

himself.—The nearer this Proportion between the Interest subsisting in a State, and those in the General Assembly of the People's Representatives is kept up, the better—for this is the Thing design'd in the original Institution of Representatives.

When an Assembly of Members thus chosen, are convened, every different Interest in the State will have its due Notice and Weight. The general, the greatest Interest of the Whole Nation, ought, no Doubt, to be the grand Point to which the principal Aim of the whole Assembly of Representatives should be directed; tho' it should interfere in some Measure with the partial Interest of particular Persons, because, tho' such Persons should labour under some accidental Inconveniences for the general Good, yet the Benefit they would receive by their Relation to the whole Community, would overbalance the Inconveniences they would suffer in those Instances. Here it may be proper to note, That where there is an entire Inconsistency of Interests, so that the Benefit of one must necessarily be in the same Degree hurtful to the other; then these two Interests never can unite in the same Government; their Connection should be broken off. The jarring Interest should be removed, or new modelled into Harmony and Consistency with the Rest; for a Kingdom divided against itself cannot stand. The great fundamental Principles of a Government should be common to all its Parts and Members, else the whole will be endanger'd. If then the Interest of the Mother Country and her Colonies cannot be made to coincide, (which I verily believe they may) if the same Constitution may not take Place in both, (as it certainly ought to do) if the Welfare of the Mother Country, necessarily requires a Sacrifice of the most valuable natural Rights of the Colonies—Their Right of making their own Laws, and disposing of their own Property by Representatives of their own choosing; if such is really the Case between Great Britain and her Colonies, then the Connection between them ought to cease—And sooner or later it must inevitably cease, and perhaps end in the total Ruin of one or both of them: The English Government cannot long act towards a Part of its Dominions upon Principles diametrically opposite to its own, without losing itself in the Slavery it would impose upon the Colonies, or learning them to throw it off, and Assert that Freedom that was denied them by those who had no better a Right to it than themselves.

I hope by this Time it is evident to all my Readers, that from the original Design of a Representative, and the only meaning the Name can bear, no Person can possibly be such a one, or by any Thing that he can do, bind others, according to Reason and common Sense, to admit his Actions as their own, unless they freely choose him to the Office. This alone, can in Reason, make his Actions theirs; and if without this others take upon them to choose Representatives for those who have no Choice themselves, it is a mere Mockery and Insult, and as gross a Violation of their Rights, as it would be to dispose of their Persons and Property by mere Force, without any Form of Law at all. This Absurdity (of our being represented in Parliament) is so glaring, that it is almost an Affront to common Sense to use Arguments to expose it; and yet it has been so much insisted upon, that it seems as if the free Use of common Sense was to be prohibited, as well as our other common Rights. I have dwelt so long upon this Point, not because long Arguments were necessary, but rather to rouse Attention by repeating, and placing the same Arguments in different Lights; and I shall close my Observations upon it, with the following Inference. If Persons here may be represented in England without their own Choice; then, by Parity of Reason, Persons there, may be represented here in the same Manner. The Laws passed in the Colonies, after obtaining the Royal Assent, are of equal Force with Acts of Parliament; so that we have as really a legislative Power, as the People in England; and therefore, if we were to make Acts of Assembly to levy Taxes upon the People of England, and obtain the Royal Assent to them, can any Man tell, why those Acts should not be as binding upon the People of England, as their Acts are upon us? For my Part I can see no Difference in the Cases.—There is indeed a Difference in the Power to enforce the Act.—They can oppress us with Impunity, but we are not able to return the Compliment. If such an Imposition would appear abominable to the People in England, let them be as tender of our Rights, as they would wish us to be of theirs, if we had Power to impose Taxes upon them by force, as they now have upon us.—And such a

Time may possibly come in future Ages. As the English Dominions in America are much more extensive than in Europe, they will in a few Ages be much more populous, and may become more powerful; and if the King, should pass an Act made in the Colonies, for taxing the People in Great Britain, could they make any Objection to it, but what is equally Strong against their taxing the Colonies? But the Violation of the English Constitution is manifest in both Cases.

