Suburban Growth and Municipal Annexation in Baltimore, 1745–1918

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ONE OF THE CENTRAL THEMES IN AMERICAN HISTORY IS THE transformation of the society and economy from rural to urban and the conflicts generated by this change. The reluctance of rural-dominated legislatures to give cities proportionate representation or complete local autonomy has been noted by many historians, but the antagonism has been more complex than the simple rural–urban dichotomy suggests because cities have been surrounded from a very early date by large peripheral or suburban populations which followed an independent course between the distinctly urban and rural areas.

In the eighteenth century cities usually annexed only small parcels of land and there was little objection to these changes. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, as cities spread more rapidly, they introduced annexation bills in the legislature covering large areas of open land beyond the urban fringe.¹ These bills invariably became enmeshed in a three-way struggle between the city, its surrounding local governments and the other districts of the state. They provide, therefore, a unique insight into the complex adjustment of state and local government of the growth of urban regions.

The annexation issue in Maryland can be seen in sharp relief because it focused on the two largest local governments in the state—Baltimore City and surrounding Baltimore County.² Like most Southern states, Maryland developed no important sub-units of government within the county structure. Those living in Baltimore County’s suburbs were ruled by county commissioners elected until the 1930s by a rural majority. The needs of the suburbs could not, however, be ignored by the county since they provided most of the county’s tax base from 1800 onward. If suburbanites became too unhappy with county administration they could seek favorable terms of annexation to the city. City leaders were almost always anxious to expand the municipal tax base and political power, but during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had to secure the consent of those to be annexed. The city thus had to make an offer attractive enough to win suburban favor, but not so attractive as to endanger municipal finances. The city continually tried to force annexations through the state legislature without the consent of the county and its suburbanites; but the Maryland General Assembly opposed this procedure until 1918. Baltimore County’s political leaders were powerful in state politics and many other rural Maryland counties were reluctant to unite the largest concentration of voters under a single municipal

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government. The century and a half of intense belligerency between Baltimore City and Baltimore County, largely over the suburban territory, provided an important historical perspective on current city-suburban problems which plague not only Maryland and the South, but the whole nation.

1745–1817

Baltimore's eighteenth-century annexations caused no controversy because they embodied no serious financial changes. The Maryland General Assembly expanded the boundaries of Baltimore Town twelve times between 1745 and 1783, but these annexations were small in scope, shifted relatively few voters and had no significant effect on local finance. They therefore excited no discernible political controversy. Baltimore Town was established in 1730 on a sixty-acre tract of land and began to expand in 1745 when the General Assembly, at the request of residents in the contiguous village of Jonestown, annexed the ten-acre tract to Baltimore. With the exception of the Fell's Point area, the other annexations were of undeveloped tracts on the edge of town. Typically, one or more landholders would request that their tract be annexed and laid off into town lots, streets and alleys. As one tract approached total coverage another would be annexed and surveyed. These tracts averaged sixty-five acres and the landowner bore the expense of surveying and street construction. There was no increased financial burden on annexed lands because Baltimore Town levied approximately the same taxes as the surrounding parishes and Baltimore County administered all major local public activities and collected the bulk of the local taxes.

The increasing size and complexity of Baltimore Town between 1776 and 1800 resulted in a fundamental restructuring of its government and its relationship to the county. Escalating public expenditures led the town fathers in 1782 to obtain from the state legislature a comprehensive tax ordinance which shifted major financial responsibility from the county to the town commissioners. As a result, municipal annexations virtually ceased because municipal residents now paid significantly higher local taxes than those living in the county. In addition, the county lost most of its taxing powers within the city limits to the town commissioners (who were superceded in 1797 by a mayor and city council). Henceforth, those residing just beyond the city line could have most of the benefits of urban life without the payment of municipal taxes. The county provided only rudimentary administration in the suburbs, but residents seemed willing to accept this in return for lower taxes and freedom from municipal regulations. They were supported by rural county leaders who now wished to keep the rapidly appreciating suburban property on the Baltimore County tax rolls. Thus by the end of the Revolutionary Era, the stage was set for continuous city-county conflict.

The phenomenal growth of Baltimore City after 1776 spilled its population well beyond the municipal boundaries and by 1818 a large urban population lived in "the precincts," adjoining the city. Baltimore County appointed Precinct Commissioners who made haphazard attempts to lay out and maintain streets. The 12,000 "precincters," as they were called, comprised almost one-third of the county's population and their property accounted for over forty percent of the county's total value. Inevitably, city officials sought to capture this wealth by a sweeping proposal to take in the entire area. The annexation petition sent to
Annapolis in 1816 from the city did not, however, mention the tax issue. Rather, it focused on the need to create a coordinated physical plan for the whole urban area to prevent further disjointed development. It requested that the city boundaries be extended over the built-up area, and “also such further portion as may be deemed advisable to lay out...with a view to further improvements.” The bill itself provided for outright annexation of over thirteen square miles of land and the creation of a general development plan for the entire area. The precincters all agreed on the necessity of a general development plan. They had petitioned Annapolis themselves in 1815 for a city-precinct street plan, but had turned against the legislature’s bill because it gave city residents too much authority over the planning. The annexation bill of 1816 went far beyond the previous year’s proposal because it extended the full planning, tax, and police authority of the city over the precincts.6

Naturally, Baltimore City residents thought it unjust that “the inhabitants of one side of the street are taxed to support a police equally beneficial to those who reside on the other side, and who do not contribute to their support.” Some precincters agreed with this view. The annexation petition was reportedly signed by several precinct property holders, one of whom stated that eventually they would have to develop their own full-scale municipal government and it would be less costly to be annexed now. Nevertheless, almost all other suburban residents opposed this “novel effort to tax the county for the support of the city.” A petition opposing annexation was signed by over half the total precinct electorate. In order to ease the suburban tax burden on powerful landowners the bill was amended to exempt undeveloped property (less than five dwellings per acre) from municipal taxation. This was an important change for over eighty percent of the proposed annex was still open land.7

