resembled each other far more than churches of any other description. Likewise, the trappings of Catholicism and Anglicanism have little in common with the plain, anti-traditionalist worship of the Friends.

Frustratingly, Meyers's lack of confidence in her own conclusions distracts her readers. Names and arguments of other historians so clutter her text it becomes difficult to find her voice. Far too much of this work is devoted to recounting the arguments and findings of others. A more polished presentation, putting her own ideas forth more assertively, would strengthen her argument.

The strength and failing of this work involves Meyers's decision to put together Christian groups that historically hated and persecuted each other. Regardless of their core theological similarities, Catholics, Quakers, and Anglicans on one side and Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists on the other would never have placed themselves together. Indeed, many considered their Free Will or Predestinarian brethren heretics. Meyers briefly mentions this paradox but must explore it more thoroughly for her work to be truly convincing. Still, she raises interesting questions for religious historians and suggests a new approach to understanding the role of religion in women's lives. Although somewhat flawed in its application, her thesis deserves praise and emulation.

Elizabeth Crosman
University of Delaware

Foul Means: The Formation of a Slave Society in Virginia, 1660–1740. By Anthony S. Parent Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, 2003. 312 pages. Appendix, notes, index. Cloth $49.95)

In 1736, Virginia planter William Byrd II articulated a philosophy for the coercion of labor: "Foul means will do, what fair means will not." For Anthony Parent Jr., this amounted to a confession of guilt, as Byrd and his generation comprehended, "the moral cost of slavery" and "were willing to pay" (265). Throughout his new book's eight chapters, divided into three parts ("Origins," "Conflicts," and "Reactions"), Parent analyzes class and class-consciousness among colonial elites, fleshing out the formation of Virginia's slave society.

The first section of this remarkable work discusses the emergence of a class of great planters during the seventeenth century through manipulation of British colonial policy, particularly the headright system. While the spirit of headrights encouraged the immigration of persons no lower than servant status, the great planters' influence over the colonial apparatus saw them receive vast, undue land grants from the importation of slaves as well.

The chapters of Part II ("The Laws of Slavery," "Revolt and Response, 1676–1740," and "Class Conflicts, 1724–1740") introduce readers to the structure of Virginia's seventeenth-century class contest among whites. Struggles with lower-class whites and colonial administrators occupied the great planters' energies as much as did attempts to permanently shackle Africans. One point of cooperation among whites of different status involved security, as the potential for slave rebellion—"the most sensitive source of the great planters' anxieties"—became a straw man justifying the frequent use of brutalizing authority (172). In the end, any union between the great planters and lesser members of white society proved uneasy. Middling planters, and even the truly wealthy who otherwise lacked family lines and traditional standing, found their interests pitted against the Byrds, Carters, and Wormeleys.

To rescue their designs, the great planters sought an ideology that would protect their prerogatives and place, settling upon "patriarchism" (197–200). Patriarchism embraced the natural inequity of traditional English socio-political organization, legitimizing privileges of wealth, status, gender, and race. Parent, employs "patriarchism" rather than "patriarchalism" because the former suggests formative stages of such organization while the latter describes an established structure. As a method of organization, patriarchism allowed great planters their preferred place among colonists, at the same time setting them ideologically apart from peers in England who might offer challenges to legitimacy. Yet, rather than an attempt to rescue traditional values from destruction in a modernizing colonial world, in Parent's view the emergence of patriarchism represented desperation on the part of the great planters, betraying feelings of "frustration, failure, and fear," as did their near-simultaneous endorsement of Christianity for their slaves (234). After decades of solid rejection, the great planters co-opted religion and the church as useful tools for indoctrination and control of blacks.

In sum, Parent offers a compelling, well-stated argument for reconsideration of the basic narrative of American colonial history, particularly its assumptions concerning the emergence of African slavery. Conventional thinking holds that the transition from white indentured servitude to black enslaved labor was the result of an "unthinking decision," a drawn-out, uncoordinated response to market forces of supply and demand. In assigning agency for the "switch," Parent indicts other influences, calculated as well as reactionary, including the collapse of the Royal Africa Company's monopoly, the rise of independent slave traders, and the perceived adaptability of Africans to a variety of agricultural work. Central influences upon these developments are his great planters. Deliberate steps *brought* African slavery to Virginia.

Having consulted a convincing blend of secondary literature and original source materials, Parent refines Edmund Morgan's classic thesis (*American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia,* New York, 1975), suggest-

ing that the "American paradox" was not simply the concomitant evolutions of black slavery and white freedom, but the probability that development of the former deeply influenced the latter, that whites learned the meaning of liberty from blacks' struggle to attain it. Black resistance to the imposition of slavery "forced the great planters to defend their own freedom as the antithesis of slavery" (5). Foul means, indeed.

David Taft Terry
Maryland State Archives

American Exceptionalism, American Anxiety: Wages, Competition, and Degraded Labor in the Antebellum United States. By Jonathan A. Glickstein. (Charlottesville University of Virginia Press, 2002. 372 pages. Introduction, notes, index. Cloth, $39.50.)

For those interested in antebellum political, intellectual, and labor history, Jonathan Glickstein's musings over the early nineteenth-century wage debate in the United States is required reading. He pursues two different but related subjects: first, the perception of wage labor by antebellum, non-working-class contemporaries and second, the treatment of Marxism and working-class history in various intellectual circles. The book is laden with interesting observations, conjectures, and conclusions, although at times it is couched in heavy ideological language.

Glickstein seems obsessed with one overriding question: why did not contemporaries accept industrial workers' depiction of their condition and the truthfulness of their analysis? In answer, the author generally holds that economic position in the class structure determined the point of view—he does proclaim himself a structuralist (27). However, he concedes much more variety to responses about the condition of the wage-earner than one might expect. For instance, he finds reason to believe that some workers imbibed bourgeois values, although he seems willing to ascribe this phenomenon to the skilled/unskilled division within labor's ranks. The reform mentality indeed included some who fretted about the fate of labor but who nonetheless fell into the trap of using individual morality to explain social ills. He uses the writings of George Weston to draw out the slave labor–free labor oratorical battle in the 1840s and 1850s, suggesting that contemporaries were concerned less with the differences in material condition between the slave and wage-earner and more with the appropriate behaviors learned from the necessity to respond to "incentives." He emphasizes, however, that the antebellum middle class dearly embraced a "Gresham's Law" toward labor in general—bad labor practices drove out good labor practices—and he holds that this attitude was behind some of the northern fear of slavery. In two vital chapters, Glickstein looks at the protectionist–free trade debate (which he finds has inter-

esting similarities to the attack on globalization in our time) and assesses critically the pauper labor argument of the high tariff advocates, correctly identifying this battle as the major public debate over the condition of the worker. He then adds a discussion of the Democratic Party's view of the free labor question, and notes—again, correctly—the suspicion Democrats evinced toward the opposition's free labor hosannas and the alleged danger slavery posed to northern workingmen. As Glickstein analyzes these debates, he continuously informs the reader of the failures of free market capitalism, the social construction of capitalist realities, the unfettered truths of Marxist analysis, and the triviality of the slave labor question in connection to the well-being of the free wage-earner.

