of reverter shall be subject to be disposed of, transferred and passed by his or her last will or codicil, and any testator devising real or personal property subject to a condition or conditions, may devise or bequeath the right of entry or reverter which may arise on breach of such condition or conditions, under the following restrictions.

There is nothing in secs. 332 to 351 prohibiting an attesting witness to a will from being a beneficiary thereunder. Leitch v. Leitch, 114 Md. 336.

The act of 1798, ch. 101, sub-ch. 1, sec. 1, did not embrace leasehold property. Origin of this section. Devecmon v. Devecmon, 43 Md. 346. And see Holzman v. Wager, 114 Md. 322.

A power of sale in a will extends to surviving executors, trustees, etc., or to his or their successor, unless will indicates contrary intention—art. 16, sec. 276.

Cited but not construed in Woodruff v. Linthicum, 158 Md. 608.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 329. 1912, sec. 320. 1904, sec. 315. 1888, sec. 308. 1798, ch. 101, sub-ch. 1, sec. 2.

No will, testament or codicil shall be effectual to create any interest or perpetuity, or make any limitation, or appoint any uses not now permitted by the constitution or laws of this State.

Cited but not construed in Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 163; Ould v. Washington Hospi-

tal, 95 U.S. 303.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 330. 1912, sec. 321. 1908, ch. 569.

The rule against perpetuities shall not apply to any contingent remainder, executory devise, bequest or limitation of real or personal property, or both, by will or testament, intended to transfer the same from any corporation incorporated for charitable or educational objects to an individual or from any such corporation to any other such corporation on a contingency or future event, nor to any condition subsequent, or breach thereof upon which any such devise, bequest or limitation is intended to operate. This section is not intended to be, and shall not be construed as an interpretation of existing law.

See sec. 308.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 331. 1912, sec. 322. 1904, sec. 316. 1888, sec. 309. 1798, ch. 101, sub-ch. 1, sec. 3.

No will, testament or codicil shall be good and effectual for any purpose whatsoever, unless the person making the same be at the time of executing or acknowledging it as hereafter directed, of sound and disposing mind, and capable of executing a valid deed or contract. No will, testament or codicil shall be good and effectual to pass any interest or estate in any lands, tenements or incorporeal hereditaments, unless the person making the same, if a male, be of the full age of twenty-one years, and if a female, of the full age of eighteen years.1

This section and secs. 336, 365 and 368 prescribe every condition essential to regular probate of a valid will. See notes to sec. 362. Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Md. 295.

Prayers granted held not to justify a reversal although they did not follow exactly the language of this section as to testamentary capacity. Kamps v. Alexander, 133 Md.

This section furnishes the rule by which capacity of testator is to be measured. Burden of proof. Tyson v. Tyson, 37 Md. 582; Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. & J. 299.

A prayer which explains clearly the terms used in this section but does not vary them is proper. Calvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 388; Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 125.

The last portion of this section has no application to leasehold property, that is a term of years in esse, and hence a will bequeathing such property is valid though executed before testator is of legal age; contra where will exact to the effect of the property. executed before testator is of legal age; contra, where will creates term of years or leasehold interest. Holzman v. Wager, 114 Md. 322.

No attempt is here made to collect or annotate the cases involving testamentary capacity—see Md. Digest.