§§1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, and 19. The portion cf §8, permitting an appeal under its provisions only when the court consents, has been eliminated. It seems anomolous to permit an appeal only with the permission of the very court whose decision is being appealed. "Final judgment" is defined in §12-101(f). "Circuit court" includes the various Supreme Bench courts; Sec. 1-101(d). No change is intended in the general rules as to appealability, with one exception. That exception is contained in the second sentence, permitting an appeal from a decision made in the exercise of original special, limited, statutory jurisdiction. The present case law is to the contrary; see Simpler v. State ex rel. Boyd, 223 Md. 456, 165 A 2d. 464 (1960). This rule constitutes something of a trap, in view of the broad general language of both Art. 5, §§1 and 6, and proposed §12-301. When legislators create such a jurisdiction, they often may not realize that no appeal will be permitted. Thus, after the Simpler decision, the legislature adopted Ch. 49, Acts of 1962, permitting an appeal from a decision awarding judgment against the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board; see Art. 66 1/2, §7-635. It seems more reasonable to let the broad general language include appeals in such cases unless the legislature expressly decides to deny them. This approach will eliminate the necessity of deciding whether a given jurisdiction is common law or special, limited and statutory; Montchester Gun Club, Inc. v. Honga River Gun Club, Inc., 257 Md. 79, 262 A. 2d. 312 (1970). It will also permit the repeal of numerous special appeal provisions, such as Art. 7, §18, Art. 16, §§66K and 84, Art. 26, §70-25, Art. 31A, §7, Art. 87, §15 (last clause), etc. No change in the law is made as to appealability of circuit court judgments in the exercise of an appellate jurisdiction; see §§12-302(a) and 12-305. As to appeals in contempt cases, see §12-304. As to court in which review may be sought, see §12-306.

The last sentence contains the substance of Art. 5, §13.