the recipient of a lump sum payment under this Article, his future compensation shall be adjusted according to the other provisions of this Article, and with regard to the combined effect of his injuries and his past receipt of compensation under this Article. In case of the remarriage of a dependent widow of a deceased employee, without dependent children at the time of the remarriage, she shall receive compensation for one year after the date of her remarriage, provided there is so much of the compensation previously awarded her outstanding. No widow or widower shall receive any benefits under this Article where the marriage shall have taken place after the person entitled to benefits hereunder shall have been injured, provided there are no dependent children.

If aggravation, diminution or termination or disability takes place or be discovered after the rate of compensation shall have been established or compensation terminated in any case, the Commission may, upon the application of any party in interest or upon its own motion, readjust for future application the rate of compensation in accordance with rules in this section provided, or in a proper case, terminate the payments.

A husband or wife of an injured employee, who has deserted said employee for more than one year prior to the time of the injury or subsequently shall not be a beneficiary under this Article.

The time within which Commission may exercise powers under this section is gov-

erned by the provisions of Sec. 66. Dashiell v. Candy Shops, 171 Md. 72.

Refusal of Commission to reopen case on account of new condition arising from aggravation, diminution or termination of injury for which compensation was awarded, is appealable. Stevenson v. Hill, 170 Md. 676.

This section referred to in construing Sec. 63. Victory, etc., Co. v. Saxton, 170 Md. 452. Where widow testified (and was partially corroborated) that she had been deserted by husband and that he had been contributing to her support, held legally sufficient to find entire dependency. Harvey v. Roche, 148 Md. 368.

This section referred to in construing sec. 51—see notes thereto. Dickson, etc., Co. v.

Beasley, 146 Md. 572.

The right to reopen is merely for the purpose of considering new conditions arising from aggravation, diminution or termination of injury. Gold Dust Corp. v. Zabawa, 159 Md. 667.

This section referred to in construing sec. 66. Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 99. Cited but not construed in Balto. Pub. Co. v. Hendricks, 156 Md. 80.

The reference to remarriage of a dependent widow without dependent children applies where there are no dependent children at time of such remarriage. The case of marriage of a dependent sister, distinguished. Giggndelle v. Piedmont & George's Creek Coal Co., 137 Md. 26.

This section referred to in holding that order of commission denying a motion to

reopen a case is appealable. Bethlehem Corp. v. Simmons, 132 Md. 508.

This section referred to in construing sec. 48—see notes thereto. Accident Fund v. Jacobs' Admr., 140 Md. 626.

See notes to secs. 52, 54 and 66.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 44. 1912, sec. 44. 1914, ch. 800, sec. 43. 1920, ch. 456, sec. 44.

If a beneficiary shall reside or remove out of the United States. and shall have been such non-resident for a period of one year, the Commission may, in its discretion, convert any payments thereafter to become due to such beneficiary into a lump sum payment, not in any case to exceed twenty-four hundred dollars, by paying a sum equal to three-fourths of the then value of such payments.

This section referred to in construing sec. 48—see notes thereto. Accident Fund v. Jacobs' Admr., 140 Md. 626.

See notes to secs. 52, 54 and 66.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 45. 1912, sec. 45. 1914, ch. 800, sec. 44.

If injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the