In the end it was partisan politics that pushed the bill through. The precincts were, like the city itself, strongly Republican. By moving them into the city the Baltimore County Federalists would be in a more favorable position to capture the county’s four state delegates. Baltimore City, limited to only two delegates regardless of its size, would become even more radically under-represented. The city Republicans attempted to amend the annexation bill to give the city two more delegates and when this failed, to put off the bill until the next session of the legislature; but again, in a straight party vote, the majority Federalists passed the bill.8 Thus, Baltimore expanded its boundaries, stated the Nile’s Weekly Register, “against the consent of nine-tenths, perhaps, of the people” of Baltimore City and the precincts.9

1818–1888

The extensive territory added to the city in 1817 contained almost all urban growth within the new boundaries until after the Civil War. By the 1870’s, however, the suburban problem rose again to prominence. “A new city has sprung up,” commented the Baltimore Sun in 1873, “attractive in every respect and extending far out into Baltimore County.” The Belt, as the new area was called, encircled the municipality on three sides with industrial and residential settlements of approximately 20,000 people by 1874 and twice that number a decade later. Much of the growth occurred just across the city line, but small industrial
and residential satellite communities spread out along the new suburban horse-
carlines up the Jones Falls Valley. These areas held over one-third of the county’s
total citizenry, but now there property provided two-thirds of the county tax
base.\(^{10}\)

Cooperation between the city and county was difficult because the two units
viewed each other with suspicion and hostility. In the first half of the nineteenth
century the city and county continued to share the cost of several public
institutions, but this caused so much conflict that in 1851 all joint facilities were
separated and the county moved its government out to the small village of
Towsontown seven miles north of Baltimore. While resolving the most serious
financial and administrative confusion, the change could not erase the fact that
both governments were trying to provide for portions of the same urban area.
The county remained disturbed by Baltimore’s large purchases of property
beyond the city boundaries for its almshouses, parks, and water system. City
taxpayers resented Belt residents using city schools, fire, police, and other
facilities without contributing to their support. “They want to receive all the
benefits of the city,” said a municipal leader, “and then evade their share of the
burdens.” When the Baltimore *American* spoke in the 1870’s of “the chronic
hostility of feeling between Baltimore County and the city,” it was summarizing
a long-standing antagonism.\(^{11}\)

The critical relationship during this era, however, was the one between the
Belt and the rest of the county; for after the enactment of the State Constitution
of 1864 no territory could be transferred from one county to another without the
consent of those to be shifted. This article was inserted by Baltimore County for
the purpose of rendering its most valuable territory immune from annexation. It
was assumed in 1864 that Baltimore City was, for this purpose, a county. The
city naturally objected and a neutral delegate from Western Maryland, speaking
against the proposal, said it would forever preclude municipal expansion since
“those parties who live just outside of Baltimore City will always vote to stay out
to avoid the taxes.” Nevertheless, the amendment passed 37-33.\(^{12}\)

The county’s rural Democrats and Republicans, unlike their counterparts of
1817, no longer desired to be rid of the suburban voters. Over-representation of
rural districts and universal sufferage now gave them a comfortable majority in
Baltimore County’s government and allowed revenues from the Belt to be shifted
to the less affluent agricultural sections. The level of public facilities and services
in the Belt was considerably lower than they were in the city, but rural county
leaders believed the suburbanites would continue to tolerate this so long as taxes
remained low. Belt residents relied on their own volunteer fire and police services,
but in fact it was the city fire and police that handled serious emergencies. Belt
schools were poor, but many suburbanites sent their children to the city schools
for a fee well below the cost of their education. They seemed to have the best of
both worlds. Since the municipality was never fully reimbursed for these services
nor felt they could be cut off, annexation appeared to be a logical solution from
the city’s point of view. A resolution to annex the Belt and a large additional
territory passed the city council in 1868, but the vote was split because some
believed another large annexation was financially unsound.\(^{13}\) Eventually the
skeptics on the city council were won over and the city began pressing the General Assembly for an annexation law. In 1874, after a bitter struggle in the legislature between the city and the county, an act was passed expanding the city one mile to the east and west and two miles to the north; subject, of course, to the approval of a majority of voters in this area.14

City leaders campaigned strenuously. Belt residents were told they paid a large “tribute” to Townsontown and received nothing in return. A vote for annexation would quickly provide them all with water and sewer lines, paved and illuminated streets and sidewalks, and efficient police and fire protection. To lessen the impact of the huge tax increase (from $0.53 per $100 to $1.65) Belt residents would pay only half the city rate for ten years. As in 1817, undeveloped property (acre tracts with less than five residences) would continue to pay the county tax rate. Future tax hikes would be partially offset, it was alleged, by an increase in property values and a decline in fire insurance rates.

Baltimore County’s leaders also campaigned vigorously. While making no defense of the quantity of Belt services, they skillfully exploited fears of the city proposal. The city’s promise of municipal services could not be kept, they said, since their provision to newer areas of the present city was lagging. Noting the rejection of a major public improvement bond issue by Baltimore City voters in the previous election, the Townsontown Journal warned that such voters would never approve bond issues to bring full services to the Belt. Baltimore County’s senior state senator, who had earlier characterized the city as “a sore on the body politic,” labeled the ten year half-tax provision “a fraud” since it was surely unconstitutional. Belt residents would pay the full rate and small homeowners would see their property “come under the hammer” to pay the “ruinous level” of municipal taxation.15

In the Eastern section of the belt around the industrial settlements of Highlandtown and Canton, the extension of municipal regulations posed a threat as serious as the higher taxes. The area was a center for coal oil refineries, distilleries, breweries and slaughterhouses, “nine-tenths of which,” said one refinery owner, “were driven out of the city because municipal ordinances defined them as obnoxious.” City sanitary and building ordinances and the closing of saloons and beer gardens on Sundays posed a major threat to the community’s economy and life style. The mere attempt of city leaders to hold a pro-annexation meeting in Highlandtown almost led to a riot, the organizers of the meeting cutting the program short and rushing back across the city line before actual violence ensued.16

