BOARD OF EDITORS

DR. RHODA M. DORSEY, Chairman
DR. JACK P. GREENE
DR. AUBREY C. LAND
DR. BENJAMIN QUARLES
DR. MORRIS L. RADOFF
MR. A. RUSSELL SLAGLE
DR. RICHARD WALSH
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Indian Policy During the War for Independence: The Northern Department</td>
<td>James F. Vivian and Jean H. Vivian</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Maryland State Colonization Society: Independent State Action in the Colonization Movement.</td>
<td>Aaron Stopak</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henri Mercier on Slavery: The View of a Maryland-Born Diplomat, 1860-1863</td>
<td>Daniel B. Carroll</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliographical Notes</td>
<td>Edited by Edward G. Howard</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed Maryland Bindings III</td>
<td>Douglas Gordon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed Maryland Bindings IV</td>
<td>Edward G. Howard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Footnote to Seventeenth Century Maryland</td>
<td>Edward G. Howard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviews of Recent Books</td>
<td></td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldridge, Benjamin Franklin and Nature's God, by W. Harrison Daniel.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullock, A History of Negro Education in the South from 1619 to the Present, by William P. Vaughn.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steinberg, The First Ten, by Victor Sapio.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haas, Historic Houses and Restorations, by Donald W. Curl.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes and Queries</td>
<td></td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annual Subscription to the Magazine, $5.00. Each issue $1.25. The Magazine assumes no responsibility for statements or opinions expressed in its pages.

Richard R. Duncan, Editor
Nancy Faass, Assistant to the Editor

Published quarterly by the Maryland Historical Society, 201 W. Monument Street, Baltimore, Md. Second-Class postage paid at Baltimore, Md.
CONTRIBUTORS

Daniel B. Carroll is an Assistant Professor of History at Villanova University and is currently finishing a doctoral dissertation, “Henri Mercier in Washington, 1860-1863,” at the University of Pennsylvania. He has previously contributed to the American Benedictine Review.

Aaron Stopak holds a Master’s degree from Temple University and is a former instructor at the University of Baltimore. He is currently teaching in Israel.

Jean H. Vivian, formerly Assistant Editor at the American Historical Association, is now Research Assistant with the American Revolution Bicentennial, The Library of Congress.

James F. Vivian is completing his doctorate at The American University, and is specializing in United States diplomatic history. He and his wife have published previously in the Maryland Historical Magazine, Wisconsin Magazine of History, and The Americas.
CONGRESSIONAL INDIAN POLICY DURING THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE:
THE NORTHERN DEPARTMENT

By James F. Vivian and Jean H. Vivian

As the crisis between Great Britain and her North American possessions intensified during the spring of 1775 and mutual differences descended to the level of open hostilities, the colonists were quick to perceive, in the event of a protracted conflict, the potential importance of the Indian tribes in the interior. They knew that few tribesmen would become their allies in such a struggle, for the entire history of frontier relations seemed to obviate that possibility. Indeed, accustomed as they were to white traders' goods, familiar with the frontiersman's propensity for pre-empting tribal lands, and impressionable to demonstrations of military prowess, the Indians might logically decide that their best interests resided with the success
of His Majesty’s forces. Nor was it at all certain that the British would forbear from inducing the tribes to their service or from arming and inciting them to prey on scattered colonial settlements.1

If, however, the several tribes, particularly those along the northern frontier stretching from Lake Ontario to Quebec, had come to any deliberations, the colonists were unaware of them. Consequently they possessed an opportunity to examine the feasibility of instructing the Indians in the attributes of neutrality. A neutral attitude on the part of the Six Nations of the Iroquois, the seven nations of Canada, and the lesser neighboring tribes was viewed by the delegates attending the fledgling Continental Congress in Philadelphia as among the happiest of possible diplomatic developments. Although members of Congress suspected British collusion with the northern tribes, John Adams reported on June 7, 1775, “by all that we can learn of the Indians they intend to be neutral. . . . None have as yet taken up the Hatchet against us. . . .”2 Congress thereupon appointed a Committee for Indian Affairs on June 16 and instructed it a fortnight later to “prepare proper talks to the several tribes of Indians, for engaging the continuance of their friendship . . . and neutrality in our present unhappy disputes with Great Britain.”3

Yet Congress found it difficult to dismiss entirely its suspicions of possible British intrigue among the Indians; and by now there were lurking apprehensions that Guy Johnson, the British


3 Worthington C. Ford, et al., eds., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (34 vols., Washington, D. C., 1904-1937), II, pp. 93, 123; hereinafter cited as Ford, Journals. The previous day Richard Henry Lee of Virginia had written George Washington, “We are this day informed in Congress that the Six Nations and Canada Indians are firmly disposed to observe a strict neutrality, and I think we shall endeavor to cultivate their Friendship.” Burnett, Letters of Congress, I, p. 147.
superintendent of Indian affairs in the northern department, and General Guy Carleton, the governor of Canada, were working to prejudice the tribes against the colonies. Although such evidence was still lacking, Congress nevertheless undertook to amend its earlier position. On July 1 Congress resolved to form alliances with any and all of the tribes should the British attempt to enlist their services. Thus the original policy, pieced together during June of 1775, was ultimately predicated upon both Indian predilections and British intentions. The process foreshadowed a recurrent theme in the evolution of American thinking toward the Indians of the northern frontier: Congress stood ready to modify and even abandon its policy whenever intelligence reports indicated, or the logic of events dictated, otherwise.

The dual approach was reflected further on July 12 when Congress established three departments to superintend Indian affairs. The decision was based on the assumption that Great Britain would “spare no pains” to incite the tribes against the colonies and that “the securing and preserving the friendship of the Indian Nations, appears to be a subject of the utmost moment to these colonies.” The Northern Department encompassed the regions of the Six Nations and the Indians north of them; the Southern included the Cherokees and all tribes to the south; while the Middle Department comprised those tribes situated in between. The commissioners of each department were authorized not only to deal directly with the Indians in order to promote their comity and to “prevent their taking any part in the present commotions,” but also to seize any British agents who came their way. The three departments divided, unequally, slightly more than 23,000 dollars to defray the costs of promoting treaties and proffering gifts.


5 Ibid., II, pp. 174-177. Commissioners for the Northern Department, selected
Accordingly, amid conflicting reports of enemy intrigue, Congress and the commissioners set about to keep the Indians pacified and uninvolved in the ensuing hostilities. No likely opportunity to further this program was left to chance, nor was any reasonable expense considered too great. Such was the case, whether it be 500 dollars allotted to Dr. Eleazer Wheelock for the continued instruction of a handful of Indian boys at his seminary along the Connecticut river, or the costs incurred in arranging for a conference with the Six Nations, whose fighting strength was thought to number about 2,000 warriors.\(^6\) The colonists were spurred on when military intelligence, much of it obtained from Canadians and Indians wandering into northern New York, indicated that Carleton and Johnson fully intended to use Indians, possibly in an invasion from Canada, if the services of a sufficient force could be procured.\(^7\)

The commissioners' efforts were not unavailing. A preliminary council with assorted representatives of the Six Nations camped on August 15 at German Flats, New York, where Tench Tilghman, secretary-treasurer for the commission, confided to his journal, "the Indians understand their Game, which is to play into both Hands." On August 24 negotiations commenced, first at Cartwright's Tavern, then at the Dutch Church in Albany, with the commissioners beseeching the tribes not to take up the hatchet against either the British or the colonists. Finally, after extended discussions, the Six Nations agreed by formal treaty, "as it is a family Affair to sit still and see you fight

---


\(^7\) See Christopher P. Yates to the Committee of Schenectady, July 13, 1775, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, I, 23; Schuyler to John Hancock, President of Congress, July 21 and 27, 1775, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, I, 51 and 71, respectively. Washington wrote Schuyler, July 28, 1775, that even though earlier apprehensions regarding Indian incursions had proven unfounded, he still feared Guy Johnson would use every means to cajole the Indians to "dip their Hands in Blood. . . ." Writings of Washington, III, pp. 373-374.
it out." Further, the Indians implored both antagonists to confine their hostilities to the seaboard, away from the tribes in the interior.\(^8\) Since the attitude of the seven nations of Canada, especially the influential Caughnawagas, remained obscure, Major General Philip Schuyler had news of the Treaty of Albany dispatched to them, along with £400 for general distribution. Schuyler, whose role as an Indian commissioner in the Northern Department coincided with his military duties, knew the Mohawk tongue and had frequently traded and hunted with the Indians in the environs of Albany.\(^9\)

\(^8\) Tilghman counted a total of 389 tribesmen on August 14, a large majority of whom were Oneidas. "An Indian Commission in August and September, 1775," Papers of Tench Tilghman (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.). The proceedings of the preliminary council at German Flats and the official report of the Albany meeting are in PCC, Item 134 (Proceedings of the Commissioners appointed by the Continental Congress to Negotiate a Treaty with the Six Nations of Indians, 1775), Roll 144, 1-44.

\(^9\) Schuyler to the Inhabitants of Canada, Sept. 5, 1775, and to Hancock, Sept. 29, 1775, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, I, 130 and 180, respectively. The Caughnawagas, kinsmen to the Mohawks, inhabited the region north of Montreal. Schuyler's association with the Indians is discussed in Don R. Gerlach, *Philip
The Treaty of Albany not only produced what the Americans most desired, a promise of Indian neutrality, but also stimulated the colonial leadership to assume an interest in the welfare of the Indians. After deliberating on the commissioners' report of the Albany meeting, the delegates to Congress resolved on November 23, 1775, to open the Indian trade at Albany and Schenectady, grant some gunpowder to the Six Nations, and send two blacksmiths to live and work among them. In addition, two tracts of land near Albany, of late illicitly occupied by colonists, were ordered restored to the Mohawks.10

Thus, as the year 1775 drew to a close, Congress could hope that it had in good measure implemented the policy of Indian friendship and neutrality. It had blunted the threat of a potential uprising of the most powerful and dangerous Indian confederation. And the prestige and influence therein obtained proved almost immediately advantageous in American relations with other tribes, particularly those lying within the British orbit of influence to the north and those of the upper Ohio valley, with whom a second treaty was concluded in mid-November at Pittsburgh.11

Nevertheless, there were some who did not share in the salubrity, for a great deal would depend upon the actions of the British, and late intelligence concerning their activities seemed to augur ill. Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty of Albany, for instance, Schuyler had reason to feel that the British in Canada were both inciting Indian attacks against the colonists and employing warriors in regular military maneuvers in northern New York.12 By December he possessed what Washington called "incontrovertable" evidence of the "Ministry's Inten-


10 Ford, Journals, III, pp. 365-366. At the same time, three members were added to the Northern Department: James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Silas Deane of Connecticut, and Francis Lewis of New York.


12 Ethan Allen told Schuyler on September 14 that several Caughnawaga chiefs informed him that the king's troops had plied warriors with rum and urged them to fight; PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, I, 158. On September 19 Schuyler wrote Hancock that six Indians allied with the British had been killed in a skirmish on Lake Champlain; PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, I, 142.
tion to engage the Savages against us. . . ." Schuyler reported that on December 12 a delegation of Indians visiting him at Albany disclosed that the British some time previously had delivered to a chief of the Six Nations a black war belt inscribed with a hatchet. Since Schuyler had prevailed upon them to give him the belt, he said, "We have now a full Proof . . ." of British machinations.13

Nor did practical American difficulties in giving evidence of military capability, or in furnishing trade items to which the Indians had become habituated, ease the situation. Washington and Schuyler renewed their efforts to "inculcate" the Indians with American prowess, lest the tribesmen should cease to be favorably impressed upon comparing the arms and materiel of the opposing camps. And when, on January 16, some Mohawks hinted at misgivings about colonial intentions, Schuyler imputed their apparent wavering to "the wicked Insinuations of our mutual Enemies . . ." and felt himself obliged to remind them of their treaty obligations dating from the previous summer.14

Increasingly, moreover, the conduct of the Indian trade—and with it the implied policy of keeping the tribes pacified—assumed critical dimensions. On January 27 Congress attempted

13 Washington to Schuyler, Dec. 24, 1775, Writings of Washington, IV, p. 179; Schuyler to Hancock, Dec. 14 and 21, 1775, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, I, 362 and 367, respectively. Congress ordered publication of Schuyler's disclosure; Ford, Journals, III, p. 456, and "Diary of Richard Smith in the Continental Congress, 1775-1776," American Historical Review, I (January, 1896), p. 298. There can be no doubt that Guy Johnson, with the approval of General Thomas Gage, recruited Indian allies during the spring and summer of 1775, a tactic, according to a recent study, intended to protect the lines of communication with the interior forts. See Jack M. Sosin, "The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re-Assessment of Responsibility," Canadian Historical Review, XLVI (June, 1965), pp. 105-109. See also Gage to the Earl of Dartmouth, June 12 and Thomas Gage (2 vols., New Haven, 1931-1933), I, pp. 402-404 and 414, respectively; and Stanley, "The Six Nations and the American Revolution," p. 222. The colonists, of course, had not adhered fully to their proclaimed policy of neutrality. Washington expressed chagrin when Indians of the St. Francis tribe tendered their services in August of 1775, and he had to refuse. But Benedict Arnold, reporting in November on the progress of the campaign toward Quebec, spoke of "40 Savages who have joined us and profess great friendship. . . ." And Congress itself resolved on December 2 that "the Indians of St. Francis, Penobsot, Stockbridge, and St. John's, and other tribes, may be called on in case of real necessity. . . ." Washington to Schuyler, Aug. 20, 1775, Writings of Washington, III, p. 437; Arnold to General Richard Montgomery, Nov. 8, 1775, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, I, 346; Ford, Journals, III, p. 401.

14 Washington to Schuyler, Jan. 16, 1776, Writings of Washington, IV, p. 253; Schuyler to Hancock, Jan. 23, 1776, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, I, 427-430.
to lay down some guidelines for the control of the trade. It
directed that henceforth only licensed traders could operate
among the Indians, and then only at designated places and at
fair prices, the latter to be determined by the Indian commis-
sioners.15 But Schuyler shortly began forwarding what gradually
became an almost unending chain of plaintively phrased notes
complaining of the embarrassing shortage of gift and trade
items. So scarce were goods, he wrote John Hancock, president
of Congress, that he suspected the Tories of actually encouraging
the Indians to solicit him for goods, even though “they are
sufficiently inclined to it without being spurred on. . . .” He
was deeply troubled that the Six Nations might in fact come to
treat with him at Albany, for he had nothing to offer them as
custom and courtesy prescribed. True, Congress had lately
authorized its Committee of Secret Correspondence to procure
trade goods in Europe, but many months would pass before
these would reach American shores.16 Meanwhile the Indian
commissioners faced the prospect of having to secure the amity
and neutrality of the tribes through something less than time-
honored practices.

While Congress, the commanders, and the commissioners gave
every indication that they intended to abide by their policy,
including some of its implications, American sincerity had yet to
be subjected to a true and direct test. This came suddenly and
from a completely unexpected source when the chief of the
Caughnawagas arrived at Washington’s Cambridge encamp-
ment and applied for a commission in the Continental Army.
The chief also intimated a readiness to contribute some 500
warriors to the American cause. The dilemma thus posed, as
Washington hastily informed Schuyler on January 27, pro-
ceeded less from “the Impropriety of encouraging these People
to depart from their Neutrality . . . as from the Expense, which
probably may follow.” To reject the offer, he added, would

15 Ford, Journals, IV, pp. 96-98.
16 Schuyler to Hancock, Feb. 10 and Mar. 6, 1776, PCC, Item 158, Roll 172, I,
514, and II, 38, respectively. On January 27, the Committee of Secret Correspond-
ence was empowered to import up to £40,000 sterling worth of Indian goods, to be
divided equally among the three departments. The committee instructed its
agent, Silas Deane, to procure Indian goods upon his arrival in France, since this
would lend credence to his appearance as a merchant, “which we wish you con-
tinually to retain among the French in general. . . .” Ford, Journals, IV, pp. 96-97;
Committee to Deane, Mar. 3, 1776, Burnett, Letters of Congress, I, p. 375.
clearly mean to risk alienating the tribe. Schuyler, who shared Washington’s lack of compunction about employing Indians, “since the Ministry have made attempts to engage them against us . . . ,” agreed that the expenses of the Northern Department already were “amazing.” Besides, he opined, the tribesmen might eventually come to think more highly of their services than reality justified. In the end a subsequent council with the Caughnawagas, according to Washington, had been unnecessary because the tribe itself had “put the Matter upon the Footing I wished . . . to join the Forces in Canada, whenever you shall call for their Assistance.”

Although it is far from clear that Washington and Schuyler so intended, their course of action in effect postponed resolution of the dilemma until Congress should take up the subject and essay its ramifications for the stated policy of neutrality. This the delegates did on March 8 when they qualified their position by resolving that Indians could not serve in the “armies of the United Colonies” unless their parent tribe consented to such service “nor then, without express approbation of Congress.”

Even so, the Caughnawaga episode served to point up an important reality: the American policy of committing the Indian tribes to neutrality evinced more heartfelt hope than calculated certainty. The fact that the decision taken toward the Caughnawaga proposal originated less from long-range policy deliberations than from immediate exigencies was neither unusual nor irregular. Time and again during the War for Independence the dilemma would be posed, only to prove a persistent and troublesome one for which no permanent or consistent solution was ever found, and which produced major differences of opinion within the Revolutionary leadership.

Meanwhile, on the frontier, tribal dispositions and loyalties began to coalesce into alignments which, on the whole, were destined to prevail throughout the war—alignments which did not bode well for the colonies. Indian interpreter James Deane and the veteran Congregationalist missionary among the

Oneidas, Samuel Kirkland, each reported that British propaganda, charging Americans with treachery and deceit, had reduced the more impressionable of the Six Nations to a state of ambivalence. Among the Iroquois, wrote Kirkland, the loyalty of the Senecas and Cayugas was tenuous at best, while the Mohawks, because of their proximity to British Canada, were the chief carriers of enemy "falsehoods" and, according to Schuyler, at the bottom of Indian problems in Tryon County, New York. Some of the Senecas had dubbed the Oneidas "Bostonians," meaning turncoats; and even the Oneidas, so far the most steadfast, anxiously awaited any encouraging news, according to Deane.\(^{19}\)

The agenda in Congress reflected these developments when, on April 10, a major part of the session concerned Indian affairs. The immediate beneficiary of these deliberations was Captain White Eyes of the Delaware tribe. While in Philadelphia on special invitation, he received an address of Congress, which assured him of the peaceful intentions of the colonies and promised diligence in dissuading "our people" from occupying tribal lands. Congress further implored him to inform his kinsmen of the Six Nations and other western tribes of all he had seen in Philadelphia and to "exhort them to keep fast hold of the covenant chain of friendship, which we have so lately repaired and strengthened."\(^{20}\)

Washington, however, was now of a different and perhaps more realistic frame of mind, as his letters of April 19 to Hancock and Schuyler revealed. Since it would ultimately prove "impossible to keep them [the Indians] in a State of Neutrality," and since Indian adherence to the enemy would be fatal, Washington counseled that it might be better "to engage them on our side, and to use our utmost endeavours to prevent their minds being poisoned by Ministerial Emmissaries [sic] . . . ." He proposed the use of Indians, possibly Senecas, in a campaign against Niagara or Detroit. A few days later John Adams offered additional support for this view when he wrote Major General Horatio Gates that, while there was much to

\(^{19}\) Deane to Schuyler, Mar. 10, 1776, Kirkland to Schuyler, Mar. 12, 1776, and Schuyler to Hancock, Apr. 2, 1776, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, II, 82, 97-100, and 77-78, respectively.

\(^{20}\) Ford, Journals, IV, pp. 267-270.
fear from bringing “Savages with their cruel, bloody dispositions” into the war, yet “such have been the Extravagancies of British Barbarity in prosecuting the war against us, that I think we need not be so delicate as to refuse the assistance of Indians, provided we cannot keep them neutral.”

The suggestion in effect was denied. Congress moved instead to cement Indian amity. On April 29 the delegates appointed a standing Committee for Indian Affairs and concurrently resolved to maintain the line drawn at Fort Stanwix to separate American from Indian lands, with “no Surveys or Encroachments” to the westward. To alleviate the persistent shortage of trade goods, Congress within the week appropriated 10,000 dollars for purchasing supplies, at Montreal, and allocated another 10,000 dollars to each department for promoting treaty talks.

