terms, that Mr. Jefferson, bold as he has since shown himself in practising on the credulity of the people, would not have dared to reject it.

After four years of delusive negotiation, first by Mr. Monroe and afterwards by Messers. Monroe and Pinkney—delusive, I mean, on the part of Mr. Jefferson, whose management had served to increase, not to remove difficulties in the way of a successful negotiation; and when he thought the nation ripe for the adoption, or that their passions were so far inflamed, as to bear the imposition of Buonaparte's continental system, under the deceitful name of embargo; then to confirm those passions, and to justify himself for suffering the disputes with Great-Britain still to remain, not only unsettled, but to be increased and aggravated, and to display his skill in diplomacy, in which it was not difficult for him and Mr. Madison, with words clothed in reason's garb, to "make the worse appear the better reason;" a voluminous disclosure of his negotiations with G. Britain was made. The embargo was laid in December, 1807; for what good reason no one could divine: the reasons presented by Mr. Jefferson to Congress being false pretences. The people at large were astonished, and murmurs and complaints began to be heard. These showed that they were not so well prepared for submission to that system as he had imagined. Fortunately for the father of the embargo and his supporters, the British orders in council of Nov. 1807, appeared; and these were immediately pressed into their service. "The appearance of these decrees, (said Mr. Madison in his letter of Feb. 19, 1808, to Mr. Pinkney) has had *much effect* in *reconciling* all descriptions among us to the embargo." In June, 1807, happened the attack on the Chesapeake for the recovery of some deserters from a British ship of war (the Halifax) which had been refused to be delivered up—although a little time before, deserters from a French frigate, then also lying near Norfolk, were without difficulty surrendered.†

This attack, every reader knows was the unauthorised act of the British naval officer commanding on the stations, and that as soon as known in London, it was disavowed by the British government, "who promptly offered to make "effectual reparation" for the injury. But this was rendered impossible by Mr. Jefferson, who coupled with his demand of reparation another demand—"an entire abolition of impressments from vessels under the flag of the U. S." as "an indispensable part of the satisfaction;" to which he knew the British government would not agree. During the four years of negotiation, he had made that abolition a *sine qua non* of a treaty with G. Britain; and, but a few months before the Chesapeake affair, had rejected the treaty signed by his ministers Monroe and Pinkney, because it did not contain a formal abolition of impressments, a point which their letters informed him the British government would not yield. The conclusion is irresistible, that the "abolition" was a new demand, in full confidence that it would be granted; and then the affair of the Chesapeake would remain unsettled, a notable theme for rancorous declamation to irritate the people and embitter still more their minds against G. Britain.

The correspondence on this subject made a part of the president's bulky communications to congress, just three months after the embargo law was enacted. These communications made a volume of 498 pages in octavo! a mass of letters and negotiation, abundantly sufficient, in quantity, to prove the industry and zeal of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, to settle all differences, and to make a treaty of "amity, commerce and navigation" with Great Britain in conformity with the public sentiment and great interests of the U. States. One misfortune only attended this abundant display of diligence and zeal—that it was utterly destitute of sincerity—according to the opinion of Mr. Bayard, officially and strongly expressed, as quoted in a former letter—an opinion founded undoubtedly on a discerning, discriminating examination of the very mass of documents, in connexion with his knowledge of facts and characters, which his long service in congress enabled him to acquire; and according to Mr. Jefferson's own avowal (also before stated) that he did not desire any treaty with G. Britain.

Here is discovered the source of all our sufferings—the suspensions, restrictions, and the destruction of our commerce, and the calamities of war—a war waged without reason—without preparation—without hope—a war in which, while every disaster is distressing, every advantage gained removes to a greater distance the prospect of peace;—a war in which the brave men who alone have acquired honour, have fought without enmity, solely from a sense of duty to obey the orders of their government, while they obtained renown—a war in which, if Canada should be conquered, it will weigh nothing in the scale of pacification; which will cost thousands of lives and millions of money to gain and to hold, and which must be restored, without an equivalent, as a condition of peace. But peace, and on terms at least equally advantageous, is attainable without more expense of blood or treasure—whenever our rulers shall seek it in sincerity and good faith.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

