

Federal Republican Tickets. HOUSE OF DELEGATES.

FOR FREDERICK COUNTY. William Ross, Alexander Warfield, John H. Simmons, Robert G. M'Pherson.

FOR CALVERT COUNTY. Gustavus Weems, Benjamin Gray, Thomas Blake, Joseph W. Reynolds.

FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY. George C. Washington, Ephraim Gaither, Ezekiah Linthicum, Benjamin S. Forrest.

FOR TALBOT COUNTY. Thomas Frazier, Nicholas Goldborough, William H. Tighman, John Goldborough.

FOR DORCHESTER COUNTY. Benjamin W. Lecompte, Edward Griffith, Michael Lucas, Dr. William Jackson.

FOR CAROLINE COUNTY. Col. William Potter, Maj. Richard Hughlett, James Houston, Willis Charles.

FOR KENT COUNTY. William Knight, Isaac Spencer, John Eccleston, Frisby Brown.

THE NEXT ELECTION. FELLOW CITIZENS,

Stability is an all important characteristic of every government. As no private individual without stability of character, so no government destitute of it, can be respectable or respected. The greatest evil complained of in the legislation of free states, is the multiplicity and frequent changes of the laws. This mutability is condemned by all sound jurists, and a certain and known rule of duty and of right, even though less perfect, is preferred to an ever varying system, which leaves the citizen in doubt and uncertainty, though the changes that are made, may in the abstract be good. No certainty can exist as to private rights or obligations, if with every returning session of the legislature, innovations upon established rules are made. If this is universally admitted to be a great evil, with respect to ordinary laws, affecting for the most part private transactions and single individuals, how much greater must the mischief be, when a spirit of innovation invades the very frame of the government itself, now destroying a pillar and now a partition, without regard to the dependence that the other parts of the fabric may have upon them, and then erecting new columns and adding new apartments without relation to the original plan of the edifice. The rights and liberties of the citizen and the powers and duties of the magistrate thus become uncertain and are liable to violation, as well from ignorance, as design. Whole nations, like individuals, are the creatures of habit. They become attached to what they have long been used to, and regard with reverence, what their fathers have held in veneration. This habitual respect forms the chief strength of all governments. Let us beware then in a free country, where public opinion gives force to law, vigour to the government, and security to every citizen, we violate this powerful principle and yield to the spirit of innovation. The democrats, who were last winter the advocates of instability and change, in the general assembly, openly pronounced their views in two bills which they introduced repealing the constitution so far as it relates to the executive department and the senate. Their plan was instead of the present stable senate, to give you one composed of a fifth delegate from each of the counties. This project, whatever may be thought of the present mode of forming the senate, is too absurd to require a moment's consideration to reject it. The great object of having a senate at all, is to form a check upon the other house. To do this effectually you must constitute it in a different manner and give it as different principles of action as possible. By the plan pro-

posed you make your senate a mere court house of parties, and the same impulses of local interest and local feeling. Under the constitution as it now stands, you have an independent and enlightened body, which is not constrained in its conduct by the wishes of any particular section of the country, but is at liberty to be governed by an enlarged view of the interest of the whole state. There is little apprehension that the present mode of selecting a senate will be changed, until a better substitute; than the absurd one just now mentioned, is proposed. I shall not therefore waste your time upon this topic, but must beg your particular attention while I consider more minutely the executive bill.

The effect of the change proposed in that bill will be to lay the country prostrate at the feet of the city of Baltimore. The object of its authors and supporters is by the aid of the overwhelming wealth and influence of that place to elevate themselves to power at the expense of the independence of the counties, and at the sacrifice of the interest and safety of the country. So unfeeling and wilfully blind to consequences is ambitious self interest!

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The proposition now made by the innovators is to abolish the council altogether and to commit the executive power into the hands of a single man, who is to be elected by a general ticket throughout the state and to hold his office for three years.

The first objection to this plan, is there is no evil felt from the present mode of electing the governor, to justify any change. This of itself is a sufficient answer to the advocates of innovation. But there are strong arguments to satisfy every impartial person that, in the abstract, the present mode of electing the governor, is much better than the one proposed. The desire and the interest of the people must be to have that man for governor, who is best qualified for administering well the executive power. It is for the interest of the people then, that those should be authorized to select the governor, who are most able to judge of the necessary qualifications of a chief magistrate and who are in a situation which imposes upon them a strong sense of responsibility for the faithful discharge of the duty of making a selection. In whom are those requisites united so completely as in the members of the general assembly? They are generally better acquainted with the character and talents of political men, than any other set of men you can find in the state. Deriving their power either directly or indirectly from the people, they will feel their responsibility to them in the execution of their trust. The members of the general assembly then offer every title to the confidence of the people—intelligence and security for their integrity.

