 |
|
|
 |
|
 |
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
| 33 III LABOR they cultivate disgruntled minorities and politically ambitious "outs". In a short tine, they are usually elected to minor offices, such as shop steward or trustee. TTith the added prominence, they perfect their organiza- tion, especially seeking opportunists anxious for honor and prestige. Simultaneously they institute an undercover campaign of "smearing11 and "character assasination" against the existing officers. They make impossible demands and exploit unredressed grievances, no matter how preposterous. Whispering campaigns are begun. Rumors are spread that the officers are company stooges." Then when election rolls around, Communists have a slate which represents minority groups such as Hegroes, embodies some popular but weak officers, and possibly has a few Communists in strategic positions. At the same time, they try to promote several independent slates to split the opposition vote. In the confusion, they are often successful in gaining power. Once in power, they attempt to expel the opposition leaders from the union on^trumped-up charges, and thus remove potential danger to their tenure. The "weak President depends upon them for advice and thus can be used at will, If the regime is unsatisfactory, as it usually is, they can drop the unpopular officers and put in a new slate of dupes the following year. By the same tactics, they try to capture the delegates to the national convention and thus have a say in electing national officers. If they can thus control enough locals, they can expel anti-Communist officers, as James Carey found out to his sorrow when he was rudely removed from office with the United Electrical Workers. Carey »s mistake was the sponsoring of an anti-Communist resolution at the convention. It must be noted J;hat in all these activities. Communists have the advice of the 'local Communist organ- ization and the aid of previously controlled unions, the point which is outstanding in all these activities is the part played' by organization. Issues and programs are decidedly subordinate. Of course, the Communists try to sponsor as many popular issues as possible. Likewise, an anti-Communist group would be foolish to come out with%ere "Red-baiting" program without any understanding of the needs and just desires of the workers. But if necessary, organization can prevail even without .popular issues. Such was the case during the YJar, when the Communists "almost completely neglected the grievances of workers and still held power f In labor, as elsewhere, Communists are masters of exploiting the "balance of power" strategy, Vfhenever possible, they either split a union into factions or talre advantage of an existing split. Then the votes of their disciplined minority will be given to the group which is most willing to co-operate. 3y this technique, they are -often able to play a decisive part with control of only a minority vote. This explains the alliances between Communists and opportunists in the labor movement, such as Richard Prankensteen of the Auto T/orkerc and Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing "Yorkers. It just happens that at times certain opportunists are in positions whsre an organized voting group is needed, and they will pay the price. An interesting example of Communist use of this technique may be noted from the better-known field of politics. The American Labor Party of New York is trying to gain a balance-of -power position between the Republicans and the Democrats, so that their dominating vote can be used to control the policies of the much larger parties. |