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From the Baltimore Republican.

Robert H. Goldsborough, Esq.

Having replied to such parts of your Address as relate to the election and public character of Mr. Adams, I shall now examine some of the measures of his administration. The principle which governed him in the appointment of his cabinet, is already understood. In relation to this subject nothing more is required, than to take notice of the charge of inconsistency which you urge against the opposition, for attempting, as you say, "to censure Mr. Adams, for regarding party distinctions, when applied to the victory at New Orleans, the highest motive avowed by many for supporting General Jackson, is his letter to Mr. Monroe, when he advised him to pursue the same course, of making his appointments indiscriminately from all parties." You remark afterwards, "that if this fact be imputed to him as a fault, proceeding in good faith, what right have the opposition to expect from him a different or better course? You then intimate that there may be some in the opposition, who are acting more in their violence than their qualifications, as a recommendation to office, like neither the liberal practice of General Jackson nor the liberality and practice of Mr. Adams. To this insinuation and others of a similar kind, and to the direct charges, in your address of improper motives, I forbear to reply; but shall proceed to compare the liberal advice of General Jackson, with what you call the liberal practice of Mr. Adams. General Jackson advised Mr. Monroe, that the difference, between the republicans and the federalists was more in name than in principle; that the latter, as well as the former, had borne their part in fighting the battles of their country; that in his appointment of the different ministers, these old party distinctions ought to be forgotten, and that the country was entitled to the services of the best and ablest men, without regard to the party or federalism to which they belonged. Did Mr. Adams select men without regard to the party distinctions? Even Mr. Walsh, in his remarks upon Mr. Webster's Speech, delivered at Boston, friendly as he generally has been to Mr. Adams, could not help observing that he saw no reason why the federalists should unite in support of an administration that continued to proscribe them. Under the peculiar circumstances in which Mr. Adams was placed, he was perhaps under the necessity of excluding individuals from his cabinet: and whether that exclusion was the result of necessity or choice, no one—especially no federalist, had a right to complain.

While you are defending him from charges which he never received, you are claiming credit for liberality which he has not exercised. The main principle of General Jackson's advice, was, that the best qualified men should be selected without reference to party. Did Mr. Adams select the wisest and ablest men of any party? He selected, it is true, from some of the new states into which the nation was divided, but were with a view to prevent future opposition from those parties, than to bring into the service of the country the ability into the service of the country.

It would require too much time to point out all the errors of the Administration respecting the Panama mission, I shall confine to one or two of the most remarkable.

In his message, Mr. Adams states, that it was within the constitutional competency of the executive to send ministers to Panama; that he had determined not to do so, without the concurrence of both Houses of Congress. It is to be presumed, that this right of sending ministers was claimed, as belonging to the President only during the recess of the Senate. The constitution declares that the president 'shall nominate and by and with the consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.'

In another clause, "that he shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of their next session."

If there no vacancy had happened, upon what ground Mr. Adams claimed the power of originating foreign missions, is impossible to conceive. After the meeting of congress, no doubt could be entertained, that according to the constitution, the power of appointing ministers was to be exercised by the president and the senate. Yet Mr. Adams determined that he and the senate should not exercise this power, in the present case, without the concurrence of the house of representatives. He afterwards communicated to that house, all necessary documents to enable it to decide upon the expediency of the measure. This assumption of the power of originating foreign missions, was harmless though ridiculous; but in giving up to the house of representatives, a part of the power of appointment, which belonged exclusively to the president and the senate, he not only departed from the plain principles of the constitution, but set a dangerous example for his successors. In a republic, it is highly important, though always difficult, to confine each branch of the government within its proper limits; more especially to prevent the popular branch from encroaching upon the other departments. Our constitution has been more than once threatened with destruction from this very cause; yet Mr. Adams with a knowledge of this, formally invites the house of representatives to control the exercise of powers, which he knew to be expressly vested in himself and the senate. The president a right, for the purpose of getting rid of responsibility, to delegate his constitutional powers, to any other branch of the government! Mr. Adams might have thought it safe to relinquish this power to a house of representatives, in which he had a majority, but he ought to have considered, that at some future time, there might be a majority against him, and that the same principle of expediency which confirmed his appointments at one time, might overrule them at another. Can his friends justify the conduct I have mentioned, or pretend that his boasted experience and learning have prevented him from pursuing a course in direct opposition to his duty, and the plain meaning of the constitution.