---

* The havoc subsequently made of our commerce under the orders of the French emperor, by captures, violent seizure, in his ports, (insidiously opened for the prey) and burning on the high seas, probably amount to as much more. A few years since, I requested Mr. Fitz Simmons of Philadelphia (one of the best informed and most judicious merchants of the U. S.—many years a member of congress—and for some of the last years of his life the president of an insurance company, which led him especially to notice such losses sustained by our merchants) to give me an estimate of the losses of our citizens, by the depredations of France; and his answer set the whole account, at that time at fifty millions of dollars. The first half pillaged by republican France, was relinquished by the treaty of 1800 commenced by President Adams, and finished by President Jefferson; and of the emperor's half, no man possessed of any glimmering of common sense, can expect the restoration of one cent; the insinuation of any member of our administration to the contrary notwithstanding. If there be a small number of our vessels piratically taken, and not yet definitively condemned, it is possible now that we have adopted his continental system, & made war against Britain, that he may order these to be restored. This would be the dictate of common policy, to soothe the sufferers with the flattering but deceitful hope of a general restoration. Gen. Armstrong knew well the character of Buonaparte. When he at one time treacherously seized many millions of neutral property in his ports, Armstrong wrote to our government, that the very amount of the seizure forbade all hope of restoration.

† The peculiar aggravations which led to the attack on the Chesapeake were little if at all known beyond the limits of Norfolk, near which the British ships and French frigates were lying. The following is an extract from a letter to a friend of mine, written on the spot, but two months afterwards, by a very respectable citizen of Norfolk. He says—"I must always think, that our government ought, in regard to its dignity, and perhaps its safety, one day to discourage desertion. I was an eye-witness to the conduct of the seamen who deserted from the Halifax; they not only rose on the officer having charge of the boat, but openly insulted their captain in the public street, having enlisted in the service of the U. S. the same day. On the other hand, a little time before that, some men deserted from the French frigate in this port, and enlisted with an officer of the U. States; they were demanded by the French captain, who received them, the American officer having delivered them to an armed force sent from the frigate to receive them. This being known, caused the British officers to conceive there was partiality shown, to their prejudice."

WASHINGTON, OCT. 21.

HARRISON'S VICTORY.

Copy of a letter from Major-General Harrison to the Secretary of War.

Head-Quarters, Detroit,
9th Oct. 1813.

SIR,

In my letter from Sandwich of the 30th ultimo, I did myself the honor to inform you, that I was preparing to pursue the enemy the following day. From various causes however, I was unable to put the troops in motion until the morning of the 2nd inst. and then to take with me only about one hundred and forty of the regular troops, Johnson's Mounted Regiment and such of Governor Shelby's Volunteers as were fit for a rapid march, the whole amounting to about 3500 men.—To General M'Arthur (with about seven hundred effectives) the protecting of this place and the sick was committed. Gen. Cass's Brigade and the corps of Lieut. Col. Ball were left at Sandwich with orders to follow me as soon as the men received their knapsacks and blankets, which had been left on an Island in Lake Erie.

The unavoidable delay at Sandwich was attended with no disadvantage to us. Gen. Proctor had posted himself at Dalson's on the right bank of the Thames (or Trench) fifty six miles from this place, where I was informed he intended to fortify and wait to receive me. He must have believed, however, that I had no disposition to follow him or that he had secured my continuance here by the reports that were circulated that the Indians would attack and destroy this place upon the advance of the army; as he neglected to commence the breaking up the bridges until the night of the second inst. On that night our army reached the river, which is twenty-five miles from Sandwich and is one of four streams crossing our route, over all of which are bridges, and being deep and muddy, are unfordable for a considerable distance into the country—the bridge here was found entire, and in the morning I proceeded with Johnson's Regiment to save if possible the others. At the second bridge over a branch of the river Thames, we were fortunate enough to capture a Lieut. of Dragoons and eleven privates, who had been sent by Gen. Proctor to destroy them.—From the prisoners I learned that the third bridge was broken up, and that the enemy had no certain information of our advance. The bridge having been imperfectly destroyed, was soon repaired and the army encamped at Drake's farm, four miles below Dalson's.