The referendum was held May 5, 1874, but the issue may well have been decided nine days before when the city’s Committee on Ways and Means announced a fifteen cent increase in the tax rate—raising the total to $1.80. The remarkably poor timing of this action undoubtedly convinced many belt residents that even at half this rate taxes would be too high and they had only verbal promises that services would be forthcoming.17

Annexation lost by a vote of 1,130 to 575 and the voting pattern indicates a clear consciousness of costs and benefits in the belt. Only the Western District, having close communications with the city, rather weak connections (both
physically and politically) with Towsontown and its largest industrial employers favoring annexation, voted to join the city. This section, however, was the least populated and its decision was cancelled out by the heavy anti-city vote of the North and East. Lower income industrial workers in the northern mill towns who feared tax and rent increases combined with those middle class residents who were skeptical of the promised services. The Eastern District forcefully expressed its perceived self-interest by a nine-to-one vote against annexation.

Press reactions to the election are full of insights into the perspectives of the participants. The *Sun* concluded that suburban voters could not understand their own self-interest and the issue should be decided by the General Assembly; but the *American*, with somewhat keener insight, predicted that eventually the lack of county services would drive the belt into the municipality. The *Maryland Journal*, the organ of Towsontown’s ruling Democrats, noted smugly that the vote turned out “as expected” and hoped no more annexationist foolishness would be heard of. The paper held the view that no serious problems existed in the belt and it would be many decades before the lower county would become sufficiently urbanized to require fundamental administrative changes. Towsontown’s Republican paper, the *Union*, was the most perceptive analyst. It warned the county’s leaders that fundamental changes were necessary if the belt was to remain loyal to Towsontown. A fair share of taxes would have to be returned to the belt. Municipal services should be expanded and communications with the county seat improved. Its editor and its shrewd city correspondents had no illusions about the rate of future suburban expansion and its consequences for the whole region. Improved road and rail communications between the city and Towsontown would stimulate more rapid suburban growth and result in annexation proposals covering the entire lower county including perhaps even Towsontown itself. By the 1920’s expansion might have spread to “all of Baltimore County” and necessitate merger of the two governments. On the other hand, if there were no further annexations, the outgrowth of population would place the majority of urban population and wealth in the county while the desperate leaders of the depleted city “humbly petition for small favors at the hand Towsontown…”

It took fourteen years to convince the General Assembly to hold another referendum. Twice the city attempted to secure annexation by a Constitutional amendment since, as Mayor Ferdinand C. Latrobe stated in 1879, “it can scarcely be expected that our neighbors will vote to subject their property to municipal taxation.” But the legislature was hesitant to act in such a seemingly undemocratic manner and refused to force residents into the city. In 1884 Latrobe returned to the referendum proposal, but this time extended the tax-relief period for twelve years and gave a specific deadline for the provision of water and sewer lines. This, thought the city delegation, was too generous and actually posed a financial threat to the municipality so they refused to act on it. In 1888, however, I. Freeman Rasin, the city’s Democratic boss united the delegates behind the proposal and the state Democratic machine, led by Rasin’s ally Arthur Pue Gorman, pushed it through the General Assembly. The bill was even more generous than that of 1884 or 1874. In addition to the twelve year half-tax, undeveloped block tracts with less than six houses on paved streets would remain
taxed at the 1888 county rate regardless of how long they remained undeveloped and regardless of how much the county rate increased. Also, each of the three belt districts was to vote independently and thus prevent the Eastern District from deciding what was expected to be a close vote in the other two areas.  

The Western and Northern Districts, with 7.5 square miles and 38,000 people, voted to enter the city while the Eastern District, by a vote far closer than predicted, remained in the county. The reasons for this change are fairly clear. First, the magnitude of the belt's urban problems had become acute. Between 1874 and 1888 approximately 10,000 houses went up in the belt and 18,000 in the city but as the municipality was approaching the end of its open residential land, the full burden of growth would shift across the city line. Already, the lack of a water, sewer and sanitary inspection system infuriated belt residents and alarmed state health officials. The secretary of the State Health Board called sanitary conditions throughout the belt "very bad" and blamed Baltimore County for having "no organized health department." Second, suburban businessmen and industrialists, many of whom had opposed annexation in 1874, now strongly favored it due to their failure to gain basic public services for their plants and employees. Police and fire protection was totally inadequate and property insurance rates in the belt remained significantly higher than in the city. Even with the low level of county services, the property tax was increasing. In 1885 and 1888 the county ran into serious financial trouble and failed to pay their teachers for several months. Taxes would have to go up even farther. Finally, a majority of belt residents became convinced that not only would the Towsontown leaders never initiate the needed services, but were unwilling to let the belt provide them on their own. A bill creating a "Belt Commission" somewhat like the old precinct commissioners was introduced in the 1886 session of the legislature. The rural districts of the county regarded this commissioner bill as a grab for county patronage jobs and had it killed. The bill had been drawn up by a number of belt residents, but other suburbanites refused to support it because it didn't give the belt enough autonomy. Clearly, many belt residents had reached the conclusion that annexation was the only alternative. The conviction grew stronger by 1888. One prominent belt resident put the issue squarely before a mass meeting just a few days before the election.

I have, in half a lifetime, seen the cornfields of this neighborhood give way to rows of houses, but for twenty years our government has been the same. The population has steadily increased, but there has been no corresponding progress in methods of government regarding sanitation, schools and other departments. No matter how willing the county commissioners may be to do what you want, they have neither the money nor the authority to comply.

Election results in the North and West were quite close to what several observers had predicted. The results when compared to 1874, are revealing.