Of the Panama mission itself, I shall merely remark, that great expectations were formed of it, by the president and his friends, and that great disappointment was the result. Mr. Sargeant, like Ulysses, in search of his beloved Ithica, was destined to traverse distant seas in search of the congress of Panama, and at length like the dove sent out from Noah's Ark, was obliged to return, without having found "a resting place for" "the soal of his foot"

WILLIAM GRASON.

To Robert H. Goldsborough, Esq.

The next subject that presents itself for examination, is the conduct of the administration, respecting the commercial intercourse between the United States and the British possessions, in North America and the West Indies.

To understand this conduct properly, it is necessary, first to see in what situation this subject was left by the administration of Mr. Monroe, whose term expired the 3d of March 1825. Mr. Clay states in his instructions to Mr. Gallatin, that, "the long and arduous discussions, which took place between Mr. Rush and Messrs Huskisson and S. Canning, in 1824, brought the parties very near together. But as they could not then agree, it was concluded to suspend the negotiation with a distinct understanding on both sides that it should be again resumed. From a comparison of the British Proposals, it will be seen:

"First, that the parties were willing to abolish all discriminating duties."

Secondly, "that the British Government was satisfied and actually offered, that the intercourse should continue restricted to the direct voyage, as it then was by the respective laws of the parties."

"But, thirdly, the point on which the parties could not agree, was, that the United States insisted that American produce should be admitted into the British Colonial Ports, upon the same terms as similar produce received from any other isle; that is, either from a British possession or any foreign country." From this statement of Mr. Clay, it appears that the administration of Mr. Monroe might have secured the Colonial trade, by a treaty with the Brsitish government, in July 1824, if it had not insisted that American produce and manufactures, sent from the United States, should pay no higher duties in the British Colonial Ports, than was charged upon similar articles sent from other British Colonies, or from Great Britain herself. The British Government might with as much reason, have contended that manufactures and other articles, sent from Liverpool to Baltimore, should pay no higher duty than similar articles sent to the same place from Boston. To this demand of our government, the British commissioners made the following reply: "The objectional condition amounts to no less than a stipulation that Great Britain shall renounce, in favour of the United States, without a return on their side, the power of protecting the staples of her own subjects. In principle, such a proposition is evidently inadmissible. It could not be entertained with credit, by any power on which it was to operate exclusively. It is directly at variance with the practice of all commercial, of all civilized states."

Mr. Clay states that this objectionable condition was made in pursuance of the act of congress of March 1823. Acts of congress to regulate any particular commerce which has been the subject of unfinished negociations, are generally determined on after consultation with the Secretary of State. Mr. Adams in his instructions to Mr. Rush, states that "the act of Congress of March 1, 1823, was introduced into the Senate by their committee of Foreign Relations at an early period of their session That, in maturing it, they had before them the act of Parliament of 24th of June, 1822, and the correspondence between himself and Mr. Canning; and the full import of the term "elsewhere," was deliberately examined and settled, as well in the Senate as upon a consultation, by the President with the members of the administration."

In another part of the same instructions, he says, in reference to the negotiation in 1819, "It has been seen that the United States then, (that is 1819) explicitly declined acceding to an article which would have opened the colonial ports, because it would have reserved to Great Britain the right of laying, in the Colonial Ports, higher duties upon articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, than upon the like articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of Great Britain or her colonies."

From these extracts it appears, that this principle was contended for, during six years at least of Mr. Monroe's administration, and four years before it found its way into the act of Congress of March 1823; and that the act itself was passed, after full examination of the correspondence between Mr. Adams and Mr S. Canning; and after a consultation between the President and the members of his administration, respecting the construction which should be put upon the word elsewhere. It is therefore nearly certain, that the inadmissible demand was made, not, as Mr. Clay states, in pursuance of the act of 1823, but in pursuance of the settled policy of Mr. Monroe's administration. How far that administration is to be censured for so long refusing to accede to the reasonable proposals of the British government, or what portion of this censure should fall upon Mr. Adams, I shall not undertake to determine. In the Inaugural Address of Mr. Adams, he expresses his approbation of the measures and principles of Mr. Monroe's administration; and as Secretary of state, he must have had considerable agency and influence in our negociations with foreign nations. Mr. Monroe might have thought there was a possibility that the British government would yield to our demand, before he received Mr. Rush's letter of the 12th of August 1824. That letter communicated to our goverment so direct and positive and deliberate a rejection of our demand, that every expectation of succeeding in it, must from that time, have been abandoned. The negociations between Mr. Rush and the British commissioners, were broken off, the 28th January, 1824, with the understanding that they were to be resumed. The letter of Mr. Rush, being dated the 12th of August, was probably received by Mr. Adams, the last of September, or first of October. As Mr. Monroe's term was nearly at an end, he might have thought it most proper to leave it to his successor, to send out a new minister, and to take such other steps as were necessary to a renewal of the negociation.

