

MARYLAND GAZETTE, AND POLITICAL INTELLIGENCER.

ANNAPOLIS, THURSDAY, APRIL 29, 1813.

No. 141

THE CITY BANK OF BALTIMORE

March 20, 1813.
PURSUANT to the act of Incorporation, notice is hereby given to the Stockholders of this Institution, that an election will be held at their Bank House, on the first Monday in June next, from 9 o'clock A. M. to 3 o'clock P. M. for sixteen Directors to manage the affairs of the Bank for the ensuing year. In the first election of Directors of this Bank, the votes are to be directed to the Treasury and lodged at the Bank before the day of Election.

By order of the commissioners,
J. STERRETT,
Treasurer to the Commission.

The following extract from the act of Incorporation is published for the information of the Stockholders. The Stockholders except females, living in the city of Baltimore, or within five miles thereof, shall vote in the choice of Directors by ballot, in person, but every stockholder living more than five miles from said city, and every female stockholder may vote in person or by written ballot, by him or her subscribed with his or her name, and said ballot shall be sealed up and addressed to the cashier of the Bank, and being transmitted before the time of the election, shall be received and counted in the election. No person who is not a citizen of the United States shall be entitled to vote in any election of this corporation.

None but a stockholder shall be eligible as a Director, except in the case of Directors chosen by the state.

No Director of any other Bank, nor any person who is a partner in trade with a Director of any Bank, shall be a Director in this Bank.

March 9, 1813.

Lands for Sale.

For Sale, a Tract of Land containing about 290 acres, lying on the north side of Severn, and binding on Deep Creek Magothy River. This land is well adapted to the produce of wheat, Indian corn, and early marketing. The above land will be sold on the most accommodating terms. Any person wishing to purchase, can view the lands by applying to Mr. James Mackubin, junr, living on the premises, or to the subscriber living in Annapolis.

NICHOLS, J. WATKINS.

P. S. If not sold at private sale before the 5th day of July next, it will on that day, be offered at public sale on the premises.

March 18, 1813.

List of Letters

Remaining in the Post-Office, April 1st, 1813.

John Brewer, Edmund Brice, John Barkman, Philip Clayton, Alexander Cumming, Jonathan Cramer, Jeremiah Cook, James Ellison, Joseph Evans, Capt. Glenn, (schooner Benj. Franklin), Joseph Gooding, John Griffin, Thomas Green, Elizabeth Hall, John Harris, (ship Neptune) Steven Hill, Philip Hammon Hopkins, Robert Hayes, Samuel Harris, (schooner Dash), John C. Higgins, Joseph Henry, (Fort Madison), Stephen Johnson, John Jacobus Mary Jarvis, Hon. William Kilty, Abner Lucas, (on board the schooner Whip), Joseph W. Lewis, (of the ship Commodore Preble), Stephen Lee, George Murdoch, Samuel Murray, Henry Manners, (ship Fair-Elizabeth), Land Officer, John Price, (Fort Mifflin), To the Captain of the Spanish ship Conceptorio, Jesse C. Palmer, James R. Reid, (Fort Severn), Capt. I. W. Rollo, (ship Neptune), Capt. Skidmore, (schooner Mentor), Daniel Stinemetz, (barracks), Daniel Smith, (on board the schr. Leabone), John Smith, (mate of the brig Calypso), Michael Stinemetz, Susannah Sellman, near Annapolis, Thos. Smith, near Annapolis, Andrew Slicer, Wm. Thompson, Capt. Enoch Turley, (on board the schr. Water-Witch), William H. Tidd, Eliza Tidings, John Updike, (on board the Pilot boat schr. Susan), Joseph White, Michael H. Walsh, (5), John Whitwright, William Watkins, Annapolis.

Thomas Bicknell, Cephas W. Benson, Julia Burgess, Able Crandle West, John S. Camden, R. Conner, Thomas Charls. Maria Harwood, Arny Jackson, Richard Kerby, Dr. Follet Oryley, (Magothy), Joseph N. Reaves, James Slack, Gassaway Watkins, Rebecca, Rebecca Watkins, Anne Annand, County.

