

MARYLAND GAZETTE.

LXVIII YEAR.]

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1809.

[No. 3278.]

Miscellany.

EXTRACT FROM ROBERTS'S SECOND LETTER TO THE KING.

WHAT the time is now fast approaching, when this kingdom will have single hands to contend for its independence, and that against all the rest of Europe under the Emperor Napoleon; this is, I think, a position, which no one, except one whose whole interest it may be to deceive the public, will attempt to deny, unless there be grounds for an opinion, that the mild, and peace-like, and unambitious nature of that Emperor should induce him to make no attacks against us, merely because we have shewn more enmity towards him than another people have shewn, and because the coming of us would be more glorious than conquering of any other people. Those who think this may see nothing new, nothing striking in the present state of the war; but those who think directly the reverse; those who think, that from principles of self-preservation, as well from the passions of enmity and revenge, as from a love of glory, Napoleon will seek the subjugation of this kingdom; those persons must perceive, that the Emperor has doubled the subsequent armaments, and the treaty by which it will necessarily be followed, have given to the contest a decided character, which warrants the opinion, that England is now contending for its existence.

It being the case, or, at least, it being my opinion, the next thing for me to enquire into is, *How we are to maintain this war?*—There are two modes of warfare; the one we may suppose Napoleon to pursue; and the other that of assault. Suppose Napoleon to pursue the former, and us to pursue the latter mode of warfare that we now pursue, I would like to ask your ministers to explain, must be the consequence of his going down quietly, giving rest, and in fact, to all his dominions, while he caused to expend seventy millions a year? How many years would this last? How many years would it be possible for us to carry on a war of this sort, which, as far as I can see, need cost the subjects of Napoleon a sum of money, when distributed, would amount to a single head? I have before explained to your Majesty, that all the most useful commercial communications are even now carried on between the several countries under Napoleon's dominion; and that, in fact, as far as relates to the prosperity of those countries, our power, as exercised, has no effect. What then, I would be glad to know from your Majesty's ministers, should we do, were he to resolve to make a mere menacing, a mere paragraph war; if he were to do nothing at all, but only to say, "you shall not have peace?" In this case the question comes to this, "How long can we continue to expend seventy millions a year?"—But, it is not to be believed, that the ever active spirit of Napoleon will induce him to pursue this mode of warfare. On the contrary if he should, in the course of a year, have finished his work on the continent of Europe, will he not, as surely as he will, set himself seriously about his late promise, the fulfilment of his pledge to Lord Cornwallis? Upon this supposition, which is the only rational one, we have next to enquire, what view of his means of attack—He will have in his hands, or completely at his disposal, all the roads, and harbours, and arsenals; that he could wish for, and many more than he could possibly want. His means of attacking and fitting out and manning ships will be inexhaustible. Even during the present war he has, I believe, built two new ships to our one! Having once settled the matter to his liking, how long would he be creating a navy far superior to your Majesty's navy in numbers? Not equal in skill, but hope not in bravery, but far superior in numbers; and unless we suppose the French to be incapable of attaining naval skill, we must suppose that experience would soon make them formidable. Painful as it may be to contemplate the prospect, it would be folly in the extreme for us to shut our eyes against them. If we look at the naval efforts that Napoleon has been making even during his great military operations, we cannot refrain from being alarmed at the view which he will be enabled to make of the British navy, completely gotten rid of from the ports already in his possession, and to the ports already in his possession, of Spain and Portugal.

By my part, I can see no reason, (if we suppose our present system of warfare,) why Napoleon should not, in a year after he has taken the affairs of the continent, have at least a hundred ships of the line, completely manned and fit for sea. Leaving the Baltic out of

the question, there are quite ports and arsenals enough for this purpose—and as to the other means, hemp, pitch, iron, copper and timber of all sorts, he will have the greatest part of them for the fourth of what they will cost us. Why, then, I would put it to your Majesty's ministers, should he not have such a fleet in the course of one year? But suppose he should choose to stop three years? Suppose him capable of refraining for that length of time his eagerness to conquer this country; and that he has 300 ships of the line fit for sea. Suppose this to be the case, in what a situation should we then be! And if our present mode of warfare be continued, I do not for my part see any reason, or can I discover any reason, why he should not have such a force, and even in a much shorter time than I have pointed out. Three years is not a long period. The present war has already endured more than six. It therefore becomes us to consider whether we shall have the means of resisting such a force. But, without the existence of any such force as this, no one, I should think, will deny, that in the course of two years, at the farthest, Buonaparte upon the supposition of having settled the continent, will be able to send out several stout squadrons at once, or at nearly one and the same time. Supposing him to do this, and to have from ten to fifteen thousand men on board of each, and to make for Ireland. The chances are that some of them would reach their destination. To watch six or seven stout squadrons would require twice as great a force as we have. In fact, it would be against such a maritime force as we are now supposing, be utterly impossible to guard all the approaches to Ireland, supposing that to be the only object to attend to. But if Napoleon should have a stout squadron in every considerable port from the Texel to Cadix inclusive, there will be nothing, that I can see, to provoke him from engaging the attention of the whole of our force, such as it now is, upon the eastern coasts of England, while he sails for Ireland, from Ferrol, Lisbon, or any of the southern ports; and especially to blockade the whole of his ports, if each contain a stout and well supplied squadron, will be impossible, even if the weather should always be fair, and to blockade a part will be of no use; and therefore, unless we adopt a new mode of warfare, it appears to me quite evident that the time is at no great distance when the safety of Ireland will depend upon the disposition of the Irish to defend their country against an invasion on the part of the French.

