

(3) REFUSING TO GRANT AN INJUNCTION; AND THE RIGHT OF APPEAL IS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE FILING OF AN ANSWER TO THE BILL OF COMPLAINT OR PETITION FOR AN INJUNCTION ON BEHALF OF ANY OPPOSING PARTY, NOR BY THE TAKING OF DEPOSITIONS IN REFERENCE TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE BILL OF COMPLAINT TO BE READ ON THE HEARING OF THE APPLICATION FOR AN INJUNCTION.

(4) APPOINTING A RECEIVER BUT ONLY IF THE APPELLANT HAS FIRST FILED HIS ANSWER IN THE CAUSE.

(5) FOR THE SALE, CONVEYANCE, OR DELIVERY OF REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY OR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY, OR THE REFUSAL TO RESCIND OR DISCHARGE SUCH AN ORDER, UNLESS THE DELIVERY OR PAYMENT IS DIRECTED TO BE MADE TO A RECEIVER APPOINTED BY THE COURT.

(6) DETERMINING A QUESTION OF RIGHT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND DIRECTING AN ACCOUNT TO BE STATED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SUCH DETERMINATION.

(7) REQUIRING BOND FROM A PERSON TO WHOM THE DISTRIBUTION OR DELIVERY OF PROPERTY IS DIRECTED, OR WITHHOLDING DISTRIBUTION OR DELIVERY AND ORDERING THE RETENTION OR ACCUMULATION OF PROPERTY BY THE FIDUCIARY OR ITS TRANSFER TO A TRUSTEE OR RECEIVER, OR DEFERRING THE PASSAGE OF THE COURT'S DECREE IN AN ACTION UNDER MARYLAND RULE V79.

(8) DECIDING ANY QUESTION IN AN INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING BROUGHT UNDER ARTICLE 47 OF THE CODE.

(9) GRANTING AN APPLICATION TO STAY ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO §3-207 OF THIS ARTICLE.

REVISOR'S NOTE: Subsection (c) takes the provisions of Art. 5, §§7 and 8A and combines them. Although most of the actions mentioned are in equity, some relief, like an injunction, may also be obtained at law; hence no distinction is made between law and equity. It may be noted that in Jackson v. Jackson, 15 Md. App. 615, 292 A. 2d. 145, Acts of 1972, the Court of Special Appeals indicated that a refusal to quash a writ of ne exeat was similar to the refusal to quash an injunction, and thus appealable by analogy to Art. 5, §7, even though the order is interlocutory.

In addition, paragraph (9) picks up a