Dr. James W. Stone. Report of the Trial of
Professor John W. Webster ...
, 1850
,
Image No: 149
   Enlarge and print image (54K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
clear space clear space clear space white space


 

Dr. James W. Stone. Report of the Trial of
Professor John W. Webster ...
, 1850
,
Image No: 149
   Enlarge and print image (54K)           << PREVIOUS  NEXT >>
140 consists entirely, solely, of circumstantial proof. And in many cases the circumstances relied upon are actually proved by other circum- stances. It is undertaken to prove circumstances by circumstantial evidence itself. And who shall say to what extent the sources of error have thus multiplied? Owing to this known tendency of circumstantial evidence to mislead the mind, owing to the danger which is likely to arise, the law has adopted certain rules, which are to govern and to guide Juries in considering it. Some of those rules I shall call your attention to, because I consider them pertinent. There may be others mentioned hereafter. The first rule which the law has adopted, for the purpose of guard- ing, as far as possible, against error-(as for guarding against it entirely, it cannot be done ; there is no human tribunal where it can be guarded against ; but to guard against error to some extent, cer- tain rules of law have been adopted)-the first rule I shall name is this. It is an established rule of law, that every circumstance which is relied on must in itself be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. I refer for that to the first of Starkie, 442 page. The first rule is, that every sin'-le circumstance from which, the conclusion is to be drawn must be proved in itself beyond all reasonable doubt. That, of course, shows you that every circumstance is a separate issue, in itself. Every circumstance is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt; and that, you understand, means this : you must find that it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt, when all the evidence is in ; not that any one witness proves a point particularly; but, when you come to consider all the evidence in the case, introduced by each side, upon each point, you are to be satisfied of each individual circumstance, beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore it follows necessarily, that if in a long train of circum- stances, upon which the case is hung up by the Government, there is any one single circumstance which fails, there is an end to the whole case at once. They undertake to anchor their case by a chain of circumstances. If one link breaks, by its own intrinsic weakness, or by any force which the opposite party brings against it, there is an end to the case. Secondly, Gentlemen, the circumstances which are proved, when you find they are proved beyond reasonable doubt-those circum- stances must establish, to a moral certainty, the particular hypothe- sis attempted to be proved by them. That is to say, if the Govern- ment undertake to prove a certain fact, by circumstances, and you are to consider it proved by an inference drawn from those circum- stances, the circumstances must prove that the inference is correct. That is to say, not only the circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but also you must be satisfied that the inference is proved beyond all reasonable doubt. And-that is the second circum- stance. For that rule I will refer to Willis on Circumstantial Evi- dence, 187 page. Thirdly, Gentlemen, the circumstances-and I pray your attention to this rule -these circumstances which are proved beyond reasonable doubt, must not only support the particular hypothesis which the Government intend they shall support but they must not support any other hypothesis. That is to say, they must not only sustain the