

always had in view one or other of two objects; and were regulated by one or other of two principles. The extreme importance to G. Britain of her seamen, and the great temptation, which the comparatively great rate of wages in this country, aided by the similarity of our habits and character, held out to her seamen, seemed to constitute a state of things, out of which resulted an obligation upon the U. S. to limit the injury thus incidentally done to her, by some regulation, either directly excluding her subjects, or at least diminishing the temptation which the condition of things in this country, offered to the cupidity of her seamen. Thus doing her less injury, she would have less reason to complain; and less justification for a resort to the exercise of her claim of impressment. This, it was contended, would be a precursor of relief from that suffering. At least that it was our duty to make trial of this policy previous to a war on that account. Such was the principle and policy of the gentlemen on his side of the house, in this aspect of the question. There was another principle of policy, which this embarrassment of our relations with G. Britain suggested. The thoughts of reflecting men were drawn to consider the basis, on which the interests of navigation rested; and it began to be seen, and was contended, that by a gradual and systematic exclusion of foreign seamen the condition of our maritime affairs would be improved, by a service, exclusively, or in a great measure, composed of native citizens. Beyond the limitation resulting from these two principles, and having relation to these two objects, no proposition was ever seriously suggested. It never was heard, or thought, that the U. S. were losers by the employment of foreign seamen. It was never heard that we could be gainers by a system of reciprocal provisions, which, adopted on some sudden suggestion, should force home the few native citizens of ours which were in the employ of foreign nations, and force away the multitudes of foreign subjects, which were confessedly and notoriously in our employ.

There is something said Mr. Q. significantly strange and mysterious in the manner in which this bill is made to pass through this house. Never did any bill meet with so many counter-currents and repugnant eddies in its course. Yet, it holds its way, notwithstanding, and seems to be facilitated rather than obstructed, by circumstances, apparently so inauspicious—On the other side of the house it is advocated as a measure of permanent policy. On this side as a temporary expedient. There it is carefully and systematically denied to have any pacific intention. Here, it is, as carefully and systematically inculcated as a measure of a certain pacific result. At one moment it is asserted to be an independent regulation yielding nothing to G. Britain. At the next it is said to be proffering her so much, that if she fail to accept the proposition, all hearts and hands must without fail unite in the war. By this sort of vacillating, accommodating argument, every species of political party seems to be fascinated; and made to concur in the immediate object. We for peace. They for war. We pulling one way. They another. We looking north. They south. We east. They west. All give the machine the same direction. By the exertions of all, the passage of the bill is facilitated.

Considering the character of the political fathers of this bill, and their known interests and connexions, its principle is not less suspicious, than its parliamentary course is mysterious. During the whole extent of their political lives, the friends of this proposition, for a total exclusion of foreign seamen, have maintained the right and the interests of the U. S. to employ them in the fullest and most unlimited extent. And now, in a breath, at a thought, without any previous warning, they turn round and propose to exclude them altogether! Can any man have faith, in the sincerity of those who advocate so extravagant a proposition, in face of all their previous theories and professions? Can any man who knows the nature of this country, and the countenance of its population believe in any other? Sir, what are the interests of the United States in relation to this subject? The opposite character of the population, homogeneous in the one, and we all spring out of the same mother earth?

Sir, the fact is altogether the reverse. The column of our American state is neither composed of flint, or of granite, but rather of a sort of pudding stone; or of a casual collection of distinct individuals, aggregated together, with no selection in the particulars, and little strength in the cement. In a nation thus constituted, it is now seriously proposed, as it is pretended, to turn all foreigners from its sea service, and to form, by a sort of parliamentary magic, in a moment, a new marine of pure and exclusive native citizens. Let who will believe in this project, I do not. Considering the quarter from which it comes, I believe as little in its sincerity, as I do in its practicability.