It is now necessary to turn to the administration of Mr. Adams, to see what steps were taken for that purpose. He came into power, the 4th of March 1825, and from that period to the 19th of June, 1826, the date of Mr. Clay's instructions to Mr. Gallatin, we hear of nothing from him, nor from any member of his administration, about a renewal of negociations respecting the Colonial Trade. Mr. King was sent as Resident Minister to England, where he remained more than twelve months, without being instructed to say a word upon that subject. Mr. Clay says, that "the first object which engaged his attention, was the state of the mixed commission at Washington, under the convention of St. Petersburg." "He was for some time occupied by a correspondence and conference with Mr Canning on that subject, until it was transferred to Washington."

It has been said that the state of Mr. King's health prevented him from transacting difficult business; and tha therefore he was not furnished with instructions in relation to the Colonial Trade. This reason however is not sufficient. If his indisposition was of such a nature, as to forbid the expectation of his reasoning, a minister ought at once to have been appointed to succeed him; and if on the other hand he laboured under temporary disease his instructions, which would require at least a month in their transmission, ought to have been sent without delay, so as to enable him to bring the subject before the British government as soon as his health would allow. As this was not done, the natur l inference is, that Mr. Adams was not yet prepared to recede from the inadmissible condition required by Mr. Monroe and that (to use the language of Mr Canning) he was still disposed to "intrench him-elf behind the act of Congress of March 1823."

It is now necessary to consider this act of Congress, in reference to the circumstances under which it was passed. It was intended, says Mr. Adams, as a "corresponding measure on the part of the United States, to the act of Parliament of 24th June 1822." By this act of Parliament the trade between the United States, and certain ports in the British Colonies, was opened under certain restrictions to vessels of the United States. In consequence of this act Mr. Monroe issued his proclamation, in pursuance of the act of Congress of 6th of May, opening the ports of the United States to British vessels, coming from such of the British ports as has been opened by the act of Parliament.

But all British vessels coming into the ports of the United States, from such colonial ports, were subject to a discriminating duty of 94 cents per ton, and ten per cent upon her cargo, in addition to the ordinary duties. These discriminating duties were to be continued by the act of congress of 1823, unless the produce and manufactures of the United States, were allowed admission into the British Colonial ports, upon the payment of no higher duties, than were charged upon similar articles imported from other British colonies, or from Great Britain. These duties were continued upon the alleged ground, that the act of Parliament of 1822 laid our vessels under inconvenient restrictions, which required to be counteracted by discriminating duties upon British vessels. But another act of Parliament was passed the 5th July 1825, four months after the commencement of Mr. Adams' Presidential term, and twelve months after the negociations were suspended. By this last mentioned act, the limitations of the act of 1822, were done away, and the British Colonies opened to the vessels of all nations, and the same rate of duties established with respect to British and foreign vessels and cargoes.

The privileges granted by this act, are limited with respect to countries not having Colonial possessions, to the vessels of such as should place the commerce and navigation of Great Britain and her possessions abroad, upon the footing of the most favored nation. It must therefore have been perceived by our administration, that, if the discriminating duties were continued upon British vessels, the British Colonial ports would be closed against the vessels of the United States. The merchants of Baltimore foreseeing the loss of the Colonial trade, if the conditions held out by the British Government were not complied with, petitioned Congress, during the session of 1825 and 6, for a repeal of the discriminating duties.