The river Thames, along the banks of which our route lay, is a fine deep stream, navigable for vessels of considerable burthen, after the passage of the bar at its mouth, over which there is six and a half feet water.

The baggage of the army was brought from Detroit in boats protected by three Gun-boats, which Commodore Perry had furnished for the purpose as well as to cover the passage of the army over the Thames itself or the mouths of its tributary streams; the banks being low and the country generally open (Prairies) as high as Dalson's, these vessels were was calculated for that purpose. Above Dalson's, however, the character of the river and adjacent country is considerably changed.—The former, though still deep, is very narrow and its banks high and woody. The Commodore and myself therefore agreed upon the propriety of leaving the boats under a guard of one hundred and fifty infantry, and I determined to trust to fortune and the bravery of my troops to effect the passage of the river.—Below a place called Chatham and four miles above Dalson's is the third unfordable branch of the Thames; the bridge over its mouth had been taken up by the Indians, as well as that at McGregor's Mills, one mile above—several hundred of the Indians remained to dispute our passage, and, upon the arrival of the advanced guard, commenced a heavy fire from the opposite bank of the creek as well as that of the river. Believing that the whole force of the enemy was there, I halted the army formed in order of battle, & brought up our two six pounders to cover the party that were ordered to repair the bridge—a few shot from these pieces, soon drove off the Indians and enabled us, in two hours, to repair the bridge and cross the troops. Colonel Johnson's Mounted Regiment being upon the right of the army had seized the remains of the bridge at the Mills under a heavy fire from the Indians. Our loss upon this occasion, was two killed and three or four wounded—that of the enemy was ascertained to be considerably greater. A house near the bridge containing a very considerable number of muskets had been set on fire—but it was extinguished by our troops and the arms saved.—At the first farm above the bridge, we found one of the enemy's vessels on fire, loaded with arms and ordnance stores, and learned that they were a few miles ahead of us still on the right bank of the river with the great body of the Indians. At Bowles's farm, four miles from the bridge, we halted for the night, found two other vessels and a large distillery filled with ordnance and other valuable stores to an immense amount in flames—it was impossible to put out the fire—two twenty four pounders with their carriages were taken and a large quantity of balls and shells of various sizes. The army was put in motion early on the morning of the 5th. I pushed on in advance with the Mounted Regiment and requested Gov. Shelby to follow as expeditiously as possible with the infantry; the Governor's zeal and that of his men enabled them to keep up with the cavalry, and, by 9 o'clock, we were at Arnold's Mills, having taken in the course of the morning two Gun-boats and several batteaux loaded with provisions and ammunition.

A rapid at the river at Arnold's Mills affords the only fording to be met with for a very considerable distance, but, upon examination, it was found too deep for the infantry. Having, however, fortunately taken two or three boats and some Indian canoes on the spot, and obliging the horsemen to take a foot man behind each, the whole were safely crossed by 12 o'clock. Eight miles from the crossing we passed a farm, where a part of the British troops had encamped the night before, under the command of col. Warburton. The detachment with Gen. Proctor, had arrived the day before at the Moravian towns, 4 miles higher up. Being now certainly near the enemy, I directed the advance of Johnson's regiment to accelerate their march for the purpose of procuring intelligence. The officer commanding it, in a short time, sent to inform me, that his progress was stopped by the enemy, who were formed across our line of march. One of the enemy's waggoners being also taken prisoner from the information received from him, and my own observation, assisted by some of my officers, I soon ascertained enough of their position and order of battle, to determine that which it was proper for me to adopt.

I have the honor herewith to enclose you my general order, of the 27th ult. prescribing the order of march and of battle when the whole army should act together. But as the number and description of the troops had been essentially changed, since the issuing of the order, it became necessary to make a corresponding alteration in their disposition. From the place where our army was last halted, to the Moravian towns, a distance of about three and a half miles, the road passes through a beech forest without any clearing, and for the first two miles near to the bank of the river. At from two to three hundred yards from the river, a swamp extends parallel to it throughout the whole distance. The intermediate ground is dry, and although the trees are tolerably thick, it is in many places clear of underbrush. Across this strip of land, its left *appayed* upon the river supported by artillery placed in the wood, their right in the swamp covered by the whole of their Indian force, the British troops were drawn up.