But the tangible results of these measures came only too slowly. In mid-May Colonel George Morgan, a commissioner of the Middle Department who was then at Pittsburgh, informed Lewis Morris of the New York delegation to Congress that there was scarcely enough powder west of the mountains to prime the rifles on hand, and, more importantly, “Things are not right with the Northern Indians, particularly with the Senecas.” Nor had Washington seen cause to alter his view. The situation, he told Schuyler on May 22, was “delicate and embarrassing” now that some tribesmen stood openly in the ranks of Sir John Johnson’s forces. Three days later, in a personal appearance before Congress, he recommended and received authority “to engage the Indians in the service of the United Colonies” in order to safeguard the northern frontier. Up to 2,000 warriors were to be gathered for attacks on both Niagara and Detroit.

---

21 Washington to Schuyler and to Hancock, Apr. 19, 1776, Writings of Washington, IV, pp. 496 and 493-494, respectively; Adams to Gates, Apr. 27, 1776, Burnett, Letters of Congress, I, p. 433.

22 Ford, Journals, IV, pp. 318, 329-330. Members of the standing committee were George Wythe, James Wilson, Oliver Wolcott, Lewis Morris, and Edward Rutledge. James Duane joined the committee on May 16. Ibid., IV, pp. 319, 359. See also Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, 1774-1788, pp. 40-42.

23 May 16, 1776, PCC, Item 163 (Letters From General and Other Officers, 1776-89), Roll 180, 237-238.

Thus, within a year of their initial declaration to cultivate Indian friendship and seek Indian neutrality, the members of the Continental Congress determined that such neutrality was an impractical if not an illusory dream. The choice, to them, was clear: the tribes would ally either with British forces or with those of the united colonies, for it had become patently evident that—caught as they were in a precarious position amidst military preparations along the Canadian frontier, British authority, and thirteen colonies shortly to issue their Declaration of Independence—they simply could not long remain apart and uninvolved. Hence the decision to allow the active recruitment of Indian allies.

Having taken the step, Congress wasted little time in implementing the new policy. A series of conferences in late May and early June, 1776, among members of Congress, Washington, and other leading citizens and commanders, underscored the revised approach to Indian relations. On May 29 a special committee, charged with considering the number of troops needed for the "defense" of Canada, reported to Congress its favoring of the employment of 1,000 warriors. The delegates thereupon doubled the quota, empowering Washington on June 3 to enlist an Indian force not to exceed 2,000 warriors. Although Schuyler doubted that so many could be recruited and wondered if the same end could not be achieved merely by preventing the tribesmen from joining the enemy, Washington soon made clear his desire to go still further in the use of

to the Marquis de Lafayette, that the "Governors, Agents, & Officers of the British King incite the Savages to join them in a war against these Colonies without the least provocation or Injury. . . . If the Commander of british forces cannot controul [sic] the Savages from Committing acts of Cruelty and Barbarity why do they incite them to Arm[s] against Us or act in Conjunction with Barbarians whose Savage customs they condemned? This was conduct in the French during the last War, was censured . . . by the British nation." PCC, Item 166 (Letters and Papers Relating to Canadian Affairs, Sullivan's Expedition, and the Northern Indians, 1775-79), Roll 183, 56. At the same time Kirkland warned Schuyler from Lake George that more than 100 warriors were currently in the King's service and were sure to raid the backcountry of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Kirkland reported that the Indians themselves felt neutrality to be impracticable, so that "it has now become necessary for the Commissioners to call upon the six Nations and demand who are Friends and who not. . . ." June 3, 1776, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, II, 202-203. For an indication of the impact in Congress of the news from the backcountry, see Thomas Stone's letter to an unnamed correspondent, May 20, 1776 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.).
Indian allies. On June 8 he queried Hancock as to the intent of the late resolution, asking if it had been the aim of Congress to limit the use of warriors solely to the expedition against Canada, or if “the Commander in Chief may order their Service to any place he may think necessary?” In a postscript appended the next day he asked whether Congress had yet approved a pending provision to reward the Indians with £5 for each prisoner taken and implied that such might prove of advantage in the course of the campaign. Hancock replied on June 11, venturing the opinion that Congress had intended the original May 25 resolution to be general and equally applicable to all three departments, while that of June 3 was meant to cover the use of Indians only in an assault on Canada.25

Yet, because it had been upon the urgings of Washington and Schuyler that Congress assented to the new policy, Washington might reasonably presume Congress would leave to him the question of Indian deployment. This it did formally on June 17 when Congress, convened as a committee of the whole, resolved that the commander-in-chief could use Indians “in any place where . . . they will be most useful . . . .” In addition, Congress authorized a bounty of 100 dollars for each commissioned officer and 30 dollars for each common soldier captured by the Indian allies. Washington was optimistic, in transmitting the news to Schuyler, that so generous an allowance, if promptly paid, would “prove a powerful Inducement to engage the Indians in our Service. . . .” 26

The Six Nations, however, remained unimpressed, especially in view of American reverses in Canada. The immediate result was that on July 4 Washington suggested raising 500 or more warriors, not from among the Iroquois, but from among the St. John’s, Nova Scotia, and Penobscot tribes, if only to foil and harass any enemy penetration in their quarter. Congress again concurred by authorizing the recruitment of an optional number of Indians from among those three tribes, in which work the General Court of Massachusetts was to assist. In conveying this

26 Ford, Journals, V, p. 452; Washington to Schuyler, June 20, 1776, Writings of Washington, V, p. 162.
request to the Massachusetts legislature, Washington advised all practical haste and, if possible, that the enlisted warriors be committed to two or three years of service on the same terms as regular Continental recruits.27

There was good reason to be worried, as General William Howe and thousands of British regulars were about to invest the city of New York. The mood permeated Congress as well and manifested itself in the first drafts of the Articles of Confederation. In these drafts, the same clause which stipulated that no land purchases would be recognized until the exact limits of each colony had been determined, also proposed that a perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive, should be concluded with the Six Nations and their neighbors, together with an explicit guarantee of the inviolability of their tribal domains.

A major debate on Indian affairs ensued, occupying the whole of July 26. But it was clear that few points of general accord

existed even now. The principal issue was who should exercise the larger jurisdiction over the various tribes, Congress or the states. Disagreement tended to follow geographic lines, with southern delegates claiming that control of Indian affairs and especially Indian trade should be retained by the several states, and northern and middle delegates maintaining that such control should devolve to the "superintendency" of Congress. Thomas Jefferson, a late addition to the Committee for Indian Affairs, attempted to clarify the term "superintendency," thereby offering a compromise solution, all to no avail. 28

Meantime, with Congress thus engaged, the commissioners grappled with their task of reaching an understanding with the tribes. Schuyler had been preparing since June, at Washington's direction, for a conference with the Six Nations. Since some of their warriors had already joined the king's troops, said Schuyler, "it becomes our Duty to request that such of them as are our Friends should declare for us . . ." and agree upon mutual defense arrangements. But when he arrived at the appointed council site, German Flats, on July 17, he found only a portion of the tribes' representatives present. Obliged to tarry in daily expectation of the missing members, he soon wished an early end to the entire business, for the consumption of rum and provisions was "incredible." Two weeks later the laggards still had not appeared. A good part of the problem, Schuyler explained, was that the enemy, by holding concurrent meetings at Niagara, had lured away most of the Senecas.

He was not without significant news to pass on to Congress, however, for he had learned through informed counsels, possibly Indian intermediaries and scouts, that the Six Nations had interpreted the past absence of an American offer to take up the hatchet as an indication of strength adequate to the crisis confronting them. Thus cautioned, Schuyler refrained from proposing a military alliance until he knew better the attitude of the Iroquois. Speeches delivered during the second week of August further persuaded him neither to proffer a treaty of

alliance nor to encourage the warriors to apprehend prisoners on behalf of the United States. To have done so could have injured the entire cause, perhaps even invited open retaliation.29

The implications at this point seemed indisputable, and Congress responded with a flurry of activity which, in effect, restored to prominence the recently foresaken policy of neutrality. On August 19 the Committee on Indian Affairs issued a report favoring the revocation of all resolutions aimed at forming military alliances with the tribes and a return to the earlier policy. Neutrality, it was suggested, might best serve to deter Indian hostility from being directed against the states. Although Congress postponed action on the report itself, it did resolve to invite several chiefs and sachems to Philadelphia, and, further, it instructed the commissioners of the Middle Department to delay conclusion of a pending treaty at Pittsburgh or, failing that, to generalize it to little more than a declaration of friendship.30

It was against this backdrop that the leadership again became singularly solicitous of the welfare and well-being of the Indians. Much interest and effort, for instance, was devoted to ascertaining the whereabouts of the Nanticoke tribe, adopted wards of the Six Nations, who were last reported somewhere in Maryland. The authorities of that state proving none too cooperative, commanding officers in Pennsylvania and Virginia, along with the Maryland Council of Safety, were queried repeatedly for the earliest intelligence, lest the Six Nations become con-

against their will.31 Mid-September witnessed the passage of several resolves to forward friendly addresses to the Shawnees in the

29 Schuyler's despatches to Hancock, dated June 8, July 17, Aug. 1, 7, 16, and 18, are in PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, II, 192-195, 226-241, 249-250, 268, 272, and 285, respectively.

30 Ford, Journals, V, pp. 668-669; the report of the Committee on Indian Affairs is in PCC, Item 30 (Other Reports of Committees of Congress, 1776-88), Roll 37, 161-163.

31 See, for example, Schuyler to Hancock, Sept. 14, 1776, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, II, 370; Ford, Journals, VI, pp. 983; Board of War to the Maryland Council of Safety, Nov. 8, 1776, Burnett, Letters of Congress, II, pp. 146; the Maryland Council of Safety to the Board of War, Nov. 15, 1776, and Samuel Chase to the Council of Safety, Nov. 30, 1776, in William H. Browne, et al., ed., Archives of Maryland (70 vols., to date, Baltimore, 1883-present), XII, pp. 447-448 and 495-496, respectively. See also Clinton A. Weslager, Delaware's Forgotten Folk: The Story of the Moors and Nanticokes (Philadelphia, 1943), pp. 59-60.
Ohio country, to provide tuitions for Indian students at Dartmouth College, and to call upon frontiersmen and soldiers alike to treat Indians “with kindness and civility.” “The most fatal consequences” could result, according to Schuyler, if allowances for clothing the Indians, who were practically destitute, were not made soon.\footnote{Ford, \textit{Journals}, V, pp. 785-787; Schuyler to Hancock, Sept. 2, 1776, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, II, 325.}

By the second week in October the commanders had fallen back on their earlier expedient of trying to impress visiting chiefs with the strength of American forces. And when the British evacuated Boston, Schuyler appropriated the occasion to glorify American prowess and invited the Indians to view the reality for themselves lest they be deluded by contrary British propaganda. He assured them, somewhat pointedly, that they would remain “a happy people” only so long as they also remained “in Love and Friendship” with the Americans, whom time had proven not to be “False and Lyars.” \footnote{Schuyler to Hancock, Sept. 25, 1776, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, II, 384; Washington to Schuyler, Oct. 16, 1776, \textit{Writings of Washington}, VI, pp. 192-193; Schuyler’s message to the Six Nations, undated, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, II, 95.} Efforts to have the Indians visit Philadelphia met with some success, too. During early December delegations of the Six Nations, Delawares, and Shawnees converged on the city to hear Congress reaffirm that the United States desired nothing so much as peace with the tribes, but, should there be any hostilities, the Indians would be dealt with easily and summarily.\footnote{Ford, \textit{Journals}, VI, pp. 1011, 1013; Washington to Major General William Heath, Dec. 17, 1776, \textit{Writings of Washington}, VI, pp. 391-392.}

The year 1776, which had seen the confident abandonment of the neutrality policy and then its hurried reinstatement when important elements of the Six Nations displayed dubiety of American intentions, closed on a note of uncertainty and some apprehension. Schuyler, who hoped the Iroquois would now “abide by the Neutrality they have promised to observe,” had cause to brood over so severe a shortage of trade goods that not even blankets could be presented to those chiefs and warriors soon to arrive at his Saratoga quarters. The shortage remained unarrested and critical with the new year. In fact, said Schuyler, difficult as it was to conduct business with the Indians
at any time, it was doubly so with empty hands. Still worse, it would be “absolutely necessary” to hold a conference with the tribes previous to launching any spring campaigns, that is, if similar talks being staged by the British at Oswego were to be counteracted.\textsuperscript{35}

As time wore on, frontier reports grew more ominous. Four times during January, 1777, Samuel Kirkland wrote from Fort Schuyler to warn of probable Indian attacks. Joseph Brant, the proud, English-schooled Mohawk chieftain and foremost British spokesman among the Iroquois, kept spies and messengers constantly circulating among the Six Nations.\textsuperscript{36} Actually, the tribes were typically disunited in their counsels; the Oneidas, for instance, determined to await the deliberations of the Mohawks, and six barrels of Schuyler’s rum hardly contributed to their tribal unity during the hiatus. Yet, by the last week of January, the best intelligence indicated that a siege of Ticonderoga by a combined British, Canadian, and Indian force could be expected within the month.\textsuperscript{37}

Duly alerted, the members of Congress decided to act on Schuyler’s unremitting appeals for trade goods. Convinced of British designs “to precipitate these Indians into a war against us,” Congress on February 17 authorized the commissioners of the Northern Department to draw 10,000 dollars from the military fund at Albany to purchase goods for the several tribes.\textsuperscript{38} Reports followed shortly thereafter to the effect that significant numbers of the Six Nations favored holding a treaty with the Americans. After observing some 300 warriors in informal talks with the commissioners at Albany, General Gates reported that they seemed friendly and “in nothing disposed to assist the

\textsuperscript{35} Schuyler to Hancock, Dec. 30, 1776, and January 4 and 25, 1777, PCC, Item 153, Roll 172, II, 516, and Roll 173, III, 10 and 44, respectively.

\textsuperscript{36} Kirkland to Schuyler, Jan. 3 and 10, 1777, PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 31-32 and 71-72, respectively.

\textsuperscript{37} Kirkland to Schuyler, Jan. 14 and 25, 1777, PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 63-65 and 21-24, respectively. Horatio Gates predicted Howe’s forces would try to take all of New York state in the coming campaign, link up with troops coming from Canada, and thus “have all the Western and Northern Indians, of this Continent, at his Devotion; to whose depredations, the whole Frontier of the Eastern and Western States will then be exposed.” Gates to Hancock, April 29, 1777, PCC, Item 154 (Letters from Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, 1775-1782), Roll 174, I, 175, 180.

\textsuperscript{38} Ford, Journals, VII, p. 127.
Enemy." The commissioners thereupon agreed to convene a major conference in mid-July in order to distribute gifts and "to renew the Covenant..." 39 Burgoyne's indelicate declaration of June 20, threatening wholesale savagery at the hands of the "thousands of Indians" in his employ, reinforced a few days later by information obtained from Indian interpreter James Deane and from two British prisoners of war, served to redouble American efforts. 40 Even so, the military situation at Fort Schuyler, the continued scarcity of trade goods, and the independent habits of the Indian commissioners all conspired to delay the Albany meeting until autumn. 41

By then the widespread conviction that the British had descended to offering bounties for American scalps was fixed permanently in the popular mind. On September 1 Congress heard a message from Gates, portraying in some detail the inhuman consequences to be seen at the site of Burgoyne's defeat at Bennington. Out of dismay and anger, the first victim of American retaliation was again the policy of neutrality. In mid-September representatives of the Six Nations, excepting the Cayugas and Senecas, finally gathered at Albany, whereupon Schuyler formally offered them a war belt during a feast on September 16. Upon disbursement of arms and equipment, some 150 warriors departed to join Gates' command. Already thirty prisoners had been taken, besides intercepted enemy dispatches, reported Schuyler enthusiastically, and prospects

39 Gates to Hancock, May 24, 1777, PCC, Item 154, Roll 174, I, 209; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to Charles Carroll, May 14, 1777, Carroll Papers, 1731-1883, Collection 206 (Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore), V, folio 3; Schuyler to Hancock, June 8, 1777, PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 149. See also John to Abigail Adams, Aug. 17, 1777: "The Enemy at Niagara and Detroit, are endeavouring to seduce the Indians, to take up the Hatchet, but as yet, with little success. They seem determined to maintain their Neutrality." The Adams Papers. Series II, Adams Family Correspondence, ed. L. H. Butterfield (2 vols. to date, Cambridge, Mass., 1963-present), II, p. 317.

40 Writings of Washington, VIII, p. 387n; Deane warned Schuyler on June 25 that by July 1 Sir John Johnson, Butler, and a large body of Indians would assemble at Oswego, from where they would launch an attack upon Fort Schuyler while British regulars stormed Ticonderoga; PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 212. The prisoners indicated the British plan included continual harassment of Ticonderoga by 800 warriors; July 3, 1777, PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 220.

seemed bright that others of the Iroquois confederation would soon assist materially in the American cause.\[^{42}\]

When news arrived from Fort Pitt that Henry Clinton, the lieutenant-governor of Detroit, was behind the Indian rampages throughout the Virginia and Pennsylvania backcountry, Congress voted on November 30 to send commissioners to Fort Pitt to plan with General Edward Hand, the commanding officer, for the reduction of "that nest of mischief," Detroit, with the aid of friendly warriors from among the Shawnee and Delaware tribes.\[^{43}\]

Still the situation darkened, and congres-
sional instructions grew more explicit and hortatory. By early December, while the Lakes tribes (Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, and Mingoes) systematically preyed on western settlements, Congress directed the Northern commissioners to induce the Six Nations to intercede and restore peace. That failing, the Indian allies should be encouraged to fall upon the Lakes tribes and destroy their towns. At the same time, the commissioners were to enlist another force of Iroquois for a surprise assault on Niagara. “These are capital objects . . .,” emphasized the delegates, who promptly authorized the Northern Department to spend up to 15,000 dollars, in money or goods, to mount the expedition. Should the Indians agree to the plan only on condition that they be permitted to dismantle the post completely, Congress was willing.

Accordingly, the commissioners immediately set about to reassemble the Six Nations at Albany during the first week of January, 1778. James Duane, a member of the standing Committee on Indian Affairs, soon disclosed, however, that British propaganda and intrigue had been even more successful than heretofore believed. It was not simply that the Senecas and Cayugas were unneutral; they could be considered hostile. “These misguided nations must Feel the Power of the united States,” counseled Duane, “since we have not the means of preserving their Fidelity by our Bounty; and they slight our Condescension.” Commissioner Robert Yates Lancy seconded these views in a separate, more detailed account, adding significantly that an invitation to those tribes to join in the assault on Niagara had not been hazarded.

Indeed, with the Six Nations pitted against themselves, the commissioners were suddenly confronted with the novel problem of having to protect from their own brethren those tribes still sympathetic to the American cause. Schuyler in particular was disturbed lest British agents instigate the Senecas against

---

44 Ford, Journals, IX, pp. 994-999, 1002-1003.
46 Lancy somewhat naively believed Congress should “…command them to bury the hatchet they have taken against us to evince their contrition for past misconduct and the sincerity [sic] of their future views by joining our Arms and immediately committing hostilities on the Enemy. . . .” Lancy to Laurens, Jan. 12, 1778, PCC, Item 166, Roll 183, 377-379.
the defenseless villages of the Oneidas and Tuscaroras. Once more preparations for an Indian treaty got underway. On February 2 Congress directed the commissioners to conduct a treaty at Johnstown, New York, with Governor George Clinton in attendance. They were remanded, however, not to proffer a military alliance until the disposition of each and every tribe was manifest, for now the primary object was once more the continuance of the "friendship or at least the neutrality of the Indians. . . ." If the tribesmen were reluctant to side with the Americans, then every effort should be directed toward persuading them not to succor the enemy. The commissioners were told explicitly to employ language befitting "the representatives of free, sovereign, and independent states, and in such tone as will convince them that we feel ourselves to be so. . . ."