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Growth and Annexation in Baltimore

As in 1874, the vote in each district correlates with its particular tax and service situations. The Western District continued its support for annexation even though the county had been expending more funds there lately than it had been collecting. In the northern section the results were somewhat disappointing to the annexationists. The factory owners had even closed their plants on election day, but many industrial workers and poor black voters, reportedly still fearing tax and rent increases, voted against annexation. The major surprise was in the eastern section where annexation received 40% of the vote. County leaders felt there was no danger of defection in Canton and Highlandtown and had done very little for its residents. During hearings in Annapolis it was stated that in recent years this area had actually been paying several thousand dollars more than it had received in county services—the level of which was woefully inadequate.

The annexation was challenged in the courts, but in the sweeping decision of Daly vs. Morgan, et. al., the Maryland Court of Appeals declared that the legislature not only had the power to extend the city boundaries by local referendum, but it could extend them “with or without the consent of the majority of voters resident within the districts annexed.” The decision asserted that the framers of the Constitution of 1867, knowing that the city must soon extend its boundaries would undoubtedly have declared that a local referendum was required for city extension “in plain and explicit terms” if this had been its intention. But there was nothing in the constitution inferring that a city must alter its boundaries in the same manner as a county. Article XIII, Section 1, clearly provides for a referendum when residents are to be changed from one county to another; but Baltimore City, though separated from any affiliation with Baltimore County, was not, in the court’s view, legally a county and so did not fall under the provisions of this section. The court chose to look only at the Constitution of 1867 where no record of its proceedings existed to clarify the meaning of Article XIII, which was taken without alterations from the Constitution of 1864. The Justices took no notice of the article’s origin in the Constitution of 1864 where the published debates clearly indicate it was to apply in the case of Baltimore City as well as the counties. The decision was an anti-climax to the struggle of 1888; but it was to have far reaching effects on events in 1916–1918.

1889–1918

Baltimore’s 1888 annexation took in over two-thirds of the suburban area opened by the horsecar lines between 1865 and 1888, but the lines were electrified and expanded in the 1890’s and a new suburban belt grew up beyond the municipal boundaries. By 1910 motor vehicles and improved roads opened an even larger area. This should logically have led to another urban-services crisis in Baltimore County leading to annexation; but conditions had changed significantly in the intervening years. The new middle class suburban areas in the North and West had developed strong neighborhood organizations which combined into the powerful Baltimore County Civic Federation of Improvement and Protective Associations. The Civic Federation, along with a more progressive political leadership in Towson raised taxes and improved conditions in many ways. In middle class areas a patchwork system of sewers had been constructed jointly by the county and private developers while other companies supplied the
Growth of Population in Baltimore Metropolitan Area
Joshua Barney
other utilities. County schools in the suburban areas were now much improved since the 1880's. Police protection hardly existed in 1888 and while still modest was supplemented by the new Maryland State Police. In 1913 county fire protection was sufficient to bring a reduction in property insurance rates. Suburbanites still lacked a comprehensive utility system and the general level of services was not equal to the better areas of Baltimore City, but there were enough facilities for satisfactory living. The majority were against annexation even though the tax increase would have been proportionately much less than 1888.27

Quite the opposite trend developed in the industrial suburbs of the East and in Curtis Bay in Anne Arundel County. The Highlandtown-Canton area contained 35,000 people who lived without sewers, adequate fire or police protection and school buildings that were a health and fire hazard. Too poor to build its own sewer system, it sought a county bond issue for that purpose in 1914; but the upcounty farmers and middle class suburbanites defeated it. The editor of the Highlandtown newspaper told a city official the majority of residents were now eager for annexation and it was rumored that the county would be happy to let it go since large expenditures would ultimately have to be made there. At Curtis Bay residents actually petitioned the city for annexation; but to no avail.28 City leaders were disturbed by conditions in these two suburbs. Curtis Bay and Canton were developing in a haphazard manner beyond the control of the Baltimore Harbor Authority and Highlandtown, a major center of crime and vice, was a continual problem to city authorities. Nevertheless, it would have been financially unsound for the city leaders to take these two problem-ridden suburbs into the municipality without at the same time annexing the wealthier suburbs.

The first step towards annexation was taken by Baltimore's Merchants and Manufacturers Association, but it had little to do with questions of regional planning or municipal services. The BMMA was dismayed that the city had been pushed back into seventh place by Pittsburgh's "mad rush to absorb adjacent towns" prior to the census of 1910. The Association said it was not seeking bigness for its own sake, but simply accepted what was perceived to be the realities of national competition. "While the basis may be wrong," the BMMA Journal stated, "cities are largely judged . . . upon population. It matters not what we think of the measure of estimate, that it is in vogue is a fact." The decline of Baltimore to tenth or twelfth place in 1920 would show the whole world Baltimore was a "slow place" and this would "do the state and the city incalculable harm."29

The BMMA naturally turned to the city delegation in Annapolis to push through an annexation bill in 1912, but Baltimore's politicians showed little interest. While the BMMA was interested only in the population issue, municipal officials were primarily concerned with its financial implications. Many city leaders had concluded that the annexation of 1888 had forced the city to spend more in the annex than it was able to recover in revenue. Baltimore's taxpayers, they thought, would strongly resist taking in any new territories that would not clearly pay their way or hopefully help shoulder the spiraling municipal debt—just then approaching one hundred million dollars.30

The situation was also complicated by the city's Democratic political leader,
Mayor James Preston. Preston had been elected for the first time in 1911 on the dubious promise of improving facilities and services without raising taxes. Neither he nor any of his opponents even mentioned annexation during the campaign. It was probably the political implications of annexation that first interested the mayor in the proposal. It was widely known that Preston wished to become the state boss. By placing all of Baltimore’s suburbs within the municipality he could conceivably become leader of the majority of the state’s Democrats. With these cross-currents swirling around the annexation issue it is not surprising that the legislation took eight years of labyrinthine political maneuvering and almost broke up the state Democratic party.