Those persons indebted for postage are requested to call at the Post-Office and pay their accounts, as it is inconvenient to wait for trifles which the aggregate would be very useful.

JOHN MUNROE, P. M.
Annapolis, April 8.

Wanted to hire.

A NEGRO WOMAN.
Who understands plain cooking and washing—one from the country would be preferred—Such an one that can come well recommended for her sobriety and industry, will find a place by applying at this office, April 1.

[VOL. LXX.]

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COMMUNICATED.

The appointment of Mr. Bayard as one of the ministers to be sent to Russia has been announced. The National Intelligencer, in making known this appointment, has borne testimony to the high character, distinguished talents and true American feelings of this gentleman. To use the language of this paper, "he is an honourable man; one between whom and the cause of his country the line has never been drawn."—After his appointment by Mr. Madison himself, he can no longer deny that his opinions are worthy of respect. It will be recollected, that when the question of war was pending in the senate of the U. S. Mr. Bayard moved the postponement of it till the fall. The speech which he delivered in support of that motion, ought to be read with attention by the American people. Let the opinions of this great politician be passionately examined, and no honest mind will for a moment doubt, that the authors of this rash, precipitate and ruinous war, have a dreadful account to settle with the nation.

A. B.

SPEECH OF MR. BAYARD,
in the Senate of the United States, upon his motion made on the 16th of June, 1812, to postpone the further consideration of the bill Declaring War against Great-Britain to the 1st of October.

Mr. BAYARD said that he was entirely sensible of the inutility in general of entering upon the discussion of a subject which had been long time under consideration, and upon which it might be supposed that the opinions of members were formed and settled; but on an occasion so momentous as the present, he should not feel himself justified in submitting even a motion of postponement without offering his reasons in support of it—nor could he think that in giving a silent vote, he had discharged the duty of his station. Gentlemen would remark, that he had confined his motion to a time, in order that members might not be compromised in supporting a war which might be the result of a momentary impulse, who might think the war itself just and necessary.

The motion did not oppose or deny the sufficiency of the causes, or the policy of the war. It went on to affirm what he trusted the course of his observations would render very evident, that this was not a time at which war ought to be declared. He indulged a confidence, that upon so great an occasion the senate would not be impelled to act by any sudden passions, nor by any considerations which did not arise out of an extended and distinct view of the interests of the country. It is not enough that we have cause of war, we must see that we are prepared and in a condition to make war. You must go to war for the benefit of your country, but your own advantage—not to gratify a vain and headless courage, but to assert your rights and redress your wrongs. If you commence hostilities before you are prepared to give a blow, and while your cities, your territory, and your property on the one side, are exposed to the mercy of a government possessing vast resources of force, what can you expect but to add to your distresses, defeat, and disgrace to the crown of which you complain? It is an strange motive for war—a wish to gratify the rapacity to swell the triumph, and to increase the insolence of the enemy.

Mr. B. said that neither the government nor the people had expected, or were prepared for war. Even at this moment, the general opinion abroad was, that there would be no war; the mercantile and trading world had continued to act upon that opinion—nor could people be persuaded, that an unarmed nation was about to attack a nation armed with the intentions and secret proceedings of those exercising the powers of the government, that the nation would be wantonly plunged into a sudden war?

He had heard it said that the embargo was a sufficient notice of the design of the government to resort to hostilities upon its expiration; and that the people must be infatuated, who, after such warning, were not apprised of the approaching crisis. But it is too recently and deeply in our recollection to be forgotten, that this is not the first embargo we have experienced, and which, though of longer duration, we saw pass away without being followed by war.