The implied urgency was borne out at the Johnstown proceedings in late February and early March. The 732 Indians present for the meeting were but half representative of the Six Nations; none of the Senecas and scarcely a handful of the Mohawks and Cayugas attended. That the United States had an Indian war on its hands, in addition to all else, was now patently evident, and thus did Schuyler interpret the situation in reporting the general results of the meeting. Those tribes not represented, he said, in effect had served notice of the commencement of hostilities, and it seemed probable that the British would seek to capitalize on this development by effecting the French plan of 1753—encircling the frontier with a string of forts through which Indian supplies would pass and to which raiding parties could retire after ravaging American settlements. As for American strategy, Schuyler advised the destruction of hostile Indian villages, the launching of attacks against British-held Oswego and Niagara, and the resumption of the Indian trade in competition with British goods.

This combination of policies characterized the American

47 Schuyler to Colonel John Greaton, Jan. 24, 1778, and to Laurens, Jan. 26, 1778, PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 272 and 268-271, respectively.
48 Ford, Journals, X, pp. 110-111. On February 5, Deane informed the commissioners that the Onondagas, who had delivered the American war hatchet to the British, and the Cayugas would follow the lead of the Senecas in regard to the Johnstown meeting. In fact, only the Oneidas and Tuscaroras could be counted on to attend. PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 282-283.
response in the months that followed, as the commanders and commissioners bent their efforts alternately toward recruiting Indian allies, protecting the lesser Six Nations from their more powerful and numerous confederates, and formulating a plan for coping with the hostile tribes. On March 4 Congress acceded to Washington’s request to recruit up to 400 warriors from among both northern and southern tribes. Washington, however, blaming the lack of gift items for the poor showing, abandoned the effort when Deane and the Northern commissioners expressed doubts that so large a number could be raised.\footnote{Resolution of Congress, Mar. 4, 1778, Ford, Journals, X, pp. 220-221; Washington to the commissioners of Indian affairs, Mar. 13, 1778, Writings of Washington, XI, pp. 76-77; Minutes of the Commissioners at Albany, Apr. 15, 1778, PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 298-313; Washington to the President of Congress, May 3, 1778, Writings of Washington, XI, pp. 343-344.} It would have been more reasonable had he blamed the failure on the inability of the United States to guarantee the security of those Indians who were still friendly. For, although an army engineer was sent to the Oneidas in early April to help in erecting defenses, Congress delayed until May 4 before authorizing Gates to provide them protection. Yet Congress did appropriate 10,000 dollars to reopen the Indian trade at Fort Schuyler in order to “conciliate the affections of the . . . Indians. . . .”\footnote{George I. Denniston to Clinton, Apr. 2, 1778, Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor of New York (10 vols., Albany, 1899-1914), III, p. 118; Minutes of the Commissioners at Albany, Apr. 15, 1778, PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 298-313; Ford, Journals, XI, p. 456.}

As of May, 1778, then, the diplomacy of the young republic toward the Indians of the north country was seriously wanting in both unity and decision. Although it still retained the loyalties of two tribes among the Six Nations, their people were so impotent as to be of little importance and, indeed, pleaded intermittently for American goods and military protection. By far the majority of the Six Nations were openly hostile, with or without British encouragement. Not even the signing of the Franco-American alliance, the news of which reached home shores in May, seemed to improve the situation, despite the fact that plans were formulated to impress the tribes with its “true” significance.\footnote{Washington to Schuyler, May 15, 1778, Writings of Washington, XI, pp. 389-390; Schuyler to Laurens, May 17, 1778, PCC, Item 153, Roll 173, III, 314-321.} Meanwhile, armed with British matériel and ammunition, the Senecas and Cayugas ravaged the Virginia,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania frontiers almost at will, forcing Washington to dispatch additional units to the region. There was little hope of conciliating either tribe, according to both Kirkland and Duane. Duane, who had just returned from a council with the Onondagas, spoke of three parties of Cayugas on the warpath, while a fourth headed possibly for Cherry Valley. Since Onondaga runners had failed to induce either the Cayugas or Senecas to sit in council, Duane conceded that the prospects for improved conditions were dim indeed.\(^5^3\)

The situation continued to deteriorate. On June 4 Congress desperately resolved to have the commissioners treat with the Delawares, Shawnees, and any other tribe willing to attend a conference at Fort Pitt in late July. A week later the delegates contemplated a report submitted by the Board of War, which revealed current difficulties to be nothing less than a general uprising of the Senecas, Cayugas, Mingoess, and Wyandots in league with dissident elements of such supposedly friendly tribes as the Delawares, Shawnees, Chippewas, and Ottawas, numbering altogether perhaps 1,600 warriors. It was "incontestably" manifest, moreover, that the ultimate source of "this civil War" was to be traced directly to the British at Detroit, who had reputedly been indefatigable in spreading the impression among the tribes that American restraint in dealing with them was due less to enlightened decision than to an inveterate inability to do otherwise. The report concluded by recommending, as advised by the several commissioners, that an offensive operation be mounted immediately to pacify the region between Fort Pitt and Detroit. Congress agreed to the proposed expedition on June 11 and ordered General Lachlan McIntosh to muster the requisite command. Simultaneously, General Gates was directed to secure the Mohawk Valley in order to insure the success of the western campaign.\(^5^4\)


\(^5^4\) Ford, *Journals*, XI, pp. 568, 587-590; the report of the Board of War, dated
Thereupon followed one of the cruelest episodes of the war. Descending upon Wyoming Valley, Pennsylvania, in the first week of July, a combined force of Indian and British raiders reportedly killed and scalped some 2,000 inhabitants. By mid-month the hostilities had spread elsewhere, notably to Tryon County, New York, prompting Washington to dispatch a second regiment from his hard-pressed command and to declare that frontier conditions were "extremely embarrassing to our other affairs." Then, on July 22, Brigadier General John Armstrong submitted to Henry Laurens, president of Congress, a lengthy analysis of the Indian crisis. He blamed British agents operating out of Niagara rather than those assigned to distant Detroit for the recent depredations. To follow through with the Detroit expedition at this juncture, he counseled, would be to invite disaster, for problems of supply and transport alone were enormous. Concurrently, Schuyler wrote that the Mohawk Valley operations had not even begun. Upon reconsideration, Congress on July 25 deferred the plan to assault Detroit and instead ordered McIntosh to remain at Fort Pitt, ravage the countryside from there, and "chastise and terrify the savages ...." For the remainder of 1778, and during much of the ensuing season, the delegates in Congress, the Indian agents, and the

June 10, is in PCC, Item 147 (Reports of the Board of War and Ordnance, 1776-81), Roll 157, II, 81-88. Gates wished the United States would "Steer clear of that hornet's nest, the Six Nations, and their Allies." The British evacuation of Philadelphia, he hoped, might convince the tribes to resume a neutral posture. Gates to Laurens, June 17 and 23, 1778, PCC, Item 154, Roll 174, I, 418-421 and 445-448, respectively.

56 Elias Boudinot to Hamilton, July 8, 1778, Syrett, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, I, p. 516. For the account of the British commander of the raid, see Major John Butler to Lieutenant Colonel Bolton, July 8, 1778, in William B. Willcox, ed., The American Rebellion, Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782, with an Appendix of Original Documents (New Haven, 1954), pp. 386-388. Butler claimed, "not a single person has been hurt by the inhabitants but such as were in arms. To those, indeed, the Indians gave no quarter." The Board of War believed Senecas and others of the Six Nations were the Indians involved. Report of July 25, 1778, PCC, Item 147, Roll 157, II, 143-146.


58 Ford, Journals, XI, pp. 720-721. On September 2, in accordance with the recommendation of the Board of War, the Detroit expedition was formally abandoned. Ibid., XI, p. 829, XII, p. 868.
The military pursued a desultory program of defending American frontier settlements while simultaneously carrying the war into Indian country. The principal object was less to inflict heavy casualties upon the hostile tribes than to deplete and destroy...
their winter stores. Convinced that there was no superior course of action, even though the approach of winter impeded offensive operations, Washington ordered the cessation of any preparations for massive assaults against either Niagara or Canada proper in favor of smaller campaigns designed to safeguard the immediate frontier. He told McIntosh that as soon as the weather permitted, attacks should be concentrated on the Iroquois confederation, since the submission of the Six Nations would have a most telling influence elsewhere.

Preliminary plans formulated during February called for forces to rendezvous at Albany, to proceed to Fort Schuyler, and thence to attack the Cayugas and Onondagas in the vicinity of Oswego. "Should we be so fortunate as to take a considerable number of women and children of the Indians," wrote Schuyler, "I conceive that we should then have the means of preventing them hereafter from acting hostilely against us." The objective, according to Washington, was to relieve the pressure on the frontier, to chastise the hostile tribes while providing encouragement to the friendly ones. Lacking the manpower and resources to levy a decisive blow, the Americans would be quite satisfied to cut off the Indian settlements, destroy their crops, and "do them every other mischief of which time and circumstances will permit."

---


60 Schuyler to unknown correspondent, Feb. 4, 1779, PCC, Item 166, Roll 183, 139-140.

61 Washington to Gates, Mar. 6, 1779, Writings of Washington, XIV, pp. 198-199. The friendly Oneidas and Tuscaroras, meanwhile, were to be treated appropriately. At Schuyler's behest, Congress on March 24 authorized the commissioners of the Northern Department to supply the tribes with provisions. On April 3, Congress resolved to transmit twelve blank commissions for distribution to faithful Oneida and Tuscarora chieftains. Schuyler to Duane, Mar. 5, 1779, PCC, Item 147, Roll 158, III, 175; Ford, Journals, XIII, pp. 363, 411.
As spring advanced, so too did plans for the Indian expedition. Major General John Sullivan, commander of the Continental force, received his official instructions on May 3, 1779. His prime objective was to be the complete destruction of the villages and towns, together with the capture of as many prisoners as possible. Upon attaining success, he was to encourage any Indian inclinations toward peace, not by conducting a treaty, for which he specifically lacked authority, but by suggesting an attack on Niagara and enemy shipping on Lake Ontario, either or both of which acts would constitute "decisive evidence" of the tribes' fidelity.

The expedition had yet to get underway, however, before random rumors reached Washington to the effect that some of the hostile tribes, particularly the Cayugas and Onondagas, might shortly sue for peace. Clearly, said Washington, the Indians were apprehensive of imminent danger, and to alleviate that danger now by treaty would free them "to resume their hostility with safety and success" at the next opportunity. Therefore it was imperative to press forward the expedition, if only in retaliation for past misdeeds and to set an example for the future. Thus, amid reports of British-inspired depredations along the frontier, an American advance guard of 500 destroyed an Onondaga settlement in early May, killing twelve Indians. Washington turned optimistic. Perhaps, he wrote Schuyler and Volkert P. Douw on May 28, a partial peace could now be concluded with the "inferior tribes," thereby further intimidating those still hostile. Also, since the Onondagas seemed most inclined to make peace, perhaps they might be induced to capture either Brant or Butler as a test of their sincerity.

Schuyler forwarded his hearty endorsement of the plan, urging in addition that the Onondagas be made to turn and attack the British. Since skirmishing on the Iroquois frontier was unlikely while twenty Seneca sachems paid him a visit at Albany, which they would do shortly, Schuyler promised he would employ every prudent means to delay their return, thereby giving American forces time to steal a march and,

---

62 PCC, Item 166, Roll 183, 221-227.
63 Washington to the President of Congress, May 3, 1779, Writings of Washington, XIV, pp. 484-485.
64 Washington to Benjamin Harrison, May 5-7, 1779, ibid., XV, pp. 5-10; Washington to Schuyler and Douw, May 28, 1779, ibid., XV, pp. 168-169.
hopefully, surprise several Seneca villages. One way or another, the Indians must "feel our power," he declared, or their intransigence and depredations would continue so long as the British retained control of Canada.65

The expedition, 3,000-strong, was finally launched late in May of 1779. July found Sullivan advancing to the junction of the Susquehanna and Tioga rivers. In the meantime General James Clinton of New York approached with another 1,200 men by way of the Mohawk river to rendezvous with Sullivan. Late in August the combined force scattered some 2,000 Iroquois and 200 British rangers in the major confrontation of the campaign at Newtown (Elmira), New York, and then proceeded to put to the torch some forty villages in the Finger Lakes country, while confiscating over 160,000 bushels of corn. The expedition worked its way southward at the close of September, until it rejoined Washington's main army in early November.66

The Sullivan expedition was a qualified success. As Washington informed Lafayette, the mission had accomplished "the entire destruction of the whole Country of the Six Nations," excepting those areas inhabited by the friendly Oneidas and a few towns belonging to the Cayugas and Onondagas. Colonel Daniel Brodhead's independent but concurrent penetration of the upper Ohio valley effectively terrorized the Senecas, Munsees, and Mingoees. Actually, comparatively few Indians had been killed, and fewer still taken prisoners, but enough destruction attended the forays that the northwestern frontier finally seemed secure for the foreseeable future. More importantly, as Washington wrote, the Six Nations now had "undeniable proofs ... that Great Britain cannot protect them, and that it is in our power to chastise them whenever their hostile conduct deserves it."67 Americans could take pride in having met the Indian

67 Washington to Lafayette, Sept. 30 and Oct. 20, 1779, Writings of Washington, XVI, pp. 574-575 and 492-493, respectively. The assessment of the Sullivan expedition continues to be a matter of controversy. According to John R. Alden,
threat successfully and within a larger crisis, but not because their success had depended upon the formulation and consistent promotion of a stated policy.

Securing the frontier through force and securing it through a lasting peace were quite different things, however, as Americans had already learned. October was not yet out before dissension arose as to whose authority ought to prevail in concluding a peace treaty with the tribes, a few of which were now convinced of the need to bury the hatchet. New York officials were most adamant in insisting that their views be heard in conjunction with any congressional efforts; the state legislature appointed a committee of five, including the governor, to represent the state at any treaty talks, regardless of whence the proceedings originated. Congress, for its part, hesitated on the question of whether peace was to be made at all, despite the imperious remonstrances of Schuyler and others. Finally, on November 27, Congress stipulated the terms under which a settlement could be concluded. Once Indian peace supplications had been accepted, the provisions included the surrender of all American prisoners, the expulsion of all British agents operating among the tribes and the deliverance of any agents who might appear subsequently, a commitment never again to take up the hatchet under penalty of forfeiting tribal lands, and a guarantee of hostages to assure the peace. Further, Congress desired the Indians to “make considerable Offers of Territory, which may stand recorded against them. . . .,” even though the appointed

---


peace commissioners were directed to refuse the offer, "to convince them of the superior Generosity of America, compared with their Experience of others." Still, Congress would be willing to accept whatever territorial cessions the Indians might care to grant, reserving to the states all prior claims.69

As apparently only the Cayugas "supplicated" for peace, Congress did not arrange for treaty negotiations. The young republic, having successfully defended its New York frontier from the Indian threat, thus entered yet another new year without having taken steps to insure the peace and security of the region. Philip Schuyler, who had resigned his commission and had become a member of the New York delegation at Philadelphia, informed the state authorities on January 29, 1780, that all of his pleas to Congress had brought not so much as an acknowledgment. The country did itself incalculable harm, said Washington the next day, by keeping the Indians "in a state of desperation and . . . at enmity with Us. . . ." Until a settlement was made there could be no paring of expenses nor shifting of troops for service in other quarters.70 The vexing dilemma now belaboring Congress remained essentially the same as before. The surest guarantee of the Indian's good faith would be their direct involvement in the American cause. To do so, however, would commit the United States to a responsibility it could ill sustain: underwriting and supporting the tribes. A simple treaty of friendship and neutrality, on the other hand, although considerably cheaper and less binding, hardly seemed sufficient. Having been unable to resolve the dilemma at earlier stages, Congress ultimately sidestepped the issue on February 21 by dispatching extremely general instructions to the Northern commissioners, empowering them to adopt any measures "conducive to the end proposed. . . ."71

Then, suddenly, the old, lamentably familiar consequence of American irresolution—Indian rampages along the frontier

69 Ford, Journals, XV, pp. 1320-1322.
71 Ford, Journals, XVI, pp. 180-181. See also the Feb. 19, 1780, report of the Board of War to Congress, PCC, Item 147, Roll 159, IV, 171-172. Not until the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, October 22, 1784, was peace concluded between the United States and the Six Nations, after which the state of New York resumed full jurisdiction over the Indians within its boundaries. Cochran, New York in the Confederation, pp. 100-101.
—returned to haunt Congress. They began in March in the form of sporadic incursions near Fort Pitt, and by May the entire northern frontier seemed endangered. Early June found James Madison telling Jefferson that, with British agents directing the raids, it was only a matter of time before an expedition out of Montreal would descend on Fort Schuyler, the key to the northwestern reaches. According to Madison, Sullivan’s seemingly successful expedition of the previous autumn apparently had “exasperated” rather than “terrified and disabled” the Six Nations.⁷²

So desperate, in fact, had the situation become by the end of June that Washington again, as earlier, had to see to the safety of the friendly Oneidas and divert sorely needed supplies to their aid. To make matters all the more critical, lack of pay and provisions among the regular forces gave rise to a serious mutiny at Fort Schuyler. Had rumors of an enemy offensive from Canada proven true, the garrison might well have fallen from within, not without. Meantime, the depleted state of financial resources effectively precluded retaliatory forays against the Indians. Therefore, for the lack of a more viable alternative, Count Rochambeau paraded the French alliance before the tribes, to counter what Americans believed to be studied British efforts to denigrate its importance.⁷³

With the coming of autumn neither finances nor Indian attitudes had improved. Schuyler continually bemoaned the sorry state of supplies until Congress finally appropriated some 6,000 dollars for the material benefit of 400 friendly Oneidas and Tuscaroras, and those Caughnawagas who had been forced to flee Canada.⁷⁴ Still, in Schuyler’s view, it was simply a question of time before the decision would have to be made: to abandon the length of the frontier from Virginia to New Hampshire, or

⁷² Brodhead to the Board of War, Mar. 18, 1780, PCC, Item 147, Roll 159, IV, 817-320; the New York delegates in Congress to George Clinton, May 21, 1780, Burnett, Letters of Congress, V, p. 160; Madison to Jefferson, June 2, 1780, ibid., V, p. 181.

⁷³ Washington to Colonel Goose Van Schaick, June 28, 1780, to the President of Congress, June 20, 1780, and to Rochambeau, Sept. 3, 1780, Writings of Washington, XIX, pp. 87-88, 36-37, and 495-496, respectively.

to attempt the conquest of Canada. But financial and logistical difficulties, together with the states' perennial failure to heed urgent requests to fill troop quotas, made the feasibility of yet another Canadian expedition most impractical. Thus the Americans once more found themselves in the all too familiar position of having to confront Indian hostilities while attempting to maintain the amity and neutrality of an Indian minority, with meager resources and even more meager means of enforcing policies. Throughout the winter and into the spring of 1781 the commanders were unanimous in entreating the government to support and assist those tribes which had befriended the country, especially as their plight had grown so grave in many instances that the resultant hardships might leave them no recourse but to join the enemy. Mindful of its empty coffers as well as its solemn obligations, Congress alternately forwarded assurances of interest and concern and authorized the appropriate states to see to their wards' welfare, the expense to be charged to the United States. Even so, it appears that the tribes obtained token material assistance only after local commanders initiated serious scavanging efforts in their behalf.

As the season progressed, and as all thoughts and intents focused on the series of events which would end with Yorktown in October of 1781, the Indians, whether friendly or hostile, received steadily less attention. Indeed, Washington formally refused an offer of support from a band of Stockbridge Indians, Congress, of course, continued to extend assurances of interest, ostensibly because their aid was not required, but privately he complained, "their services never compensated the expense." concern, and sympathy, as circumstance might occasion, but the victory at Yorktown was not three weeks into history before the members of Congress and the individual state legislatures once more began dividing and contesting as to whose authority ought to prevail in the Indian west.