The other major concern of the book deals almost entirely with current academic theories. This running commentary about scholarship is tied to antebellum labor arguments, but at times the historiography almost takes on a separate life. Glickstein's attention to intellectual debate is revealed in the structure of the book; it is nearly 350 pages long, but the narrative takes only 228 pages while the notes, filled with historiographical argument, consume 118 more. His commentary divides into two subject areas, one about "mainstream" historiography, and the other about the "linquistic turn" and the political left. Of the first, the most castigated word in the book is in the title, "exceptionalism." Glickstein brooks no suggestion that in any manner, form, or shape was the United States exempt from the social processes in Europe and England, that anyone then or now who so finds differences is guilty of the twentieth century's greatest crime (or so it seems) of believing in consensus history. These portions of the book are contentious, tedious, and over-wrought; the current literature chastising consensus history and exceptionalism has become worse than the flogging of a dead horse, it is like the flogging of a decomposed horse (I dare not say a deconstructed horse). Of more interest for the reader is Glickstein's quarrels with neo-Marxism, the linquistic turn, and postmodernism. Much of this book is actually a debate with Marxist scholars who want to reject materialism, class, textual evidence, and the New (but now Old) Labor History (26–28). Glickstein uncomfortably finds himself joining the ranks of political, economic, and foreign affairs historians in the realm of fuddy-duddydom, the realm inhabited by those whom the linquists have banished. In particular, he rails against the new "whiteness" studies that have lifted the class out of the working class and have found the wage-laborer guilty of absorbing racism for reasons independent of class (93–96).

Although the book is rich in interpretation, analysis, and historiographical argument, it has a number of problems, one of which stands foremost—methodology. Glickstein shows no understanding at all of basic statistical philosophy. That philosophy can be reduced to the theory of large numbers. Given a large number of observations (N of cases—of people, of a characteristic, etc.),

then those observations will on some sort of scale have a central tendency (i.e., an average) and exhibit a dispersion around the average (i.e., the standard deviation). If one wants to investigate a society (e.g., Boston or Massachusetts or New England or the North or the U.S.) then one needs to determine the central tendency of that society on some defined measure and then look at the dispersion around the central tendency. If one deals with popular opinion, or elite opinion, or working-class opinion, then the first operation one should undertake is to figure out the average or modal response and then note the deviations from it.

This criticism is phrased in this fashion because of the procedures that Glickstein employs: he looks to big cities, to industrial wage-earners, and to the "marginalized" trades to draw criticisms of wage labor and free labor society. In other words, on almost every scale of economic activity in the United States, he purposely goes to the areas that are most uncharacteristic of the North to get his information. When one goes three standard deviations from the norm, it is guaranteed that one will find something significantly different from the mainstream. The problem with Glickstein's book is that he never seeks to find the central tendency. Instead we are treated to intense analysis of numerous free labor advocates (William Ellery Channing, James Freeman Clarke, Joseph Tuckerman, Isaac Toucey, Frederick Law Olmsted, Horace Greeley, George Henry Evans, Calvin Colton, and others) without knowing how their major ideas and their subordinate arguments fit in the general free labor/slave labor debate, which ideas and arguments were beyond normal boundaries for that society, and which were standard. Likewise, Glickstein evidently cannot stand diversity in human conceptions of reality. His structuralism demands uniformity of thinking when the material reality is the same—he cannot accept the theory that when a large number of cases exist, some deviations will occur. Thus, because workers revealed a difference of opinion on slavery, the chore becomes not to determine which ideas were the norm and which were deviations, but to find some material explanation for the deviations.

On this subject of understanding the existence of central tendencies and deviations from the norm, one last application can be offered. Because Glickstein is fixated on the condition of marginalized workers in large cities in the Northeast, he assumes that the free labor argument is about justifying either the industrial worker or the marginalized wage-earner. But the central tendency of northern society in 1850, 1860, 1870, and almost up to 1880 was neither the factory nor the city: it was the agricultural town or village. If one looks at the free labor discussion in Congress between 1846 and 1860, or in the newspapers, or even among reformers, the referent of free labor speakers is not the industrial wage-earner. Rather, it is the free farmer—the farmer free of feudal obligations, feudal taxes, and landlords. What happens to Glickstein's book if the major

referent to free labor is not the wage-earner but the yeoman farmer? If such is the case, an entirely different perspective about labor markets and about social expectations is required. And such may have indeed been the case.

James L. Huston
Oklahoma State University

The Claims of Kinfolk: African American Property and Community in the Nineteenth-Century South. By Dylan C. Penningroth. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 310 pages. Introduction, illustrations, maps, figures, conclusion, notes, bibliography, acknowledgments, index. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $19.95.)

Maryland is often treated as an anomalous case in the history of slavery, because of its high percentage of free African Americans on the eve of emancipation. Richard Paul Fuke, for example, revealed that in 1864, 36.5 percent of people of color on the Eastern Shore and in the southern counties were already free, with some control over land and their own labor (Fuke, *Imperfect Equality: African Americans and the Confines of White Racial Attitudes in Post-Emancipation Maryland* [New York: Fordham University Press, 1999], 47). But Dylan C. Penningroth's new work demonstrates that enslaved people, too, owned property. Using records of nineteenth-century legal disputes in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, he diligently pieces together the story of property acquisition among enslaved people, revealing that this paradoxical phenomenon of "property owning property" was widespread. More surprisingly, Penningroth argues that ownership was central to maintaining networks of kin, demonstrating that, for African Americans as for Africans, "property was less an institution or a legal right than a social process" (189), one that the Civil War profoundly affected.

How did enslaved people gain property? For slaves whose labor was organized by task rather than time, "hiring out," artisan skills, and work in small gardens enabled them to obtain moveable goods—horses and pigs, clothing, tools, and even surplus crops. Penningroth insists these efforts were not the "acquisitive individualism" of incipient capitalism (77). Rather, the ability to accumulate small amounts of surplus cash or food kept many from the direst existence, and perhaps more importantly in the long term, it helped them make and sustain social ties. Enslaved people held their property only at the sufferance of their masters and therefore depended upon networks of kin to reinforce their tenuous claims.

Penningroth employs innovative comparisons between slavery in the U.S. and Africa's Gold Coast to underscore these links between kin and property. In the Fante region slavery created a sort of familial relationship between slave and master, so that in order to retain their rights to family possessions after British abolition in 1874 many newly freed people legally affirmed their past bondage.

"Multiple, overlapping, and sometimes competing" claims necessitated that colonial courts depend upon family testimony to determine ownership (41). Similarly, in the antebellum South, without access to legal protections enslaved people relied on the consensual construction of property rights by other African Americans. In a process the author calls "display and acknowledgment" (106), enslaved people publicly associated themselves with their goods to ensure that everyone knew which were their livestock, boats, buggies, and housewares. He describes how "prewar living conditions, the system of display, and the intense affective ties created by shared interests in property fostered detailed knowledge" useful for upholding former slaves' claims before courts and military agencies (128). The author uses such parallels not to establish the persistence of Africanisms in North America, but rather to shift historical emphasis toward the complex kin structures and informal economies common among rural people oriented toward oral knowledge.

Emancipation and Reconstruction created a revolution in black and white understandings of ownership, allowing "formal law . . . to sweep aside extralegal understanding as the anchor of black people's claims to property" (131). Although now legally entitled to their possessions, freedpeople who appealed to the Freedmen's Bureau and the Southern Claims Commission to enforce these rights confronted white officials suspicious of the very notion of ownership by slaves. Penningroth gives these northerners credit for attempting to unravel conflicting claims, but former slaveowners were another matter. If the war had nullified their rights to property in flesh, they nevertheless expected to retain control of all land, moveable property, and black labor—the result was extortionate labor "contracts" and an explosion in the number of accusations of theft against people of color in the 1860s and 1870s. Emancipation also complicated African Americans' definition of family by forcing changes in old ideas about kin obligations. Husbands and fathers accustomed to controlling the labor of wives and offspring found those claims checked by other freedpeople or these family members themselves, with the result that "black-on-black negotiations transformed their lives as much as anything whites did" after the war (185).

While one might have hoped for at least a hint of post-Reconstruction ramifications, *The Claims of Kinfolk* does comprehensively explore the little studied phenomenon of property acquisition by the enslaved, breaking out of the precapitalist/capitalist dichotomy often applied to American slavery. This fine work of scholarship challenges and complicates notions about slavery, reminding us of the diversity and resilience of the people subject to its debilitating effects.