I trust, that no one will dare to tell your Majesty, that there is no danger now, because, hitherto, the threats of Napoleon have proved harmless; that no one will dare to tell you, that, for several years, during the present war, England fought France single-handed, and was very far from losing in the contest. The battle was, indeed, single-handed sometimes; though, during this war France has actually had to fight Austria, Prussia, Naples, Spain and Portugal, and, by way of interlude, she has disposed of about half a dozen principalities, and a popedom. But whether she had actually to fight them, or not, she knew of their being in existence. There were, at any rate, three great powers, Russia, Austria and Prussia, who, though not at war with her, might be at war with her at any moment, if a misfortune happened to befall her; so that, in fact, we had then all these powers on our side, for whatever appearances might be, they all hated France at the bottom of their hearts. Now, how different is the state of things! With the sole exception of Russia, there is no power, worthy of being so called, left upon the continent, besides France; and, it is but too evident, that before Napoleon again returns to Paris, he will make himself as sure of the obedience of Russia as he is of that of Holland or Italy. He will, in that case, be freed from all apprehension. There will scarcely remain the possibility of interrupting him in his plans with regard to England; and the whole of the mental as well as the other means of his vast empire, will, without doubt, be directed against this kingdom. I beg your Majesty to reflect on this important change in the circumstances of the war. Pared as the nails of Austria were in her last war, she was still a great power; and, if she had by those shallow-headed politicians, who have so often urged our friends on to their own destruction; if she had remained quiet for the present, she might still have been an object of fear with Buonaparte; but she listened to those who hit upon the bright thought of making in Austria a diversion in favour of Spain, and she has paid the price of her credulity. She is no longer a power. It is not to be doubted, that Napoleon will use the rights of a conqueror, and bestow the territories of the emperor Francis, or the greater part of them, on those whom

he can confide in. As to the people, it is evident their wishes will never be consulted; nor does it appear to be at all necessary.—They seem to have been very calm and indifferent spectators of the passing events; and so they must have been, seeing that 200,000 Frenchmen were permitted to take possession of their capital, and to overrun their country; a lesson, one would think, well calculated to be useful to other governments, if governments were capable of receiving lessons; if any one ever began to amend until amendment was too late, if any one ever relied upon any thing but his power, till that power was swept away, and till other means of preservation became useful; if any one ever appealed to any thing but the sword, till it was compelled to listen to the sentence—"he who lives by the sword shall die by the sword."

This lesson is, indeed, of a nature one would think, to strike sensibly even into a stone. Eighteen millions of people suffered two hundred thousand to take possession of their country, and that two hundred thousand being seven or eight hundred miles from home! What a lesson! But what are we to think, when we are told that these eighteen millions of people were full of "loyalty," full of "enthusiasm," in the cause of their country! I beseech your Majesty to remark this well; and to bear it in mind, when you hear or read the language of courtiers, or of general writers, or when, from the lungs of contractors or jobbers you hear those songs, healths, and sentiments, which the unprincipled retailers of news and politics have the impudence to circulate as the effusions of loyalty. How often, alas! were we told of the loyal songs and tunes at the theatres at Berlin and Vienna! How often were we told of these proofs of enthusiastic loyalty, and of hostility towards the French! How many thousands of paragraphs have for our information, been translated from the German papers, in which the writers of that country appear almost to melt away in reading the marks of the people, attached to their "beloved sovereigns." We have seen, and the sovereigns of Germany have felt, what reliance is to be placed upon such professions and protestations: upon this miserable cant of loyalty: while the sovereign of Spain has seen even those of his nobles nearest to his person lead the way over to his enemy, and lend their hand to the imprisonment of him, whom they had formerly addressed on their knees.