And while negotiations leading to the peace settlement

77 Schuyler to Huntington, Jan. 18, 1781, PCC, Item 158, Roll 173, III, 555; Richard Peters to the President of Congress, Mar. 15, 1781, PCC, Item 147, Roll 159, VI, 304-306; New York delegates to Governor Clinton, Mar. 11, 1781, Burnett, Letters of Congress, VI, p. 25; Ford, Journals, XIX, p. 465.
78 Washington to Chiefs of the Stockbridge and to General William Heath, Sept. 2, 1781, Writings of Washington, XXIII, pp. 80-81 and 75, respectively.
dragged on, with the fate of the transmontane and British-occupied regions weighing in the balance, scores of American frontiersmen poured over Indian lands, to the mutual consternation of the tribes, the British, and American officials. Thus the Peace of Paris, which confirmed to the young republic sovereignty over the western lands, also bequeathed to it the task of evolving a policy that would achieve harmony along the frontier, for all endeavors to do so during the War for Independence had come to nought.

See, for example, General William Irvine to the Secretary at War, Oct. 28, 1782, PCC, Item 149 (Letters and Reports from Major General Benjamin Lincoln, Secretary at War, 1781-1783), Roll 163, II, 71; Madison to Governor Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, Nov. 15, 1782, Burnett, *Letters of Congress*, VI, p. 542; Samuel Wharton to George Read, Nov. 17, 1782, ibid., VI, pp. 543-544. A general discussion of postwar Indian affairs is in Prucha, *American Indian Policy...*, pp. 31 ff.; and in Reginald Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812* (E. Lansing, Mich., 1967).
THE MARYLAND STATE COLONIZATION SOCIETY: INDEPENDENT STATE ACTION IN THE COLONIZATION MOVEMENT

By Aaron Stopak

The main force of the anti-slavery movement in the early nineteenth century was the American Colonization Society and its auxiliaries. Founded in 1816, the society was dedicated to the belief that the “race problem” in the United States could be solved only by the removal of the Negro to Africa. Support for the society came from all parts of the country. Southerners favored the colonization of freedmen as a means of making slave property more secure, while Northerners believed that it would lead to the gradual and voluntary emancipation of slaves.\textsuperscript{1} Despite initial enthusiasm for the national organization, a number of auxiliaries were soon to assert their own independence. One of the most successful of these local units was the Maryland State Colonization Society.

From the beginning, the national society was dependent on its auxiliaries for financial assistance. During the 1820’s, local societies were merely fund raising organizations, while the national group, with its headquarters in Washington, managed the movement’s activities. The national society sent out the agents to organize new auxiliaries; assisted them in collecting funds; encouraged freedmen to emigrate to Africa; chartered and equipped ships for voyages; and finally governed the society’s colony of Liberia. National leaders felt that centralized control was essential in achieving their aims and goals. But during the 1830’s, auxiliary societies in Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, Mississippi, and Louisiana revolted against this control.\textsuperscript{2} The Maryland group was the first to undertake a course of independent action, and it was in Maryland that such a program had its most successful and complete development.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 232-236.
The events which led the Maryland auxiliary to take an independent course dated back to 1827 when, under the leadership of Charles Harper and John Latrobe the Maryland Auxiliary Society was reorganized to include every auxiliary of the American Colonization Society in the state. The new group’s main function continued to be collecting and providing funds for the parent society, but it also now began to lobby with the state legislature on behalf of the national organization. As a result of these efforts, the legislature in February, 1827 enacted a law by which the American Colonization Society was to receive an appropriation of $1,000 annually on the condition that the sum was to be used for “the colonization on the coast of Africa of free people of colour” who had been residents of the state of Maryland. However, in 1829, the state terminated its appropriation because the society had failed to meet the condition upon which the grant depended, for by 1828 it had settled only twelve emigrants in Liberia. The loss of the state appropriation led to a loss of interest in colonization among Marylanders and convinced the members of the Maryland auxiliary that they could never accomplish their purpose while dependent on the parent group to perform the task.

The interest of Marylanders in colonization was again revived as the result of a meeting held in Baltimore by the friends of African colonization on February 21, 1831. Those present at this meeting approved and adopted a resolution put forward by John Latrobe to set up a new association, the Maryland State Colonization Society. While the new group was to be nominally an auxiliary of the American Colonization Society, it was at this point that Marylanders began to follow a course of independent state action. The resolution setting up the new society indicated that more money could be collected from Marylanders if it were made clear that all collections would be applied exclusively to the removal of the state’s free colored population.

---

3 Ibid., p. 110
6 Minutes of the Board of Managers of the Maryland State Colonization Society, May 4, 1831, Maryland State Colonization Society Papers, Md. Hist. Soc. Hereafter cited as Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, MS. 571.
7 Ibid., February 21, 1831.
The state society now prepared to manage almost all aspects of the colonization movement in Maryland from encouraging free Negroes to emigrate, to the outfitting and chartering of vessels which would transport them to Liberia.

The founders and officers of the Maryland State Colonization Society came from Baltimore’s commercial and professional community. Most of these men were not strongly opposed to the institution of slavery; yet many of them adopted a free labor point of view in that they favored the gradual manumission of slaves. At the same time, they were worried about the ever increasing number of free Negroes in Baltimore and the state. The leaders of the Maryland society generally believed that free Negroes were a degraded and corrupt class and that therefore their large numbers had a harmful effect on the city and the state. They believed that colonization was the only way by which large-scale manumission could be allowed without suffering the consequences of having a large free Negro population living in their midst.

Relations between the new group and the national society were stormy from the beginning. The Maryland society asserted its right to manage its own affairs. At the same time, it asked the parent society for such documents as would entitle emigrants, sent by the Maryland society, to the same rights and privileges in the colony as other emigrants. At first the national organization opposed this program of independent state action as narrowing its own field for collecting money and emigrants. However, its leaders realized that Maryland would be completely lost to the cause unless some attempt were made to cooperate with the scheme of independent action. Therefore, they granted permission to transport freedmen to Liberia on the condition that the state society would pay twenty dollars per person in order to cover part of the expenses of the colony. The terms were accepted but only after a lengthy correspond-

---

9 Board of Managers of the Maryland State Colonization Society, *Address of the Maryland State Colonization Society to the People of Maryland* (Baltimore, 1831), pp. 4-5.
10 Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, February 22, 1831.
12 R. R. Gurley to J. Howard, April 4, 1831, letter in Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, April 12, 1831.
ence in which the Marylanders protested that they were being over-charged.\textsuperscript{13}

Within a month after the state society's formation, its Board of Managers appointed a full-time agent to manage its affairs. The initial appointment went to Dr. Eli Ayres, who received a detailed set of instructions on his duties. He was directed to travel throughout Maryland in order to collect money and form auxiliaries among the white people of the state. On these trips, he was also expected to make speeches before groups of free Negroes, to inform them of the benefits of emigration, and to collect the names and addresses of those interested in migrating. He was also to manage the Baltimore office, to engage vessels to transport the colonists to Africa, and to prepare and supervise emigrants prior to their departure.\textsuperscript{14}

The society's first expedition, which left Baltimore on October 21, 1831, was somewhat less than a complete success. In his report on the expedition, Dr. Ayres stated that originally sixty persons had offered themselves for the passage and that therefore funds were expended in outfitting the schooner \textit{Orion} with enough berths to accommodate that number. But when the time for sailing came, only thirty-one actually departed for Africa. Some of the freedmen could not leave because of unsettled financial obligations, while others were not able to provide sufficient evidence of their status as freedmen. Dr. Ayres also claimed that some of them, chiefly those from rural areas, were "detered by the misrepresentations of blacks from Baltimore City and the neighboring counties . . . who left no means unturned to put obstacles in the way of our expedition."\textsuperscript{15}

During the first year of the society's existence, it became apparent that it would not be as easy as originally expected to maintain active county auxiliaries. Dr. Ayres was successful in setting up several auxiliaries during a trip in the spring of 1831.\textsuperscript{16} However, once he returned to Baltimore, he found that he could not obtain any replies from local officials.\textsuperscript{17} The county units were supposed to function as a continual source of revenue

\textsuperscript{13} Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, May 4 and October 12, 1831.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, Feb. 24 and March 7, 1831.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, Nov. 16, 1831.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, March 23 and Aug. 5, 1831.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, Nov. 28, 1831.
for the state society, and it was Dr. Ayres' apparent inability to obtain such assistance from them which led to his dismissal on December 6, 1831.¹⁸ Later agents were no more successful than Dr. Ayres in keeping them permanently organized as sources of revenue.¹⁹

![Plan of the Township of Harper and its vicinity at Cape Palmas by John Revey, Colonial Secretary. MS. 571. Md. Hist. Soc.](image)

Fortunately, financial difficulties of the society virtually came to an end in December, 1831, when the state legislature approved a bill to finance the colonization of those free Negroes who were willing to go to Africa. The bill was passed during the period of popular frenzy that gripped Maryland after Nat Turner's insurrection in Virginia. In reaction to the outbreak, which took place in August of 1831, the slaveholding states

¹⁹ James Reid to John H. B. Latrobe, Jan. 31, 1835, and David Weessel to I. Easter, Aug. 6, 1836, Correspondence Received of the Maryland State Colonization Society, 1827-1863, Md. Hist. Soc. Hereafter cited as Maryland Correspondence.
passed a series of laws aimed at preventing the recurrence of such an outbreak by imposing still more stringent controls on the Negro.20 These laws were especially aimed at the freedman, who was feared as an instigator of slave insurrections.

Under the Maryland law of 183121 a Board of Managers of the State Fund for the Removal of Coloured People, which included three members of the Maryland State Colonization Society, was appointed. The Board of Managers was to supervise the spending of state funds, not exceeding $20,000 the first year and $10,000 each year thereafter, for the removal of free Negroes, with their consent, to the colony of Liberia and to provide for their establishment and support in Africa as far as possible. The law provided that every deed of manumission was to be reported to the Board which in turn would notify the Maryland Society to transport the freed slave to Africa. In those cases in which the state society either refused or was unable to remove a manumitted Negro, the Board of Managers was to perform the task of removing him from the state. In case he refused to leave the state, the Board of Managers was required to notify the county sheriff whose duty it was “to arrest and remove such person beyond the limits of the state.” 22 There can be no doubt that the law of 1831 gives proof of the legislators’ negative attitude in regard to Negroes; yet the evidence seems to indicate that the harsh provision for the use of police power was rarely enforced.23

Almost all the state funds provided under the Act of 1831 were given to the Maryland society. This law gave a new lease on life for the state’s colonization movement. The appropriations from the state treasury in the period from 1832 to 1861 were sufficient to cover most of the costs of transporting emigrants to Africa and in providing for their needs for a brief period of adjustment on their arrival.24 An immediate result of the Act was the departure in December, 1832, at the state's

21 “The Maryland law bears the date March 12, 1832, but is commonly spoken of as the law of 1831, having been passed at the December session of that year.” Ibid., p. 15.
22 Laws Made and Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Maryland—1832 (Annapolis, 1832), Ch. 281.
23 Latrobe, Maryland in Liberia, p. 16.
24 Ibid., p. 82.
expense, of 144 colonists to Liberia. While the state society still had to collect funds from private sources in order to pay for the society’s activities of promoting its objectives and to cover the long-term assistance of Maryland emigrants in Africa, the lack of privately collected funds no longer was a major handicap in sending expeditions to Africa. Now the most important function of the state society was to convince enough free Negroes to emigrate. And the financial support of the state government also enabled the Maryland society to take a still more independent stand in its relations with the national organization.

At the same session that passed the Act of 1831, the legislature incorporated the group as the Maryland State Colonization Society. Under its charter, the society was authorized to purchase and occupy such lands and tenements as it might deem best suited for the colonizing of the free Negroes in Africa. The provision was written into the charter with the understanding that at some future date the society might find it advantageous to purchase territory in Africa in order to establish a colony for Maryland emigrants, which would be completely under its control.

Consideration of the proposal for setting up a new colony became urgent as a result of the unfavorable reports sent back by emigrants who were sent to Liberia on the ship Lafayette in February, 1833. They complained that the citizens of Liberia had seized their provisions and that local authorities had replaced them with goods that were inferior in quality and quantity. The colonists wrote that the earlier settlers were not only unfriendly, but that they also played every kind of trick on the inexperienced newcomers to separate them from their possessions. The leaders of the Maryland society realized that if such reports of dissatisfaction continued to reach the state’s Negro community, the result would be a complete end to further emigration. They also realized that the national organization could never allow a favored treatment for Maryland’s emigrants in the colony, even if the additional expense

---

26 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
27 E. Pembleton and James Rice to John H. B. Latrobe, Feb. 3, 1833, and James Reese to John H. B. Latrobe, Feb. 2, 1833, Maryland Correspondence.
28 Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, May 18, 1833.
was paid for, as this would result in jealousy on the part of emigrants from other states towards the Maryland colonists. Therefore it was concluded that the only way in which the society could ensure the property and comfort of future emigrants would be by establishing their own colony.

On April 30, 1833 a meeting of the Maryland society passed a resolution, stating that it was going "to form . . . a new settlement on the coast of Africa [at Cape Palmas] where there will be no restraint upon emigration beyond the control of the state society. . . ." The resolution further stated that it was "the desire of the Maryland State Colonization Society to hasten as far as they can the arrival of the period when slavery shall cease to exist in Maryland." This declaration put the Maryland society in a class of its own, as the only colonization organization in a slave state that maintained that its "ultimate objective" was the eradication of slavery. As Northern societies also advocated colonization as a means of eliminating slavery, it was not surprising that, at first, they greatly praised the Maryland scheme.

More surprising were the reactions of Maryland's slaveholders whose attitudes continued to range from acquiescence to active support of the society's activities. The position taken by slaveholders was especially important, as their disproportionately large representation in the legislature gave them the power to grant or deny the state's annual appropriation for the society. In fact, the state society's "ultimate objective" did not seem to be a threat to the slaveholders, as the Maryland society had never suggested that they be forced to free their slaves. Rather, it had been the view of the society that slaveholders would be encouraged to free their slaves voluntarily, if they knew that the manumitted slaves would be sent to Africa and therefore there would no longer be a burden or a potential threat to the white community. The slaveholders, having no illusion about their own ultimate objectives, supported the colonization

28 Dr. Hall to John H. B. Latrobe, Feb. 6, 1833, Maryland Correspondence.
29 Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, April 30, 1833.
30 Latrobe, Maryland in Liberia, p. 20.
31 New York Observer, May 11, 1833, quoted in the African Repository, IX (May, 1833), pp. 89-91; Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, June 28, 1833.
32 Board of Managers of the Maryland State Colonization Society, Address of the Maryland State Colonization Society to the People of Maryland (Baltimore, 1831), pp. 4-5; Maryland State Board of Managers of the State Fund for Removing the
scheme because they believed that such a plan would also make their property in slaves more secure.\(^{34}\) In later years, many slaveholders became strong critics of the society, but this criticism was mainly directed to the failure to accomplish the goal of removing a large proportion of the state's free Negroes.\(^{35}\)

The American Colonization Society reacted negatively to the Maryland society's plan to organize its own colony. The national organization, quite correctly, saw the Maryland plan as an attempt to break the last ties of dependence to the national society. Maryland's partial enterprise would also divide available resources and thus handicap the nationwide system of colonization.\(^{36}\)

In contrast to the national society's plea for unity, the Board of Managers of the Maryland society proclaimed that the best way to promote colonization was for each state to do what they were doing: take over the "sole management of colonization within its confines."\(^{37}\) The discordant views entertained by the members of the colonization movement throughout the nation were seen as preventing the unity of sentiment and action within the national society that were necessary for its success. The Maryland society envisioned the state action plan as the only way of avoiding disputes over the slavery question. Therefore, it was proposed that "those states having reasons to send emigrants to Liberia, sending them for such reasons as please them, and those states not having emigrants for Africa, but willing to contribute to cause with money, selecting for themselves the particular object or views which they are most desirous to advance."\(^{38}\) The upshot of this argument was that "Maryland could be the object of Northern aid, as the Maryland Society had avowed the principle [of the eventual extirpation of slavery] which the North had long contended as the proper basis of colonization."\(^{39}\)

---


\(^{37}\) *African Repository*, IX (May, 1833), p. 89.

\(^{38}\) Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Oct. 2, 1833.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.
The Maryland society, in making plans for its new colony, made an effort to avoid the mistakes made by the national society in Liberia. The early settlers in the old colony had complained that there was no declaration of rights clearly defining their privileges as citizens and serving as a protection against oppression.\(^{40}\) In order to avoid such a problem in the new colony, it was decided to send the colonists to Africa with a set of laws, including a constitution and a Bill of Rights. All adult emigrants to the colony were required to sign a declaration to support the colony's constitution and to abstain from liquor. Under the constitution, the state society was to make the laws for the colony until an unspecific time in the future when the colonists would be allowed to govern their own affairs without supervision. The Bill of Rights included, freedom of religion, trial by jury and the prohibition of slavery.\(^{41}\) The governor of the colony was appointed, but qualified voters of the colony were given the right to elect other public officials, including a vice-agent, sheriff and treasurer.\(^{42}\)

The leadership of the Maryland society wanted to prevent the new colony from following the example of the older colony in what they believed was an over-emphasis on commercial activities in the form of petty trade with the natives and with the vessels that frequented the colony's harbor. In the new colony, agriculture was to be the activity of primary importance. An emphasis on farming would give the colonists the means of sustaining themselves independently from the outside or from the necessity of relying on natives for food. The society maintained that petty trade with the natives would lead the emigrants "... to vicious habits [and] intervals of idleness ..." while "... agricultural pursuits from the moment of their arrival, would have their minds in the best state to receive and preserve those sentiments of religion and morality which, it was the wish of the state society, should form the character of the population."\(^{43}\) It was typical of that religious age that the pursuit of agricultural and temperance programs by the emigrants were seen as factors that would help the colonists to "... set

\(^{40}\) Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Jan. 8, 1834.
\(^{41}\) Ibid., Nov. 22, 1833.
\(^{42}\) Latrobe, *Maryland In Liberia*, pp. 33-34.
\(^{43}\) Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Oct. 2, 1833.
better examples for the surrounding heathens and designed to bring gospel light . . .” to them.\textsuperscript{44}

Dr. James Hall, who had just returned to the United States after serving two years as a physician in Liberia, was appointed by the state society on September 9, 1833 to take charge of the expedition to establish the new colony.\textsuperscript{45} With this accomplished, Hall was to continue supervising the project as its governor.

Permission was granted by the American Colonization Society to allow the emigrants on the expedition to reside at the national society’s settlement until land at Cape Palmas could be bought for the new settlement.\textsuperscript{46} The national organi-

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Sept. 9, 1833.
\textsuperscript{46} Minutes of the Board of Managers of the American Colonization Society, Oct. 7, 1833, Papers of the American Colonization Society, Library of Congress. Hereafter cited as Minutes of Board of Managers, American.
ization also permitted the state society to recruit emigrants for the new settlement from among those Marylanders who had settled in Liberia from earlier expeditions.\textsuperscript{47}

On November 28, 1833, the expedition left for Africa on the Ship \textit{Ann} with Hall, his assistant, the Reverend John Hersey, and nineteen emigrants. The expedition also included two missionaries from the American Board of Foreign Missions who were to look after the religious life of the colonists and the natives of the Cape Palmas region. The number of emigrants sent on the \textit{Ann} was purposely kept small, as it was thought that the earlier settlers, who were to be recruited from the old colony, would be better suited to carry out the arduous work of preparing a new settlement, since they had already been acclimated and were not as susceptible to tropical diseases that affected most emigrants on their arrival in Africa.\textsuperscript{48} When the \textit{Ann} reached Liberia, public meetings were held to inform those colonists originally from Maryland of the state society’s plan and to interest them in joining the new settlement. These meetings resulted in thirty-four of the old settlers volunteering to join the project.\textsuperscript{49}

On February 13 and 14, 1834, Dr. Hall held a palaver with the native kings of Cape Palmas and the surrounding territory, which resulted in the sale of their land, excluding those territories then inhabited and cultivated, to the society. In return for the sale of their land, the natives received such trade goods as muskets, gunpowder, cloth, kettles, hats, beads, fishhooks, scissors and other similar items.\textsuperscript{50} While these goods seemed to have a high value to the natives, they did not compare with the value of the land given up. It is not unlikely that, as in other similar cases, the natives misunderstood the white man’s concept of land ownership. The society also promised that schools would be established for the native children within one year.\textsuperscript{51}

The most unusual aspect of the transaction was that it was completely without the use of ardent spirits as any part of the con-

\textsuperscript{47} Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Dec. 7, 1833.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} Latrobe, \textit{Maryland in Liberia}, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{51} Schools for the native children were provided, in fulfillment of the promise of the state society, by the American Board of Foreign Missions. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 41.
The transaction was thus in accordance with the temperance principle of the Maryland society and contrary to the usual practice in trade with the natives.

