

Shaw and Chisholm's, in Church
the Dock, Annapolis, a quantity
rown sugar; likewise loaf sugar by
the subscriber, living in the city
is, on the 24th of this instant July,
ant man named GEORGE BRA-
enter by trade, born in Ireland, a
five feet seven inches high, very
the small-pox: had on when he
ntry linen shirt and trousers, an old
r of country made shoes much worn;
ends the said servant so that he may
all receive twenty shillings reward
law allows, and reasonable charges
home, by
ROBERT KEY.
Annapolis, July 9, 1776.
om the subscriber on the 24th of
c gray mare, about 7 years old; she
high, has a small switch'd tail with
; as she has been accustomed to
gh may probably have some marks
She paces, trots and gallops plea-
a number of dark coloured spots,
er rump and legs. Whoever will
or give information of her, so that
shall receive 20 shillings reward.
JAMES MURRAY.
REWARDS
Frederick Furnace, July 1, 1776.
ast night, two servant men, viz.
EN RICHARDS, a convict, has
in the country, a miser, born in
le fellow not exceeding 5 feet 5 or
hard featured and pitted with the
ow-legged and wears his hair tied:
with him a country linen shirt and
jacket did brown, a country linsley
shoes, broad brass buckles, and a
ne is about 28 years of age.
ES, an indentured servant, has been
about 15 months, born in Wales,
or 7 inches high, has been brought
works and is acquainted with the dis-
of the business, dark complexion
the small-pox, short curled black
ur look, small eyes, speaks broken
and took with him one oxford
on trousers, blue upper jacket, one
de of Welch cotton with sleeves, an
and half worn shoes and buckles.
es up said servants and brings them
them so that the subscriber gets
all receive if 20 miles from home
es 30 s. if 40 miles 40 s. for each,
above reward including what the law
DENTON JACQUES.
Annapolis, June 19, 1776.
TO HIRE IMMEDIATELY,
MAN, who understands waiting at
and can write a good hand. Such a
character, may hear of a place.
encouragement will be given, by ap-
rinter hereof.
PENCE per pound in
for fine white LINEN
d one penny per pound for
the Printer hereof.
HARWOOD, jun. treasurer of the
shore, will give constant attendance
West-street, Annapolis, to give
of credit, emitted by the Provincial
Maryland the seventh day of De-
for those emitted by the Convention
h day of July, 1775.
June 11, 1776
from the subscriber, living in Prince-
county, near Mr. Richard Snowden's
Sunday last, a convict servant man
AM SHEPPARD, by trade a shoemaker,
5 feet 4 or 5 inches high, has short
of a swarthy complexion, and has an
He has been hurt in his right leg,
him to limp and to walk on the end of
at side, had on and took with him
a new, an old, claret coloured coat
the shoulders, new green jacket, of
leather, breeches patched on the knees,
kings, and an old pair of shoes.
servant ran away on the 10th of May
taken up and brought home a day or two
his last departure. He stole out of my
day last, a young black mare 3 years
hands, 3 inches high, red but not
off hind foot white. He took with
a couple of tools.
cures the said servant and mare, so that
may get them again, shall receive 40
s. for the servant, alone three pounds
are forty shillings, and if brought back
charges, paid by
JOSEPH DUVAL.
BEN.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 22, 1776.

LONDON, May 21.

THE brig Minerva, capt. Winning, after a passage of five weeks, from Salem in New-Jersey, is arrived at Londonderry, where she has been seized by the custom-house officers in consequence of the restraining act. She had 320 hogheads of flax-seed on board; all the papers which the officers could find, they seized also.

A letter from Ireland to a gentleman in Liverpool mentions, that a vessel arrived at Newry the first of May, in 28 days, from New-York.

Advice is said to be received of a total change in the French ministry, and that those who are now to take the lead have not the same pacific sentiments as their predecessors.

Yesterday a gentleman of distinction was sent off express to Madrid.

May 27. Yesterday a full board of admiralty was held, at the breaking up of which 12 men of war of the line were ordered to be put into commission.

