1924                                                   VETOES

"The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of
telephonic and telegraphic communications shall not be violated. The interception
and divulgence of a private communication by any person not a party thereto is
contrary to the public policy of this State, and shall not be permitted except by
court order in unusual circumstances to protect the people. It is further declared to
be the public policy of this State that detection of the guilty does not justify
investigative methods which infringe upon the liberties of the innocent."

In State v. Siegel, supra, the Court was dealing with the validity of Court
ordered interceptions under Section 94(a) of Article 35 and Section 125D of
Article 27. The orders did not specify that the authority to intercept would
terminate when the desired communication had been obtained; they did not require
the interception to be executed as soon as practicable; and they did not require that
the interception be conducted so as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception. Each of these provisions is
required by §2518 of Title 18 (U.S.C.), which the Court held applicable; and for
that reason, the orders were held invalid.

The underlying theory expressed by the Court is that; (1) in order for wiretaps
to be conducted by State or local law enforcement officers in Maryland, there
must be a State statute authorizing such conduct, which is provided at present by
sections of Article 27 and 35; (2) the State statutory authority may be more
restrictive, but not more liberal than the federal authority contained in Title 18 of
the United States Code; and (3) to the extent the State statutory authority is
broader than the federal, it is invalid and the federal provisions will control. I do
not read the Siegel case as abrogating Section 125A of Article 27 or Sections 92 of
Article 35, but only those procedures relating to Court ordered interceptions that
exceed what is permitted in corresponding sections of the federal law, and the types
of crimes, in excess of those stated in the federal law, for which wiretaps may be
authorized.

H.B. 962 does repeal those two sections designed to preserve the privacy of
Maryland citizens as well as Section 93 of Article 35, which, inter alia, prohibits
the interception or attempted interception of telephonic communications, without
consent of all parties to the conversation. See Robert v. State. 220 Md. 159,
169-171 (1959). It enacts in their place, in new Section 93(b) of Article 35, the
following provisions:

"(2) It shall not be unlawful under this subtitle for a person acting under color
of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to
the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception.

(3) It shall not be unlawful under this subtitle for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person is a
party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted
for the purpose of committing any criminal or torturous act in violation of the
constitution, or federal or state law, or for the purpose of committing any other
injurious act." (emphasis supplied).

These two new subsections are taken from Section 2511(2) of Title 18, and their
effect when read together with the balance of H.B. 962, is to allow the police, and
anyone else, to intercept, listen in, and record the private conversations of people
where only one party to the conversation has given consent to such activity. The
other party to the conversation is thus subject to having his conversation
intercepted without his knowledge, without prior court approval, and without any
need to show probable cause to believe that criminal activity of any kind may be