The troops at my disposal consisted of about one hundred and twenty regulars of the 27th regiment, five brigades of Kentucky volunteer militia infantry under his Excellency Gov. Shelby, averaging less than five hundred men, and col. Johnson's Regiment of mounted infantry, making in the whole an aggregate something above 3000. No disposition of an army opposed to an Indian force can be safe unless it is secured on the flanks and in the rear. I had therefore no difficulty in arranging the infantry conformably to my general order of battle. Gen. Trotter's brigade of 500 men formed the front line, his right upon the road and his left upon the swamp. Gen. King's brigade as a second line, 150 yards in the rear of Trotter's, and Chile's brigade as a corps of reserve in the rear of it. These three brigades formed the command of Major Gen. Henry; the whole of Gen. Desha's division, consisting of two brigades were formed *en potence* upon the left of Trotter.

Whilst I was engaged in forming the infantry, I had directed col. Johnson's reg't, which was still in front to be formed in two lines opposite to the enemy, and, upon the advance of the infantry, to take ground to the left and forming upon that flank to endeavor to turn the right of the Indians. A moment's reflection, however, convinced me that from the thickness of the woods & swampiness of the ground, they would be unable to do any thing on horseback and there was no time to dismount them and place their horses in security; I therefore determined to refuse my left to the Indians, and to break the British lines at once by a charge of the mounted infantry; the measure was not sanctioned by any thing that I had seen or heard of, but I was fully convinced that it would succeed. The American backwoodsmen ride better in the woods than any other people. A musket or rifle is no impediment to them, being accustomed to carry them on horseback from their earliest youth. I was persuaded too that the enemy would be quite unprepared for the shock, and that they could not resist it.—Conformably to this idea, I directed the regiment to be drawn up in close column, with its right at the distance of fifty yards from the road, (that it might be in some measure protected by the trees from the artillery) its left upon the swamp, and to charge at full speed as soon as the enemy delivered their fire. The few regular troops of the 27th regt. under their col. (Paul) occupied, in column of sections of four the small space between the road and the river, for the purpose of seizing the enemy's artillery, and some ten or twelve friendly Indians were directed to move under the bank. The Crotchet formed by the front line and General Desha's division was an important Point. At that place the venerable governor of Kentucky was posted, who at the age of sixty-six preserves all the vigor of youth, the ardent zeal which distinguished him in the Revolutionary war, and the undaunted bravery which he manifested at King's Mountain. With my Aid-de-camp, the acting assistant adjutant general captain Butler, my gallant friend com. Perry who did me the honor to serve as my volunteer Aid-de-camp, and Brigadier General Cass, who having no command tendered me his assistance, I placed myself at the head of the front line of infantry, to direct the movements of the cavalry and give them the necessary support.

The army had moved on in this order but a short distance, when the mounted men received the fire of the British line and were ordered to charge; the horses in the front of the column recoiled from the fire; another was given by the enemy and our column at length getting in motion, broke through the enemy with irresistible force. In one minute the contest in front was over; the British officers, seeing no hopes of reducing their disordered ranks to order, and our mounted men wheeling upon them and pouring in a destructive fire, immediately surrendered. It is certain that three only of our troops were wounded in this charge. Upon the left, however, the contest was more severe with the Indians. Col. Johnson, who commanded on that flank of his regiment, received a most galling fire from them, which was returned with great effect.—The Indians still further to the right advanced and fell in with our front line of infantry, near its junction with Desha's division, and for a moment made an impression upon it. His Excellency Governor Shelby however brought up a regiment to its support, and the enemy receiving a severe fire in front and a part of Johnson's regiment having gained their rear, retreated with precipitation. Their loss was very considerable in the action, and many were killed in their retreat.

I can give no satisfactory information of the number of Indians that were in the action, but they must have been considerably upwards of one thousand. From the documents in my possession, (General Proctor's official letters, all of which were taken) and from the information of respectable inhabitants of this territory, the Indians kept in pay by the British were much more numerous than has been generally supposed. In a letter to General De Rottenburg, of the 27th instant.—Gen. Proctor speaks having prevailed upon most of the Indians to accompany him. Of these it is certain that fifty or sixty Wyandot warriors abandoned him.*

The number of our troops was certainly greater than that of the enemy, but when it is recollected, that they had chosen a position that effectually secured their flank, which it was impossible for us to turn, and that we could not present to them a line more extended than their own, it will not be considered arrogant to claim for my troops the palm of superior bravery.