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- 1. A man of great firmness of character, that he may see that the law be executed, however dangerous or difficult it may be.
2. He should possess extensive knowledge, particularly of the constitution and laws of the state and the United States.
3. He should be endowed with great sagacity, that he may be able to penetrate into the character and talents of men, that he may make a judicious selection of the officers of government.
4. He ought to have great experience, that he may know how to guard against the deception of men interested to mislead.
5. He ought, to possess great prudence, that he may so administer the government as to increase the respect and attachment of the people for it, instead of exciting their aversion.
6. He ought to be a statesman of profound and liberal views, that he may recommend such measures to the legislature as will be conducive not only to the present but the future welfare of the state.

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Table with 2 columns: County, Population. Includes Baltimore, Frederick county, Harford, Washington, Dorchester, Anne Arundel, Prince-George's, Cecil, Montgomery, Queen Anne, Somerset, Talbot, Caroline, Charles, Kent, St. Mary's, Allegany, Calvert, Annapolis.

The city of Baltimore nearly doubled its population between 1800 and 1810. We shall be moderate then, if we calculate upon an increase of 50 per cent. between 1810 and 1820, especially when we reflect that within the last two years the limits of the city have been so far extended, as to embrace more than three times as much space as it did in 1810. Add fifty per cent. then to the population of Baltimore including the precincts in 1810, and you will have {41,883} 62,824 as its population at present.

We may safely conclude that the three large and flourishing counties of Baltimore, Frederick and Harford, which alone would gain by the proposed change, have also rapidly increased in white population, while the white population of the smaller counties, which would lose political weight, has taken together, either been stationary or has actually diminished. It is certain, at least,

As there is no distinct census of Annapolis, within reach of the writer, the above number of white inhabitants are assigned to it from the proportion which its number of voters bears to it.

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On the other hand, if the governor is to be elected by a general ticket, what security have they that a proper choice will be made? A Governor ought to be

proposed you make your senate a mere court house of parties, and the same impulses of local interest and local feeling. Under the constitution as it now stands, you have an independent and enlightened body, which is not constrained in its conduct by the wishes of any particular section of the country, but is at liberty to be governed by an enlarged view of the interest of the whole state. There is little apprehension that the present mode of selecting a senate will be changed, until a better substitute; than the absurd one just now mentioned, is proposed. I shall not therefore waste your time upon this topic, but must beg your particular attention while I consider more minutely the executive bill.

The effect of the change proposed in that bill will be to lay the country prostrate at the feet of the city of Baltimore. The object of its authors and supporters is by the aid of the overwhelming wealth and influence of that place to elevate themselves to power at the expense of the independence of the counties, and at the sacrifice of the interest and safety of the country. So unfeeling and wilfully blind to consequences is ambitious self interest!

The governor and council are now appointed annually, by the representatives of the people, chosen as their agents, with an express view to that election as well as to their duty of legislation. And these representatives are responsible to the people for the faithful exercise of this power as well as others. And I think, I may with confidence appeal to your recollection, fellow-citizens, whether proper appointments have not in general been made.

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Appointment of Delegates on the basis of population. Baltimore city 17, Frederick county 8, Baltimore county 6, Harford 4, Washington 4, Dorchester 4, Anne-Arundel 3, Worcester 3, Prince-George's 3, Cecil 3, Montgomery 3, Queen-Anne's 3, Somerset 3, Talbot 2, Caroline 2, Charles 2, Kent 2, St. Mary's 2, Allegany 1, Calvert 1, City of Annapolis 1. Total 80.

In the above table I have given an additional delegate to each of the counties, having a remainder or fraction larger than one half of 3625, the number which entitles to one delegate.

I have drawn out the present address, fellow-citizens, to a greater length than I intended. I will therefore postpone to my next the consideration of the serious consequences, that will overtake the country, if political power is to be thus accumulated in the city of Baltimore and distributed in the counties according to the above scale, merely remarking for the present, that that government alone is secure, free, where the rights and interests of all the parts are equally well guarded against the encroachment of the others—that this is the only practicable sense, in which EQUALITY OF RIGHTS can be understood—and that this EQUALITY would be utterly destroyed in this state, if political power should be distributed according to the ratio of population.

AGRICOLA.

For the Maryland Gazette.

And so, Mr. Printer, our troubles are likely to increase. We are going to have a war, with Spain I learn, and some of the old war hawks begin to tell us, it would be a most glorious war. I understand there is a party in Congress already who are full of a war with Spain. They want to fight for the South Americans. A fine thing indeed, that our money, if we have it, and lives in to the bargain, are to go, just to humour some restless spirits, who are always wanting to be at war. I suppose too, if we were to get a democratic assembly, we should have some more pledges of our lives and fortunes, and most sacred honour, in defence of this war. Now suppose we were to go and declare war against Spain, what would be the consequence? Why England would delight to join her. She has got no employment for her soldiers, and would like to send them to this country. If they were killed, she would be saved some of the enormous expense of supporting such a large army. Some of the other European