

the bar, and a practitioner in the Criminal Court of Baltimore city.

2d. I have had occasion to witness the demeanor of Judge Stump upon the bench, and do not hesitate to say that in my judgment it is not dignified, and very frequently rude, disrespectful and insulting to the members of the bar. I was present in Court when he announced his determination to send the record in the case of Wm. G. Ford to the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel county; his attention was then called by Milton Whitney to the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case, I believe of Emanuel Rabb, that Anne Arundel county was not a county adjoining to Baltimore city, and consequently that the Circuit Court of said county had no jurisdiction over removed cases from Baltimore city; the case was cited in open Court, and the Judge remarked that he knew of said decision, but inasmuch as the Court of Appeals had used either in a previous or a subsequent case, I do not now remember distinctly which, language which admitted of a different construction, he wanted them to settle the conflict between the two cases, though he himself knew that Anne Arundel county was not adjoining to Baltimore city.

In August, 1859, I was requested by Charles E. Phelps, Esq., a member of the Baltimore bar, to appear during his absence from the city, for a free negro, named Thomas Watkins, who had been convicted of larceny in the Criminal Court of Baltimore city and sentenced by Judge Stump, and to move for his discharge from custody, the Court of Appeals having reversed the judgment.

I accordingly went into Court and filed a motion for the negroe's discharge; the opinion of the Court was read to Judge Stump, who treated it with levity and contempt, by the acting prosecuting attorney, Robert C. Barry, Esq., who interposed no objection to the motion; but the Judge declined then to grant it, stating that he would think about it a day or two. I then called his attention particularly to the concluding paragraph of the opinion of the Court of Appeals in said case, in which they distinctly declare that the effect of the reversal is to defeat all prior proceedings in the case, but he still refused to order the prisoner's discharge, though it was manifest that there was nothing under which he could lawfully be detained.

On the following Saturday I again went into Court and expressed to the Judge the hope that a week's reflection had satisfied him of the propriety of granting the motion which I had filed. He again refused, stating that the Court of Appeals had not decided what judgment was the proper one, though they had decided that that which he had rendered was *not* the proper one. I urged upon him that his duty to discharge the prisoner was, under the circumstances, per-