By June, 1834 the settlement began to take on the appearance of a civilized community with the erection of twelve private frame houses and the completion of such public buildings as a fort, jail, community kitchen, and three structures for the reception of new emigrants. The colony also made an early start in developing its agricultural potential. Practically all the land within the area that had been set aside for the first settlement as cleared, fenced and planted by the summer of 1834.

Maryland's example was soon followed in 1834 by state societies in New York and Pennsylvania, which jointly set up a colony at Bassa Cove in Liberia. In 1836, the Mississippi and

---

52 Dr. James Hall to John H. B. Latrobe, Feb. 19, 1834, Maryland Correspondence.
53 Latrobe, Maryland in Liberia, p. 49.
54 Washington, D.C. National Intelligencer, August 30, 1834, quoted in African Repository, X (October, 1834), pp. 243-244.
Louisiana state societies announced that they would join together to establish their own colony. This plan was carried out in 1837, when a colony was set up on the Sinou River in Liberia. All four state societies made use of information supplied to them by the Maryland society for demonstrating to them the feasibility of independent state action. Unlike the Maryland society, the state societies of New York, Pennsylvania, Mississippi and Louisiana remained auxiliaries of the national organization. However, their nominal auxiliary status did the national society little good, as the new colonies soaked up most of the funds collected in these states and thus further weakened the national society.

While the Maryland society could take pride in having its example followed by some of the other state societies, it was to be disappointed in its desire to obtain large-scale financial support for its own operations from outside of the state. In fact, those states which had founded their own colonies were motivated by a desire to reduce the size of their own free Negro population and therefore had little interest in aiding the Maryland society. Marylanders chose not to send agents to the states which had established colonies, but they showed no such reluctance to send agents into other areas where they would compete with the national society.

In the summer of 1834, the Maryland society sent two brothers, the Reverend Messrs. Leonard and Robert Breckinridge, to New England as agents "... to explain the plans and system of the Maryland society with a view of procuring pecuniary aid." The society expected that once the New Englanders had the Maryland plan explained to them that they would shift their support from the national organization to them. Maryland's agents presented the scheme as an experiment which would prove that a slave state could be made a free state.

---

55 Robert S. Finley to John H. B. Latrobe, March 19, 1836, Maryland Correspondence.
56 Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Dec. 14, 1837.
57 Ibid., Jan. 8, 1834; Robert S. Finley to John H. B. Latrobe, March 19, 1836, Maryland Correspondence.
60 "The Third Annual Report," Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Jan., 1835.
through colonization and which would be promptly followed by other slave states once its success had been demonstrated.\textsuperscript{61}

The attempt to put activities of the Maryland society in a good light for Northerners proved fruitless, as the abolitionists were more convincing when they presented the Maryland organization in the same unflattering colors with which they had previously pictured the American Colonization Society. A meeting, held by the agents of the Maryland society in Boston on July 28, 1834, motivated William Lloyd Garrison to write his highly critical pamphlet, \textit{The Maryland Scheme of Expatriation Examined by a Friend of Liberty}.\textsuperscript{62} In this pamphlet, he wrote that the scheme was not intended for the benefit of the Negro but rather for the slaveholder, who feared that the unrestricted association of free Negroes with slaves would lead to insurrections.\textsuperscript{63} In developing his argument, Garrison presented the laws passed in regard to freedmen and colonization at the 1831-1832 session of the Maryland legislature as part of a malicious plan to force freedmen, against their will, to emigrate to Africa.\textsuperscript{64} While the harsher provisions of these laws were rarely enforced, Garrison's description of the laws was fairly accurate in regard to their original intent.\textsuperscript{65} But with much less basis in fact, Garrison argued that there was considerable "... abolition feeling in Maryland, and that if that feeling was not drained off in the direction of Africa, it would seek another vent... in emancipation on the soil of Maryland."\textsuperscript{66}

In its annual report for 1834 the Maryland society reported that the Breckinridge brothers were "... not able... to make their Northern visits profitable in a pecuniary point of view, but it is believed they made a deep favorable impression which will before long secure to the state society the cooperation of the friends of colonization to the northward."\textsuperscript{67} As it turned

\textsuperscript{61}Board of Managers of Maryland State Colonization Society to Reverend Robert Breckinridge, undated letter, Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, July 11, 1834.

\textsuperscript{62}William Lloyd Garrison, \textit{The Maryland Scheme of Expatriation Examined by a Friend of Liberty} (Boston, 1834), p. 4.

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid., pp. 5-9. The laws described by Garrison are the same as those found in \textit{Laws of Maryland—1832}, ch. 281 and 323.

\textsuperscript{65}Latrobe, \textit{Maryland in Liberia}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{66}Garrison, \textit{Maryland Scheme of Expatriation}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{67}"Third Annual Report," Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Jan., 1835.
out, the society was sadly mistaken in its fond hopes for assistance from the North based on the supposedly good impression made by its agents. Especially in Boston, the Breckinridge brothers had greatly damaged the image of both Maryland and its state society by leaving many Bostonians with the impression that Negroes would be exterminated if they were not sent to Africa.\textsuperscript{68}

From January, 1835 until May, 1837, the Reverend L. R. Wynkoop was the part time agent of the Society in the North.\textsuperscript{69} Wynkoop was a resident of Princeton, New Jersey, and he exerted his efforts in his home state and in New England. He found that his solicitations in New England were stymied by the propaganda of the abolitionists against the Maryland Society.\textsuperscript{70} Furthermore, many of the friends of colonization, both in New England and New Jersey, had a long period of association with the national organization, and they were therefore reluctant to give up their support of it in order to back the Maryland group.\textsuperscript{71} The friends of colonization in New Jersey, like those in New York and Pennsylvania, were more interested in removing their own free Negro population than in helping the Maryland society. In fact, the citizens of New Jersey showed their greatest interest when for a short time in 1836 a group of New Jersey Negroes showed an inclination to settle in the Maryland colony; but when these plans failed to materialize, interest in New Jersey subsided to its previous low level.\textsuperscript{72}

The activities of the Maryland society turned out to be a less serious problem for the national organization in the North than they were in the South. In the spring of 1837 the Marylanders staged their most dramatic out-of-state coup, when Mrs. Emily Tubman of Georgia paid the Society all the expenses of transporting and settling in Liberia thirty-six of her former slaves.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{68} Rev. L. R. Wynkoop to John H. B. Latrobe, June 25, 1835, Maryland Correspondence.
\textsuperscript{69} Rev. L. R. Wynkoop to John H. B. Latrobe, Jan. 29, 1835; Rev. L. R. Wynkoop to John H. B. Latrobe, May 3, 1837, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{70} Rev. L. R. Wynkoop to John H. B. Latrobe, June 25, 1835, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{71} Rev. L. R. Wynkoop to John H. B. Latrobe, June 22, 1836, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{72} Rev. L. R. Wynkoop to John H. B. Latrobe, Nov. 14, 1836; Rev. L. R. Wynkoop to John H. B. Latrobe, Feb., 1837, \textit{ibid.}
sylvania Society, both of which had sought to settle the Tubman contingent of emigrants in their own colonies.\textsuperscript{74}

The Maryland Society was created for the specific purpose of transporting free Negroes from Maryland to Africa, and it was on this basis that it obtained financial assistance from the state. But it was the failure to find a sufficient number of freedmen in Maryland, who were willing to emigrate to Africa, that led the society to accept emigrants for its colony from outside of the state. The cost of sending out-of-state Negroes to Africa was covered completely by private contributions, as the society did not have the right, under the law of 1831, to use state funds for this purpose. Without assigning a fulltime agent to the South, the society was able to obtain 115 emigrants from the states of Georgia and Virginia. Thus around 9 per cent of the total number of colonists sent to Africa under its auspices came from outside of Maryland.\textsuperscript{75}

It was, however, in regard to the emigration of free Negroes from Maryland that the greatest effort was continued to be made, but despite this effort, emigration was relatively small. The society was generous in terms to the freedmen: passage and all reasonable personal freight, along with all provisions for the voyage, were free. Upon arrival at the colony, each adult male was provided with all necessary farming implements, and each female head of the family was supplied with all the necessary furniture. Provisions and shelter were also provided for the first six months after arrival, so that the colonist could have a chance to recover completely from the acclimating illness that affected most newcomers. Each head of a family was given five acres of land within the township, and it was stated that a larger quantity of more remote land would be provided if the emigrant showed that he had the ability to cultivate it.\textsuperscript{76}

The society realized that it could not bear the cost of removing a large proportion of the state's freedmen under the generous terms that it was providing. But the Board of Managers maintained that it would no longer be necessary to provide inducements once the colony became firmly established.

\textsuperscript{74} Gurley to Gales, May 7, 1837, Letters Received of the American Colonization Society, Library of Congress.

\textsuperscript{75} Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Feb. 19, and Jan. 23, 1858.

\textsuperscript{76} Maryland Colonization Journal, n.s. 1 (Sept., 1842), p. 256.
and prosperous. They foresaw a time when large numbers would emigrate at their own expense to the colony, just as Europeans were currently migrating to the United States.\textsuperscript{77}

Despite the constant efforts of agents, only 1250 freedmen in Maryland took advantage of the society's offer up to 1858, out of a total free Negro population in 1830 of 52,938 and in 1850 of 74,723.\textsuperscript{78} Time after time the society made plans to send large expeditions to Africa, only to find at the time of departure that the number of emigrants had fallen far short of expectations. For example, in 1836 the society intended to send out two expeditions with each carrying 150 emigrants.\textsuperscript{79} The actual number on the first expedition was a mere seventeen, while the second one numbered only thirty-two.\textsuperscript{80} A planned expedition for 1840 did not sail, because no colonists could be obtained. In 1846, another expedition sailed with only fourteen.\textsuperscript{81} And the society's periodical, the \textit{Maryland Colonization Journal}, in August, 1849 expressed its disappointment over the expedition of that year, which sailed with only ten emigrants, after nearly fifty had given their names as willing to go to Africa.\textsuperscript{82}

The most frustrating experience for the society's agents was that they were frequently unable to obtain the consent of slaves to go to Africa, even when their manumission depended on it. For example, in 1831 the agent, Dr. Ayres, spoke to a group of slaves who were offered their freedom if they would go. They, however, refused for they believed that Ayres was a slave trader and that those, who had earlier accepted, had been betrayed and sold back into slavery in Georgia.\textsuperscript{83} In 1836, agent Ira Easter spoke to a group who strongly opposed the idea of leaving what


\textsuperscript{78} Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Feb. 19, 1856 and Jan. 23, 1858; "Population of the Counties of Maryland," \textit{Maryland Colonization Journal}, n.s. VI (Sept., 1852), p. 247. The slave population of the state, which numbered 90,368 in 1850, was also a potential source of emigrants.

\textsuperscript{79} Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Jan. 15, 1836.

\textsuperscript{80} "Fifth Annual Report," Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Feb. 7, 1837.


\textsuperscript{83} Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Aug. 5, 1831.
they considered their native country, even if their choice was between freedom or being sold as slaves in the deep South.\textsuperscript{84} Also in 1836, a Mr. Oliver offered to manumit his slaves on the condition that they emigrate to Africa; in addition he offered to buy the wives and children of those who had married slaves of other masters in order to prevent families from being divided. Despite his offer, the greater part of Mr. Oliver's servants preferred to remain in Maryland.\textsuperscript{85}

The colored population of Maryland was generally suspicious of the white supporters of colonization, who were posing as their benefactors. On March 21, 1831, a "... meeting of persons of colour was held in Baltimore, for the purpose of expressing their sentiments..." in regard to the colonization movement.\textsuperscript{86} The meeting expressed the belief that it was based "... more in a selfish policy than in the true principles of benevolence, and therefore ... it is not entitled to our confidence, but should be

\textsuperscript{84} Ira Easter to John H. B. Latrobe, Sept. 7, 1836, Maryland Correspondence.
\textsuperscript{85} "Seventh Annual Report," Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Jan., 1839.
viewed with distrust . . ."  

The meeting noted with disapproval the uncomplimentary statements that were often made by its white supporters in regard to the moral standing of the Negro. The meeting resolved "that we consider the land in which we were born and in which we have been bred our only true and appropriate home and that we sincerely regret their effort to ameliorate our condition is not more in accordance with our wishes."  

In their trips throughout Maryland, agents of the Maryland Colonization Society found that the state's Negroes envisioned Africa as a veritable hell on earth. Generally they believed that Africa was so unhealthy, because of its climate and diseases, that it was impossible to live there; that it was a land inhabited by beasts; and that the natives were warlike and were constantly fighting with the Afro-American colonies.

The society's agents claimed that these views resulted from propaganda spread by the paid or voluntary agents of abolition who followed them from place to place in order to persuade the colored population not to emigrate. However, conclusive evidence was never provided to prove their case. In fact, the beliefs of the colored population were no more than exaggerated versions of reports that had come back to Maryland on the actual problems faced by colonists in Africa. Despite their oppressed condition, the Negro had a natural reluctance to leave the land of his birth for a strange one unless conclusive evidence was provided that the material benefits of Africa outweighed its dangers. The Maryland colony, like the other African colonies, lacked the material comforts that even a Negro could enjoy in America.

Also the mere fact that the colonization scheme was supported by many whites was enough to convince most Negroes that the state colonization society was not to be trusted. It was not surprising that many Negroes believed that its agents were slave traders, for Negroes had often been tricked by those who had pretended to be their benefactors. Among those who knew that

---

87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
90 Ibid., p. 5.
91 Ibid., p. 6.
the agents were not slave traders, there were still many who believed, with much justification, that the white man was selfishly motivated in supporting the colonization scheme.

The manner in which the advocates of colonization presented their scheme to the white population was not likely to promote such ideas among Negroes. Colonization literature often warned of the dangers of an ever growing free Negro population in Maryland.92 One of the more extreme examples of such literature, one report stated that it was “unnecessary to explain to the citizens of Maryland the evils of the coloured population, they see and feel them daily.”93 This account went on to explain that freedmen took jobs that would otherwise go to whites and that unlike the whites the Negro could not be expected to protect or improve society.94 In another example, it was stated that the degraded position of the colored race was perpetual, and that the white man would never accept the Negro as an equal.95 Such literature often contained the threat of forced removal at some future time if the Negro failed to take advantage of voluntary emigration.96 Even the *Maryland Colonization Journal* admitted that the failure of the society to obtain emigrants was due in part to the “language of colonizationists themselves . . . Trouble seen in the very fabric of African colonization—the belief that equality is impossible for Negroes in this continent, that the lesser, the weaker race must serve or flee. This doctrine no matter how kindly or judiciously announced must always to the party effected be extremely unpalatable. . .”97 This article went on to say that the case for colonization was still further hurt by the insulting terms used by colonizationists in reference to colored people.98

In contrast to the colonizationists, many intelligent colored people believed that social and political equality with the whites was possible. Such equality, however, was only possible by the

---

92 “Circular Letter,” Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, March 13, 1841.
93 Board of Managers, *Statement of Facts on Colonization*, p. 3.
94 Ibid.
97 “Why Don’t the Colored People Go to Africa,” *ibid.*, n.s. III (Jan., 1847), p. 291.
98 Ibid.
united action of large numbers of freedmen, and therefore the scheme was opposed because it weakened the potential pressure that Negroes could exert to obtain their rights. After its first decade of existence, the state society was also subjected to harsh criticism from some of its former friends, especially slaveholders, for its failure to fulfill its goals. Yet, the society was able to obtain financial support as late as 1861. The total amount of money privately contributed to the state society from its creation in February, 1831 until the end of 1857 was $45,385. Private contributions were just barely sufficient to pay for the salaries of the society’s agents. The largest share of assistance was from the state government of Maryland. Altogether the organization received $255,703 from the state treasury in the period from February, 1831 through December, 1857. The society was therefore duly concerned when the question of abolishing financial assistance to the society came up before the state legislature. During the legislative session of 1844, an enquiry was made by the Committee of Ways and Means to ascertain whether the state’s appropriation of $10,000 per annum could be dispensed with. The committee was motivated by the belief that the number of emigrants sent to Africa was not commensurate with the amount of money already expended by the state. The society argued that the appropriation should be continued because the idea of African colonization was just gaining large-scale acceptance among the Negroes of Maryland and that therefore this acceptance would result in a massive emigration in the near future. The argument was apparently convincing, for the Committee of Ways and Means voted against any interference with the appropriation. After the original

99 Ibid., p. 290.
100 While slaveholders were generally supporters of the society, some became highly critical of the organization once it became clear that it was not able to induce a large emigration of free Negroes. “Slaveholders Convention,” Maryland Colonization Journal, n.s. I (Jan. 15, 1842), p. 120.
102 “Balance Sheet for Maryland State Colonization Society, up to December 31, 1857,” Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Jan. 23, 1858.
104 “Balance Sheet . . .,” Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Jan. 23, 1858.
105 “Thirteenth Annual Report,” Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Jan., 1845.
appropriation under the law of 1831 ran out at the end of 1851, the society was successful in having the act renewed for another six years under the original terms of $10,000 per annum. In 1858, at the expiration of the 1852 law, the appropriation was once again renewed for five years but at the reduced rate of $5,000 per year. Three payments were made under this law before it was finally abrogated with the Civil War.

During the 1850's the colony of Maryland in Liberia moved towards independence and towards a union with the nation of Liberia. The American Colonization Society had already granted independence to Liberia in 1848, and this acted as a stimulus for the Maryland colony. Consequently, the Maryland society feared that the new nation would "draw the most intelligent and enterprising emigrants, even from Maryland, until Maryland in Liberia became entirely independent of foreign jurisdiction." The state society therefore decided to aid the colonists in organizing an independent government. On June 8, 1854, Maryland in Liberia was proclaimed as an independent nation with all the rights of self government. However, the state society retained the rights to transport colonists to the new nation and to endow them with land on their arrival there.

In December, 1856, the former Marylanders in Liberia became involved in a war with neighboring native tribes. They were able to defeat the tribes and to restore peace only with the assistance of troops from the Republic of Liberia. The incident now convinced them of the necessity of unification with the Republic of Liberia. Negotiations between the two neighboring countries were therefore begun, and led to the absorption of Maryland in Liberia into the Republic of Liberia as Maryland County.

