MARVIN MANDEL, Governor                                 11

for contempt by summary conviction. It
went on to say that the Act of 1853 did not
confer jurisdiction, but was merely
declaratory of the common law.

Later decisions indicate that the list of
punishable acts in Art. 26, §4 is not
limiting on the courts, and also is not
all-inclusive as a statement of the common

law; Weaver v. State, 244 Md. 640 (1966).

Moreover, it would be unconstitutional for
the legislature to attempt to strip the
courts of their inherent contempt power;
Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300
(1949) .

It is clear that Art. 26, §4 refers only to
direct contempts, but the legislature has
not attempted to define the limits of
constructive contempt, even if it has the
power to do so; Hitzelberger v. State, 173
Md. 435 (1938) .

The line of cases rejecting the
legislature's ability to limit the exercise
of contempt power, or at least judicial
statements reiterating that view, have
continued up to the present; see, e.g.
Kandel v. State, 252 Md. 668 (1969);
McDaniel v. McDaniel, 256 Md. 684 (1970);

Goldsborouqh v. State, 12 Md. App. 346

(1971); Muskus v. State, 14 Md. App. 348
(1972); and Roll & Scholl v. State, 15 Md.
App. 31 (1972).

In view of this case law, Art. 26, §4 is
misleading in form and probably of little
real benefit. The revision commission
concluded that equal usefulness would be a
simple statement of contempt power and a
reference to the Md. Rules. Subtitle P of
those Rules spells out contempt procedure;
see also Subtitle P, Md. District Rules.
Naturally, the repeal of Art. 26, §4 is not
intended and will not remove any act listed
in the section from the category of acts
punishable as contempts.

Because of the definition of "court" in
§1—101(c), the contempt power of the
District Court is recognized, thus