Congress," (Act of 1795, Sec. 2.) The Proclamation is therefore without any color whatever of right, and is as plain and bald a subversion of the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the laws, as ever was attempted by the military power, in any Government ostensibly free. The pretense of "existing exigencies" is but the shape in which military revolutions have always begun, since the prestige of free institutions has rendered it necessary, even for usurpers to make a show of apology for overthrowing them.

If ever a triumphant illustration could be given of the wisdom of our fathers, in providing by the constitution, that the government should operate upon its individual citizens through the laws, and not upon the States by military coercion, it is to be found in the fact, that the first administration daring to depart from this fundamental and consecrated principle, has rushed, in the short space of sixty days, into the assertion of absolute control over the whole military resources of the country, in open and reckless defiance of every legal and constitutional restraint. The Committee hazard nothing in saying, that there is not a citizen of Maryland, whatever be his political opinions, who must not shudder at the palpable and ominous presence of this usurpation, and who does not recognize, for the first time, in his own experience or the history of Maryland, that he is living and moving and holding his civil and political rights at the pleasure of an unrestricted military power, and subject to the arbitrary and anti-republican caprices of what is entitled "military necessity." For any man to be able to persuade himself, under such circumstances, that the policy of the administration ever meant peace and not war—the "enforcement of the laws,"—the "defence of the capital"—and not subjugation—requires a peculiarity of mental construction with which reason is at a loss how to deal. To suppose that a blockade of the whole sea coast, from the capes of the Chesapeake to the extreme borders of Texas, with a land army extraordinary of one hundred and fifty thousand men, and a naval increase of eighteen thousand, can be intended only in aid of "the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or the powers vested in the Marshals," and is therefore within the scope of the President's civil functions, and not of the war-making power, which only Congress can exercise, implies a facility of conviction, to which nothing can be regarded as impossible.

The Committee are of course not unacquainted with the familiar doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Martin *vs.* Mott, (12 Wheaton,