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It must be a fair and natural inference, not a forced or an artificial
one. There are some instances where the law has declared that a
fact shall be considered in evidence of such a conclusion; but it has
not commonly been so ; and perhaps the better rule is, that it should
not be so. It has sometimes been held, that a woman who is the
parent of a bastard child, and who gives no notice of the birth of her
child, being found with a dead child, it is to be presumed that she
murdered it ; but that is an artificial and not a natural presumption.
But, in circumstantial evidence, the inference to be drawn from
the facts is a probable one, and it should be a necessary one: the
presence of one is proof of the existence of the other.
For this purpose, therefore, each fact which is necessary to the con-
clusion must be distinctly proved. It is not, therefore, that you may
offer partial proof of a variety of facts, and then ask the Jury to
draw an inference from them. Each fact must be proved, as I have
said ; that is, each fact necessary to the conclusion.
It does sometimes happen, as it does in the present case, that facts
are offered in evidence, not because they are necessary to the conclu-
sion, but to show that they are consistent with it, and not repugnant
to it.
If the proof of one of these facts fails, it does not destroy the chain
of facts; it fails only to give them that particular corroboration. I will
only illustrate it by a fact in the present case, which I shall consider
more particularly by and bye.
Suppose, for instance there is proof here, which goes to show that
the teeth found in the furnace were the identical teeth belonging to
Dr. Parkman, as examined a fortnight before, and actually seen by
one person the day before his disappearance. This has a tendency
to prove that he was the person. The first great fact to be proved
being what is called the corpus delicti, the body of the crime; - ordi-
narily, it is to prove that the crime has been committed.
Now, suppose, at the same time, there is other evidence in the case, of
a less conclusive nature, - for instance, the shape, size, height of these
various parts, when put together, which would naturally conform to the
body sought. Now, this latter view would fall short of being a conclu-
sive circumstance, because the same height, and the same other indi-
cations, might not be so indicative of the individual. They go to
corroborate the first evidence thus far, that they are consistent with
it; and a great part of the evidence is resorted to, not because each of
these particular tacts is necessary to establish the main conclusion, but
because they go to show that the circumstances are not such as to be
repugnant to or inconsistent with it. It must depend upon a basis
of facts, which must be as strictly proved by testimony as any other
facts must be ; the coincidences may be of a physical character, or
of a moral nature. The ordinary views and feelings with which
parties act are facts, and they are of such uniform operation, that a
conclusion may be drawn from 'them, that, if a person acts in a par-
tic ular way, he does it from a particular motive: when they are of a
physical and mechanical nature, they are very strong-sometimes they
may be so strong that there can be no question on the subject. Take
an instance where it is natural or physical. Certain circumstances
may exist, which are so conclusive as to leave no doubt.
One of the recent cases that occurred in this Court was a murder,
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