The change in the French ministry has alarmed us exceedingly; the comptroller-general of the finances, Torgant, was a warm friend to peace and domestic improvement, and would not listen to the spanish faction; but the new arrangement is of a very different complexion.

Yesterday in consequence, as it is imagined, of the above alarming intelligence, the different stocks fell two per cent.

Extra of a letter from Lisbon.

"By the great preparations here it seems we are at the eve of a war, however the Portuguese have taken care to fill their granaries with corn sufficient for two or three years, which has been brought to Portugal by American vessels, in return for which they received fire-arms, gunpowder, &c. and what they now buy is shipped for their good friends the French, who, it is said, are rather in want, but they make them pay an exorbitant price for it. Fifteen sail of American vessels are now in the Tagus, and will soon proceed on their return home; there are likewise nine sail of men of war almost ready for sea, exclusive of frigates and smaller vessels.

It is said that the lords of the admiralty have issued an order for the raising 6000 more marines.

The 20th of May arrived at Spithead three vessels, of 600 tons each, with stails, &c. for the reception of horses to be sent to America with the fleet; and the second division of the Hessian troops were under sail at the 14th instant.

Extra from Dr. Price's excellent pamphlet, entitled, Observations on the nature of civil liberty, &c.

Of the authority of one country over another.

FROM the nature and principles of civil liberty, as they have been now explained, it is an immediate and necessary inference, that no one community can have any power over the property, or legislation of another community, that is not incorporated with it, by a just and adequate representation. When only, it has been hewn, is a state free, when it is governed by its own will. Such a country, therefore, is in a state of slavery. And it deserves to be particularly considered, that such slavery is worse, on several accounts, than any slavery of private men to one another, or of kingdoms to despotisms within themselves. Between one state and another, there is none of that fellow feeling that takes place between persons in private life. Being detached bodies that never see one another, and residing perhaps in different quarters of the globe, the state that governs cannot be a witness to the sufferings occasioned by its oppressions; or a competent judge of the circumstances and abilities of the people who are governed. They must also have in a great degree separate interests; and the more the one is loaded, the more the other may be eased. The infamy likewise of oppression, being in such circumstances shared among a multitude, is not likely to be much felt or regarded. On all these accounts there is, in the case of one country subjugated to another, little or nothing to check rapacity; and the most flagrant injustice and cruelty may be practised without remorse or pity. I will add, that it is particularly difficult to shake off a tyranny of this kind. A single despot, if a people are unanimous and resolute, may be soon subdued; but a despotic state is not easily subdued; and people subject to it cannot emancipate themselves without entering into a dreadful, and, perhaps, very unequal contest.

I cannot help observing farther, that the slavery of a people to internal despots may be qualified and limited; but I don't see what can limit the authority of one state over another. The exercise of power in this case can be no other measure than discretion; and, therefore, must be indefinite and absolute.

Once more. It should be considered, that the government of one country by another, can only be supported by military force; and, without such a support, must be destitute of all weight and efficiency.

This will be best explained by putting the following case. There is, let us suppose, in a province subject to the sovereignty of a distant state, a subordinate legislature, consisting of an assembly chosen by the people; a council chosen by that assembly; and a governor appointed by the sovereign state; and paid by the province. There are, likewise, judges and other officers, appointed and paid in the same manner, for administering justice agreeable to the laws, by the verdicts of juries fairly and indiscriminately chosen. This forms a situation seemingly free, by giving the people a share