In communicating to the President through you, Sir, my opinion of the conduct of the officers who served under my command, I am at a loss how to mention that of Gov. Shelby, being convinced that no encomium of mine can reach his merit. The Governor of an independent state, greatly my superior in years, in experience and in military character, he placed himself under my command, and was not more remarkable for his zeal and activity than for the promptitude and cheerfulness with which he obeyed my orders. The Major Generals Henry and Desha, and the Brigadiers Allen, Caldwell, King, Chiles & Trotter, all of the Kentucky volunteers, manifested great zeal and activity.—Of Governor Shelby's Staff, his Adjutant General Col. M'Dowell, and his Quarter Master General Colonel Walker, rendered great service, as did his Aids-de-camp Gen. Adair, and Majors Barry and Crittenden.—The military skill of the former was of great service to us, and the activity of the two latter gentlemen could not be surpassed. Illness deprived me of the talents of my Adj. Gen. Col. Gaines, who was left at Sandwich. His duties were however ably performed by the Acting Assistant Adjutant General Captain Butler. My Aids-de-camp Lieutenant O'Fallon and Captain Todd of the line, and my volunteer Aids John Speed Smith and John Chambers, Esq. have rendered me the most important services from the opening of the campaign. I have already stated that Gen. Cass and Commodore Perry assisted me in forming the troops for the action. The former is an officer of the highest merit, and the appearance of the brave Commodore cheered and animated every breast.

It would be useless, Sir, after stating the circumstances of the action, to pass encomiums upon Col. Johnson and his regiment. Veterans could not have manifested more firmness. The Colonel's numerous wounds prove that he was in the post of danger. Lieut. Colonel James Johnson and the Majors Payne and Thompson were equally active, though more fortunate. Maj. Wood of the Engineers, already distinguished by his conduct at Fort Meigs attended the army with two 6 pounders. Having no use for them in the action, he joined in the pursuit of the enemy and with Maj. Payne of the mounted regiment, two of my Aids-de-Camp, Todd and Chambers, and three privates, continued it for several miles after the rest of the troops had halted, and made many prisoners.

I left the army before an official return of the prisoners, or that of the killed and wounded, was made out. It was however ascertained that the former amounts to six hundred and one regulars, including twenty-five officers. Our loss is two killed and seven wounded, five of which have since died. Of the British troops twelve were killed, and twenty-two wounded. The Indians suffered most—thirty-three of them having been found upon the ground, besides those killed on the retreat.

On the day of the action six pieces of brass artillery were taken, and two iron 24 pounders the day before. Several others were discovered in the river and can be easily procured. Of the brass pieces, three are the trophies of our revolutionary war, that were taken at Saratoga and York, and surrendered by Gen. Hull. The number of small arms taken by us and destroyed by the enemy must amount to upwards of five thousand; most of them had been ours, and taken by the enemy at the surrender of Detroit, at the River Raisin and Col. Dudley's defeat. I believe that the enemy retain no other trophy of their victories than the standard of the 4th regiment. They were not magnanimous enough to bring that of the 41st regiment into the field, or it would have been taken.

You have been informed, sir, of the conduct of the troops under my command in the action—it gives me great pleasure to inform you, that they merit also the approbation of their country for their good conduct, in submitting to the greatest privations with the utmost cheerfulness: The infantry were entirely without tents, and for several days the whole army subsisted upon fresh beef without bread or salt.

I have the honor to be, &c.

WM. H. HARRISON.

Hon. John Armstrong,
Sec'ry of War.

P. S. General Proctor escaped by the fleetness of his horses, escorted by 40 dragoons, and a number of mounted Indians.

* A British officer of high rank assured one of my Aids-de-camp, that the day of our landing, General Proctor had at his disposal upwards of a thousand Indian warriors, but assured that the greatest part had left him previous to the action.