Could not the Administration understand the act of Parliament of July 1825, as well as the Merchants of Baltimore? If they did not understand it, was that a reason to prevent negociation? If Mr. King continued too unwell, and Mr. Adams did not think it proper to make any advance towards negociation without first receiving an invitation from the British Government, why did he not recommend to Congress the passage of a law, during the session of 1825 and 6, for the purpose of complying with the conditions of the act of Parliament? He preferred negociation yet neglected to negociate; he took no steps himself, for securing the trade, and yet left Congress under the impression that no legislative act was necessary for that purpose. The British Government perceiving no disposition on our part to renew the negociation, and that no notice was taken of the liberal proposals held out to us by the act of Parliament of July 1825, directed Mr. Vaughan to address the following note to Mr. Clay. "I have received instructions from His Majesty's Government, to acquaint you, that it is preparing to proceed in the important negociations between that country and the United States, now placed in the hands of the American Minister in London. The negociation will therefore be forthwith resumed, and it will be for the Government of the United States to judge whether, considering the state of the health of Mr. King, which Mr. Canning laments to say, has been since his arrival in England, far from satisfactory, will join any other negociator with him."

From this it appears, that the British Government, after waiting twelve months, found it necessary to call the attention of our government to the state of Mr. King's health, and to suggest the propriety of joining some other person with him in the negociation The British Government began, no doubt to be impatient; their vessels entering the United States from the Colonies were still paying the discriminating duties; the conditions upon which the trade of those Colonies was offered to foreign nations, were not yet fulfilled by our government; and it is probable that the resolution was now formed to exclude our vessels from their Colonial possessions, unless their own vessels were placed upon the requisite footing with as little delay as possible. The note of Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Clay is dated the 22d of March 1826. On the same day he wrote to Mr. Canning, that "Mr. Clay had informed him that he should not be able to furnish Mr. King with his instructions before the end of the month of May, to enable him to recommence the negociation." On the 27th July 1826, was issued the British order of Council, by which the intercourse in American vessels between the United States and the British Colonies, was to be closed on the first day of the following December. This order was issued two years after the suspension of the negociation, sixteen months after Mr. Adams came into power; twelve months after the act of Parliament which, on certain conditions, opened the Colonial ports to the vessels of all nations; and just long enough after the session of Congress, and the promise of Mr. Clay to send out instructions, to perceive that nothing farther was to be expected either from our Congress or Executive.

Mr. Gallatin, the successor of Mr King, arrived in England a few weeks after the order of Council was issued. In his instructions, dated 19th June 1826, Mr. Clay tells him that the United States consent to "wave the demand which they have heretofore made of the admission of their productions into British Colonies at the same, and no higher rate of duty, as similar productions are chargeable with when imported from one into another British Colony."

He afterwards says, "you will observe that the instructions now given, respecting the Colonial Trade, amount to an authority on the part of this Government to you, to agree in substance to the modification of Mr. Rush's proposal, which was required by the British Plenipotentiaries." Thus we find the Administration consenting at last, to waive the demand, which so long had prevented us from securing the Colonial Trade by treaty. They refused a treaty while it was in their power, and offered to accept it, when it no longer could be obtained. Let us now examine what is said by the Adams Convention, in defence of this conduct, and what the Administration say for themselves.

You say in the address of the Adams Convention, that in the selection of Mr. King, the strongest evidence was given of a desire to pursue the negociation effectually; yet you say immediately afterwards, that we had but little reason to believe that we could speedily obtain the terms proposed by our Government: and therefore, as we were in the enjoyment of a good trade, we had no inducement to press the subject. If for the reasons given, we had no inducement to press the subject, the selection of Mr. King can hardly be admitted as a proof that we wished to pursue the negociation effectually.

You speak of the state of Mr. King's health, as a reason why the negociation was not resumed; and then state that no instructions were sent out, because no intimation had been given by the British Government, of a wish to resume it. According to this statement, Mr. King would have done nothing if he had been well, nor would our government have furnished him with the necessary instructions, till an intimation had been given by the British Government of a wish to negociate. It was evidently the duty of the American Government to make an advance towards the renewal of the negociation, as soon as the determination was formed to recede from our extravagant demand. If neither party had receded from its demands, a renewal of negociation would have been useless.

You say our great interest was to secure the trade permanently by treaty, instead of leaving it to the "mutable and unsteady arrangements of legislative acts on both sides. Forbearance therefore on our part, so far from being a fault, was rather advised by policy.

Forbearance here means delay, and delay, or forbearance, in getting the trade secured by treaty, was the very way to leave it to the mutable legislative acts of both parties.