Sir, if I wished to press far into the discussion of this bill, which I do not, I would ask, what has become of that great doctrine of the right of expatriation, so obtrusively and clamorously maintained, from the first establishment of our national government down to the present day, by the patrons and authors of this bill, their friends and supporters? Are all those choice topics of declamation to be abandoned? Are they forgotten by gentlemen on the other side of the house? If they are, will they be forgotten by this people? This bill proceeds upon the principle, that the right of expatriation does not exist in the subjects of foreign governments. For if it does exist, then, such foreign government has no right to reclaim them, and we have no right to drive them home. The bill abjures this right of expatriation; and in doing this, cuts up by the roots not only the claim of the individuals whom it contemplates to force back to the service of their respective sovereigns, but also your whole right to protect, beyond the limits of your local jurisdiction, even your naturalized citizens. For, if the right of expatriation does not exist, then every foreigner, in taking upon himself the obligations of allegiance to this country, does it subject to the inalienable principle of native allegiance which this bill admits to exist. So that it recognizes the justice of the claim of foreign sovereigns to their original subjects, as well those who are naturalized, as those who are not. I wish to be understood as making no objection on this account—I ask only, where is the consistency of it? I see the effects of this bill too plainly, not to be satisfied that it does not abandon the projects for which the clamour about the right of expatriation was originally raised. It varies the means, without losing sight of the end. It is, however, most extraordinary, that men, who have been all their lives long, perfect knight errants, in favour of distressed foreigners, who have set their spears in their rests, and gone tilting all over the world in defence of oppressed humanity; who have been inviting it to our shores with both hands, should turn round at once, and pretend to be about to send them all home again, and leave them to the mercy of ancient systems and of their former masters.

But this is not all. This great right of expatriation, which the advocates of this bill and their political friends have been maintaining these 20 years, in favour of all the world, is now denied by the bill to exist, even in our own citizens. The reciprocity of the bill consists in this, that these our citizens should be forced home, according to the obligations of their natural allegiance! For on this principle alone, have we a right to claim their return. Thus strange and mysterious is both the character and parliamentary course of this bill.

Mr. Q. said that his first objection to the bill, considered in the light in which it had been placed by its advocates, as a measure of permanent policy, was, that its provisions were unnatural. By which he meant, that they were irreconcilable with the known nature and habits and prejudices of the great majority of the people of this country. These had always been accustomed to the employment of foreigners in their sea service, and been taught to view it in a favourable light. Now, although it might be wise to counteract these prejudices and to change these habits, yet this could not be done suddenly, nor by virtue of mere law. It must be done gradually, and, as it were insensibly, by such systematic, temperate regulations, from which no great temporary embarrassment should result, and which would make the community more ready to co-operate with the general policy. Nothing violent, could be permanent. And consider-

ing the previous practice and prejudices of the community, nothing was ever more violently repugnant to both than the provisions of the bill.

Mr. Quincy said that another objection was, that the bill proceeded upon the assumption of a state of things, as a fact which was notoriously false. The only possible ground, upon which a proposition, such as that contained in this bill could be made to all the nations of the world, must be that of interest. We would offer to drive their subjects but of our employ, on the proposed condition, that they should drive our citizens out of their's, only on the principle, that, in the present existing reciprocation of service we were losers and they gainers.—Now, who believes that this is the case? Who ever heard that their employment of our citizens was an injury? The particular circumstances of the British nation, and the temptation which employment, in our marine and merchant service, offered to her seamen, was a cause of embarrassment with her, which, in relation to that nation, it was important to obviate. But G. Britain out of the question, and the employment of the mariners of other nations is highly useful and important to us, and particularly is it important if we are about to set ourselves seriously to drive from our employ British seamen.

Mr. Quincy said that the nature of the arguments, which had been urged in support of the bill, and the particular character of the support it had received, was another objection. The particular argument in favor of the bill had been vacillating from one principle to another. It was uncertain, as to its tendency, and plainly a game of expedients; and not the foundation of any enlarged system of policy. Plain good intention is easily discerned. It is direct and steady, in all its movements. Its object is distinct and its course towards it certain. In this way confidence is inspired. But who can have confidence in a measure which, in its nature, contravenes all the previously declared maxims of its advocates, relative to the subject; & which on one hand is supported as a measure of war, and on the other as a measure of peace; in the house as yielding nothing to Great Britain, and out of it, as yielding everything? It is impossible—good never did proceed from a contrivance of this motley, non-descript character.

Had the proposition contained in this bill, been adopted in a time of peace, had it been temperate in its character, had it reference to any distinct interest, by which it was modelled, its effects must have been, in the highest degree, salutary. In such a course adopted under such auspices, Great Britain would have seen a wise intelligence operating, on which she might have calculated. But what calculation can be made on the provisions of this bill? Will that nation, or any other, credit that the U. States are seriously intending to drive all but native and naturalized seamen out of their employ? Or, if such be our intention, will it not be viewed, as it is, as a temporary expedient, having reference to particular exigencies; and which will be abandoned as soon as the present end is answered.