Preston’s first annexation plan was geographically comprehensive, but created many problems. He proposed establishing four large boroughs around the existing municipality encompassing an area of almost 150 square miles. The boroughs would (for census purposes) become part of the city; but would retain substantial local political and financial autonomy. The city would provide a limited number of services in return for a small portion of borough revenues. The city delegation, presented with the bill in the midst of the 1912 legislative session, gave it little consideration and it never came out of committee. Nevertheless, Preston began drumming up local support for the plan in 1913. After some preliminary endorsements on both sides of the city line, opinion gradually shifted against the proposal. Suburbanites feared they would end up subsidizing the city and municipal taxpayers feared the reverse. The President of the Baltimore County Civic Federation told Preston that suburbanites would favor the bill if it provided for local referendums on all changes in the status of the boroughs; but the mayor refused to tie the city’s hands in this way. In 1914 Preston brought out a revised borough bill. It took in a somewhat smaller territory and put a ceiling on borough tax rates; but this was too generous for municipal leaders. Several city leaders openly opposed it and even Preston’s loyal city solicitor voiced his private doubts. As might be expected, the bill again failed in Annapolis.

The following year Preston gave up the borough plan and allowed city leaders to draft a traditional annexation proposal. It took in roughly thirty-five square miles of Baltimore and Anne Arundel counties and gave only a short-term tax break to the suburbanites. The proposal mandated a city referendum on the question, but did not allow those to be annexed to vote in it. The proposal was authored by the Baltimore City-wide Congress, an organization composed of civic, business and middle class neighborhood groups. The business sector had now come to see the advantages of a more traditional extension of the full authority if the city—particularly in regard to Baltimore’s harbor area. The “helter-skelter development” of the shoreline outside the city limits (and thus beyond the authority of the city’s harbor board) threatened by 1915 to impede the efficiency of Baltimore’s trade facilities. Neither Baltimore or Anne Arundel counties showed any interest in developing a master plan for the whole port.

The new annexation proposal became a central issue in the state-wide election of 1915 and the city suffered a major defeat in the contest. Comptroller Emerson Harrington, running for Governor in the Democratic primary, won the firm support of Baltimore and Anne Arundel counties by opposing the city annexation
plan. Mayor Preston backed Blaire Lee, a candidate publicly committed to city extension. Harrington campaigned more against Preston than Lee, urging voters not to allow the state to be "run from City Hall." Lee was thought to be running a close race with Harrington in the counties; therefore the comptroller made a bid for the Baltimore vote by announcing his support for some plan that would give the city control of the harbor area. Harrington also allied himself with an anti-Preston faction in the city machine led by Frank Kelly. The strategy worked well. He picked up just enough votes in Baltimore to combine with his unexpectedly large majority in the counties—thanks in part to Baltimore County's 9-1 vote in his favor. At the Democratic convention Harrington's supporters drew up an annexation plank that pledged the party to a "reasonable extension" of the city to allow it "complete control of the harbor." The Republicans, hoping to roll up a large vote in Baltimore County, pledged that they would allow no annexation without a local referendum as in 1888. In November Harrington defeated the Republican Governor, Philip Lee Goldsborough, by a scant 3,744 votes. While winning in Baltimore City by 2,562 votes, it was not the crucial margin of victory. His fundamental debt was owed to Baltimore and Anne Arundel County leaders whose support had given him the primary victory.36

Leadership in Baltimore had been fractured by the primary contest and therefore the 1916 session of the General Assembly was presented with two annexation bills drawn by the two major factions in the city. The first was the City-wide Congress bill. The second was drawn up by a group that included both Preston (as a silent partner) and the senior city senator, Frank Furst, who had been Harrington's campaign manager.37 The city delegation finally gave its support to the Furst bill. It gave a better tax break to the suburbanites and thus overcame objections from other state legislators that the city was simply trying to shift its financial problems onto Baltimore County taxpayers. The tax provision, however, was distinctly unpopular with most city property owners outside the business elite.38

The city's business and political leaders convinced enough legislators to advance the measure to its third reading in the senate where, after breaking a Baltimore-Anne Arundel County filibuster, its passage seemed assured.39 But on the final vote two Harrington men from the Eastern Shore reversed their vote and killed the measure. Another Harrington man from Baltimore City quickly introduced a new annexation bill in the lower house giving the city (subject to a referendum in the annex), a narrow strip of industrial land around the harbor; but none of the middle class suburbs. Furst and his supporters as well as the City-wide Congress were dumbfounded and furious at the governor whom they publicly blamed for scuttling the city's annexation plan and substituting "a counterfeit bill" in the house. The session ended with bitter attacks by city legislators on Harrington and his associates in the assembly.40

