

An. Code, 1924, sec. 7. 1912, sec. 7. 1904, sec. 7. 1894, ch. 661, sec. 6A.

7. The period within which any suit or action may be brought under any statute of limitations in force in this State shall not be extended because the plaintiff in such suit or action was, is or shall be a *feme covert*, imprisoned, or beyond the seas, or out of the jurisdiction of this State at the time of the accrual of the right, title or cause of action.

Plaintiffs mentioned in this section having a vested right to sue at time of its adoption had ten years thereafter to enter suit; since June 1, 1904, they have been on same footing as other plaintiffs. *Safe Deposit Co. v. Marburg*, 110 Md. 415; *Baumeister v. Silver*, 98 Md. 427; *Sowers v. Keedy*, 135 Md. 450.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 8. 1912, sec. 8. 1904, sec. 8. 1888, sec. 7. 1849, ch. 224. 1876, ch. 58.

8. Whenever any person may die indebted and his interest in real estate may be liable to be proceeded against for the payment of his debts by reason of the insufficiency of his personal estate, the operation of this article both at law and in equity shall be suspended in relation to the heirs and devisees of such debtor for the period of eighteen months from the death of such decedent, and where any debts of such person so dying indebted have been or may be paid by his executor or administrator and the real estate of such decedent is proceeded against for the payment of his debts, the operation of this article, both at law and in equity, shall be suspended in relation to the heirs and devisees of such deceased debtor as to the claims so paid until the lapse of eighteen months after the filing of said bill.

The statute is suspended in favor of a creditor against an heir and devisees. Case saved by this section from operation of statute. *Eirley v. Eirley*, 102 Md. 454; *Thompson v. Dorsey*, 4 Md. Ch. 151.

The period allowed by statute having expired before bill for a sale of real estate was filed, this section held to have no application. *Simms v. Lloyd*, 58 Md. 480.

This section regarded as prospective. *Shepherd v. Bevans*, 4 Md. Ch. 411.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 9. 1912, sec. 9. 1904, sec. 9. 1888, sec. 8. 1814, ch. 122, sec. 3.

9. The time intervening between the petitioning of an insolvent debtor and the time when his petition may be dismissed shall not be computed on any plea of limitation so as to defeat the claim of any person against such debtor.

An. Code, 1924, sec. 10. 1912, sec. 10. 1904, sec. 10. 1888, sec. 9. 1818, ch. 90. 1849, ch. 424.

10. Whenever land shall be taken up under a common or special warrant, or warrant of re-survey, escheat or proclamation warrant, any person, body politic or corporate may give in evidence under the general issue his possession thereof; and if it shall appear in evidence that the person, body politic or corporate, or those under whom they claim have held the lands in possession for twenty years before the action brought, such possession shall be a bar to all right or claim derived from the State under any patent issued upon such warrant; but nothing herein contained shall apply to any warrant laid before the 26th day of January, 1819.

If the possession is not under color of title, twenty years' exclusive adverse possession by actual enclosures must be shown. *Newman v. Young's Lessee*, 30 Md. 420. See also *Davis v. Furlow's Lessee*, 27 Md. 546.

When a party entitled to benefit of this section ought not to have his title clouded by a subsequent grant upon an escheat warrant. *Armstrong v. Bittinger*, 47 Md. 111. See also *Hoye v. Swan*, 5 Md. 244; *Dorothy v. Hillert*, 9 Md. 574; *Jay v. Van Bibber*, 94 Md. 695.

*Quære* whether plaintiffs as well as defendants can avail themselves of act of 1818, ch. 90, and as to whether that act is a grant or confirmation of title. The act of 1818, ch. 90, was not repealed by act of 1839, ch. 4. The former act held under admitted