You cite the declarations of General Smith and Mr. Cambreling, to show that neither Mr. Adams nor Mr. Clay discouraged the proposition before Congress for repealing the discriminating duties. General Smith exonerates Mr. Adams and Mr. Cambreling exonerates Mr. Clay. But it is well known that both these members of Congress condemned the course of the Administration in relation to the Colonial trade. And according to my recollection, Gen. Smith in his speech in favour of the petition of the Baltimore merchants, stated that Mr. Lloyd of Massachusetts, the chairman of the committee of commerce, and the friend of Mr. Adams, had given the Senate to understand, that the Administration were of opinion that Congress had better leave this subject to negociation. But suppose Mr. Adams had told General Smith, that he was not opposed to the repeal of the discriminating duties; are we to ascertain his opinions and wishes from his declarations to persons, not having his frienship, or are we to judge from his own acts, and the votes of his friends. You will admit that Mr. Clay had better opportunities than General Smith and Mr. Cambreling, of knowing his own opinion and the opinion of Mr. Adams, respecting the interference of Congress, upon the subject of the discriminating duties In his letter to Mr. Vaughan 11th October, 1826, Mr. Clay states "that it is difficult to understand on what ground the British Government had placed the hope that Congress on the recommendation of the President, would have abolished the discriminating duties. Supposing the American government prepared to consent to their abolition, two modes of accomplishing the object presented themselves, one by treaty and the other by acts of separate legislation. The two governments had selected the former as the more eligible, by opening a negociation, of which there was only a temporary suspension." From this it appears that Mr. Adams could not be expected to recommend the repeal of the discriminating duties by law, because he considered negociations as the more eligible mode. Does not this show that the administration were really opposed to any act of Congress in relation to the subject? Negociation was the burden of their song; negociation was the more eligible mode of settling the difficulty, and it was so easy in negociation, "by a single word of explanation, an instantaneous suggestion of the modification of a proposal elicited in conference, to lead to the adjustment of a difference, which might not be settled for a long time by two bodies, composed of several hundred members separated by the Atlantic ocean." Another advantage which the administration no doubt promised themselves from negociation, was, that the credit of securing the trade would belong exclusively to them. But they were so long in making explanations by a single word, and so dilatory in their instantaneous suggestions, that they have lost the credit, which they expected for themselves, and the trade which was expected by our merchants.

But admit that Mr. Adams had not been opposed to securing the Colonial trade, by a repeal of the discriminating duties, or by any other measures of Congress, would that be a justification of his own mismanagement in not securing it by treaty, when he had so long had it in his power? But if the indisposition of Mr. King or any other circumstance prevented the Administration from providing by treaty, for the privileges offered by the act of Parliament of July 1825, then it was clearly the duty of Mr. Adams, to recommend to Congress the adoption of such measures, in favour of British vessels, as the Act of Parliament required.

So far as this subject has been examined, it is difficult to perceive any reason for the triumphant remark in your Address, "that with such evidence against them, even opposition must cower and retire." You certainly promised yourselves an easy victory; and were inclined, in this respect to give credit to the opposition, for a more retiring disposition, than you have ascribed to them in other parts of your address.

I shall now examine Mr. Clay's defence of the administration. He states that Mr. King was sent to replace Mr. Rush, in the spring of 1825, fully empowered to treat on all the subjects of the previous negotiation: That he was instructed first to get the British government to remove the impediments, raised by the British Commission at Washington, which prevented the execution of the convention at St. Petersburg: That his instructions on the subject of the suspended negotiation should be sent in time to open it: And "that they would have been so transmitted but that upon his arrival in England, in the month of June 1825, he was indisposed, that he learned that his Britannic Majesty was ill, and that Mr. Canning was also unwell, and moreover, that the British Cabinet was dispersed over the island and upon the continent, in the pursuit of health and recreation."

Mr. King informed Mr. Clay of the indisposition of the members of the British Cabinet, in a letter dated the 9th August 1825, which must have been received in Washington some time in September. Mr. King could not have received an answer from Mr. Clay till the month of October. By that time it might have been expected that his health would be restored, and the members of the British Cabinet re-assembled in London. There was no necessity therefore for keeping back instructions on account of the indisposition of Mr. King and the dispersion of the British Ministers. Mr. Canning returned to London before the 26th of September, on which day he was to receive Mr. King on business.