Despite the continued desire to rid Maryland of a free Negro population, the activities of the society slowed to a snail's pace during the late 1850's. The Negro population, which had never

---

107 Ibid., p. 84.
109 Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Nov. 20, 1852.
110 Ibid.
112 Minutes of Board of Managers, Maryland, Feb. 19, 1856.
showed a great interest in colonization, showed still less interest as the debate over slavery raged in the nation and presented a ray of hope that the condition of the Negro would be improved. Starting in 1856 the society found it increasingly more difficult to secure emigrants, and many felt that it hardly paid to expend additional effort on an enterprise which, after so many years, showed no signs of future success.\textsuperscript{114} In 1861 the society sent out its last expedition, which was composed of seven adults and five children.\textsuperscript{115} After the Civil War, the society maintained a nominal existence as the trustee of a fund for the benefit of a school at Cape Palmas.\textsuperscript{116}

The Maryland State Colonization Society had many notable accomplishments to its credit; yet the society was a failure in terms of the goals that it had set for itself. The Maryland society served as an example for other state societies in the independent state action approach to colonization, but while it proclaimed a policy of promoting the manumission of slaves in Maryland, a policy especially designed to appeal to the sentiments of Northern states, the society was nevertheless unable to obtain large-scale financial assistance from outside Maryland. Even in the state financial support for the society from private sources was relatively small. It was above all else the appropriations of the state government which enabled it to carry on its activities. These appropriations were approved by state legislators who were under the impression that colonization could solve the "Negro problem." Colonization partially failed to work because the Negro failed to cooperate with the supposedly benevolent scheme. The colony of Maryland in Liberia never acquired the degree of prosperity that the society had hoped would attract large masses of Negroes to Africa. The society's greatest disappointment and failure was its inability to convince the freedmen to leave Maryland in mass for Africa. But the greatest failure of the supporters of colonization was one of understanding—understanding that it was possible to have equality and cooperation between the races in the United States.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} "Report . . . for 1861," \textit{ibid.}, Feb. 7, 1862.
\textsuperscript{116} Latrobe, \textit{Maryland in Liberia}, pp. 84-85.
HENRI MERCIER ON SLAVERY:
THE VIEW OF A MARYLAND BORN DIPLOMAT, 1860-1863

By DANIEL B. CARROLL

During the American Civil War slavery meant various things to different people. For many Americans it was an immediate and for some a frightful problem. But slavery was less frightful, of course, to Europeans, even for those of an abolitionist persuasion. Slavery for the governments of Great Britain and France was mostly a diplomatic factor. Ministers of both countries in the United States had to aid in interpreting the sectional crisis to their governments, and their reports were important to the policy making process. For most of the war period the French minister to Washington was a Maryland born diplomat who in his views reflected a conservative interpretation of the crisis.1

The French minister to the United States from 1860 to 1864 was Henri Mercier. Mercier’s family had been in government service for some time, and he himself was born in Baltimore, where his father served as Louis XVIII’s consul. Forty-four years old in 1860, Mercier had been with the foreign ministry since his early twenties. Being assigned to Washington was a hard blow for the rising diplomat; he had gone as minister from Dresden to Athens to Stockholm, and the shift across the sea struck him as demotion and exile. His young aristocratic wife was in perennial bad health; she was pregnant at the time of the ocean voyage, and her complaints added considerably to Mercier’s dissatisfaction with having to stay in the United States for over three years. One alleviating factor was the recent appointment of his friend Edouard Antoine Thouvenel as foreign minister. The friendship guaranteed that Mercier’s reports would be full and frank. Another compensation, of course,

1 The relevant sections of the French archives are as follows: Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (hereafter AMAE), Correspondance politique, États-Unis (hereafter CP, E-U), vols. 123-130; Mémoires et Documents (hereafter MD), Papiers Thouvenel, vol. XIII.
was the unusual importance his post had assumed as the cata-
clysm of civil war began to break around him.

Mercier himself was of upper bourgeois background. He
shared some of the liberal leanings of the government he served—Napoleonic and popularly based as well as imperial—and he was opposed on principle to human slavery. But his basic bent was conservative, and he valued order and direction above indi-
vidual and political liberty. Like other influential Europeans, he distrusted American democracy and saw demagoguery, license, and political corruption among its fruits. His predeces-
sor, Count Eugene de Sartiges, had felt the same way:

Six years of studying liberty in this country, where the law protects the brigand and the honest man has to look out for himself, are enough for my political education. Replace me with some backward statesman so he can begin his.²

One of the most frequently repeated clichés about Mercier and his “education” is that he met a number of Southerners in 1860 who fixed his impressions and convinced him that secession was unavoidable. Secretary of State William Seward accepted this view as did part of the American press which use it as a basis of criticism against Mercier.³ In truth Mercier did meet a number of Southerners, for they occupied key posts in the Buchanan administration and in Congress. He knew Judah P. Benjamin and John Slidell of Louisiana for certain, and he was quite possibly acquainted with others like Senator Jefferson Davis, Secretary of the Treasury Howell Cobb, and Secretary of the Interior Jacob Thompson.

But Mercier’s known contacts included many Northerners as well: Senator William Seward of New York, Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Secretary of State Lewis Cass, and of course President Buchanan himself. There is this much to the old cliche; a great many of Mercier’s acquaintances, while not technically Southerners, were either pro-Southern in outlook or willing to tolerate secession in preference to civil war. Chief among

these was William W. Corcoran, the prominent Washington banker and philanthropist, whose daughter was married to Slidell’s secretary, George Eustis, and who in 1862 left for Paris rather than live in Republican Washington. We know too that Mercier lived for days at Hampton, Maryland with the slave-owning Ridgely family. The diplomat Henry White remembered that his Grandfather Ridgely heard the news of first Bull Run with marked satisfaction. As the war progressed, with the slaves gone and social life constricted, Grandmother Ridgely reached the point of mental illness in her bitterness towards the federal government. Mercier was probably not there the day his friends shaved off the hair of a slave girl for impertinence, but the Ridgelys reflected a way of life which could do such things, and their influence on Mercier could not have been healthy.  

In general, then, those Americans whom Mercier met in 1860 were apt to be a John Slidell or a W. W. Corcoran rather

---

than a Charles Sumner or a Thaddeus Stevens. Mercier himself had almost no known personal contact with Negroes. After his rented house in Georgetown burned in 1862, he lived in Corcoran's palatial home on H Street, while the banker left to join the Eustises in Paris. There the servants were mostly Irish. In fine, Mercier had to form his judgment about slavery from the only source available to him—ignorance compounded by contacts with whites who preferred to see the continuation of slavery rather than civil war.

Intellectually Mercier shared fully the view of the Gettysburg Address that the nation's continued existence was bound up with the concept of popular, democratic government. But unlike Lincoln, he expected the country to founder; four score and four years it had had, and he felt that that was about all anyone could anticipate from such a heterogeneous, loosely ordered, mobocratic society:

The American system is no longer going smoothly, and the disease germs which it harbored in its head, among which slavery and universal suffrage could be specified, . . . have taken a course which will put it at the mercy of the first accident.\(^5\)

Mercier, therefore, regarded slavery as wrong; along with democracy it was doing America in.

This, of course, did not make him an abolitionist in the sense of wanting immediate emancipation. In fact he had early come to despise the American abolitionist movement, and he noted with disgust that Wendell Phillips desired secession as a way of cutting the South off. How much effect would this movement have upon the North? Rhetorically he answered:

Doubtless the abolitionist teachings flatter their natural inclination, but surely not to the point of making them forget their interests. . . . They are therefore not disposed to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs for the sake of a principle . . .

Before the war, then, Mercier felt that anti-Negro prejudice, combined with economic self-interest, would keep the North from risking too much in the cause of human freedom.\(^6\) As


early as July 8, 1861, with the war scarcely begun in earnest, he realized that if the conflict continued, slavery would be abolished.7

Mercier got a unique opportunity to observe the United States and its patterns of interracial relations in the summer of 1861 just after the battle of Bull Run. Prince Napoleon, first cousin of the emperor, came to tour the country and to see the war, and Mercier felt that it was his duty to accompany him. With the Prince was his young wife Clotilde of Savoy, and his aide Colonel Camille Ferri-Pisani and Maurice Sand, son of the novelist George Sand, were a part of the entourage. The Prince was known as a liberal, and his position in the French legislature and in the imperial household gave his opinions added interest; he was firmly anti-slavery and outspokenly pro-Northern in the Civil War.8

At the beginning of the trip in New York, the Prince made a snap judgment that the United States seemed too little concerned about slavery. His opinion was shaped by the fact that the war was proclaimed as one for Union only, while such an objective was apt to strike European liberals as too limited. Prince Napoleon's own contacts with Negroes were limited to waiters. With that shallowness which sometimes marks his diary, he peevishly betrayed his own racial prejudice without knowing or trying to know its cause. Among other objects of the Prince's annoyance was Abraham Lincoln: "What a difference between this sad representative of the great republic and her founding fathers!"9

Maurice Sand made note of Northern segregation. While they were still in New York, the group went by ferry to visit a French unit in an army encampment on Staten Island. On this "floating house", Sand wrote:

Everything is pell-mell, . . . passengers of both sexes and every age, dogs, horses, carriages and luggage. It is very democratic!

7 Mercier to Thouvenel, Washington, July 8, 1861, ibid., fol. 370-78, no. 46.
8 All of the visitors mentioned above left accounts of their impressions: "Voyage du Prince Napoleon aux Etats-Unis, 1861", ed. Ernest d'Hauterive, Revue de Paris, XL (1933), 241-72 and 547-87 (hereafter Prince Napoleon's diary); Camille Ferri-Pisani, Prince Napoleon in America, 1861, ed. Georges Joyaux (Bloomington, Ind., 1959); Maurice Sand, Six mille lieues à toute vapeur (Paris, 1862).
9 Prince Napoleon's diary, pp. 256-57 and 265.
Ah! yes, the Negroes are separate, below, as if hidden from the view of persons and animals.\(^{10}\)

From New York the party went to Washington, where they not only met everyone from Lincoln on down but were also given permission to visit Confederate headquarters near Manassas. General P. G. T. Beauregard spoke French and contributed to making the dinner in the Prince’s honor at General Joseph E. Johnston’s headquarters a success. Sand found that slave waiters were inefficient, as distinguished from free (also Negro, presumably) waiters in the North. This was a strange complaint when there were so many bigger issues at hand, but at least it was honest, and quite particularly French.\(^{11}\)

From Washington the somewhat Pickwickian troupe returned to New York, and then in the second half of August they went west by train. They visited numerous points from Altoona to Pittsburgh and Cleveland; then by a lake steamer they toured northern Wisconsin and Michigan. Finally by train via Chicago the group reached St. Louis at the time of Fremont’s fiasco. General John C. Fremont had just issued his decree freeing the slaves of white rebels within his jurisdiction. President Lincoln, who was trying desperately to hold Kentucky within the Union, ordered Fremont to rescind the order for fear of offending the border states. Prince Napoleon was much bemused by the order and wondered whether it were legal and what it might portend about abolition.\(^{12}\)

Here Sand recovered something of a claim to sensitivity. He attended a vaudeville show at Martin’s Gaieties which included a “comic” Negro skit about a husband who had been away for years and was too stupid to realize that his wife’s younger children were not his own. Not only did Sand include this disapprovingly in his book, but he added the ironic touch that the all-white audience sang a patriotic ballad about freedom during another part of the show. Ferri-Pisani noticed that even Negro children hung back in public when white children played.\(^{13}\)

Mercier kept no diary, and there was no room in his dispatches for touches like the quality of table service or the bill at Mar-

\(^{10}\) Sand, *Six Mille*, p. 154.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., pp. 205-210.

\(^{12}\) Prince Napoleon’s diary, pp. 566-567.

tin's Gaieties. He did keep mulling over the slavery question which was partly prompted by Fremont's decree. From this point on, he repeatedly expressed the fear that overly rapid emancipation might trigger a servile revolt in the South:

I certainly do not pretend to foresee the change which the United States will have to undergo in the wake of this crisis, but if the war goes on long, there is almost no doubt that it will entail the violent emancipation of the Negroes and a greater fragmentation of the Union. Violent emancipation would be a frightful disaster, for the Negroes, for the whites—even in the North, for all the commerce of Europe. On the other hand, if the unity which the slave States have maintained until now with the free States should come to an end, a great progress would be realized. Gradual emancipation would be inevitable, and it seems to me that the English government can locate herself perfectly upon this ground without fearing the attacks of the abolitionists.¹⁴

There were two new thoughts behind this exposition. First, sudden abolition might ruin "all the commerce of Europe," i.e., if slaves should flee the cotton fields, Europe might not be able to obtain it even after the war. Second, British opposition to intervention might be overcome by pointing out that abolition and secession were compatible; if left to herself, Mercier reasoned, the South would free the slaves gradually to the ultimate good of everyone:

In the United States slavery is an illness too widespread and deep for one to hope reasonably to cut it out at one stroke. It needs a long treatment which looks for help to the natural course of current events. . . .¹⁵

Back in Washington in the autumn of 1861, Mercier watched the Union army buildup under General George B. McClellan. Mercier got wind of the fact that McClellan had ideas about war-aims which diverged sharply from those of the "radicals." McClellan was willing to see slavery continue indefinitely, but Mercier was enough of a realist to feel that things had gone

¹⁴ Mercier to Thouvenel, Quebec, Sept. 13, 1861, AMAE, MD, Papiers Thouvenel, XIII, 403-05. See also Mercier to Thouvenel, Washington, Oct. 8, 1861, AMAE, CP, E-U, 125: 119-33, no. 63.

too far for the status quo of 1860 to be regained. Not only would the South reject the reestablishment of the Union, but "the abolitionist faction is growing and must be reckoned with." Mercier had recently heard that a Union colonel in haranguing his troops had spoken of arming slaves—and this in the presence of Secretary of War Stanton.¹⁶

As the Trent affair unfolded, Mercier's attention was inevitably drawn from everything else, but he still kept an eye on the overall picture, and the possibility of a stroke-of-the-pen type of emancipation continued to worry him.¹⁷ He had sensed already that the United States had turned a corner in 1861. When a quick Union victory failed to materialize, Secretary

¹⁶ Mercier to Thouvenel, Washington, Nov. 17, 1861, AMAE, CP, E-U, 125: 204-12, no. 69.
of State Seward had already picked up the new idea of freedom and was flaunting it in Europe's face. Europe, he said, had established slavery in America; should she now intervene to maintain it, it would be at her peril. Even the moderate Seward was beginning to see that the Civil War was becoming a war to end slavery.\(^{18}\)

Lincoln in dealing with the problem of slavery was aware of its relationship to the war, and in 1862 he tried to prepare for the future. His plea for gradual emancipation in the northern slave states was not heeded. When Mercier heard of the plan, he felt that white prejudice would prevent it from working. In this he was relaying the view of "a person whose good judgment I have often had reason to appreciate," who told him that Lincoln's purpose was to appeal to abolitionist feeling in Europe and thus help to forestall recognition of the Confederacy:

I am told that . . . today it would be impossible to get the border States to do with the help of the Federal government what most of the free States did spontaneously in another era. The reason would not be in the number of slaves but in that of free men of color. If it were only a matter of interest, the owners of slaves would readily be sacrificed for the bulk of the population, but beyond interest there is racial antagonism, which everywhere is more violent as the number of colored inhabitants is more considerable.\(^{19}\)

This antagonisme des races, Mercier noted, was worst among white men of the lower class.\(^{20}\)

On Seward's advice the President waited for the summer to pass before acting. McClellan had failed to take Richmond, and the Secretary wanted to keep Europe from considering emancipation as the desperate act of a beaten government. After Antietam, however, the moment was a hand, and the President issued his proclamation.

Mercier got it all wrong. Despite Seward's caution and despite Antietam, he saw the emancipation proclamation as a terrible weapon and as an effort to stir up servile insurrection


\(^{19}\) Mercier to Thouvenel, Washington, March 11, 1862, AMAE, CP, E-U, 126: 215-50, unnumbered.

\(^{20}\) Mercier to Thouvenel, Washington, March 17, 1862, ibid., fol. 250-61, no. 91.
in the South. Indeed, it was in September of 1862 that Mercier came as close as he ever did to recommending immediate European intervention. Lincoln's decree, therefore, with its capacity for altering Europe's mind, came into Mercier's life at a time when he could not assess it objectively:

I am so thunderstruck by the proclamation of the president relative to emancipation, which I have just laid eyes upon, that it is all I can do to retain enough mental facility to write you. At first glance it seems that it is an act of desperation, atrocious in the intentions it betrays and the consequences it could entail . . .

A week later Mercier was a little less breathless but still of the same mind. After the second battle of Bull Run and then Antietam, he believed that the battlefield was at a stalemate.

. . . and Republican abolitionists have profited from this situation to persuade President Lincoln that the only way to safety which remained was to make emancipation the idea of the war and to use all the authority he still has and the fear which separation engenders to lead the North into a desperate fight. At the same time they made him see that in doing so he would doubtless also succeed in strongly interesting European anti-slavery sentiment in favor of the North's cause. . . .

On top of that, Mercier continued, Lincoln had revoked the right of habeas corpus—all this in the name of human freedom—and probably hoped by that to influence the forthcoming elections. How would the nascent peace movement in the North take this, and in particular, what about General McClellan?

It would likewise be very important to know the sentiment which the president's proclamation will give rise to in the Army of the Potomac. . . . I know . . . from a reliable source that Gen. McClellan is again on the worst terms with the administration and that the question of his resignation or dismissal has been posed. Either of these eventualities would be a very serious thing, for the general is the only one today who has the confidence and affection of the army.

In summary, Mr. Minister, it seems to me that the most probable outcome of the policy determined by the emancipation decree is that the crisis will reach its climax and that we cannot help know-

ing before long whether it will eventuate in peace or in a revolu-
tionary war the end of which no one could foresee . . .

Like most other Europeans, Mercier was a moderate aboli-
tionist, but the thought of so many Negroes suddenly becoming
free citizens was too much for his imagination to embrace:

As for slavery, it is unquestionably necessary to detest it, but
beside the principle there is the fact which policy cannot excuse
itself from considering. What to do with these four million
slaves? 

President Lincoln had given that a lot of thought, and during
most of 1862 he favored voluntary emigration as one way to
get around the interracial problem. Negroes would be given
the opportunity to colonize places like the Chiriqui area of
Panama, at that time a Colombian province. Friendly govern-
ments in the western hemisphere and European states with
tropical colonies might be moved to cooperate if sounded out
on the issue. Seward had long been convinced by his early
association with abolitionists that colonization was impractical,
but he set himself manfully to work on the new project. In a
circular dispatch of September 30, 1862 he laid out some ideas
for a model colonization treaty with a whole bagful of guaran-
tees which would have to be secured for the emigrants—all the
way from freedom itself to “sea-worthy vessels” and “an educa-
tion of the children in the simple elements of knowledge.”
One trouble with this scheme was that very few Afro-Americans and
almost no foreign countries were interested in it. Guatemala,
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica sent regrets.

So did Britain and France. But the new French foreign min-
ister, Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, had a thought for Mercier to
ponder:

While putting off for now a response to the overtures . . . it
seemed to us, however, that the dispositions which they display
could be put to use in another way. . . . Because of our expedition
in Mexico, we would be interested in recruiting a certain number

---

22 Mercier to Thouvenel, New York, Sept. 30, 1862, ibid., fol. 107-13, no. 117.
23 Mercier to Drouyn de Lhuys, Washington, Dec. 16, 1862, ibid., fol. 299-301, 
private.
24 Seward to Dayton, Washington, Sept. 30, 1862, State Dept. Corres., France, 
Instructions, XVI, 262-65, no. 227; see also Frederic Bancroft, The Life of Wil-
of Negroes whom we would employ either as soldiers or as workers. . . . If it were possible, moreover, to enroll Negroes already trained in military discipline, the operation would entirely correspond to the aim we have in mind.\textsuperscript{25}

The federal government, having freed the slaves, was now asked to help France send them marching on against the Monroe Doctrine. How Thaddeus Stevens or Ben Butler would have enjoyed hearing that one!

It is equally difficult to detect any trace of conscious humor in this French suggestion and to understand how it could have been made. Perhaps in its own way it illustrates the wild improbability of the whole colonization idea. Mercier's own reaction to his government's proposal was a polite pocketing of the whole senseless notion.\textsuperscript{26}

Henri Mercier had always appreciated emancipation as a good thing in general:

\textit{In effect one cannot prevent Christians, living under a regime of freedom, from detesting slavery . . . nor from striving to make their sentiments prevail.}\textsuperscript{27}

But he had become convinced that rapid abolition would precipitate violence and social chaos. So far as Mercier was concerned, the emancipation proclamation was bound to fall on deaf ears. Beyond that, most Frenchmen hoped for a peace of reconciliation, even should that mean the continuation of slavery: the sufferings of French workers and the danger to French forces in Mexico from a Union victory were more immediately compelling considerations than was American slavery. For the rest, Mercier proved a reliable reporter of interracial problems in America. Emancipation, he saw, would have to hurdle not only economic interest but also ethnic prejudice. What Mercier failed to see was America's determination to make the attempt. When the leap was finally made, he could hardly believe his eyes.

\textsuperscript{25} Drouyn de Lhuys to Mercier, Paris, Dec. 4, 1862, AMAE, CP, E-U, 128: 265-266, no. 32.

\textsuperscript{26} Mercier to Drouyn de Lhuys, Washington, Dec. 30, 1862, AMAE, CP, E-U, 128: 308-14, no. 132, and Mercier to Drouyn de Lhuys, Washington, May 17, 1863, \textit{ibid.}, 130: 77-80, no. 151.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

SIGNED MARYLAND BINDINGS III

A book-binder active in Baltimore in the mid-nineteenth century and having a ticket with which to sign his bindings was Walter Giles, a native of England. The 1850 census shows that his wife was born in New Jersey, his eldest daughter Cathe, in Massachusetts, his second, Georgianna, in New York, his third, Henrietta, and his fourth, Alvina, and also his only son, Walter, in Pennsylvania. The final child Mary was likewise born there, just eight months before the census was taken.