The language held thereas to people out of doors who have doubted of the war, is retorted by the public voice with equal confidence and on better grounds. They rely upon your integrity and wisdom, and say that congress cannot be so infatuated, destitute as they are of the means of aggression or defence, to draw upon themselves a war with one of the most powerful and formidable nations on the globe. If a war with Britain be thought unavoidable, yet, as she leaves to us the time of commencing it, surely we ought to select that time, when the first shock shall be least disastrous & can best be resisted. Why should we hurry into a war from which nothing but calamity can be expected? There is no danger that the redress of our wrongs or the assertion of our rights will be barred by the limitation of time. No time has existed for years past when we had less cause to complain of the conduct of G. Britain. Her vessels of war had all been withdrawn, from our coast as he presumed, in order to avoid collisions and hostility. If the war be suspended till November, the government and the people will both be better prepared to sustain it. He was not a friend to the restrictive system, but with a choice out of evils, he should prefer the embargo to war.—Postpone the war and we will submit to the embargo till November.—This will furnish time for the return of your ships and seamen; and if at the same time you will abandon the non importation act, you will replenish your treasury with at least twelve millions of dollars and restore to your citizens sixty millions now abroad and in danger of being lost. It appeared to him that the course which had been pursued was the most preposterous imaginable. For eighteen months past we had been sending our property out of the country, and not suffering it to return; and while contemplating a war with G. B. we saw our effects to an immense amount accumulating in that kingdom, liable any moment to fall a prey to the government, and to be employed in support of the war against us. He asked why rush with this precipitancy into the war? Are you provided with means to annoy the enemy or to defend yourselves? Have you an army or navy which can make any impression? Are your exposed towns fortified and garrisoned? Was any nation ever less prepared for war? It would require the whole military force you now possess to constitute an adequate defence for N. Orleans, N. York and Newport. It is very well known that the general who will command at N. Orleans, has declared to the government, that he will not be answerable for the security of the place with less force than ten thousand men, which is equal to all the effective troops yet raised. It would be natural to suppose that no government would declare war till it was prepared to attack its enemy. In peace we require no defence, and shall we declare war in order only to defend ourselves? But what blow are you prepared to strike? Were you able in the summer to recruit your army of twenty five thousand men could it be employed in any service in the course of this year? A soldier is not made in a day. The authority of a foreign officer now in this country, of the highest military reputation, he had heard frequently cited that it required at least 14 months to form a soldier of a recruit. This remark applied to France, where the officers have generally received a military education & where there are so many models to imitate & so many instructors to teach. But here the officer is to form as well as the soldier. The officer has to learn his lesson first before he can prescribe the task of the soldier. You may possibly have a herd of men, but you can have no army to lead into service this season.—And if this herd be led against disciplined troops you can expect nothing but defeat and disgrace.

But you have not got nor can you

get the men during the present year. These are not the days of Cadmus. It will require great patience and industry, and a considerable length of time to collect twenty-five thousand men. Have you the least prospect, if you declare war, of attacking Canada this season? It is impossible that you can do it with effect. You will be sufficiently occupied in defending your frontiers against the savages.

It is not on land then that you expect immediately to assail your enemy. Is it on the ocean that the impression is to be made? You have twenty vessels of war—Britain upwards of a thousand.—What will avail the activity or gallantry of your officers and seamen against such disparity of force? Your little navy must fall immediately or be driven from the ocean. Some gentlemen indulge great expectations from privateers; but has Great Britain any unarmed or unprotected trade which they can attack? Privateers have no other object than plunder and booty. They avoid armed vessels—and defended as is the British commerce in every part of the world by her great naval force, it is little to be expected that privateering will be attended with much success or encouragement. But while we are searching for the means of annoying the commerce of Britain, does it become us to overlook at this moment the condition of our own? A valuable part of the trade from beyond the Cape of Good Hope has not yet arrived. Of the numberless vessels which sailed upon the eve of the embargo few have returned. Your merchant vessels are without convoy and utterly defenceless. Your condition therefore, is, that with more commerce exposed, your adversary will possess greater means of annoyance, and the consequence must be, that we shall lose infinitely more than we can expect to gain.

Under such circumstances what should hurry us into the war? Are gentlemen afraid if they wait till November the world will not last long enough to afford them time to gratify in war their mighty resentment against Britain? He believed as he hoped that there was no honourable gentleman on the floor who would not live long enough to have a complete surfeit of the war, though it should be postponed for a few months.