"Happily (says Mr. Clay) His Britannic Majesty, and his Principal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, were restored to health. The British Cabinet did not re-assemble until the autumn of 1825, and Mr. King unfortunately remained feeble and unwell up to the period of his return to the United States, in consequence of his indisposition. If his instructions were not forwarded to him, it was because it was known that he was engaged in discussions respecting the St. Petersburg convention, and it was believed that his languid condition did not admit of entering upon the discharge of the more arduous duty of resuming the suspended negotiation."

According to the accurate style of Mr. Clay, Mr. King continued unwell in consequence of his indisposition; but if it was known at Washington that he was engaged in discussions respecting the convention of St. Petersburg, it might have been inferred that he would soon be able to enter upon the more arduous duty of resuming the suspended negotiation. But why was this last mentioned duty so very arduous? The parties, according to Mr. Clay's own account, were brought very near together. If Mr. King had been merely instructed to inform the British Government, that the United States were willing to wave the demand, which so long had formed an obstacle, and to accede to the proposals offered to Mr. Rush in 1824, every difficulty would have been removed The probability is that the administration never made up their mind to wave this demand, until it was too late; for Mr. Clay makes an acknowledgment nearly to this effect, in the following passage of a letter to Mr. Vaughan. "It is true (he says) that the proposal by the British Plenipotentiaries to Mr. Rush was made about two years ago, and has been under consideration since it was received," If it was under consideration all this time, it is evident that the administration had not determined whether to accept it or not; and it is obvious, that it was their duty when even they did determine to accept it, to communicate that determination to the British Government. It was this indecision on the part of our administration, and not the causes alleged, which continually delayed the renewal of negotiation; until at length the order of council of 27th July 1826, finally put an end to every prospect of a treaty. The order of council appears to have taken the administration by surprise. The United States never dreamed (says Mr. Clay) that without the smallest notice, the negotiation was to be suddenly arrested. I will now show that the administration had been dreaming themselves if they did not expect it. The trade was opened in July 1826, as it had been in June 1822, on certain conditions; countries not fulfilling those conditions were to be excluded from the trade. We had not fulfilled them, nor had we manifested any intention of doing so. In 1822, we expected to be cut off from the trade in consequence of not complying with the conditions, as appears by the following extract from Mr. Adams' instructions to Mr. Rush.

"The admission of our vessels had been presented to us not only upon conditions exceedingly burdensome, but under a direct menace that, if we should not accept it upon the identical terms offered in those acts, commercial intercourse between us and all the British colonies in this hemisphere would be prohibited by an order in council. And we have received intimations that this power, reserved to the King by the act of 25th June would be exercised, if we should not immediately exempt British vessels employed in the trade, from the foreign tonnage and additional import duties. We have therefore been under the necessity of deciding upon our course of policy, relating to the interest, upon a calculation of probability that the power would be exercised, and that the order of council would issue.' But Mr. Clay alleges that the act of Parliament of July 1825 was never officially communicated to the Government of the United States; and that it had reference to numerous other acts of Parliament, of a very complicated nature, the examination of which required considerable time. The act was published in the usual manner, and Mr. Clay does not pretend that he remained ignorant of it, a moment longer, in consequence of his not being officially informed of it. The merchants of Baltimore were informed of it in time, to petition Congress, as I have already mentioned, at the session of 1825 and 6. By an examination of the instructions to Mr. Rush, it will be seen that Mr. Adams understood the complicated acts of Parliament perfectly well. But if the absence of official information respecting the act of 1825 and ignorance of the laws to which it referred prevented the administration from complying with the requisite conditions at first; the same reasons would have operated to the last, and prevented the instructions to Mr. Gallatin. It was the duty however, of the administration to understand the act of Parliament and so far as it concerned the United States, they did understand it, and our government had been apprised of the subject as they pretend to have been, that circumstance alone would have prevented negotiation between the two nations would have superseded every legislative act of parties.

The conduct of the administration, in relation to this subject, completely justifies the opinion advanced by the Jackson convention; "that the President has been guilty of a palpable neglect of duty, to which a parallel can hardly be found in the history of our exterior relations." It was my intention to reply to some other arguments and statements in the address of the Adam's convention, which appeared to me to be as untenable as those I have examined. But I have already said so much more than I first intended, that I will now conclude with the assurance, that I have endeavoured to avoid every expression that could appear to be inconsistent with that respect and friendship, which I have so long entertained for you.

WM. GRASON.