Elizabeth P. Stewart
Maryland Commission on African American History and Culture

Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland. By Peter B. Levy. The Southern Dissent Series. Stanley Harrold and Randall M. Miller, editors. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003. 249 pages. Notes, index. Cloth, $55.00.)

To all but the most serious scholars of the 1950s and 1960s Civil Rights Movement, the Cambridge, Maryland, demonstrations were virtually unknown. Even those who lived elsewhere in Maryland rarely consider them when reflecting on that tumultuous era. As Peter Levy points out, however, in his well written book *Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland*, those demonstrations are worth studying for several important reasons.

Cambridge, a city on Maryland's Eastern Shore, is part of the Upper South. As such, its history included slavery. Both Harriet Tubman and Frederick Douglass spent parts of their lives as Eastern Shore slaves. Maryland, as a border state almost entirely surrounding Washington, D. C., did not join the Confederacy but had Union troops stationed in key areas to ensure neutrality. The Eastern Shore and southern Maryland were decidedly southern in sympathy. By the middle years of the twentieth century, Cambridge prided itself on its tolerance. The white people saw how far they had come; the black people saw what they did not have. Everyone could vote. Black voters who lived in the black residential Second Ward elected an African American man to the town council. Of course, he was one councilman among five. The right to vote, then, was not at issue—economic parity was the point of contention.

Blacks may have been able to vote, but they were barred from jobs in tax-supported organizations such as the fire department. Cambridge was a one-industry town, Phillips Packing Company, and therefore the towns' fortunes rose and fell with the company's success. Cambridge was a fairly isolated city with a thriving port until 1956 when the Chesapeake Bay Bridge opened and eliminated the need for much of the boat trade. The bridge also ended Cambridge's isolation. As the struggle for civil rights spread throughout the South, activists in Baltimore began fighting there, and some of them crossed over to Cambridge to help.

Levy bolsters his assertion that jobs, wages, and housing were the biggest issues by pointing out that, during the War on Poverty in the mid-1960s, Cambridge was quiet. The biggest demonstrations were in 1963 and 1967.

Gloria Richardson, the driving force behind the Cambridge Movement, found herself one of the few women to lead such a fight. Her politics of confrontation emerged several years before "Black Power" became a battle cry. While Fanny Lou Hamer served as the voice of the Mississippi Freedom Democrat Party, she was one leader among many in the voter-registration drive in Mississippi. Ella Baker organized the students who formed SNCC but turned it over to the students, and

Rosa Parks outside of her one courageous act on the bus in Montgomery, had been a behind-the-scenes worker. Ms. Richardson's leadership was key to the tenor of the demonstrations. Had she chosen passive resistance, the crowd would have followed her. She did not. When faced in 1964 with the ultimatum of retreating or continuing a march, she continued on, taking her people with her (109). In light of the fact that many of the protesters were men, her strong leadership is all the more remarkable.

Although an occasional factual error jolts the reader (Parren Mitchell was Clarence Mitchell II's brother and Juanita Jackson Mitchell's brother-in-law, not their son [130]), Levy makes a good case that the Cambridge Movement was fighting in the early 1960s for reasons and with methods that only later in the decade would the Black Panthers and some of the more mainstream groups like SNCC espouse. Not only were the issues different from those that blacks in the Deep South adopted as critical (voting and access to federally funded buildings were not at issue; access to good jobs and fair pay was), but also the protesters shunned the non-violence promoted by Rev. Martin Luther King and, eventually, King himself. *Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland* is an important addition to the history of civil rights in the United States and to the history of Maryland.

Tracy Miller
Towson University

Gerald W. Johnson: From Southern Liberal to National Conscience. By Vincent Fitzpatrick. Southern Biography Series. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002. 341 pages. Bibliography, index. Cloth, $39.95.)

On a sunny day in 1977 a photographer for the *Baltimore Evening Sun* snapped a picture of an elderly man napping in a Baltimore park. Identified only as "an old man on a bench" when the picture was published, the dozing eighty-seven-year-old turned out, ironically, not to be just an "old man." He was Gerald W. Johnson, one of Baltimore's most prolific journalists and authors, who had not been recognized by the staff of the newspaper where he had once been a star performer. The picture, however, was titled "The Old Man and the Sun," a point noted by Vincent Fitzpatrick in this well-constructed biography of Johnson. The title was more apt than the editors knew, Fitzpatrick contends, because Johnson shed light on many aspects of the American experience during a career that spanned three-quarters of the twentieth century.

Fitzpatrick endeavors to retrieve Johnson from the obscurity into which he has fallen despite numerous honors awarded during his lifetime. His pungent commentaries, which alternated with those of his mentor, H. L. Mencken, in the

Evening Sun in the 1920s and 1930s, would make him of interest to scholars even if he had written little else, but that was hardly the case. Johnson left behind more than fifteen million words, churning out some forty books, mainly works of American history and biography, and more than a hundred magazine articles.

Fitzpatrick, curator of the Mencken Collection at the Enoch Pratt Free Library in Baltimore, has spent years researching Johnson's life, locating some thirty archival collections to produce this meticulously crafted book, which is Johnson's first biography. It tells the story of a gifted writer, who was the first professor of journalism at the University of North Carolina and a leading figure in the southern literary renaissance. A man of deep conviction, he supported Franklin D. Roosevelt, although this caused him to leave his job at the *Evening Sun*, and took unpopular stands on civil liberties, including opposition to McCarthyism and the Vietnam War. He criticized the Ku Klux Klan and the murder of civil rights workers in Mississippi. He was one of the first television commentators and one of Baltimore's most noteworthy residents for more than fifty years. Adlai Stevenson praised Johnson as "the critic and conscience of our time" (x).

Yet, Johnson was not an opponent of segregation. His views placed him in the company of other "liberal segregationists." of his day (43). Fitzpatrick seemingly soft-pedals the racism that marred Johnson's liberalism, although he concedes, "That Johnson began his career as a segregationist is hardly surprising; that he would end as one is surprising indeed" (44). Johnson wrote until almost the end of his life in 1980, years after integration was accepted. One would like more analysis as to why he refused to change his position.

It was on the *Evening Sun* with Mencken that Johnson's career flowered. The *Sun* represented Johnson's move to the North after growing up in rural North Carolina, where he was born in 1890. Influenced by his father, Archibald, the editor of a magazine published by a Baptist orphanage, who showed little interest in material goods, Johnson went into journalism after graduation from Wake Forest College. After winning acclaim for his editorials in Greensboro, North Carolina, he joined the *Evening Sun* in 1926 at Mencken's urging. It had been Mencken's indictment of the South, "The Sahara of the Bozart," that prompted Johnson to defend his native region and write articles on Southern themes for Mencken's *American Mercury*. Johnson and Mencken did not always agree. Johnson was far more charitable than Mencken to William Jennings Bryan in the Scopes Trial, for example, and he applauded the New Deal, which Mencken detested.

Yet, Johnson never wavered in his devotion to Mencken, whom he eulogized as one who "touched the dull fabric of our days and gave it a silken sheen" (219). The same could not be said of Mencken, who wrote in his diary, published after each man's death, that Johnson was a "second-rate Southerner" with little to say (272). Unfortunately, these mean-spirited remarks were published while Johnson's wife, Katherine, with whom he had a long and happy marriage, was still living.

They say more about Mencken than they do about Johnson, a figure worthy of Fitzgerald's polished biography.

Maurine H. Beasley
University of Maryland

African American Life in the Rural South, 1900–1950. Edited with an Introduction by R. Douglas Hurt. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003. 227 pages. Notes, index. Cloth, $32.50.)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, African Americans were a rural and southern people. Ninety percent of them lived in the former states of the old Confederacy and eighty percent lived in the countryside. With few exceptions, they earned their livelihood as farmers. A few owned their own farms. Some were tenant farmers. Most were sharecroppers. Yet, despite their considerable knowledge of the land and agricultural skills, they were poor people. Their poverty was racial, structural, and violent. It affected every aspect of their lives and, eventually, pushed them out of their homeland.