Having I think sufficiently shewn, that the Colonies are not represented in the English Parliament; it follows of Course, that they cannot legally be taxed there. This Consequence is inevitable, the Advocates for the Tax themselves, have in the strongest Expressions, allow'd it. They ground their Right of taxing, entirely upon the Reality of our being represented in Parliament; and since it appears, that we are not represented, they must allow we cannot be legally taxed upon any Pretence whatsoever.—Even tho' it should appear, that there are several Towns, Corporations, and Bodies of People in similar Circumstances in England—For that would only shew, that some of the People in England, as well as those in America, were injured and oppressed; but would shew no Sort of Right for the Oppression. It would shew that those Places ought to join with the Americans in Remonstrances to obtain Redress of Grievances. Indeed it has long been the Complaint of the most judicious People in England, as the greatest Misfortune to the Nation, that the People in England are so unequally represented; some large Towns and Corporations send none, or but a few to Represent them, while several insignificant Places, of only a few indigent Persons, whose chief Support is the Sale of their Votes, send many Members to Parliament, to Vote according to the Direction of the Ministry, who enable them to purchase their Seats with the Nation's Money, given for very different Purposes.

These are Evils that are too notorious to escape general Observation, and too atrocious to be palliated.—Why are not these crying Grievances redressed? The Reason is plain—I hey afford the greatest Opportunities for Bribery and Corruption—By enabling proper Tools, with the Nation's Money, to purchase Seats in Parliament, and by bribing others with Places and Pensions, a corrupt Administration can command a Majority in the House of Commons, that are entirely at their Command, and will pass what Laws they please: So that they can command the Nation's Money, to bribe Persons to make Laws for its Destruction! And are they not satisfied with the Money that may be thus raised at home without an open Violation of the Constitution, by taking Advantage of the Defects that Time and Change of Circumstances has occasion'd in the Rules or Forms of choosing Representatives for Parliament? Must the rapacious Schemes be extended to these remote Regions of his Majesty's Dominion, and have their Foundation on the Ruins of the English Constitution in America!

And in this Land of Liberty, (for so it was our Glory to call it) where no honest Man need be afraid to express the Dictates of his Heart before the greatest Man upon Earth, are there really Men to be found so insensible to Shame, as, before the awful Tribunal of Reason, to mention the Hardships, which thro' their Practices, some Places in England are obliged to bear without Redress, as Precedents for imposing still greater Hardships and Wrongs upon America!

Having thus shewn, that if many Places and Persons in England, interested in the Business of Parliament, have yet no Share in the Choice of its Members, that it must be a Hardship upon them, and calls loudly for Redress, which they ought to seek and obtain, but can be no Sort of Reason for the like Oppression being imposed upon the Americans: I come now to shew, that there is in Reality, no Resemblance between the Cases of any of the Places and Persons before enumerated to justify the Taxing of the Colonies, nor any similar Taxation to be found in England. As to the Towns, tho' they send no Members to Parliament, yet all the Counties where these Towns stand do send Members to Parliament; and is there one of them, in which several Gentlemen, who are Members of Parliament (besides the Members for the County) are not deeply interested? And how then can these suffer, when there are so many Persons in Parliament to take Care of their Interests? And are not many of the Inhabitants of these Towns, Voters for the County Members, over whom therefore they have all the Influence they can desire? The same may be said of the East-India Company: That Company consists of a great Number of

the principal Gentlemen in England, and can they want a sufficient Number of Members to take Care of their Interests in the Parliament? I am sorry I have no Opportunity of knowing how many Members of Parliament belong to the East-India Company, but am well assured their Number is very considerable. The like may be said of the Proprietors of the public Funds, and as to the other Promised Interest, which is mention'd as sending no Members to Parliament, I am at a Loss to know the Persons meant: If it be all those who have Money to let at Interest, can it be doubted that there are a sufficient Number of Gentlemen in the House who have considerable Property in Money, to take due Care to regulate the Interest? Besides, all those Persons who have no Votes, especially if they be Men of large Property, have yet an Opportunity of considerable Influence in Elections, as well as to have their Concerns duly attended to, by the Members for contiguous Places. Nor is it difficult for any Men of Fortune, to procure a Right of voting for Members of Parliament—so that the Mention of these Cases, as parallel with that of the Colonies, is wonderfully trifling and impertinent, more especially the Cases of Persons under Age, and Women! As if these were distinct Bodies of People unconnected in Interest with those who have a Right of voting.—When it can be shewn, that the collective Body of Infants, have a distinct Interest from that of Persons of Age, or that the female Part of the Species have a distinct Interest from the Males, then I promise to prove that they have a Right to send Members to Parliament. And must a great Nation be deprived of its most sacred Rights upon such Arguments as these!—When such are brought to justify the tremendous Act, is it not a Proof that no reasonable ones can be found! But is it possible, that on a Matter of such Importance, any Man who valued his Reputation as a Man of Sense and Honesty, should before the Public, seriously propose Arguments so very trifling and ridiculous! And is it not most wonderful, that those Arguments should be received with Applause, and have sufficient Influence to overturn the English Constitution in America!