He said he was greatly influenced in his motion for postponing by the combined considerations of the present defenceless condition of the country, and the protection which Providence had given us against a maritime power in the winter season. During the winter months you will be defended by the elements—Postpone the war till November and we shall not have to dread an enemy on our coast till April. In the meantime go on with your recruiting, fill up, discipline & train an army. Take the stations if you please which will enable you to open an early campaign. Your trade will all have time to return before hostilities commence, and having all your ships and seamen at home, you may be prepared to put forth all your strength upon the ocean on the opening of the ensuing spring. Shall we, by an untimely precipitancy, yielding to a fretful impatience of delay, throw our wealth into the hands of the enemy, and feed that very rapacity which it is our object to subdue or to punish?

We can lose nothing by delay; much will be certainly saved; and at a moment pregnant with great events, it was most evidently our true policy to temporize. You give up no right, yield no pretension and profit by every day in rendering the condition of the country more secure and its attitude more formidable.—The just appreciation of time is among the highest point of political sagacity. To know what step the times will warrant, and to take the step at the proper time, is generally a matter of more important and difficult consideration than the nature of a proposed measure.—Without inquiring whether war was the right course for the nation to take under existing circumstances, he did most confidently assert that this was not the time when war ought to be commenced.

Mr. B. said it belonged to the motion he had submitted to bring under review the alleged causes of war and to inquire into the probability of our attaining the objects for which we were to embark in the war. If we are to come out of the war, or we enter into it after having wasted the blood and treasure of the nation, and loaded the country with debt and taxes, it would certainly be more rational to submit at once to the wrongs we endure. If we expect to extort any concession from Britain, we must be prepared for a long, obstinate and bloody conflict.

Britain at this moment does not court the quarrel. She has reduced the catalogue of our complaints; and though not disposed to surrender her pretensions, she has evidently made advances towards conciliation. The recent orders in council were desired to be so considered, and she has removed a great source of umbrage in withdrawing her armed ships from our coasts.—She had offered satisfaction for the affair of the Chesapeake, which our government had accepted—which must therefore be taken to be honorable and sufficient, and the offence which had been given completely expiated.

We are no longer at variance in relation to the colonial trade.—France no longer has colonies and we have no occasion to contend at present for any empty rights which could not be exercised if yielded.

The question, therefore, as to the right of a neutral to be the carrier of the produce of the colony of a belligerent, having been reduced by the course of the war to a mere question of theory, it no longer entered into the disputes of the two governments.

The question as to the impressment of our seamen did not present insuperable difficulties. Britain never contended for a right to impress American seamen.—The right she claims is to take her own subjects found in our merchant service she exercises the right in relation to her own private vessels. This right she never will, nor can give up. If our merchant flag were a secure protection to British seamen who sailed under it, the British navy must be unmanned by desertion; while our merchants can, and do pay a dollar for every shilling a sailor can earn in the naval service of his country.

Can it be expected that a nation which depends for its existence upon its naval strength would yield a principle threatening the destruction of its maritime power? No war, of any duration, or however disastrous, will ever extort this concession—she may as well fall with arms in her hands, as to seal quietly the bond of her ruin.

He did not know that our government had ever required the unqualified abandonment of the right to impress. Our complaints were chiefly of the abuses committed in the exercise of the right. It was a practice frequently attended with violence, insult, and gross injustice. Americans were often, from design or mistake, seized as British subjects, and we have abundant evidence of the fact, that many of our native seamen have been forced into British service.—He had always understood however that such acts were not justified by the British government. The government have never claimed the right of holding an American seaman against his will.—The pretensions of the two governments upon this subject, admitted of adjustment.—The chief embarrassment arose from the difficulty of distinguishing the sailors of the two countries. But he had no doubt that this, and all other difficulties on the subject might be vanquished without having recourse to war.

The dispute, as to paper blockades was, for the present, merged in the orders in council. Those orders were now to be considered as comprehending the whole cause of war.

This subject deserves to be viewed in every light. The orders in council were not at this time, in truth, supported upon their original ground.

The ex-minister Mr. Canning, had publicly and candidly confessed the fact. They were admitted as measures of retaliation, they never deserved that character. He had always considered the Berlin and Milan decrees used as a mere