In this collection of eight thought-provoking essays, R. Douglas Hurt, Professor of American Agricultural and Rural History at Purdue University, brings together the work of several scholars whose research has located the experiences of African Americans within the context of American agrarian history. These essays examine how the social forces of race, class, and the state buffeted African Americans during the first half of the twentieth century. In the first essay, Louis M. Kyriakaoudes discusses African American migratory practices within the South. Like poor whites, blacks moved from one farm to another in search of better opportunities or more favorable working conditions. Unlike like poor whites, however, blacks found racial discrimination a powerful barrier to economic mobility. Ted Ownby's second essay critiques the meaning of agrarianism in the autobiographical writings of Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. DuBois, Richard Wright, and Zora Neale Hurston. Their writings keenly rejected sentimental attachments to folk culture and its impoverished people. For them, racial segregation denied the descendants of American slavery the promises of freedom and democracy and brought with it extraordinary pain and suffering.

What mitigated some of this misery was the African American rural church. As Lois E. Myers and Rebecca Sharpless point out in their essay, the church served multiple purposes. It articulated a world view. It served as a community center. It provided a refuge from the ravages of racism. As a resource, the church was one of the instruments that made it possible for African Americans to negotiate the violence of southern race relations and to construct for themselves a culture. In chapter four, Melissa Walker addresses the racial divide. Although she draws attention to the fluidity of race relations in the countryside, blacks were forced to occupy a

subordinate status to whites. More than custom or paternalism, white violence, or its threat, kept the races segregated and enforced Jim Crow laws. African Americans coped with this perilous situation by developing a vibrant culture that made sense to them. Valerie Grim's essay describes how poor black people struggled to maintain some control over their identity and self-esteem. Churches, family life, schools, music, social clubs, sports, and improvements in communication technology enabled African Americans to creatively express themselves in a hostile world.

In their struggles against menacing social forces, African Americans found the state to be indifferent to their plight. Both William P. Browne and Jeannie Whayne analyze how the federal government failed to address the specific needs of black farmers. Government farm subsidies and technical assistance went to white landlords who had the right to vote and not to black tenant farmers and sharecroppers who were disenfranchised. Browne makes a compelling argument. Even if blacks had secured ownership of "forty acres and a mule," they could not have resisted the collusion between government and corporate agricultural interests. The twentieth-century enclosure movement forced all small landholdings, regardless of the owner's race, into larger agglomerations. And, in her essay, Whayne comes to a similar observation. As much as black agricultural extension agents genuinely sought to improve the lives and productivity of black farmers, they were, in fact, agents of agricultural modernization and its transformation of a labor-intensive economy into a capital-intensive one. Faced with such pressures, African Americans devised strategies that would deliver them from the burdens of rural southern life.

According to Peter Coclanis and Bryant Simon in the book's final essay, one way to understand black deliverance is through economist Albert O. Hirschman's formulation about how people express their discontent with a declining economic or political entity. One response was to exit or leave. Another reaction was to voice their protests in subtle and overt ways. The third was to re-define loyalty in such a way that it worked for them. Of the three, blacks spoke with their feet. By the end of the twentieth century, African Americans were an urban people with nearly half living in northern and western cities.

Lester P. Lee, Jr.
Northeastern University

Letters to the Editor

Editor:

Francis Neale Smith's article on Capt. James Neale is excellent and most interesting. Just a few comments by way of addition:

Neale's mother was indeed named Jane Forman when she married Raphael Neale, but her maiden name was Baker. Her first husband was Dr. Simon Forman (1552-1611), a notable Elizabethan, a physician, astrologer, necromancer, diarist, intimate counsellor to many prominent figures, and posthumously prominent in a famous murder trial, at which Jane testified. He is the subject of three modern biographies: A.L. Rowse, *Sex and Society in Shakespeare's Age: Simon Forman the Astrologer* (1974); Barbara Howard Traister, *The Notorious Astrological Physician of London: Works and Days of Simon Forman* (2001), and Judith Cook, *Dr. Simon Forman: A Most Notorious Physician* (2001), as well as five murder mysteries by Judith Cook set in Elizabethan England and starring Forman as the detective.

While Mr. Smith is quite right that our knowledge of Neale's adventures during the English civil wars leaves much to be desired, there is one other smidgen of evidence, though it is tantalizingly vague. In 1660 Neale applied to Charles II for the office of Treasurer of Virginia, and declared that "he and his father lost blood and estate in His Majesty's Service, and now joyfully expect his speedy restitution." *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Right of Charles II, 1660–1661* (1860), 13. In addition, while the chatter in older works of Mrs. Neale's having been a lady in waiting to Queen Henrietta is surely inflated, it seems worth mentioning that she did own a ring of enamel set in gold, bearing a secret miniature of King Charles I with the date of his execution. I assume this is still displayed, as it was many years ago, in the society's museum.

In addition to the demonstration by Mr. Smith that Neale's relatives and children were Roman Catholics, it can readily be shown that Mrs. Neale and her family were not only of that persuasion but very emphatically so. Benjamin Gill and his wife (called interchangeably Ann and Mary; her name was almost certainly Anna Maria, like her daughter's), of St. Andrew, Holborn, Middlesex, were indicted for recusancy repeatedly between 1626 and 1635. John Cordy Jeaffreson, ed., *Middlesex County Records*, Old Series 3:12, 19, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, 138 (1888). Mrs. Gill had three brothers (George, Christopher and Edward Mainwaring) who attended the English College at Rome and became Jesuits. See Henry Foley, *Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus vol. 1* (1877).

Sincerely,

Brice M. Clagett

Notices

Maryland Historical Society Fellowships

The Maryland Historical Society invites applications for its Lord Baltimore Research Fellowships. The society offers four fellowships each year designed to promote scholarship in Maryland history and culture through research in its library and museum collections. Applications will be welcomed from independent scholars, graduate students, or university faculty in any discipline appropriate to its collections Although the fellowships are non-stipendiary, fellows will be provided with office space, computers with Internet connections, office supplies, staff-level access to the library and museum, and free parking. The term of the fellowship may be from one week to six months during the period from June 1, 2004, to May 31, 2005. Fellows are expected to be in residence during their fellowship term, make use of the society's collections in their research, and participate in the intellectual life of the society. Fellows are encouraged to present their research-in-progress in informal presentations at the society and to submit their work for possible publication in the *Maryland Historical Magazine.*

To apply, send a cover letter, a c.v. or resume, a 2–4 page summary of the planned research and how it fits into your overall research project, and the names and complete addresses of two references to: Fellowships, Maryland Historical Society, 201 West Monument Street, Baltimore, MD 21201. For additional information about library-related fellowships, please contact Bea Hardy, Library Director, at library@mdhs.org or 410-685-3750 x309. For information about museum-related fellowships, please contact Nancy Davis, Museum Director, at museum@mdhs.org or 410-685-3750 x343. Applications must be postmarked by April 1, 2004. Notification of awards will be made by the end of April.

SAWH Publications Prizes

The Southern Association for Women Historians invites submissions for its annual publications prizes. The Julia Cherry Spruill Prize for the best published book in southern women's history carries an award of $750. The Willie Lee Rose Prize honors the best book in southern history authored by a woman. For articles, the association awards the A. Elizabeth Taylor Prize for the best article published in the field of women's history. All works must carry a 2003 publication date. To nominate a publication send four copies to Melissa Walker, Converse College, Department of History and Politics, 580 East Main Street, Spartanburg, S.C., 29302. Contact melissa.walker@converse.edu.