The true Reason, I suppose, why those Places and Persons send no Members to Parliament is, that they do not want any, their Interest being sufficiently guarded already by Members for other Places, concern'd in their Welfare, who answer the same Purposes as if sent by their own Votes.

And now, where is the Resemblance between these Places and Persons, who have all the Benefit of Representatives, tho' they, as distinct Bodies, do not send any; and the Colonies, which are at Distances too remote to have the least Influence in the Election of Members, or in promoting or opposing any Matters that concern themselves in Parliament; and are not only unconnected in Interest with any of the Members, but in many Respects entirely opposite—indeed I believe in all Respects, when the Affairs of the Colonies would come before that House; for when has the Parliament meddled with any Matters relating to them, except to lay some Imposition upon them?

It is essential to the Character of a Representative, that his Interest shall be consistent with that of his Constituent, and that he shall have an exact Knowledge of his Circumstances and all his Concerns. Without these, no reasonable Man would choose a Representative. And must the injured Colonies be forced to acknowledge as their Representatives, Persons they never chose nor knew, and who are as little acquainted with them or their Circumstances, and are certainly destitute of the necessary Requisites for such an Office? Must the Actions of such Representatives be acknowledged by the Colonies as their own, tho' the most contrary to their Inclinations, their Interest, and their most valuable Rights!

I should now conclude, having, as far as the Brevity to which I am confined, will permit, finish'd what I at first propos'd in this Essay; but it seems necessary to consider some other Matters relating to the Subject, which have been often mention'd to justify the Taxation. I have not Time to study in what Order these Matters would most properly fall under Consideration, I shall take them just as they happen to occur to my Mind.

It has been said that the Impositions upon the Colonies have been the more insisted upon, and the more rigorous, from an Apprehension that they were aiming at Independence; and because the Ministry were exasperated at their disputing the Parliament's Right to tax them.

As to the Dependency or Independency of the Colonies, I cannot conceive how these Terms can be applicable to them. They are a Part of the

British Dominions.—Kingdom be said to when all have the have indeed a recip another for Assistance of their common an do not deriv those From the Author of them. And no other fringe them. If the onies are supposed than that they claim Liberty and Property England; it is very And as the People in that they depend up of any Power on these Rights; so, ne is there any Thing justly offend our Br they wish us to part without remonstratio and Freedom of Eng upon such an interest Manner unworthy ou

But if the Indep were supposed to aim off their Allegiance of Great Britain, no than such a Suppositio more strongly and a Sovereign, than the tion, to his Majesty his Royal House; ne mous, and firm in t and Constitution of risk their Lives and This Affection and a Sense of Duty and ful Sovereigns, his enjoy'd, and were p their Rights and Priv ever ready to hear their Welfare. Whil ges, what Motives c sibly have to throw o jessly, of desire a Cha Rights, Liberty and to them by the Engli wish for more under that are injured and cal Government, will Change;—but the En are secured to them of England, can wi form no Wif of H have no Change but nies were at this Tim Period, entirely unco any other Part of the of their Laws, and form; they could n adopting the Laws s for their own; and p Protection and Gover ertful and so good as h ver and Defender of tution: And therefor so great and powerfu Change of Governm their own Disadvant er would be, in equa and Power of Englan all Parts of the Bri same common Rights, between them; they Prosperity, and think Security and Happine to shew that there nev Colonies to break of Mother Country, to d to his Majesty, to res Government, and A stitution; so long as the full Enjoyment of Constitution entitles th —nor can they be t

This brings me to Relation that really Country and the Col King to act in Behalf which having, by Law ferred that Office upon and acknowledge his their own; then there virtually subsisting, bet tion on the one Part, tling the Colonies, on The Lands to be se