I know it is said, that the generalization of this bill is a mere cover to conceal its true nature, which it is pretended, out of doors, is that of a proffer to Great Britain, and that foreign nations will not reciprocate. For my part, I shall wonder, indeed if they do not. For Great Britain excepted, there is not an European nation, as I believe, which would not be gainers, and in the same proportion would the United States be losers, by the reciprocity.

As a system of general policy, then, the provisions of the bill are illusive. It remains to be considered what efficacy the bill will have in the attainment of peace, so anxiously and so justly desired by the people of the United States. It is said to be an instrument of peace. It is, in my apprehension, altogether the reverse. It has not that tendency; nor do I believe it introduced with that intention. I give entire credit to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) when he says, it is not a measure of peace. It has not that intention. I ask this question Mr. Speaker: Suppose an agent of yours has full powers to negotiate upon any subject; and he should come to you and ask a limitation of those powers—what reason can he have? Plainly but one, he means to have a justification, in his hand, in case he refuses certain terms of

settlement, which may be offered.—Having full powers to do his best, if he reject any offers, the responsibility rests upon himself. But if he have terms and conditions specified, by which he is to govern himself, then he is justified in refusing any proposition, not fairly included within the terms of limitation.

This is precisely the situation of the president of the United States, and this, as I conceive, is the exact bearing of this project.

It is foreseen that negotiation of some kind will soon be inevitable.—The president of the United States has full power to negotiate, upon this subject, under the provisions of the constitution. His business, and his duty, are to exercise his entire powers free and full, as that instrument has granted them, and make the best arrangement he can. His duty then, is to come to the senate, and, if necessary, to the house—and say, "these are the best terms I can make; ratify, or reject them according to your sense of public duty. I have done my duty. It remains for you to do yours."

This is the plain and the only constitutional course. The provisions of the bill reverse the whole order of proceedings. It causes the legislature to present an ultimatum to G. Britain; to which, if she does not accede, the president throws the responsibility of continuing the war upon congress, who have thus limited the general authority of the constitution. It is in vain to say that the provisions of this bill are not, in effect, a limitation of the treaty-making power of the executive. In the nature of things it must be so. It is so undeniably upon the grounds, on which rests the very argument on which it is maintained that this bill is necessary. The reason for passing this bill is that as the subject must require legislative interposition, it is necessary that the president of the United States should know to what point the legislature will advance in such settlement; and that without such previous declaration of the legislature, that foreign nations can have no confidence in any treaties, which may be made since the legislature are not bound to enact the requisite provisions. It is, then, apparent that if this bill be necessary to give confidence in any treaty which shall go thus far, that a treaty can be entitled no confidence, which should go farther.—In other words, beyond the limits of our law, the treaty-making power cannot advance.

One of two things is inevitable. Either the terms of the bill are more than Great Britain will require from us—or they are less. If they are more, we have shown our whole hand, and cannot hope for anything better than our own voluntary terms. If they are less negotiation is hopeless. The president of the U. States will never dare to go beyond what this bill authorizes, when it is said that to go as far as this it is necessary that such a bill should pass.—In this lies the mischief of this bill. It offers, in effect, as our ultimatum terms which Great Britain has rejected, over and over again. It proffers terms; apparently, but not really, reciprocal. When rejected by her, as they will be, the executive has obtained an apology for continuing the war, and the opportunity to cast the responsibility of its continuance upon congress.

Mr. Q. said, that to show how utterly destitute of all reciprocity, even in terms, its provisions were, he would only refer to a single circumstance. By the first section, we require Great-Britain to permit us to retain, in our own employ all her native citizens, whom we have naturalized or who have declared or shall declare before a treaty is made, their intention to become naturalized. In the eighth section, which contains the pretended reciprocating proposition, we require Great-Britain to prohibit from her employ all naturalized citizens of the United States, without exception of those naturalized, or those voluntarily resident! The very class of her citizens which we claim the right of keeping, is the very class of our citizens which we demand of her to restore. And this is called reciprocal! These are the terms to which if G. Britain does not accede, all Americans are for ever after bound to unite heart and hand in the war! For my part, I consider it said Mr. Q. as no pacific measure. Its true purpose is to give a pacific aspect to the time—to clear the atmosphere, for a moment, so that the money-gudgeons may be made to bite sharp at the treasury hook. He said that he viewed it as a scheme calculated to deceive the people—to buoy them up with false hopes, when

the real intention was to continue the war. Under this belief it should have no support from him. Mr. Q. concluded by apologizing for the desultory manner in which he had treated the project—that he had gone farther into its examination than he had at first intended; his chief motive in rising having been to repel the charge of inconsistency; and to make such an explanation of his vote, when he was about to differ from many of his political friends, as might show the true principles upon which it proceeded.

