

Assembly; rather, we look for a specific prohibition against such an enactment, and finding none we accord the measure a presumption of constitutionality. Consequently, where, as here, we find persuasive reasons for at least doubting that the measure violates either the separation of powers mandate or any other provision of the Constitution, "the necessary and proper clause can [amply] authorize a given method of obtaining a desired result," and the underlying authority of the General Assembly will be presumed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we advise that, although House Bill 619 poses several significant and close questions of constitutional law, it is not clearly unconstitutional. On the contrary, we are persuaded that there are substantial arguments in favor of such legislation, however unwise as a matter of policy it arguably might be.

Very truly yours,
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FOOTNOTES

- 1 This statutory committee exists by virtue of Code, Article 40, §40A. Its present authority and its history are discussed at 62 Op. Atty. Gen. ____ (1977) (Rules Service Edition No. 77-10). See also, Sachs, The Joint Legislative Committee On Administrative, Executive and Legislative Review (AELR): Its Past, Procedures and Proposals for Reform, Legislative Study Group, Inc. (February 7, 1977).
- 2 See, Bosivert, A Legislative Tool For Supervision of Administrative Agencies: The English Laying System, 25 Ford. L. Rev. 638 (1956-57).
- 3 "The actual form of the veto can vary greatly depending on the way in which three sets of variables are combined. First, the wielder of the device can vary. The veto can be—and has been—vested in the whole Congress, in one House of Congress, in the committees, and even in a committee chairman. Second the manner in