With only one more opportunity to expand Baltimore's boundaries before the 1920 census, the Merchants and Manufacturers Association launched an all-out campaign to wrest an annexation bill from the Harrington administration. The association formed a state-wide organization called the Non-partisan Greater Baltimore League. While claiming 10,000 members by 1918, the league was a
businessmen's and politician's organization. Two-thirds of the league's directors were BMMA members and the league's executive secretary worked closely with the association's chief lobbyist.\footnote{At a large public meeting in June, 1917, the league approved a bill that annexed (without a referendum) an area almost twice the size of the old Furst bill (46.5 square miles of Baltimore County and 5.4 square miles of Anne Arundel County). Taxpayers in the new annex would begin paying sixty percent of the full city rate in 1919 which would increase two percent a year until 1939 when they would pay the full rate. As provided in the 1916 bill, city tax exemptions for manufacturing equipment would extend to the annex, but city nuisance ordinances would not be enforced against existing businesses in the area—the latter a concession to large slaughterhouses and distilleries in the industrial suburbs.\footnote{The league's annexation bill caused strong repercussions throughout the state. It was predictably condemned by suburbanites and officials of both parties in Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties, praised by the Preston machine and criticized by Governor Harrington and the allied Kelly faction of the city Democrats. Harrington's forces, however, dominated the 1917 state Democratic convention and booed the very mention of Preston's name. It pushed through an annexation plank opposing any city extension that did not allow a local referendum in the suburbs. Preston's men bolted the party and condemned Harrington for "making war upon Baltimore."\footnote{The Republicans whose convention had not yet met, were elated. Former Republican Mayor Timanus (a leading member of the Nonpartisan Greater Baltimore League) told reporters, "it gives the Republicans a golden opportunity and I hope they take advantage of the mistakes of the Democrats." The Republican convention, in a complete about-face, endorsed the league's bill. Only the Baltimore County Republicans and a few die-hard anti-urbanites criticized what they called a "shameful deal" between the Republicans and "boss" Preston.\footnote{The Greater Baltimore League spent a great deal of money and effort around the state explaining the annexation issue. Voters in rural areas were assured that under the Maryland Constitution Baltimore City would never be given a majority of legislative seats even though annexation might ultimately give it more than half the state's population. Failure to expand the city, they were warned, would seriously retard the whole state economy and every county would suffer. It was admitted that suburbanites would pay a price for the change, but the league argued that this was not unfair. As the former Chief Judge of Baltimore's Supreme Bench, Henry D. Harlan, said in a widely quoted public statement: Those who locate near the city limits are bound to know that the time may come when the legislature will extend the limits and take them in. No principle of right or justice or fairness places in their hands the power to stop the progress and development of the city, especially in view of the fact that a large majority of them have located near the city for the purpose of getting the benefit of transacting business or securing employment or following their profession in the city.\footnote{The split in the state Democratic party, which was widened by the annexation issue, resulted in the Republicans capturing sixteen of the city's twenty-four...}
delegates and gaining control of the lower house 55–47. The Democratic majority in the state senate was cut to a single vote. Considering that the city delegation in the previous legislature had been Democratic by a margin of 14–10 and the whole House of Delegates by 56–44, the change spelled victory for annexation.  

When the 1918 session of the General Assembly opened in January the annexationists were poised for action. The few Republicans who appeared reluctant to vote for House Bill No. 1 (The Greater Baltimore Bill) were counterbalanced by the Preston Democrats. In the House, where the bill finally passed 61–36, all the Republicans but one voted for it along with six of the eight city Democrats (the two holdouts being Kelly faction men). The Senate began debate on the bill amidst rumors that the Baltimore and Anne Arundel County Democrats were attempting to strike a bargain with the prohibitionists whereby votes would be traded to stop both annexation and the sale of liquor. Simultaneously, Baltimore County’s senators introduced a substitute annexation bill similar to the Greater Baltimore proposal, but giving the city only seventeen square miles of territory in a narrow strip around the harbor. It was a last-ditch effort by the county to protect its middle class residential areas.  

Senator Furst, manager of the Greater Baltimore Bill, was disgusted. He told reporters:

If they [the anti-annexationist Democrats] can’t see for themselves that the defeat of annexation will mean the disruption of the Democratic Party in this state... they can remain blind for all I care... if the party leaders want to commit party suicide they can do it and go hang themselves for all I care.

Fortunately for the annexationists, the prohibition forces already had enough votes to approve their bill so they did not need to make any deals. The BMMA lobbied heavily, Preston pleaded with uncommitted Democratic senators and former Republican Governor Goldsborough, who kept in close touch with the mayor, used his influence very successfully with the Republicans. Every one of the seven new Republicans voted for the bill as did three of the six new Democrats. Of those who sat in the 1916 session, three Republicans and one Democrat switched over to annexation. The final vote was 18–9. Baltimore and Anne Arundel officials made frantic appeals to Harrington, but the governor, trimming his sails to the new legislative winds, had stated at the opening of the 1918 session that if any annexation bill passed he would feel compelled to sign it—which he did. The constitutionality of the act was challenged, but it was upheld by Maryland’s highest tribunal on the basis of the 1888 Daly vs. Morgan decision.

The 1918 annexation, however, led no one to believe that the city–suburban problem had been permanently resolved. Following the passage of the 1918 act, property holders just beyond the new boundaries were reported to be “simply delighted” since “another belt will spring up soon and their holdings will be in demand.” As the editor of the Union-News had perceived when the bill was first introduced, its passage would simply drive more affluent residents further out “while the poor man must remain where he is.” The growth of new county suburbs was cut short by the depression and war, but after 1945 construction across the city line boomed once again and prompted one of the county’s alert state senators to act. Senator William Bolton, recalling how in 1918 the city
“successfully exploited a loophole in the constitution of annex some of the most valuable portions of Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties,” introduced a constitutional amendment specifically prohibiting Baltimore City from extending its boundaries without the consent of those to be annexed. The city’s leaders, apparently convinced that the city was large enough already, made no effort to block the proposal and it passed overwhelmingly.53

City officials, from the mayor on down, took no interest in the question. The Baltimore Chamber of Commerce took no position. Like many middle class urbanities, Baltimore’s businessmen were moving both their families and enterprises out into the county. The Sunpapers, while opposing the amendment, said further annexations were “impractical” since the city’s problems were better solved by a regional government than by further annexations. Even the city voters showed relatively little concern over the closing of the annexation option. Almost one-third favored the amendment. In the required state-wide referendum the city voted 70,409-47,893 against the amendment and 14,000 passed over the question. In Baltimore county a record 93% turnout voted 51,889-9,722 in favor. The state-wide total was 139,974-103,687 with the suburban counties voting most heavily for the amendment.54

The last time the question of Baltimore City and its surrounding counties was interjected into state politics occurred during the debate on the new state constitution in 1967–1968. The constitution was the result of a major effort by popularly elected delegates. It allowed the legislature to create “regional governments” in heavily urbanized areas of the state without a local referendum. Baltimore County’s leaders declared it to be a thinly veiled annexation threat and vigorously opposed it. The two-to-one vote against the constitution in Baltimore and Anne Arundel counties was a major factor in its rejection by the state’s voters.55