MARYLAND GAZETTE. ANNAPOLIS, THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1813. THE ALARM.

This is a subject which, for the honor of our City, we would gladly have passed unnoticed, had not some splenic soul given currency to a report that the Citizens generally had been put in great bodily fear by the appearance of the British Squadron in the Bay. It has been a great misfortune to this City, since the declaration of war, to have those within it who on the slightest occasions have excited alarms, and caused much trepidation, among certain of our good citizens. Alarms since that period have been no uncommon things, for they have often magnified vessels of small dimensions into war-ships of the largest size. When it was known that the Chesapeake was in a state of rigorous blockade, every Craft, of whatever description, that happened to pass upon the Bay, was eyed with the greatest attention, and new fears were excited. In this state of mind, it may be easily supposed, that any thing wearing an uncommon appearance would necessarily give rise to a variety of conjectures, and perhaps be productive of "war's dread alarms." A few days since a small vessel was discovered a few miles below the city, which was thought by some to look more than commonly suspicious, and with the aid of good glasses some of our citizens could make nothing more nor less of her than a Ketch, sent up to reconnoitre from the squadron below. When strengthened the suspicion was, that some person in the morning had represented the whole Chesapeake fleet to be within a short distance of the city, and that an immediate attack might be expected. Every eye was looking with the keenest attention for the squadron—and its length, by the assistance of magnifying glasses placed upon a very lofty dome, a speck became discernible in the horizon. Upon making this discovery some mounted their Breeches and some their Rosinantes, and down they went, post-haste, to meet the enemy. Every information only strengthened the belief that they were approaching; so much so, that some of our good folks procured vehicles to remove their families, and others began to pack up their most valuable materials, waiting with solicitude the moment when the city should be bombarded. In this state of trepidation, a gentleman of note writes to his friend in a neighbouring city, and in the glowing colourings of exaggeration, which is so peculiarly the offspring of his fertile genius and poetic imagination, describes our situation as awful—not exactly that an attack was apprehended, but that Admiral Warren's fleet was just off the entrance of the harbour. Flocks crowded to read this letter, and it was confidently believed, upon the writer's report, that Annapolis was in the most imminent danger. All disputes were hushed in the evening, and the City once more assumed a state of tranquillity, by the supposed Ketch coming to anchor in the harbour, and proving her national character.—What had been so often and clearly made out to be a Tender from the squadron, was at length discovered to be a Yankee schooner, such as is usually laden with New-England produce, instead of munitions of war. But what has become of the speck which appeared in the sky, and was auxiliary in producing the perturbation which for a time agitated the city, we do not know. We sincerely hope, for the future, that this gentleman will employ his time better than by trumpeting abroad such unfounded reports. Persons culpable of such acts not only excite the ridicule of others, but often produce serious inconvenience to the citizens.—Should danger actually threaten, the services of such epistolary writers would be of infinitely more value with muskets on their shoulders than in circulating idle rumours to frighten silly old women and children. This, indeed, is too ridiculous a subject to be treated in a serious manner; therefore we will conclude by advising those who bluster daily about the insolence of the foe, at the corners of the streets and in public places, and manufacture thunderbolts of vengeance, to stand their ground in the event of necessity, and not be the first to scamper away like sheep at the sight of a wolf.