in their own government, and some check on their rulers; but, while there is a higher legislative power, to the controul of which such constitution is subject, it does not itself possess liberty, and therefore cannot be of any use as a security to liberty; nor is it possible that it should be of long duration. Laws offensive to the province will be enacted by the sovereign state. The legislature of the province will remonstrate against them. The magistrates will not execute them. Juries will not convict upon them; and consequently, like the pope's bulls which once governed Europe, they will become nothing but forms and empty sounds, to which no regard will be shewn. In order to remedy this evil, and to give efficiency to its government, the supreme state will naturally be led to withdraw the governor, the council, and the judges, from the controul of the province, by making them entirely dependent on itself for their pay and continuance in office, as well as for their appointment. It will also alter the mode of choosing juries, in order to bring them more under its influence; and, in some cases, under the pretence of the impossibility of gaining an impartial trial, where government is resisted, it will perhaps ordain, that offenders shall be removed from the province to be tried within its own territories. And it may even go so far in this kind of policy, as to endeavour to prevent the effects of discontents, by forbidding all meetings and associations of the people, except at such times, and for such particular purposes, as shall be permitted them.

Thus will such a province be exactly in the same state that Britain would be in, were our first executive magistrate, our house of lords; and our judges, nothing but the instruments of a foreign democratical power: or were we liable to be transported to a distant country, or to be tried for offences committed here; and restrained from calling any meetings, consulting about any grievances; or associating for any purposes, except when leave should be given us by a lord lieutenant or viceroy.

It is certain, that this is a state of oppression which no country could endure, and to which it would be vain to expect, that any people should submit an hour without an armed force to compel them.

The late transactions in Massachusetts Bay, are a perfect exemplification of what I have now said. The government of Great-Britain in that province has gone on exactly in the train I have described; till at last it became necessary to station troops there, not amenable to the civil power; and all terminated in a government by the sword. And such, if a people are not sunk below the character of men, will be the issue of all governments in similar circumstances.

It may be asked, "Are there not causes by which one state may acquire a rightful authority over another, though not confounded by an adequate representation?" I answer, that there are no such causes. All the causes to which such an effect can be ascribed are conquest, compact, or obligations conferred.

Much has been said of the right of conquest; and history contains little more than accounts of kingdoms reduced by it under the dominion of other kingdoms, and of the havoc it has made among mankind. But the authority derived from hence, being founded on violence, is never rightful. The Roman republic was nothing but a faction against the general liberties of the world; and had no more right to give law to the provinces subject to it, than thieves have to the property they seize, or to the houses into which they break. Even in the case of a just war, undertaken by one people to defend itself against the oppressions of another people, conquest gives only a right to an indemnification for the injury which occasioned the war, and a reasonable security against future injury.

Neither can any state acquire such an authority over other states, in virtue of any compacts or cessions. This is a case in which compacts are not binding. Civil liberty is, in this respect, on the same footing with religious liberty. As no people can lawfully surrender

"The independency of the judges we esteem in this country, one of our greatest privileges. Before the revolution they generally, I believe, held their places during pleasure. King William gave them their places during good behaviour. At the accession of the present royal family their places were given them during good behaviour, in consequence of the act of settlement, 2. c. 2. s. 2. But an opinion having been entertained by some, that though their commissions were made under the act of settlement to continue during good behaviour, yet that they determined on the demise of the crown, it was enacted, by a statute made in the first year of his present majesty, chap. 23. "That the commissions of judges for the time being shall be, continue, and remain in full force, during good behaviour, notwithstanding the demise of his majesty, or any of his heirs and successors; with a proviso, that it may be lawful for his majesty, his heirs and successors, to remove any judge upon the address of both Houses of parliament." And by the same statute their salaries are secured to them; during the continuance of their commissions: his majesty, according to the preamble of the statute, having been pleased to declare from the throne to both Houses of parliament, "That he looked upon the independency and uprightness of judges, as essential to the impartial administration of justice, as one of the best securities to the rights and liberties of his loving subjects, and as most conducive to the honour of his crown."