Maryland Historical Society Maryland Day Event

In celebration of Maryland Day 2004, Dr. Timothy Riordan, Chief Archeologist of Historic St. Mary's City, will present an exciting lecture from his forthcoming MdHS Press book *The Plundering Time: Maryland and the English Civil War, 1645–1646*. The lecture is scheduled for Maryland Day, Thursday, March 25, 2004 at 7:00 p.m. The lecture, followed by a book signing, will be held in the society's France-Merrick Hall. Series packages are $25 for Maryland Historical Society members and students with valid ID and $40 for non-members. Individual lecture prices are $10 for members and students and $15 for non-members. For additional information, or to purchase tickets, call 410-685-3750 x321.

Index to Volume 98

Index to Volume 98
1 (Spring): pp. 1–128
2 (Summer): pp. 129–56
3 (Fall): pp. 257–82
4 (Winter): pp. 383–496

A Government by the People: Direct Democracy in America, 1890–1940, by Thomas Goebel, reviewed, 118–19
"A TALE OF TWO PARK PLANS: THE OLMSTED VISION FOR BALTIMORE AND SEATTLE, 1903," W. Edward Orser, 466–83
Act Concerning Religion (1649), 273
Adams, John, and Judiciary Act of 1801, 138
African–American Family in Slavery and Emancipation, The, by Wilma A. Dunaway, reviewed, 369–71
African American Life in the Rural South, 1900–1950, by R. Douglas Hurt, reviewed, 495–96
African Americans, end of segregation at Druid Hill Park, 199; first political convention in Maryland, 85; free black population in Revolutionary War period, 304, 308–9; free black workers, 85
Alexander, William, 423–4
American Catholic Lay Groups and Transatlantic Social Reform in the Progressive Era, by Diedre M. Moloney, reviewed, 233–35
American Exceptionalism, American Anxiety: Wages, Competition, and Degraded Labor in the Antebellum United States, by Jonathan A. Glickstein, reviewed, 487–90
American Grit: A Woman's Letters from the Ohio Frontier, Emily Foster, ed., reviewed, 366–67
Anglican Church, 4–33; 267
Architecture in the United States, 1800–1850, by W. Barksdale Maynard, reviewed, 109–12
Armistead, Maj. George, and War of 1812, 144; 148
Atlas of Historical Maps of Maryland, 1608–1908, by Edward C. Papenfuse and Joseph M. Coale III, reviewed, 362–63

Bacon, Thomas, 18
Baltimore, Maryland 77; and Civil War sentiment, 91, 484; and export trade during the confederation period, 412; plans for, by Frederick Law Olmsted Jr., 467–79; Pratt Street riot, 92, 484; trade conditions upon end of Revolutionary War, 409–10
Baltimore American, editorial regarding Lincoln funeral, 96
Baltimore American and Commercial Advertiser, 154;158–59; on Pratt Street riot, 160–1
(Baltimore) Evening Sun, 53
Baltimore Sun, 55; Howard M. Norton, 55, 58, 59, 63, 64; and "Maryland's Shame," 57, 64; and Pratt Street riot, 154; 156–57; 158; 160–1
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 76
"BALTIMORE'S CATHOLICS AND THE FUNERAL OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN," by Kenneth J. Zanca, 91–101
Banneker, Benjamin, 308
"BATEAUX, MILLS, AND FISH DAMS: OPENING NAVIGATION ON THE MONOCACY RIVER AND CONOCOCHEAGUE AND ANTIETAM CREEKS," by Dan Guzy, 281–301
Beasley, Maurine H., review by, 493–95
Behind the Backlash: White Working-Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940–1980, by Kenneth D. Durr, reviewed, 220–21

Bentalou, Paul, 425–30
Bernath, Michael T., review by, 107–109
bibliography. See Maryland
Birdwell, Tracey, review by, 363–64
BLAND, RICHARD L., "The Handbook of Traugott Bromme: A Nineteenth-Century German Immigrant's Guide to Maryland," 73–77
Boylan, Anne M., *The Origins of Women's Activism: New York and Boston, 1797–1840*, reviewed, 105–107
Bradford, Augustus G., 484
BRIDNER, ELWOOD L. JR., "Joseph E. Snodgrass and Freedom of the Press in Antebellum Maryland," 456–65
Bromme, Traugott. See Richard L. Bland, "The Handbook of Traugott Bromme"
Brown, Mayor George W., 153; and newspaper portrayal, 161; 163
Buckley, Thomas E., *The Great Catastrophe of My Life: Divorce in the Old Dominion*, reviewed, 237–38
Butler, Benjamin F., Gen., 153

CALDERHEAD, WILLIAM L., "Slavery in Maryland in the Age of Revolution, 1775–1790," 303–24
Calvert, Cecil (second Lord Baltimore), 263–68, 273
Calvert, Leonard (Governor), 268, 270
Carroll, Charles, of Carrollton, 12; 25;
Carroll, James, bequest by, 10;
Carroll, John, report by, 8; first Catholic bishop, 92;
Catholic Church, 76; 91; appeal to slaves from West Africa, 20–22; early parish churches, 23; establishment in Baltimore, 92; in Kent County, 88, 91; and religious life of slaves, 4–33; and response of clergy to Lincoln funeral, 97, 267; and slave kinship networks, 23–5; and slavery, 92–93
Central Park (New York), 187
Charles Carroll of Carrollton: Faithful Revolutionary, by Scott McDermott, reviewed, 240–42
Chase, Samuel, impeachment and acquittal, 139
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, 76
Chestertown, Maryland, 78–88
CHEW, RICHARD S., "'Far Short of Our Expectations': Baltimore and the Atlantic World Trade in the Confederation Period," 409–39
Church of England, on the Eastern Shore, 85–86; and religious life of slaves, 4–7, 15
Cimbala, Paul A., and Randall A. Miller, eds., *Union Soldiers and the Northern Home Front: Wartime Experiences, Postwar Adjustments*, reviewed, 230–32
Circus Age: Culture and Society under the Big Top, The, by Janet M. Davis, reviewed, 116–18
Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland, Stanley Harrold and Randall M. Miller, eds., reviewed, 492–93
Claims of Kinfolk: African American Property and Community in the Nineteenth-Century South, The, by Dylan C. Penningroth, reviewed, 490–91
COFFEY, JUSTIN P., "Spiro T. Agnew and Middle Ground Politics," 441–55
Colbatch, Joseph, 18, 19
Common Whores, Vertuous Women, and Loveing Wives: Free Will Christian Women in Colonial Maryland, by Debra Meyers, reviewed, 484–85
Conversations with the High Priest of Coosa, by Charles M. Hudson, reviewed, 363–64
Courts, circuit, system established, 138
Crawford, Michael J., ed., *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History. Volume III. Chesapeake Bay, Northern Lakes, and Pacific Ocean*, reviewed, 224–27
Crosman, Elizabeth, review by, 484–5
Crownsville Hospital, 36; sexual abuse of patients at, 41

Daly, John Patrick, *When Slavery Was Called Freedom: Evangelicalism, Proslavery, and the Causes of the Civil War*, reviewed, 107–109
Davis, Janet M., *The Circus Age: Culture and*

Society under the Big Top, reviewed, 116–18
Day Dixie Died: Southern Occupation 1865–1866, The, by Thomas and Debra Goodrich, reviewed, 115–16
DeWees, Susan, review by, 105–107
Digges, Ignatius, 12–13;
Dilts, James D., review by, 109–112
Dix, Gen. John A., 484
Downs, Jim Jr., review by, 228–29
Driver, Robert J. Jr., *First and Second Maryland Cavalry, C.S.A.*, reviewed, 104–105
Druid Hill Park, 187;
Dunaway, Wilma A., *The African–American Family in Slavery and Emancipation*, reviewed, 369–71
Dunaway, Wilma A., *Slavery in the American Mountain South*, reviewed, 369–71
Durr, Kenneth D., *Behind the Backlash: White Working–Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940–1980*, reviewed, 220–21
DUVALL, WILLIAM G., "Smuggling Sotweed: Augustine Hermann and the Dutch Connection," 389–407