The history of Baltimore City annexations thus appears ended since further annexations have become politically impossible. But even if the city were able to annex the most heavily built-up areas in lower Baltimore County and North Anne Arundel County, those who could afford to escape will simply move further back into the surrounding counties taking with them the jobs, shopping centers and good schools. Even the merger of Baltimore City and Baltimore County would not provide a permanent solution since suburban population has long since spilled over into four other adjoining counties. A change of genuinely historic proportions has occurred. The very basis upon which Baltimore City was established as a separate political entity in the 1790’s—its fundamentally urban character which set its life apart from the surrounding agricultural region—no longer exists. There is once again little difference between the landscape of the municipality and the surrounding region. In the eighteenth century trees and meadows reached down into the very center of Baltimore Town. Now the regional city’s houses, stores and factories are spilled across the land in five surrounding counties. As a result of this profound change, not only has the tool of annexation been lost as a practical administrative device; but the very concept of a separate municipality in the center of the Baltimore urban region seems now a historic anachronism. That this irrational and wasteful system will probably remain for
years to come is not difficult to predict since its evolution has always been primarily determined by self-interest and political expediency.

REFERENCES


2. Baltimore County, exclusive of the city, maintained the largest population of any county in the state from 1800 to 1960 with the exception of the period 1818–1830 when, due to annexation of population by Baltimore City, it fell to second place. In spite of two much larger annexations in 1888–1898 Baltimore County remained far ahead of all the others until the 1950's when the Washington, D.C., suburban boom pushed Montgomery into first place.

3. Laws of Maryland, 1729, Ch. 12; 1745, Ch. 9; 1747, Ch. 21; 1750, Ch. 11; 1753, Ch. 20; 1765, Ch. 2; 1766, Ch. 22; 1773, June Sess., Ch. 4; 1781, November Sess., Ch. 24; 1782, April Sess., Ch. 2, 1782, November Sess., Ch. 8; Ch. 11.


7. Laws of Maryland, 1816, December Sess., Ch. 209, Sec. 6, Federal Gazette, December 11, 17, 31, 1816; January 3, 8, 20, 29, 30; February 18, 1817, Baltimore American , November 27, 1816 [hereafter cited as American ].


10. Baltimore Sun, February 24, 1873; March 4, 1884 [hereafter cited as Sun].


12. Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 1864 (Annapolis, 1864), III: 1692–1693; the amendment became Article X Section 1 of the Constitution of 1864 and was retained as Article XIII Section 1 of the Constitution of 1867 which remains Maryland’s fundamental law today.


15. During the six weeks between the passage of the act and the referendum over one hundred articles and editorials appeared in the Sun, and the American and the two county newspapers.

16. One of the City Senators told the somewhat inebriated assembly that with annexation they would have pure piped water instead of polluted wells; but the crowd shouted back, "We don’t want it, we have plenty of beer!" Sun, April 21, 1874; American, April 17, 21, 1874.

17. Sun, May 6, 1874; American, May 6, 1874.

18. Sun, May 16, 1874; American, May 16, 1874; Maryland Journal, May 16, 1874; Baltimore County Union, May 16, 30, March 21, June 6, 1874.

20. Housing figures are compiled from the Mayor's annual messages, 1874-1888 and computed from population figures in the belt transplanted into housing units at the city ratio of 4.4 persons per dwelling unit. For description of the city and suburban building boom of the 1880s see the *Sun* March 11, 1880, February 14, March 25, 1884, June 1, 1887 and January 20, 1888.

21. *Ibid.*, May 30, June 2, 1887; the views of the major factory owners are contained in an interview with their official spokesman and the report of his testimony on behalf of the 1888 annexation bill which appeared in the *Sun* December 17, 1887, and March 1, 1888; the problems of crime and fire protection are discussed on April 23, 29, 30, 1881, January 20, February 23, March 2, 12, April 29, 30, 1885.


23. *Sun*, January 13, 15, February 4, 8, 12, 19, 23, 24, 1886; *Baltimore County Union, January 23, 30, February 6, 13, 20, March 6, 1886.


26. Daly vs. Morgan, et. al., Md. 69 (1888); *Sun*, November 24, 1888; *Message of the Mayor of Baltimore City*, (1889), 83.

27. There is no study of Baltimore's suburban expansion, but a graphic portrait of real estate development in the metropolitan area can be seen in local atlases of the 1890-1915 era. Brief descriptions appear in Hall, *Baltimore: Its History and Its People, I: 279-280; The Union-News* ( Towson) November 19, 1910; the Baltimore News, April 18, 1914. Activities of the state and county roads departments can be found in Maryland State Roads Commission, *Annual Reports* (1908-1915); *The Union-News*, March 7 1914; *The New Era* ( Towson), February 6, 1915. Descriptions of the improved county services are found in the *Sun*, January 5, 21, February 24, July 1, 1913 and *The Union-News*, February 28, 1914.


30. A special city tax commission reported in 1908 that the annex acquired in 1888 had not paid for its services. By obtaining special legislation in Annapolis in 1902 it was still paying the old 1888 county rate in spite of the fact that the annexation act had stipulated the full rate after 1900. By 1908 the annex was paying a lower rate than property in the county! In 1913 the Baltimore City-wide Congress issued a report highly critical of the 1888 act which opened the door to a protracted litigation to tax the annex at the same rate as the rest of the municipality. The annex did not pay the full rate until 1939. See Advisory Commission on Taxation and Revenue, *Report of the Committee on Relations of the City and Suburbs*, (Baltimore, 1913), 5-6; Leonard O. Rea, *The Financial History of Baltimore, 1900-1926* (Baltimore, 1929), pp. 18-19, 65-69. A pamphlet published in 1916 by the Anti-Annexationist Association of Baltimore County began with the following: "The City Needs You to Pay a Debt of About $100,000,000. The County Has No Debt. Where Do You Prefer to Be?" Pamphlet in Preston Correspondence, Container 9, File 68, Baltimore City Archives.