A worthy friend and able lawyer has supplied me with this note. It affords, when contrasted with that dependence of the judges, which has been thought reasonable in America, a sad specimen of the different manner in which a kingdom may think proper to govern itself, and the prologue to it.

their religious liberty, by giving up the right of judging for themselves in religion, or by allowing any human beings to prescribe to them what faith they shall embrace, or what mode of worship they shall practise; so neither can any civil societies lawfully surrender their civil liberty, by giving up to any extraneous jurisdiction their power of legislating for themselves and disposing of their property. Such a cession, being inconsistent with the unalienable rights of human nature, would either not bind at all, or bind only the individuals who made it. This is a blessing which no one generation of men can give up for another; and which, when lost, a people have always a right to resume. Had our ancestors in this country been so mad as to have subjected themselves to any foreign community, we could not be under any obligation to continue in such a state. And all the nations now in the world who, in consequence of the tameness and folly of their predecessors, are subject to arbitrary power, have a right to emancipate themselves as soon as they can.

If neither conquest nor compact can give such an authority, much less can favours received, or any services performed by one state for another. Let the favour received be what it will, liberty is too dear a price for it. A state that has been obliged is not, therefore, bound to be enslaved. It ought, if possible, to make an adequate return for the services done to it; but to suppose that it ought to give up the power of governing itself, and the disposal of its property, would be to suppose that, in order to shew its gratitude, it ought to part with the power of ever afterwards exercising gratitude. How much has been done by this kingdom for Hanover? But no one will say, on this account, we have a right to make the laws of Hanover; or even to draw a single penny from it without its own consent.

After what has been said, it will, I am afraid, be trifling to apply the preceding arguments to the case of different communities, which are considered as different parts of the same empire. But there are reasons which render it necessary for me to be explicit in making this application.

What I mean here, is just to point out the difference of situation between communities forming an empire, and particular bodies or parts of men forming different parts of a kingdom. Different communities forming an empire have no connections, which produce a necessary reciprocation of interests between them. They inhabit different districts, and are governed by different legislatures. On the contrary, the different classes of men within a kingdom are all placed on the same ground. Their concerns and interests are the same; and what is done to one part must affect all. These are situations that are totally different; and a constitution of government that may be consistent with liberty in one of them, may be entirely inconsistent with it in the other. It is, however, certain, that even in the last of these situations, no one part ought to govern the rest. In order to a fair and equal government, there ought to be a fair and equal representation of all that are governed; and as far as this is wanting in any government, it deviates from the principles of liberty, and becomes unjust and oppressive. But in the circumstances of different communities, all this holds with unspeakably more force. The government of a part, in this case, becomes complete tyranny; and subjection to it becomes complete slavery.

But ought there not, it is asked, to exist somewhere in an empire, a supreme legislative authority over the whole; or a power to controul and bind all the different states of which it consists? I answer, let every state, with respect to all its internal concerns, be continued independent of all the rest; and let a general confederacy be formed by the appointment of a senate, consisting of representatives from all the different states. Let this senate possess the power of managing all the common concerns of the united states, and of judging and deciding between them, as a common arbiter of umpire, in all disputes; having, at the same time, under its direction the common force of the states to support its decisions. In these circumstances, each separate state would be secure against all oppression and insult, from every neighbouring state. This might the scattered force and abilities of a whole continent be gathered into one point; all litigations settled as they rose; universal peace preferred; and nation prevented any more from lifting up a sword against nation.

In a word. An empire is a collection of states or communities united by some common bond or tie. If these states have each of them free constitutions of government, and, with respect to taxation and internal legislation, are independent of the other states, but united by compacts or alliances, or subjection to a great council representing the whole, or to one monarch entrusted with the supreme executive power; in these circumstances the empire will be an empire of freemen. If, on the contrary, like the different provinces (subject to the grand seignior, none of the states possess any independent legislative authority, but are all subject to an absolute monarch, whose will is their law, there is the empire an empire of slaves. If one of the states is free, but governed by its will all the other states, then is the empire, like that of the Romans in the times of the republic, an empire consisting of one state free, and the rest in slavery. Nor does it make any more difference in this case, that the governing state is itself free, than it does in the case of a kingdom subject to a despot; that this despot is himself free. I have before observed, that this only makes the slavery worse. I here is, in the one case, a chance that, in the quick succession of despots, a good one will sometimes arise. But bodies of men continue the same; and have generally proved the most unrelenting of all tyrants.