Eastern Shore (Maryland), 133; and slavery, 135
Eastern Shore Hospital, 36
Election, presidential, of 1800, 137
Embargo Act of December 22, 1807, passage of, 139
English Civil War, 270–73

"FAR SHORT OF OUR EXPECTATIONS: BALTIMORE AND THE ATLANTIC WORLD TRADE IN THE CONFEDERATION PERIOD," by Richard S. Chew, 409–39
Fett, Sharla M., *Working Cures: Healing, Health and Power on Southern Slave Plantations*, reviewed, 228–29
First and Second Maryland Cavalry, C.S.A., by Robert J. Driver Jr., reviewed, 104–105
Fitzpatrick, Vincent, *Gerald W. Johnson: From Southern Liberal to National Conscience*, reviewed, 493–95
Footner, Geoffrey M., *USS Constellation: From Frigate to Sloop of War*, reviewed, 367–69
Forret, Jeff, review by, 369–71
Fort McHenry, and War of 1812, 143; 146–47; 153
Foster, Emily, ed., *American Grit: A Woman's Letters from the Ohio Frontier*, reviewed, 366–67

George, Christopher T., review by, 224–27
Gerald W. Johnson: From Southern Liberal to National Conscience, by Vincent Fitzpatrick, reviewed, 493–95
Gibson, Edmund, bishop of London, 15, 17;
Glickstein, Jonathan A., *American Exceptionalism, American Anxiety: Wages, Competition, and Degraded Labor in the Antebellum United States*, reviewed, 487–90
Goebel, Thomas, *A Government by the People: Direct Democracy in America, 1890–1940*, reviewed, 118–19
Goldenberg, Bonnie, review by, 116–18
Goodrich, Thomas and Debra, *The Day Dixie Died: Southern Occupation 1865–1866*, reviewed, 115–16
Great Catastrophe of My Life: Divorce in the Old Dominion, The, by Thomas E. Buckley, reviewed, 237–38
GUZY, DAN, "Bateaux, Mills, and Fish Dams: Opening Navigation on the Monocacy River and Conococheague and Antietam Creeks," 281–301
Gwynns Falls Park, 194

"HANDBOOK OF TRAUGOTT BROMME: A NINETEENTH–CENTURY GERMAN IMMIGRANT'S GUIDE TO MARYLAND, THE," by Richard L. Bland, 73–77
HARDY, BETARIZ BETANCOURT, "'The Papists . . . have shewn a laudable Care and Concern': Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Slave Religion in Colonial Maryland," 4–33
Harrold, Stanley, *Subversives: Antislavery Community in Washington, D.C., 1828–*

1865, reviewed, 238–40
Harrold, Stanley, and Randall M. Miller, eds., *Civil War on Race Street: The Civil Rights Movement in Cambridge, Maryland*, reviewed, 492–93
Health care, of mentally ill patients, 35; decline in patient care expenditures, 36–37; improvements recommended, 43–44; as hidden from public view, 44
Henderson, Michael, review by, 222–24
Henry, Joseph, and visits to Mayer family, 174
Hermann, Augustine (passim), 389–407
Hicks, Thomas Holliday, gov., 153
Hospitals, state mental, 35; conditions of, 38–39, 47, 50, 55, 65; drunkenness and mental illness among hospital attendants, 40; food shortages reported at, 49; and funding for, 36–37, 64; "Maryland's Shame," 57; newspaper and radio features concerning, 44–45, 51-53, 55; overcrowding in, 37, 39, 56, 66; staffing of, 39, 40, 66; Volunteer Citizens' Committee formed, 49
Hudson, Charles M., *Conversations with the High Priest of Coosa*, reviewed, 363–64
Hunter, William, 9
HURST, HAROLD W., "Kent County and Chestertown in 1860," 78–90
Hurt, R. Douglas, *African American Life in the Rural South, 1900–1950*, reviewed, 495–96
Huston, James L, review by, 487–90

Immigrants, 73; and Civil War sentiment in Baltimore, 91; indentured and convict labor in colonial period, 333–35
Indians, 263, 268,
Ingle, Richard, 269, and Ingle's Rebellion and "the plundering time," 270

"'JAMES NEALE . . . HATH ADVENTURED HIMSELF INTO OUR PROVINCE OF MARYLAND,'" by Francis Neale Smith, 263–80
Jefferson on Jefferson, by Paul M. Zall, reviewed, 112–13
Jeske, Mary Clement, review by, 240–42
Jesuits (Society of Jesus), and religious instruction of slaves, 9–11;
Johnson, Henry, 409–10; 427
"JOSEPH HOPPER NICHOLSON: CITIZEN-SOLDIER OF MARYLAND," by Scott S. Sheads, 133–51
"JOSEPH E. SNODGRASS AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ANTEBELLUM MARYLAND," by Elwood L. Bridner Jr., 456–65

Kauffman, Christopher J., review by, 102–103
Kent County, Maryland, 78–88; and political parties, 86–88; and Civil War sentiment, 87–88;
"KENT COUNTY AND CHESTERTOWN IN 1860," by Harold W. Hurst, 78–90
KERNS-NOCERITO, MECHELLE, "Trade in Colonial Anne Arundel County: The Tobacco Port of London Town," 325–44
Key, Francis Scott, 147

Lane, Governor Preston, 54, 57; recommends emergency funding for hospitals, 64
Leakin Park, acquisition of Dead Run Valley, 190, 192; contention among planners, 197; flooding problems in, 193; and Frederick Law Olmsted Jr., 189–91, 200; opposition to,197 ; and plans for construction of interstate, 194–95; and report concerning, 196–98; riding academy in, 193
Lee, Lester P. Jr., review by, 495–96
"LETTERS OF A MARYLAND CONFEDERATE," ed. by Robert W. Schoeberlein and Andrew Brethauer, 345–61
Lewis, John, 11–12;
Lincoln, Abraham 91–7; following Fort Sumter attack, 153; funeral procession in Baltimore, 96–97; response of clergy to assassination, 95–97; and suspension of *habeas corpus*, 158, 168
London Town. See Mechelle L. Kerns-Nocerito, "Trade in Colonial Anne Arundel County: The Tobacco Port of

London Town"
Long, Michael E., review by, 112–13

Manifest Destiny's Underworld Filibustering in Antebellum America, by Robert E. May, reviewed, 113–15
Maryland: Anglicanism in, 4–33; Catholicism in, 4–33; 88; colonial land grants, 264–65; Eastern Shore, 78, 83, 84, 85; Methodism in, 86; selected history bibliography of (2002), 204–19 slavery in, 5, 303–4; state mental hospitals, 35–72
Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, announcement by Joseph Nicholson, 135;
Maryland Mental Hygiene Society, founding of, 46; renamed Maryland Mental Health Association, 66
"'MARYLAND'S SHAME':PHOTOJOURNALISM AND MENTAL HEALTH REFORM, 1935–1949," by Robert W. Schoeberlein, 35–72
May, Robert E., *Manifest Destiny's Underworld Filibustering in Antebellum America*, reviewed, 113–15
Mayer, Alfred Marshall. See Joseph F. Mulligan, "Physics and Fly–Fishing: The Remarkable Career of Baltimore's Alfred Marshall Mayer, 1836–1897"
Mayer, Brantz, and enlistment in the Union army, 174–75
Maynard, W. Barksdale, *Architecture in the United States, 1800–1850*, reviewed, 109–12
McClurken, Jeffrey W., review by, 238–40
McDermott, Scott, *Charles Carroll of Carrollton: Faithful Revolutionary*, reviewed, 240–42
Medical and Chirurgical Faculty, review of state mental hospitals by, 38–39; report on poor conditions at hospitals, 43–44
Methodism, Eastern Shore, 85–86; 88; and slavery, 95
Meyers, Debra, *Common Whores, Vertuous Women, and Loveing Wives: Free Will Christian Women in Colonial Maryland*, reviewed, 484–85
Meyers, Debra, review by, 366–67
Miller, Tracy, review by, 492–93
Mitchell, Charles W., review by, 230–32
Moloney, Diedre M., *American Catholic Lay Groups and Transatlantic Social Reform in the Progressive Era*, reviewed, 233–35
Morrow, Diane, *Persons of Color and Religious at the Same Time, The Oblate Sisters of Providence, 1828–1860*, reviewed, 102–103
Mosley, Joseph, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19