It is somewhat surprising, that since the British squadron has been lying so quietly in the mouth of the Chesapeake, the modern Archimedes should have let slip an opportunity of immortalizing himself, by producing the destructive effects of his submarine navy. When he might have paddled along a mile

below the city, and grasped the watery element, and grasped Sir John Bull unawares, we have scarcely heard his name once mentioned, much less his torpedoes. Now is the time when their efficacy could be fully shown; but for some unaccountable reason, he does not think proper to try the experiment. When the enemy is blocking up our largest bay with their fleet, and committing their ravages on the remnants of our commerce, and holding the citizens of Norfolk in terror, it is altogether astonishing that the torpedoes should never once have been thought of as the only effectual mode left of driving them from our coasts. It is greatly to be feared, that all our boasted schemes of defence are about to fall; and that the torpedoes, with the gun-boat system, must expire together. That this invention of a great philosophic noddle, which promised such immense advantages to the country, and such immortal renown to the inventor, should share the same fate with the "mosquito fleet," is greatly to be regretted; for it certainly appeared at one time as if we were jogging on with a quicker pace in the high road of general expectation than any other nation was ever known to proceed. What of an enemy's navy was left remaining by the broad mouthed thunder of a gun-boat, it was confidently expected would be blown sky-high out of the water by a kind of artificial volcanic eruption, kindled by combustible materials secretly confined in a judiciously constructed machine, and in the most secret manner to the bottom of their ships. Perhaps, however, it has been the fate of this submarine navigation, as with many other notions which have raised the curiosity of more great geniuses, to be productive of more evil than they are capable of being benefit to the country. But a hope this will not be the case with Fulton's machine, and that in the short time the British navy, which is now swimming about so peacefully in our waters, will be made to feel the effects of its terrible combustion. If he is ambitious to appear on the scroll of worthies as a conservator of his country, we cannot but hope that he has been bidden the thunder, with which, by a desperate effort, he will soon drive every mother's son of an Englishman from our coasts, or splash their "floating dungeons" piece from piece on the sea.

The democrats surely have a wonderful knack of turning every meritorious action performed since the commencement of the war to their own advantage, and pompously assuming all the credit to themselves. Every gallant achievement, whether performed by a federalist or democrat, without hesitation is declared to be the immediate effect of their favouring auspices. But sooner is a defeat or disaster to the army announced, than by the strangest perversion of truth, and in the twinkling of an eye, the most flaming jacobin is transformed into a federalist, and without a shadow of mercy, or the semblance of a trial, is stigmatized as a traitor. No matter whether it be from inefficiency of courage, military skill, or their incapacity in their favorite generals, that misfortune befalls the army, the effect is the same, and by a kind of political sleight of hand, the poor, unfortunate, discarded general, is saddled upon the federalists. Whenever there is any necessity for subterfuge, they always have one ready at hand. To hear them declaim on the advantages of a peace, as now necessary to protect the rights of a commercial people, a stranger to their former professions would be readily drawn into a belief that no other could have ever been more rare than the navy had hitherto been.

Notwithstanding all this gabble, those at all acquainted with the origin and progress of the French party in this country, know what construction to put on these declamations.—It is but a glance over the speeches of some of their great political preachers of '96, and their come at once upon the doctrines and sentiments of the whole party. Whenever it is necessary to apologize for the sluggishness with which the wheels of government move, an excuse is always ready manufactured.—If the president is distressed for money, and cannot procure it, the failure is attributed to the opposition of federalists.—If an army cannot be recruited agreeable to their wishes, it is because the federalists refuse them.—In fine, whatever failure or disadvantage any favorite scheme of administration, democrats invariably trace it to a federal resort, to the opposition of federalists.—If a federal state does not send money to expend nearly a mil-

lion of dollars in an armament, immediately raised from the other, Men who have been with decent the nation, able with a heaped upon vilage of a umphs of a their constitu port!! T with a ven It would to retrace principles; ents (if the have been nience, or the current to do this, for ever se or inconsi fling, turn ever before even in the absurd des their design had an opp ledge of the modern des uninfected, gust—For, It is "a That to For Now the are told a good citize and appro it seems to might be a justice, at endeavour to avert its of hostilitie mies are in sworn and to doubt ei to war, or conducted, of being in Men, who read that from the duties citizen owe this new fav discover if therefore l war is of t that it ab rights, and them the ir ing or wri sciences th Men of have been time of wa on ought t that wars, rors and ca oportunitie alas! who encroach u and to con a despotic obedient to appointment happen the country w blindly de loud and l administrat the policy, "powers th court will with these whatever c over well g be treated to the coun In every endeavour from slave abuse, and assumed to people's ex be the case tranquillity our libertie the nation passions of fully excite of officers creared.—E often with ministratio country, ar cause of th happened, themselves fastened a Those, h try better who have n liberties, ar naees and duty, which are due fro regardless of your to aw their dang not, will co fate which