32. Mayor Preston to George A. Frick, February 24, 1912; W. E. Levering to Mayor Preston, April 3, 1913; George A. Frick to Mayor Preston, April 18, 1913; John Trainor, President Baltimore Civic Federation to Mayor Preston, November 1, 1913, Preston Correspondence, Container 6, file 53 Baltimore City Archives; James H. Preston, *First Annual Message of Mayor James H. Preston*, April 18, 1913, 34; *Journal of Proceedings of the House of Delegates of Maryland, January Sess., 1912, 1329, 1561; Sun, February 9, 10, March 7, 8, 9, 21, 1912; *The Union-News, February 10, December 3, 1912, March 23, 1918*.  

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33. S. Field to Mayor Preston, January 17, 1914, Mayor Preston to S. S. Field, January 9, 1914, Preston Correspondence, Container 6, File 53-A Baltimore City Archives; Votes and Proceedings of the House of Delegates of Maryland, January Sess., 1914, 1159, 2826; Sun, January 2, 15, 24, April 2, 1914; American, April 2, 1914; Baltimore News, April 2, 1914.

34. City-Wide Congress, Report of the Committee on Enlarging the Boundaries of Baltimore City, May 20, 1915; Sn, June 1, 1915.

35. Baltimore City Harbor Board, The Port of Baltimore, (Baltimore, April, 1918), 18-19; Sun, July 2, 14, 23, 1915.

36. Sun, June 8, 20, 24, July 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 28, 29, September 11, 12, 16, 17, November 4, 1915; The Baltimore News, June 1, 2, 21, July 15, 16, 23, September 16, 17, 1915; American, July 16, September 13, 24, 25, November 4, 1915; The New Era, October 9, 16, 23, November 6, 1915.

37. In an effort to convince legislators that the bill was not connected with the mayor, its sponsors never mentioned Preston's name, he never spoke publicly on the bill, and left the country while the matter was debated in Annapolis. C. M. Harwood, Editor, Baltimore News to Mayor Preston, January 8, 1916, Preston Correspondence, Container 9, File 68-B, Baltimore City Archives.


39. A filibuster was the only tactic the suburbanites could muster towards the end of the debates. Attempts to meet the annexationists' arguments often became ludicrous as in the case of advertisement in the Sun stating that "A larger city doesn't always mean a greater city. Peking, China, has a population twice as large as Baltimore, but who wants to live in Peking?" Sun, January 26, 1916, November 5, 1917. A more imaginative tactic of the county leaders was to take over a hundred state legislators on a tour of undeveloped land within the 1888 boundaries of the city to indicate that the city still had much room for expansion. In response the city published figures from the Census Bureau showing Baltimore to have the highest population density of any large city in the United States. Sun, March 19, 21, 1916.

40. Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, January Sess., 916, 855-862, 864-871, 873-888, 1013-1014; Sun, March 2, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, April 1, 2, 3, 6, American, March 23, 24, April 1, 2; The Baltimore News, March 23, 24, 31, April 1, 2; The Union-News, March 4, 25; News Era, April 1, 8, 1916.


42. Thomas, Greater Baltimore, 8-21; Sun, June 8, 1917; American, June 8, 1917. On the exemption of the new annex from municipal nuisance ordinances see Mayor Preston to A. N. Bastable, Pres., Union Stockyards Company, January 14, 1916, Preston Correspondence, Container 9, File 68-B, Baltimore City Archives.

43. Sun, September 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 23, 1917; American, September 12, 21, 22, 23, 1917; The Baltimore News, September 9, 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, 24, 1917.

44. Sun, September 13, 25, 26, 1917; American, September 24, 25, 26, 1917; News, September 21, 25, 26, 1917; The Union-News, September 15, 22, 29, 1917.

45. Sun, September 18, 1917.

46. Sun, November 1, 2, 5, 8, 1917; American, November 5, 8, 1917; The Baltimore News, 5, 6, 8, 1917; The Union-News, November 5, 12, 1917.

47. Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Delegates of Maryland, January Sess., 1918, 143, 158-163, 171-181, 201-202; Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, January Sess., 1918, 481-503; Sun, January 1, 2, 4, 7, 11, 17, 24, 26, 29, 31, February 2, 7, 10, 16, 19, 22, March 8, 12, 13, 14, 1918; American, January 4, 29, 30, March 12, 13, 1918; The Union-News, January 12, 26, February 2, March 9, 23, 1918; New Era, February 2, 9, March 9, 16, 1918.


49. Mayor Preston to Hon. P. L. Goldsborough, March 14, 1918, Preston Correspondence, Container 10, File 68-C, Baltimore City Archives. Also in this file is an extensive correspondence between the mayor and political leaders in the counties regarding the annexation bill. See also the Sun, January 29, March 14, 19, 21, 22, 1918.


51. McGraw vs. Merryman, et. al., Med. 133 (1918); Sun, April 19, May 30, June 4, 5, 26, July 4, 11, August 4, 1918.

52. Sun, March 23, 1918; The Union-News, May 26, 1917.

2042, 2415, 2576. The only press coverage of the debate in Annapolis appears in the local Towson paper *The Jeffersonian*, January 31, March 14, April 4, 1947.

54. *Sun*, October 20, November 4, 6, 10, 1948; *The Jeffersonian*, October 29, November 5, 12, 1948; *Maryland Manual*, (Annapolis, 1949), 266.

55. *The Jeffersonian*, October 5, 1947; John P. Wheeler and Melissa Kinsey, *Magnificent Failure: The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968* (New York, 1970), 2–3, 23, 108–109, 204–207, 229. A proposal to form a state commission to simply study ways in which the city and county might cooperate was not even given serious consideration by the legislature. See Senate of Maryland, *Senate Resolution No. 73* (March 3, 1975); *Sun*, March 9, 1975. The current Baltimore County Executive was widely criticized by county residents and political leaders for even discussing with Mayor of Baltimore City the possibility of joint purchase of equipment and other minor areas of cooperation. County residents appear to fear that even the most trivial connections with the city will become an opening wedge for metropolitan government. See the *Sun*, July 22, 1975.