National Intelligencer, and Pratt Street riot, 161–3
Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, The . Volume III. Chesapeake Bay, Northern Lakes, and Pacific Ocean, ed. by Michael J. Crawford, reviewed, 224–27
Neale, James. See Francis Neale Smith, "James Neale . . . Hath Adventured Himself into our Province of Maryland"
Nelson, Horatio, 418
Newspapers, 154; as politically motivated, 158; secession sentiment and Pratt Street riot, 166–68
Nicholson, Elizabeth, Chesterfield Farm, in Centreville,136
Nicholson, Joseph Hopper. See Scott S. Shields, "Joseph Hopper Nicholson: Citizen-Soldier of Maryland"
Nicholson, William, and War of 1812, 144
Niles' Weekly Register, 143

O'Conor, Herbert, Governor, 48, 49
Olmsted, Frederick Law Jr., and design of Roland Park, 189; and planning for Leakin Park, 190; plans for Baltimore and Seattle, 467–79
Origins of Women's Activism, The: New York and Boston, 1797–1840, by Anne M. Boylan, reviewed, 105–107
ORSER, W. EDWARD, "A Tale of Two Park Plans: The Olmsted Vision for Baltimore and Seattle, 1903," 466–83

Paine, Christopher M., review by, 235–37
Painter, Nell Irvin, *Southern History Across the Color Line*, reviewed, 235–37
PAPENFUSE, EDWARD C. AND JOSEPH M. COALE III, *Atlas of Historical Maps of Maryland, 1608–1908*, reviewed, 362–63
"'PAPISTS . . . HAVE SHEWN A LAUNDABLE CARE AND CONCERN, THE': CATHOLICISM, ANGLICANISM, AND SLAVE RELIGION IN COLONIAL MARYLAND," by Beatriz Betancourt Hardy, 4–33
Parent, Anthony S. Jr., *Foul Means: The Formation of a Slave Society in Virginia, 1660–1740*, reviewed, 485–87
"PARK VISIONS IN CONFLICT: BALTIMORE'S DEBATE OVER THE LEAKIN BEQUEST," by Michael P. McCarthy, 187–203
Patterson Park, 188
Penningroth, Dylan C., *The Claims of Kinfolk: African American Property and Community in the Nineteenth-Century South*, reviewed, 490–91
Pennsylvania College of Gettysburg (Gettysburg College), 175
Persons of Color and Religious at the Same Time, The Oblate Sisters of Providence, 1828–1860, by Diane Morrow, reviewed, 102–103
Philadelphia Inquirer, and Pratt Street riot, 163–5
"PHYSICS AND FLY-FISHING: THE REMARKABLE CAREER OF BALTIMORE'S ALFRED MARSHALL MAYER, 1836–1897," by Joseph F. Mulligan, 173–85
Pineo, Ron, review by, 113–15
Pinkney, William, 316–17, 318
Political parties, and Eastern Shore, 86–87; Federalists and Jeffersonians, 138; and presidential campaign of 1860, 87
Port of Annapolis, shipping records of, 328–33
Potomac Company, canal construction, 283; and Conococheague Creek, 284–85; and the Monocacy River, 287–89; and Antietam Creek, 291–95
Powhatan Lords of Life and Death: Command and Consent in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, by Margaret Holmes Williamson, reviewed, 364–66
"PRATT STREET RIOTS RECONSIDERED, THE: A CASE OF OVERSTATED SIGNIFICANCE?" by Robert F. Bailey III, 153–71
President Street Station, 156
Preston, George H., Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, 40; report to Board of Mental Hygiene, 42; views media as ally, 48; 50; 55; retirement, 64
Profit, Campbell, Dr., 174
Providence, founding of, 273
Pryor, Sandra Strohhofer, review by, 233–35

Queen Anne's County (Maryland), county seat moved to Centreville, 135

Reader, Thomas, 4, 26
Revolutionary War, 134; and effect on rates of manumission, 307
Rice, James, review by, 364–66
Rosewood State Training School, 36; response to exposé, 63; understaffing and incidents of patient death, 40;

Sassafras River, settlement of, 395
SCHOEBERLEIN, ROBERT W., "'Maryland's Shame': Photojournalism and Mental Health Reform, 1935–1949," 35–72
———, AND ANDREW BRETHAUER, eds., "Letters of a Maryland Confederate, 345–61
Seattle, park plans for, by Frederick Law Olmsted Jr., 467–79
SHEADS, SCOTT S., "Joseph Hopper Nicholson: Citizen-Soldier of Maryland," 133–51
Short, John Rennie, review by 362–63
6th Massachusetts regiment, 153; 164
Sklansky, Jeffrey, *The Soul's Economy: Market Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 1820–1920*, reviewed, 222–24

slavery, in Baltimore, 91; Charity Folks, 308; in colonial era, 336; during Revolutionary War era, 303–4; on Eastern Shore, 85; Jesuits and slaves, 10; legal challenges, 313, 316–19; manumission efforts, 305–7, 317–19; 310; 314; religious opposition to, 305, 313–17; slave escapes, 310–11; slave religion, 4–33; Thomas Carney, 308
Slavery in the American Mountain South, by Wilma A. Dunaway, reviewed, 369–71
"SLAVERY IN MARYLAND IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1775–1790," by William L. Calderhead, 303–24
SMITH, FRANCIS NEALE, "'James Neale . . . Hath Adventured Himself Into Our Province of Maryland,'" 263–80
Smith, Ryan K., review by, 237–38
Smith, Samuel, elected to U.S. Senate, 138; and rivalry with Joseph Nicholson, 142; second term as U.S. Senator; 145; 146
"SMUGGLING SOTWEED: AUGUSTINE HERMANN AND THE DUTCH CONNECTION," by William G. Duvall, 389–407
Snodgrass, Joseph E., publishes antislavery and temperance articles, 457–64
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Patients, 46–47
Soul's Economy, The: Market Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 1820–1920, by Jeffrey Sklansky, reviewed, 222–24
Southern History Across the Color Line, by Nell Irvin Painter, reviewed, 235–37
Spalding, Martin J., archbishop of Baltimore, responds to Lincoln assassination, 93–95
"SPIRO T. AGNEW AND MIDDLE GROUND POLITICS," by Justin P. Coffey, 441–55
Spring Grove State Hospital, Public Hospital of Baltimore, 35 35, 36, 38; children and unclean conditions, 59, 61; 64–5; incompetent medical staff and attendants reported, 40, 42; Dr. Silas Weltmer, 63, 64; staffing shortages at, 43, 66; unsanitary conditions reported, 43
Springfield Hospital, 36, mental illness of hospital attendant noted, 40; physical and sexual abuse of patients at, 38, 40, 49; poor conditions reported, 45–46; 66; positive portrayal of, in newspaper, 45
St. Mary's City, 263, 265
St. Mary's College, 173;
Stewart, Elizabeth P., review by, 490–91
Subversives: Antislavery Community in Washington, D.C., 1828–1865, by Stanley Harrold, reviewed, 238–40