As the Giles family had moved frequently from city to city, so Giles himself moved his bindery from 88 North Calvert Street, where he is located by the 1847-1848 City Directory, to 71 West Baltimore Street (1849-1850 Directory), to 3 East Fayette Street (1851 Directory), to Fayette Street between Harrison and Frederick Streets (1852 Directory). The advertisement he inserted in the 1852 Directory includes the statement "Works in the Foreign Language carefully arranged and bound," and adds "Orders from the Country can be sent by Express." Seemingly neither from city nor country did sufficient orders arrive, for the name Walter Giles never appears again in subsequent directories as a book-binder. However, as "traveling agent" he is listed in the annual directories from 1870 to 1873. In 1876 after an absence of two years he re-appears as "penmaker," the following year as "agent." After an absence of several years an E. Walter Giles is found in 1885 and 1886 as "agent" with a Walter Giles as "machinist" at another address.

Walter Giles the elder was evidently, with his flock of seven children, barely able to eke out an existence, as he changed businesses, office addresses and residences. Yet he deserved a better fate. For a binding which bears his ticket shows that he was more than competent in his work. The binding in question is of three-quarters green morocco, with greenish marble paper sides and yellow end-papers to match the color of his binder's ticket, inserted in the lower left corner of the inside of the front cover. The title and pseudonym of the author, and single bands of a heavy and light line found twice at the bottom and once at
the top of the spine and on either side of the four ribs are gilt, and are applied in a workman-like and attractive way.

The book bound by Giles is *Cent Proverbes*, described on the title as by “Grandville.” This was, however, merely the pseudonym of its popular illustrator, Jean-Ignace-Isidore
Gérard. The three heads on the title page shown without names under a fool’s cap represent Emile Forgues (or Daurand-Forgues), Taxile Delord and Arnaud Fremy, the authors of the Proverbes.

The book-plate of the late learned Librarian of the Peabody Library, Louis Henry Dielman, is on the inside front cover. Mr. Dielman presented the book to its present owner.

Charlcote House
Baltimore

DOUGLAS GORDON

SIGNED MARYLAND BINDINGS IV

Through the gift of Miss Lucy Seymer of Baltimore, the Society has obtained another signed example of the work of Louis Bonsal, Baltimore binder discussed in the first of this series of notes.¹

It consists of printed paper over boards backed by a strip of black morocco (“quarter binding”) on Matchett’s Baltimore director for 1847. There are no headbands, and the work appears to be a publisher’s binding, having probably been applied uniformly to a part of the edition of the book before sale (seemingly that limited portion containing a map of the city, as this copy does). The binder’s work is nevertheless tastefully conceived and executed, as it was on the custom-made example described earlier.

The spine of the book is 8½” x 1” and flat. The whole is framed by Greek key (or “wall of Troy”) rolls at top and bottom, repeated to set off the title. The floral tool used above and below the title, though perhaps a bit more wooden than flowery in appearance, is nevertheless reminiscent of some of the decorations that began to appear some years earlier on French “romantic” bindings.

Bonsal’s ticket, at the upper left corner of the front paste-down of this book, is identical to the one pictured earlier in this series.²

A FOOTNOTE TO
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MARYLAND

The Society has recently purchased an extraordinarily fine copy of H. Curson’s A compendium of the laws and government . . . of England . . . and dominions . . . (London 1699), described as item 191 in Miss Elizabeth Baer’s Seventeenth century Maryland (Baltimore 1949).

The Society’s copy is of interest as confirming Miss Baer’s conjecture that the copies at Evergreen and John Carter Brown contain a cancel title-leaf (suggested by its vertical chain lines). Comparison of the present title-leaf (which has horizontal chain lines, as does the remainder of signature A) with that of the Evergreen copy, as illustrated by Miss Baer, shows that the two are from entirely different type-settings. They differ in no significant respect, however, save in the imprint, which reads as follows in the Society’s copy:

² Ibid., facing p. 439.
LONDON, Printed by the Assigns of Rich. and Edw. Atkins, Esquires, for J. Walthoe, and are to be sold at his Shop in the Middle-Temple Cloysters. 1699

The variant reproduced by Miss Baer concludes:

... and are to be sold by John Deeve, at Bernard's Inn-Gate in Holbourn. 1699

It is evident, therefore, that this variant is indeed a cancel, done at the behest of Deeve.

Baltimore

Edward G. Howard
The American Revolution and the British Press, 1775-1783. By
SOLOMON LUTNICK. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
1967. Pp. xi, 249. $6.00.)

It is never an easy task to write a history of a critical era by an
analysis of its organs of public opinion. The scholar inevitably risks
distorting the record by his choice of materials, exaggerating the
role of newspapers by unproven assertions of influence, or boring
the reader to distraction by the mere weight of his selections.
Professor Lutnick, it seems to this reviewer, has escaped most of
these charges in his examination of the British press during the
American Revolution.

He has written his account clearly, sparely, and with considerable
grace. In his opening chapters he explains the nature of the British
press in the revolutionary era, giving convincing reasons for limiting
his sights to London rather than the provinces; it was the London
newspaper that carried foreign news, and the provincial reader
would have to buy, as he still does, the metropolitan paper if he
wanted more than local news. Lutnick also makes a good case for
lumping all the Opposition papers into one group when it came
to reporting the war in America, although a number of them repre-
sented particular Opposition factions or interests; the putative mis-
handling of the War by the North Ministry was sufficient cement
for unifying all the Opposition press. He is careful to identify in an
appendix all the newspapers he cites, and notes whether they stood
with or against the ministry. The open expression of discontent
that forms a strong current throughout the book suggests that
freedom of the press was a reality in the England of the American
Revolution, all the more remarkable in a country which was in a
world war before independence was finally granted.

The main events chronicled in the volume flow smoothly and
without surprise once the reader has grasped the essential nature
of the British press on the eve of the Revolution. The Opposition
with a few significant exceptions remained as hostile towards the
government in 1781 as it had been in 1775, and the conduct of the
war received the kind of attention from both pro- and anti-ministry
papers which could only serve the American cause. In the early stages of the war, America's war potential was consistently exaggerated in the London papers, and in the later stages of the war with France preempted the stage to the degree that the acceptance of America's independence in one form or another was reasonable to Tory papers and to both Opposition papers. Whatever annoyances the latter had over American behavior they did manage to suggest to their readers that the American cause was that of "late-seventeenth century English Whiggism." Perhaps a measure of their success in convincing the nation was the fact that opposition to the war and to the North ministry was made so frequently and so openly without subjecting editors to imprisonment for high treason.

But this is speculation. Unlike Arthur Schlesinger's study of the American press prior to the Revolution, Lutnick cannot say with authority how much influence the press exerted on the war effort. Only rarely is he able to find in the manuscripts of leading policymakers evidence that the press had any influence at all. There are other questions that can be raised. The author seems to equate the strength of the Tories in the country with weakness in London, as if the field were left to the Opposition entirely. Yet, the North Ministry had not only the government's official organ the London Gazette but a host of others with circulation equal to that of the leading Opposition papers. Bribery is mentioned only casually, but as a fact of political life in the eighteenth century it might have been taken more into account. How many other editors, in addition to Bate of the influential Morning Post, were tempted with offers of money and preferment? Professor Lutnick concludes his work with a useful observation that slanted editorials on either side were ultimately less significant than the news sections themselves which gave England an opportunity to learn what was happening in America and to draw their own conclusions from the events.

Kent State University

Lawrence S. Kaplan

The Growth of the Seaport Cities, 1790-1825. Edited by David T. Gilchrist. (Published for the Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation by the University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1967. Pp. xvi, 227, List of participants, index. $5.00.)

This book is a collection of papers and comments delivered at a conference of economists and historians gathered at the Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation to discuss the reasons for the growth of
the seaport cities, 1790-1825. With such a format there could be no
general agreement, but the conference could have been more fruitful
if attention had been paid, not only to Boston, New York, Phila-
delphia and Baltimore, but also to the other seaport of importance,
Charleston, S. C. In 1790 Charleston was larger than Baltimore,
although by 1825 it had lost much of its commerce. An examination
into the causes of Charleston's commercial decline would have
provided contrasting examples for the above discussion.

Charleston had sprung into being when colonial markets radiated
out from England (one port being as good as another), and the
agency system of marketing was used. Although general merchant
firms in Charleston pulled some of this trade together, this weakly
focussed market structure could endure only as long as European
markets remained open and diverse. This diversity of outlet was
maintained until 1808, due to the Napoleonic wars and the opening
of the French West Indies. But after 1808 the agents of English
firms withdrew. (Bjork is wrong on page 187 in speaking of this
loss as an occurrence of 1783.) The departure of this group with
their entrepreneurial skills undermined the commercial core of
the city. With the spread of cotton and the appearance of large
cotton planters rural culture began to engulf the city.

Just as Charleston had gobbled up the business of her outports
Georgetown and Beaufort in the eighteenth century, New York
now gobbled up that of Charleston. New York became the
entrepot market. Steam and regular packet service clinched New
York's geographic position by making the southern crossing obso-
lete. This was also the age of innovation in New York financial
institutions, while Charleston's banks reflected more and more
the demands of the planters rather than of the merchants. A
decline in tradesmen ancillary to overseas trade took place. These
changes were summed up in the reports of the British Consul
(William Ogilby) from Charleston in 1833.

Since this is a book of suggestions rather than of final conclusions,
additional suggestions for further study might be appropriate. How
did New York gobble up the coastal trade? Did Charleston's crisis
produce a group of local economists? Did the state's attempt to
protect the institution of slavery by passing the Seamen Acts in
1822 and 1823 hamper local commerce? What was the effect of the
loss of commercial attitudes upon the mind of the city? Upon
nullification and secession? Growth or lack of growth did have
effects upon the culture of the cities.

University of South Carolina

George C. Rogers, Jr.

With Whig interpretations of the Age of Jackson gaining mounting ascendancy in college texts, this short book will be welcomed by some historians. Not that Professor Remini presents an uncompromising defense of Jackson's role in the Bank War. Unlike his earlier biography of Jackson, in which he gave an almost blanket endorsement to Old Hickory's destruction of the Bank, he now places blame where he feels he must, even though Jackson emerges, in part at least, as a poorly informed bully, a "willful, proud, stubborn" man. Overall, his views are balanced and judicial. One wonders, however, whether Professor Remini has not bent the bow too far in the direction of excusing the Bank from error. Still, his sympathies are unmistakably with Jackson, and with this the reviewer can find no objection.

The death of the Bank, according to Remini, resulted from the personal clash of Jackson and Nicholas Biddle, President of the Bank. Both men, "reckless" and "insufferably arrogant and vindictive," must be held responsible for what occurred. Since neither would compromise, a useful economic institution was sacrificed. Although Biddle was a great financial administrator, the Bank was a potentially dangerous monopoly. Although Jackson baited the Bank, an institution that could dictate to the government was incongruous with American democracy. Once realizing that the "octopus" could not be reformed, Jackson killed it without mercy by using all of the arts of an able and astute politician.

In fact, the significance of the struggle, in Remini's opinion, was its political ramifications, especially in regard to party development and growth of presidential power. Not only did the Bank War give rise to the Whig party, but it helped reshape the Democratic Party in ways that would persist until nearly the Civil War. More important was its impact on the transformation of the presidency. Jackson "capitalized on the struggle to strengthen the executive branch of the government and infuse it with much of the power it enjoys today." While one may question whether Jackson was entirely cognizant of the long-range repercussions of his actions, certainly Remini is on firm ground in arguing that the character of the presidency was drastically and dramatically altered as a result. Herein lies the chief contribution of the book. Jackson utilized the veto power to block legislation for reasons of policy
and not for traditional constitutional scruples. By taking the Bank issue to the people in the election of 1832, he broadened presidential power considerably. Moreover, as he battled Congress, he drew support from his overwhelming re-election, thus including all the people in the area of presidential responsibility. Throughout the entire affair he acted as the sole and direct representative of the people; this notion of the chief executive as a "Tribune of the People" was revolutionary. Last of all, he established conclusively the right of the President to remove members of his Cabinet. In short, "In his two terms in office he virtually remade the presidency; and he did it, to a large extent, during the Bank War." It might be added that largely as a result of Jackson's political struggle with the Bank, the United States has enjoyed an executive that is unmatched in strength and independence but which is responsive to the will of the people.

The book is a signal addition to Jacksonian historography. Although no startling new interpretations are advanced, the Bank War is placed in a political perspective which makes good sense. It is a lively and well-written work, but traditional grammarians no doubt will frown on a few incomplete sentences. Complete with footnotes and bibliographical essay and available in paperback, it will make suitable reading for professional historians and laymen alike.

Seton Hall University

WILLIAM BARLOW


In this study Alfred Owen Aldridge, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of Maryland, is concerned with the religious attitudes and beliefs of that remarkable citizen of the eighteenth century, Benjamin Franklin.

It is asserted that no subject occupied more of Franklin's time and reflection than the attempt to unravel the secrets of divinity and morality, that he always felt a need for active participation in organized worship, and that "his religious spirit was always alive." His religious life, the author maintains, was the record of an unsuccessful but "incessant attempt to reconcile and combine private notions with . . . orthodox . . . worship." Franklin's private religious thoughts fluctuated from atheism to polytheism but they
never interfered with his public support of orthodoxy. Whatever his personal religious speculations were at a given time they did not prevent Franklin from attending worship services or contributing to the support of the church. Neither did they weaken his affinity for clergymen nor lessen his interest in the beliefs and practices of numerous sectarian groups.

Franklin's religious concepts never became rigid; he eschewed dogma and metaphysics and embraced what he considered the rational, practical, and expedient approach to religious matters. It is claimed that throughout most of his life Franklin was "a common-sense" or humanitarian deist. A humanitarian deist is described as one who ceases looking for God in nature and "looks instead into his own heart for the evidence of moral order and assumes that it has been implanted by God." As this type of deist Franklin might privately repudiate Christian doctrines, but he would not "attempt to wither Christianity by ridicule or bludgeon it to death by argument."

Franklin was religious in that he constantly sought a more vital or meaningful religious faith and identified himself with organized religion. He believed that the primary function of religion was to promote "external welfare" and hence his spiritual quest prompted him to channel his energies to social reform and humanitarianism. The author concludes that Franklin was "a consummate Christian in terms of doing good, tolerating the beliefs of others, and using his rational faculties in the service of God and man." He opposed intolerance, intellectual authoritarianism, and the concept of infallibility, but he believed neither in the divinity of Christ nor the divine inspiration of the Bible.

This study helps to illuminate a facet of one of the more popular figures of the Enlightenment and also contributes to an understanding of the religious ferment of that era. Aldridge admires his subject and defends him against the charge of trimmer or opportunist in religious matters. If it appears that Franklin sometimes acted that way it is because one does not understand the true Franklin. If Franklin seems to be contradictory, derisive, or mocking he should not be taken seriously. He was only having fun. On several occasions Franklin's position on some philosophical or theological topic is contrasted with the views of Jonathan Edwards on the same issue and invariably the practical man appears to have a more intelligent approach than the puritan philosopher and theologian. These are minor distractions; a more serious one is the omission of a bibliography.

University of Richmond

W. HARRISON DANIEL

In using sheet music as a means to relate American history, Mr. Levy says in his introduction, "Events seldom march down the path of time to a strict, unbroken cadence. The central themes are threaded with shufflings, waverings, and the comments of the crowds on the sidelines. These are the grace notes of history, and it is with the grace notes that this book is concerned."

As a collector of sheet music for many years and the possessor of one of the greatest collections anywhere, Mr. Levy has shared it with friends, enthusiasts and experts. His own expertise is always available, and his greatest delight is to hear the discovery of a rare piece. This has become comparatively frequent recently since he has been watching over the fine Maryland Historical Society collection of Maryland sheet music.

In Grace Notes he has selected ninety pieces of music, illustrated them, transcribed the tunes and quoted verses, and then has given the background and history of the person, subject or event concerned.

The book is in two parts, Mores and History. Part one includes hero worship, ridicule, costume, demon rum, Uncle Tom's Cabin, nostrums, fun and games. Part two: leaders, transportation, Indians, songs of disaster, and the Civil War. It will be seen that music writers and publishers capitalized on the foibles, incidents, calamities, successes, and failures of the people and the nation. In this way the song, always written after the event, acted as a form of reporting and interpreting of history.

Some of the historical background can be found in works of reference; but these are essays on their own. In some cases, such as "That Game of Poker", the details are not generally known and will come as a surprise. The author's research on this game is masterly, and is almost entirely Baltimore inspired.

It is also good to see the author refuting the popularly accepted story that Cooperstown saw the birth of the game of baseball in 1839. Mr. Levy tells of the illustrations dating back to the fourteenth century, and later, when British played stoolball with a club. By the 1860's baseball became big business for the music publishers, and with the composers having their favorite teams, many pieces were written.

The bibliography is comprehensive and will be of great value to the scholar. This is not a book primarily for musicians; it is a
A History of Negro Education in the South from 1619 to the Present.

The author, a professor of sociology at Texas Southern University, has attempted a monumental task: to examine the history of Negro education in the southern states from 1619 to the present in 288 pages of text. What emerges is a general survey of Negro problems with some emphasis on education. The reader is given long, explanatory discussions of life under slavery, the process of reconstruction and subsequent reaction to it, the attempt of twentieth century Negroes to win equal rights in all aspects of life through the courts, as well as an account of contemporary protest movements.

So much time is devoted to background material that Bullock has barely enough time to outline his major thesis, i.e., how the unintended consequences of the Negro's developing educational opportunities caused basic changes in American race relations. He describes the sub rosa education of slaves before and during the Civil War and the organized beginning of freedmen's education by private benevolent associations and the federal government during Reconstruction. Following the collapse of Congressional Reconstruction and return of the Conservatives to power, Bullock discusses how southern Negroes were forced to accept the "great detour," i.e., a system of segregated, special education with emphasis on industrial training, aimed at perpetuating the segregated order. The most informative chapter, "Deeds of Philanthropy," deals with the activities of the Peabody, Rosenwald, Slater Funds and other philanthropic efforts to aid Negro education in the South.

Bullock emphasizes that unexpectedly from the segregated school systems, especially the Negro colleges, emerged seeds of revolt and demands for racial equality in all areas of life. He discusses the Niagara movement, origins and influence of the NAACP, Urban League and related groups, and the gradual legal inroads made into school segregation in the thirties and forties, culminating with the Supreme Court decision of May, 1954. He concludes with an
epilogue on new conflicts and the "new challenge," declaring that although desegregation has been instituted by legislation, "racial integration must come about by socialization." The failure of American Negroes to achieve full realization of this has led to a "withdrawal to resegregation" as advocated by black power leaders. The only way to overcome this, says Bullock, is to "socialize" Negro Americans "into the next state—the integration of all Americans."

What otherwise might be a useful, although too general, survey of a fascinating subject is badly marred by numerous errors in fact, misidentification of personalities and inexcusable errors in spelling. This reviewer believes that the author and Harvard University Press staff must both assume blame for such glaring errata as: identifying New England anti-slavery authoress Lydia Maria Child as "a former slave in South Carolina" (p. 17); replacing General T. W. (Thomas West) Sherman with W. T. Sherman at Hilton Head Island, South Carolina in February, 1862 (p. 18); misinterpretation of source data (p. 27) regarding Negro contributions to their own education through church organizations; and the erroneous assertion (p. 50) that Texas' 1868 constitution contained a mixed (integrated) school provision. Philanthropist George Peabody of South Danvers, Massachusetts, is incorrectly described (p. 118) as "moving with his impoverished parents from his native South to Brooklyn, New York after the Civil War." Reconstruction Governor W. W. Holden of North Carolina is listed as "W. H. Holden" (p. 41), and Beale Street in Memphis becomes "Beal Street" (p. 150).

