

construing it, we must give such a meaning to it as will reconcile *all* its provisions.

It is to be observed also that the prohibition which is relied on as denying to the Legislature any power over the subject is a prohibition against increasing or diminishing the salary of public officers during their "term of office," and (in the case of the Judges during their "continuance in office.")

Manifestly, therefore, this language, giving to it its broadest effect, does not prohibit the Legislature from passing a law increasing salaries to take effect *in future* as to new incumbents, but is limited to a denial of their power to increase or diminish during the officers' term of office.

Under our system the term of the Judges commence at different periods; some of the Judges now in office will hold beyond the expiration of the terms of their colleagues, and unless we construe the Constitution as I think it should be construed upon the point under review, the anomaly might be presented of Judges sitting on the same bench receiving different salaries.

The obvious escape from this predicament is to interpret the special clauses relating to the Judges as conferring on the Legislature the power to increase, but as denying the power to diminish, and this construction removes all difficulty.

The last clause in section 1, of Article 15, has no application to the question, for the plain reason, that it embraces the cases not specially provided for, and as the case of the Judges is specially provided for, it can have no reference to them.

Respectfully, &c.,

JOHN P. POE.

Mr. Brown, from a minority of the Committee on Judicial Proceedings, submitted the following

REPORT :

*Minority Report of the Judiciary Committee.*

Senate Bill No. 97, as we understand it, proposes by Legislative enactment to report an express provision of the Constitution, the organic law of the State, and to enact another and different one in lieu thereof.