Taney, Michael, proposes abolishing property ownership as requirement to vote, 137;
Terry, David Taft, review by, 485–87
Toomey, Daniel Carroll, review by, 104–105
Trade, early tobacco trade, 325–40; 389–92; at end of Revolutionary War, 409–10; food items, 337–39; glut of grain and tobacco stores, 419–22; shift in market conditions as cause of commercial crisis, 411–12; trading vessels, 326–27
"TRADE IN COLONIAL ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY: THE TOBACCO PORT OF LONDON TOWN," by Mechelle L. Kerns-Nocerito, 325–44
Trimble, William C. Jr., review by, 115–16
Tucker, Spencer C., review by, 367–69

Union Soldiers and the Northern Home Front: Wartime Experiences, Postwar Adjustments, ed. by Paul A. Cimbala and Randall A. Miller, reviewed, 230–32
USS Constellation: From Frigate to Sloop of War, by Geoffrey M. Footner, reviewed, 367–69

Van Osdell, John G., review by, 118–19
Voss, Franklin. See "Letters of a Maryland Confederate," 345–60

War of 1812, 142–48; Joseph Nicholson and proposal for war, 143; war declared, 143; Major General Samuel Smith organizes defenses, 143; and fitting out of privateers, 145

Washington, George, 134, 135
Washington College, 79–80; 134
Washington Evening Star, and Pratt Street riot, 157–58; 161–63
Wehrle, Edmund, review by, 220–21
When Slavery Was Called Freedom: Evangelicalism, Proslavery, and the Causes of the Civil War, by John Patrick Daly, reviewed, 107–109
Whitefield, George, 18
Williamson, Margaret Holmes, *Powhatan Lords of Life and Death: Command and Consent in Seventeenth-Century Virginia*, reviewed, 364–66
Winans, Thomas, "Crimea" estate purchased for Leakin Park project, 192
Wolleston Manor, 263, 267, 275
Working Cures: Healing, Health and Power on Southern Slave Plantations, by Sharla M. Fett, reviewed, 228–29
Zall, Paul M., *Jefferson on Jefferson*, reviewed, 112–13
ZANCA, KENNETH J., "Baltimore's Catholics and the Funeral of Abraham Lincoln," 91–101

Betsy Bonaparte
The Belle of Baltimore

CLAUDE BOURGUIGNON-FRASSETO

Translated by Elborg Forster



This is Baltimore's own Betsy Patterson as seen from the other side of the Atlantic. Written by popular French historian Claude Bourguignon-Frasseto and expertly translated by Elborg Forster, this lively biography sold widely in France and is now brought to American readers by the Maryland Historical Society. Enjoy this history of the dauntless young woman who married Napoleon's younger brother, defied the angry emperor himself, and fought the French nobility for her son's future as told from an entirely different point of view.

324 pages, illustrated. Original paperback edition, $22.00. MHS member price $14.30. Sales tax where applicable. Add $3.50 s+h.

New in January!

"ON AFRIC'S SHORE"

A History of Maryland in Liberia, 1834–1857

RICHARD L. HALL

"A triumph." — The Baltimore Sun



A close, first hand look at a small but hugely important topic in nineteenth-century American history—the misguided effort to colonize Americans of African descent in Africa. It is a story of epic human interest. Free black men and women, and newly freed slaves faced with the choice of emigration or the auction block, boarded ships and sailed for a new life on the west coast of Africa. Greeted there by a people who looked down upon them as former slaves, they created a society similar in most ways to the one from which they had been expelled: Christian, agricultural, republican, and, pointedly, egalitarian. Conflicts ensued—with the native Grebo people and with intrusive Christian missionaries. Bandits, pirates, and murderers plagued them. Courage, sacrifice, and high-mindedness vied with selfishness, greed, and corruption. Everywhere and most of the time, the colony worried about securing enough food.

After nearly two decades of research and writing, Richard L. Hall has created a masterpiece of narrative history in recounting their struggle. From the departure of the first settlers aboard the brig *Ann* in 1834, to the climactic battle of Lake Sheppard, this history conveys a sense of immediacy. The reader can see the African coast, feel the sea spray from the breakers on the beach, experience the heat and fevers inland, and sense, as the settlers did, that freedom was in the making. This magnificent volume also includes a complete list of all the settlers who reached Maryland in Liberia, their ages, places of residence in the United States, and fate where known, in the Maryland colony.

672 pages, cloth; illustrations, Roll of Emigrants, references, bibliography, index.
ISBN 0-938420-86-0
$45.00 MdHS Member price $29.25.
Sales tax where applicable. Add $3.50 s+h.

ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO, A SMALL FIRE BEGAN IN A DRY GOODS STORE. IT WOULD BECOME BALTIMORE'S WORST CATASTROPHE.

"BIG FIRE HERE. MUST HAVE HELP AT ONCE."

"A thousand fire engines cannot stop it, the fire is king tonight."



"They fought the flames . . . until their clothing caught fire."

"Like a blizzard from hell . . ."

"We thought our end had come . . ."

"The roar of flames sounded like the wind howling on a mountain top."

THE GREAT BALTIMORE FIRE
By Peter B. Petersen
On sale February 7, 2004
232 pages; illustrations, notes, index
ISBN 0-938420-90-9
$30.00 / MdHS Member price: $19.50

THE MARYLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY

OFFICERS AND BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 2003–2004

Chairman
Stanard T. Klinefelter

President
Barbara P. Katz

Vice-Presidents
Earl P. Galleher Jr.
Dorothy McIlvain Scott
Henry Hodges Stansbury
David McIntosh Williams

Secretary
J. Jefferson Miller II

Assistant Secretary
Gregory H. Barnhill

Treasurer
William T. Murray III

Assistant Treasurer
William T. Reynolds

At Large
Alex. G. Fisher
George S. Rich

Class of 2004
Jean H. Baker
Marilyn Carp
H. Chace Davis Jr.
T. Edward Hambleton
Carla D. Hayden
Frank O. Heintz
J. Leo Levy
Camay C. Murphy
William T. Murray III
George S. Rich
Jacqueline Smelkinson

Class of 2005
Erin Gamse Becker
William F. Chaney
Thomas A. Collier
Atwood Collins III
Stiles T. Colwill
Alex. G. Fisher
Louise Lake Hayman
M. Mercer Neale III
Dwight S. Platt
George K. Reynolds III
John R. Sherwood
Beverly L. Wright

Chairmen Emeriti
L. Patrick Deering
Jack S. Griswold
Samuel Hopkins
The Hon. J. Fife Symington Jr.

Class of 2006
Gregory H. Barnhill
Francis J. Carey
Douglas V. Croker III
Earl P. Galleher Jr.
David L. Hopkins Jr.
Barbara P. Katz
Stanard T. Klinefelter
Alexander T. Mason
J. Jeffferson Miller II
William T. Reynolds
Dorothy McI. Scott
Henry H. Stansbury
Michael R. Ward
David McI. Williams

Ex-Officio Trustees
Dennis A. Fiori, Director
Elizabeth Bone
The Hon. James M. Harkins
Brian Lawrence
Isabelle B. Obert
The Hon. Martin O'Malley
The Hon. Janet S. Owens
The Hon. Howard P. Rawlings
The Hon. James T. Smith Jr.
Mary Megan Wolfe

Presidents Emeriti
E. Mason Hendrickson
John L. McShane
Brian B. Topping

In this issue . . .

Smuggling Sotweed: Augustine Herrman and the Dutch Connection
by William G. Duvall

"Far Short of Our Expectations": Baltimore and the Atlantic World Trade in the Confederation Era
by Richard St. Chew

Spiro T. Agnew and Middle Ground Politics
by Justin P. Coffey

Joseph E. Sprague and Freedom of the Press in Antebellum Maryland
by Elwood L. Bridges

A Tale of Two Park Plans: The Olmsted Vision for Baltimore and Seattle, 1903
by W. Edward Orser

Index to Volume 98