The chapters dealing with the vital Reconstruction era are inaccurate and uninformative. Virtually no reference is made to the extent of school integration in Louisiana from 1868 to 1877 and its relative success in New Orleans. This volume would have profited from more careful and accurate research in primary source materials and a more thorough proofreading by author and editorial staff.

North Texas State University

William P. Vaughn


For both the layman and the professional historian, rating the nation's presidents is one of the most popular, yet one of the most frustrating of our national games. The popularity probably stems from an understandable interest in how those who have risen to
the pinnacle of power have exercised that power; the frustration undoubtedly stems from the impossibility of establishing any valid and generally acceptable criteria by which presidential greatness can be measured.

In 1948 and again in 1962 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Sr., polled leading American historians, asking them to rate the presidents as “Great,” “Near Great,” “Average,” “Below Average,” and “Failures.” Thomas A. Baily, whose *Presidential Greatness* is the latest attempt to evaluate them, has criticized the results of those polls (published in *Life*, Nov. 1, 1948 and *The New York Times Magazine*, July 29, 1962) for establishing “performance in office” as the only criteria. He argues that what a man did before and after assuming the executive office must be considered as relevant factors in any valid assessment of presidential greatness. On the other hand, in *America’s Ten Greatest Presidents*, Morton Borden, who admitted that rating presidents is, “as personal and as difficult as handicapping thoroughbreds,” accepted Schlesinger’s results because they reflected a “large measure of agreement among the experts.”

In his assessment of the first ten presidents Alfred Steinberg sets out to prove the already generally accepted proposition “that the office of the Presidency in practice has been as weak or as strong as each occupant has made it.” He claims to have found a “new approach” by “concentrating on the administration of each President: what he did from the time he took office until he left; how he was affected by the issues of his day, his own past, his personality and philosophy.” Neither the proposition nor the approach are new, and *The First Ten* contributes nothing new to our knowledge of the men who held the office or the problems with which they dealt.

Although he has used all the standard biographies of the first ten presidents, many of the standard histories of the ante-bellum era, and the most important manuscript materials of the period, Steinberg has not captured either the personality of the presidents or the tone of their years in office. *The First Ten* is little more than a repetition of all the standard anecdotes about the presidents tied together by brief character sketches and short, superficial summaries of the major political issues of each administration.

Furthermore, his ranking of the men is surprising, unacceptable to this reviewer, and contrary to the results of both the Schlesinger polls and Baily’s evaluation, neither of which, incidentally, are mentioned in the bibliography. He demotes Jefferson from “great” (the position he held in both Schlesinger polls) to below average because “he ignored his professed philosophy of states’ rights . . .
and Legislative branch Domination—and ran Congress like a dictator." He accuses John Adams ("near great" in the Schlesinger survey) of "reducing the office of the Presidency to a shoddy innocuous post." He promotes Tyler ("below average" by Schlesinger's standards) to near great for establishing the precedent that "a Vice-President succeeding a dead chief executive would have full Presidential powers."

In spite of these faults, the book is lively and colorfully written and will make interesting reading for aficionados of the game of presidential evaluation.

Towson State College

Victor Sapió


Russell Lynes tells us that "to move is as natural to the American as maintaining roots is to the European." Unlike Europeans who can claim residence in the same area, if not the same house, for many generations, we move from state to state, coast to coast, with what some would claim was startling regularity. Yet there is evidence that as a people we are at least searching for that vague type of permanence that we call roots. We build "early American" salt box style houses on the sub-tropical sands of Florida and in the forests of the Pacific Northwest; we furnish them with Williamsburg reproductions, and commission portraits of our "ancestors." We also purchase books picturing and describing early American homes.

Haas' book is one of a number of similar volumes that have appeared on the market in recent years. The author, like many concerned Americans, sees indiscriminate urban renewal, freeway building, and real estate promotions as threats to what he calls "the pitifully few historical landmarks remaining to us." Thus he has presented his collection of historic houses and restorations as a "tribute to the entire preservation movement in the United States."

There are many disappointments in this book. The primary one is that the selection of structures to be included seems to be without rhyme or reason. It is perhaps unfair to criticize an author of such a volume for the houses he did not select for discussion, but it is fair to criticize his failure to present any type of unifying theme. In his foreword Haas says he was guided by the criteria of the Registry of National Historical Landmarks in his decisions on which houses to present, but unfortunately, these criteria only establish a broad definition for what might be termed an "historic
house.” The result for this volume is a potpourri of colonial and early nineteenth century houses located mainly in the eastern half of the United States. The exceptions are few and include the late nineteenth century Frederick Vanderbilt Mansion on the Hudson at Hyde Park and one house in California and one in Oregon. No houses by Wright or any of the other twentieth century architects are included.

Moreover, many of the houses treated are found in other collections of houses. A case in point would be the five pages and three color photographs devoted to the White House. No one would deny the beauty of the building or its importance to the nation, but considering the magnificent book by Amy LaFollette Jensen, *The White House*, and the many other essays and photographic articles devoted to the Mansion, it would seem to be out of place in a book that can only cover a limited number of houses. It is true that the author also takes up some less well known structures, but quite often in these instances he has chosen to present a few paragraphs of commentary and no photograph. This is the case with Hampton at Towson.

The disappointment for Maryland readers will be that the author has chosen to ignore Annapolis and its many fine houses and restorations, though Baltimore’s Mount Clare is included as well as the above mentioned Hampton.

In the last analysis, the book must be judged on its own merits. Haas does include many beautiful photographs, both in color and black and white, short essays on the individual houses, and addresses, visiting hours, and admission charges for the buildings he presents. Unfortunately, this is an expensive book that does not live up to its promise. It is certainly not a serious attempt to catalogue or to define our architectural heritage. The reviewer suspects from its November publication that it was meant to take advantage of both our search for roots and the Christmas gift trade.

*Florida Atlantic University*  
DONALD W. CURL


Using both previously published and new materials, Dr. Durnbaugh presents an interesting picture of the arrival of the Brethren in America early in the eighteenth century and their subsequent growth. Although the amount of material is unevenly distributed
over the more than half a century which this volume covers (with some periods seeming almost totally unrepresented), a living account has been produced by Dr. Durnbaugh as he has skillfully woven together—with brief but clear introductions—materials from various original sources: letters, journals, chronicles, deeds, wills, etc.

Additional interesting information on Brethren relation with Quakers, Moravians, Mennonites, Schwenkfelders, Lutherans, Universalists, and other religious groups in Colonial America appears from time to time. The subject of the splinter Ephrata community and its strained relations with the Brethren is prominently treated, although the editor must have had to hold tight reign on himself not to let this problem bulk even larger in this book. Other subjects of interest to the broader reader are Brethren and slavery and Brethren and the American Revolution, although neither is pictured as fully as one might wish.

The Brethren, also known as Dunkards, Dumplers, Tumplers, and by several other names, settled in all the colonies from Pennsylvania and New Jersey southward to Georgia. Seven congregations existed in Frederick County, Maryland, by the middle of the eighteenth century. Unfortunately little material dealing with these groups and those farther south was available to the editor—so that, on the whole, the volume seems almost completely concentrated on the Pennsylvania Brethren (admittedly the largest and most important segment of the church).

Dr. Durnbaugh and the Brethren Press are both to be congratulated on this source book, which is well-printed and carefully proofed. Appropriate illustrations add to the value and appeal of the work.

Southern Methodist University

KENNETH L. CARROLL


In 1940, Mrs. Passano, while State Historian of the Maryland Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution, conceived the idea of listing all records extant in Maryland. The resulting book became the bible of most researchers in Maryland history, and since three-quarters of it (363 pages) concerns an index of
names, it has become the source book for anyone engaged on Maryland genealogy.

For over a quarter of a century it has stood the test of time. Records have occasionally changed location; indexes have been updated or changed; but the work is indispensable for librarian and private researcher. It became out-of-print in the fifties, and was an expensive purchase until it was reprinted.

Clearly, it needed updating, but this time-consuming task will never be possible because of the ever increasing proliferation of record and genealogical publishing. The best that could be done was to include an introduction which pointed to the book’s deficiencies and the changes which have taken place in over 20 years. The reviewer received perfect cooperation from the State Archivist and other persons connected with the book’s contents, and it is hoped that users will study this introduction before making use of its contents.

But in all, the book is a splendid achievement. The contents of the Maryland Historical Society, the D. A. R. Library in Washington, the Library of Congress, Johns Hopkins University, the Maryland Diocese, the Hall of Records and the Enoch Pratt Free Library are listed, and now that the Hall of Records has published The County Courthouses and Records of Maryland (which supersedes the Maryland record portion of Passano) researchers in any field of Maryland history should have little difficulty in quickly running down the location of any reference work.

Maryland Historical Society

P. W. Filby
The cover for this issue is "The Massacre of Wyoming (Pa.)", July 3-4, 1778, an oil painting done by Alonzo Chappel in 1859. The painting is reproduced here through the courtesy of the Chicago Historical Society.

The Index of Obituaries in Boston Newspapers, 1704-1800 has been published in three volumes by G. K. Hall & Co. of Boston. This index was originally compiled for the architect Ogden Codman. Upon his death it was bequeathed to the Boston Athenaeum.

The index is divided into two parts: deaths within Boston, 1704-1800; and deaths outside Boston, 1704-1795. Because complete, official records of deaths were not kept in 18th-century Boston, this index is the most comprehensive single source of information. The compiler scanned eleven newspapers to gather his material. In many cases he scanned all issues of a given newspaper for several years. Coverage is selective, however, because newspapers at that time recorded only the deaths of prominent people, and accidental or sensational deaths which were deemed news items.

The index, containing an estimated 22,500 entries, is available at $75.00 in the U. S. and $82.50 elsewhere.

The Catalog of Manuscripts of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, will be published in seven volumes by G. K. Hall & Co. of Boston.

The Massachusetts Historical Society, the oldest society of its kind in the United States, began collecting historical materials in 1791, the year of its founding. Early in its existence the Society narrowed its collecting aims to historical manuscripts and books and such related materials as would "mark the genius, delineate the manners, and trace the progress of society in the United States." In its long history particular attention was given to gathering in manuscripts, and with such good effect that today it ranks as one of the major manuscript depositories in the country. Certainly no accurate history of the United States—to say nothing of New England—could be written without recourse to its holdings.

The card catalog is a dictionary catalog with entries under personal and corporate names, and to a lesser degree under subjects and geographical areas. A great many of the collections have been cataloged in depth; others selectively, and still others by main entry.
only. In the case of recent acquisitions, the main entry will refer
the reader to more detailed descriptions of them available at the
Society.

The Catalog, containing an estimated 250,000 cards, will be
available at the prepublication price of $520.00. After January 31,
1969, the price will be $650.00. These prices apply in the United
States only; there is an additional charge of 10 per cent on orders
shipped elsewhere.

Descriptive material on these two publications is available on
request. Inquiries and orders may be sent to the publisher, G. K.
Hall & Co., 70 Lincoln Street, Boston, Massachusetts, U. S. A. 02111.

Information Desired: Milton L. Henry, Jr. is trying to finish a
biography of Henry Winter Davis (1817-1865), Baltimore lawyer
and member of the United States House of Representatives. He
would be indebted to any readers who could help him obtain
information pertaining to the Davis family and the life of the
Maryland statesman. Please write to: Milton L. Henry, Jr., 1702
White Oak Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland, 20910

Carroll Geneology: Readers may obtain a privately printed pub-
lication, "Dr. Charles Carroll (1691-1755) Progenitors and Prog-
ceny," mimeographed, Pp. 106, $10.00—limited supply. For in-
formation, write Box 406, 21022

THE STAR SPANGLED BANNER

It is the intention of the Society to mount a definitive exhibition
of editions of The Star-Spangled Banner, to coincide with the 155th
anniversary of the Bombardment of Fort McHenry in September,
1969.

Since we hoped to compile a catalogue, with illustrations, giving
the background to the publications of The Star-Spangled Banner,
it seems fitting to attempt an inventory of the more famous issues
before 1820.

In the next number of the Magazine we shall list in some detail
the more important issues before 1820, but meanwhile it would
be useful if holders of any such issue of the poem, an appearance in
a newspaper, magazine, songbook, or sheet music, would communi-
cate with P. W. Filby, Librarian, so that work can begin on the
bibliographical and other notes.

P. W. FILBY
Now available

The
Manuscript Collections
of the
Maryland Historical Society

A guide to the manuscripts in the Maryland Historical Society, describing over 1700 collections, comprising approximately 1,000,000 items, with subject, name and place index.

390 pp.  $15.00
Plus 35¢ postage, etc.;
tax, if applicable, 3%

Order from: MARYLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY
201 W. Monument St
Baltimore, Md. 21201
The fully documented story of General George H. Thomas, "Rock of Chickamauga," ablest soldier the North produced and author of the most decisive victory of the war at Nashville—the incomparable leader whose mighty deeds were obscured by the false accusations of the military hierarchy, Grant and Sherman in particular.

This scholarly biography, on the New York City Board of Education approved reading list and destined to become a standard work, restores to top ranking the one man who never lost a battle and who twice saved the Army of the Cumberland from disaster.

"All dedicated students of Civil War military history should read this volume... it represents a viewpoint about Grant not adequately presented in recent literature nor anywhere so boldly since the last century." Civil War History

"The author does a valuable service when he emphasizes that the military hierarchy of Grant, Sherman and Schofield exerted tremendous influence in giving their version of events relating to the Civil War... This book deserves a respected place on the groaning Civil War bookshelf." Journal of American History.

"An excellent character sketch of one of the Civil War's finest generals." Washington Civil War Round Table.

"Recommended that the Civil War student read... for a new approach and a wealth of detailed information." Civil War Times Illustrated.


"My congratulations on a book well written—a wonderful contribution to the annals of history." Frank A. Palumbo of the Frank A. Palumbo Civil War Museum.

$10.00

649 pages—fully illustrated—detailed maps.

At all bookstores, or from

EXPOSITION PRESS, INC.

50 Jericho Turnpike—Jericho, New York. 11753
The Evening Sun called the original edition:

"Easily the best collection of Baltimore pictures ever made."

Now — a fascinating picture record of a vital century in Baltimore history, plus the most eventful decade in its existence ... in the enlarged and updated edition of the best-selling 1958 documentary.

Commentary by Francis F. Beirne • Compiled under the auspices of the Maryland Historical Society • Autographed copies available • 362 pictures — 196 pages — $6.50.

A special gift for "confirmed" Baltimoreans!

HUTZLER'S BOOK SHOP
All five stores or phone 727-4321
# PUBLICATIONS

## Studies in Maryland History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>His Lordship's Patronage: Offices of Profit in Colonial Maryland.</td>
<td>Donnell M. Owings</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Texts and References for School Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The War of 1812 On The Chesapeake Bay.</td>
<td>Gilbert Byron</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Maryland.</td>
<td>Kaessmann, Manakee and Wheeler</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Star-Spangled Banner.</td>
<td>Francis Scott Key</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians of Early Maryland.</td>
<td>Harold R. Manakee</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>$1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland in the Civil War.</td>
<td>Harold R. Manakee</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>$4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler Leaflets on Maryland History.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Miscellaneous

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A History of the University of Maryland.</td>
<td>George H. Callcott</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>$7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quakers in the Founding of Anne Arundel County, Maryland.</td>
<td>J. Reaney Kelly</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>$5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Queen Anne's County.</td>
<td>Frederic Emory</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>$7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Mill Wheel to Plowshare</td>
<td>Julia A. Drake, J. R. Orndorff</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chesapeake Bay Sailing Craft.</td>
<td>M. V. Brewington</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semmes and Kindred Families.</td>
<td>Harry Wright Newman</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hollyday and Related Families of the Eastern Shore of Maryland</td>
<td>James Bordley, Jr., M.D.</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regimental Colors of the 175th Infantry (Fifth Maryland)</td>
<td>Harold R. Manakee and Col. Roger S. Whiteford</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## World War II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maryland in World War II: Vol. I, Military Participation, 1950;</td>
<td>H. R. Manakee, comp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. II, Industry and Agriculture, 1951; Vol. IV, Gold Star Honor Roll, 1956;</td>
<td>Col. John P. Cooper, Jr. Illustrated.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of the 110th Field Artillery, with Sketches of Related Units.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland in World War II—Register of Service Personnel,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 vols.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MARYLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY**

201 W. Monument Street        Postage and tax, Baltimore, Maryland 21201        if applicable, extra.
The ANSWER to the need for GREATER INCOME:
SAVINGS CERTIFICATES

in denominations of $12,000 and up, earning the HIGHEST permissible rate by the Federal Home Loan Bank

and

$3,000 and up, also earning a very high rate. (Additions may be made in multiples of $1,000.)

Interested? Call Fraternity Federal,
LEXington 9-1313 in Baltimore or
HOward 5-5445 in Howard County.

The more flexible passbook savings accounts to which any amount may be added or withdrawn at will, also earn a very HIGH rate (including that extra $\frac{1}{4}\%$ per annum).

FRATERNITY FEDERAL

Savings

AND LOAN ASSOCIATION

Main Office: Branch:
764-770 Normandy Shopping Center
Washington Blvd. Route 40 West
Balto. Md. 21203 Ellicott City, Md.

✓ HEADQUARTERS for economical MORTGAGE LOANS
Chartered, Supervised by ONE GOVT. Agency; INSURED to $15,000. by another = DOUBLY SAFE!

★ Postage-FREE SAVE-by-MAIL Service—CERTIFICATES may be purchased by mail
★ DRIVE-UP Windows—main office (at-the-door PARKING LOTS at both offices)
★ Economical SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES—both offices
IN 1908

when we reached the age of 29

Wilbur Wright in his aeroplane covered three kilometers in 1 minute and 46 seconds at Le Mans, France—Aug. 8.

Fire destroyed valuable books and other treasures in the library of the Johns Hopkins University at Baltimore—Sept. 17.

Statue of Cecil Calvert was unveiled in Baltimore—Nov. 21.

In 1965

... we occupied our new office and warehouse especially constructed to utilize the most modern equipment and techniques.

MOVING—We are Maryland's largest agent for Allied Van Lines, with the experienced personnel and facilities for any moving job—local or long distance. Our expert packers prepare anything from household furnishings to precious art treasures for safe handling in transport or in storage, using customized containers and new, clean packing material.

STORAGE—Our especially designed one-level storage warehouse reduces handling to a minimum. All goods are packed into room-size portable containers, sealed against light, dust or moisture and stored in the sprinkler-protected, fireproof building that permits lowest possible insurance rate.

Our motto is: "WE CARE"

Agent for Allied Van Lines, the World's Largest Moving Organization

Monumental-Security STORAGE CO.

3006 Druid Park Drive, Baltimore, Md. 21215
Phone 664-1664
Salisbury, Md. Office & Warehouse: 815 Benny St.
Phone: PI 9-7117
Serving Maryland and the Nation Since 1879
The Blue Dog Legend  an adorable 18th century ghost dog that still roams about. $2.00

William Smallwood  a revolutionary hero's life told by an adventurous Charlie Turtle and his woodland friends. $3.00

Please include handling charges 25¢ per book and Maryland Sales Tax 3%. No C.O.D.'s. Checks payable to:

Leo Aries Press
P. O. Box 301
Port Tobacco, Maryland 20677
CLASSIFIED ADVERTISING

PHOTOGRAPHY
Since 1878
Hughes Co.
Copy and Restoration Work a Specialty.
Black and White or color.
Phone: 889-5540

C. Gaither Scott
115 E. 25th Street
Baltimore, Md. 21218

FAMILY COAT OF ARMS
A Symbol Of Your Family's Heritage From The Proud Past
Handpainted In Oils In Full Heraldic Colors — Size 11½ × 14½ — $15.00
Research When Necessary
Anna Dorsey Linder
Pines Of Hockley
166 Defense Highway
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
Phone: 263-3384

PLUMBING—HEATING—AIR CONDITIONING
M. Nelson Barnes & Sons, Inc.
Established 1909 Phone: 252-4313 2011 Greenspring Drive, Timonium

BOOKBINDING
Joseph Ruzicka, Inc.
TU 9-7847 — TU 9-5095
3200 Elm Avenue (11)
Magazines, Books & Records
Restoration of Rare Volumes