But, if there is no hope in the dispositions of the people of Austria, or of any other country, and if Buonaparte should become completely master of the whole of the continent, the ports and naval arsenals included, still it may be said, "the sea is ours; let us take that and keep it, if he take and keep the land." True, and so obviously true, that it requires not a moment's reflection. It is evident, that, unless we command the sea as completely as he commands the land, we must fall. And then the question is, *can we do it!* If we can, *how?* Some persons may think, perhaps, that the discussion of these questions are unnecessary, seeing that we command the sea now; but from the fact, stated in my former letter, it appears that we do not command the sea now; for, would it not be absurd to call that a command of the sea, which permits convoys of 200 or 300 vessels of the enemy to pass (coast ways) unmolested, and carry on, uninterrupted, between the countries of the enemy, all that sort of commerce which is essential to their mutual comfort and prosperity, and which furnishes the enemy with all the means of forming, in a short time, a vast naval force? Yes, it would be absurdity itself to give to this the name of an absolute command of the sea.

We have absolute command upon the sea where we cannot injure the enemy, unless he choose to come out to us; but as to that sort of command, which is capable of really annoying him, and preventing the growth of his naval power, if we have it, it is manifest, that we turn it to no account. The expedition now, perhaps in the act of attacking the enemy, may, indeed, do some service; that is a sort of command of the sea, which, if the effect be proportioned to the means, must tend to the great object at which I aim, the destruction of the enemy's valuable commercial intercourse; and of course, of his means of rapidly raising and sending forth a navy, equal or superior, in numbers, to that of England. But, Sir, if this mighty armament; this really great force; this probably, more than half of the force which England can command, is intended to do nothing, or should be able to do nothing, but merely capture an island, to keep which will require very great strength and expense, and which, after all, is of no great consequence; if this, even adding to it the destruction of a few ships of war, and a naval arsenal; if these are to be the achievements of perhaps 80,000

men, by land and sea, and of an expense of millions; if not to reckon the loss of lives, such effects are to be purchased with such means, what must be our situation before this day five years? At this rate of proceeding, according to this mode of carrying on the war, the destruction of every French ship will cost us half a million of money. Besides, shall we, when Napoleon has settled the affairs of the continent, dare attempt such a mode of warfare? If, instead, of his now having a war in Spain and another in Austria, he had no war but his war with us to attend to, should we, in that case, have attempted this expedition? It is clear that we should not have dared to attempt it, because, when our force was bent toward the Scheldt, he would have had from several ports to the southward, squadrons sailing out for Ireland, or other ports of the sea islands. If, at a time when Napoleon has wars in Spain and Austria, and while he himself is, perhaps, seven hundred miles distant from our point of attack—if at such a time, under such circumstances, it requires such an armament to destroy a few French ships, what can we expect to be able to do when these circumstances shall be totally changed, and when not one circumstance favourable to us will remain?

From the Hartford Courant.

QUESTIONS ON MAGNETISM.

1. WHETHER any gentleman who is in the practice of using the magnetic needle, has made any discovery that the needle is now returning or receding from the Meridian? And if so, then,

2. At what time past did the needle begin to alter its motion from approaching the meridian, to its departing further therefrom? And then,

3. At what rate is the receding motion of the needle?

As to myself I would state, that according to the observations which I have made in practical surveying, I have for several years past suspected that the needle did not continue to approach the meridian as heretofore, but was departing further therefrom; and I have of late become confirmed in that opinion. Now, therefore, if any gentleman has been so fortunate in his observations as to be able to make an accurate discovery of the position of the magnetic needle at this day, and will publish correct answers to the foregoing questions, it will be very useful to the public, and much oblige the subscriber

NATH'L SPENCER.

Surveyor for Litchfield county.

New Hartford, Sept. 24, 1809.

OWYHEE.

WE have heard many particulars of the progress towards civilization and the adoption of European, (or American) customs and arts in the much talked of Sandwich Islands, in the Pacific Ocean. To Americans more than any others, are these islands indebted for instruction in those arts and improvements. Tahama, chief of Owyhee, has subjected to his codes and dominion the whole Archipelago in the neighbourhood of Owyhee. He employs numbers of Americans, Englishmen and Frenchmen, in extending his projects of trade and conquest, in exploring the earth, and in the manufacture of implements of industry and war. He has, we learn, a marine of some nine or ten vessels, which have visited China & the Landrones, and some of them the dependencies of Japan, and that he intended soon to navigate the coast of Mexico, Peru and Chili.

AGRICULTURAL.

TO FARMERS.

EVERY attentive observer, will remark among the plants of almost every kind of crop, some individual stalks which are distinguishable from others by a greater degree of health, or luxuriance, or prolificacy, or earliness, or some other peculiarity. A friend of mine remarked some years ago, a particular stem of peas among his earliest crop, which came into flower and ripened long before the others. He marked this stem and saved the whole of its produce for seed. These came as much earlier as they had originally done. This produce was also saved for seed; and thus he obtained a particular kind of early pea, that came at least a week before the best sort he could buy in the shops, if sown at the same time with them. Doctor Anderson relates facts similar to this respecting wheat and beans. The general idea he means to inculcate is obvious, and extremely worthy of attention.