

Limitations runs from date of promissory note payable on demand, but only from date of demand on certificate of deposit so payable. *Fells Point Savs. Institution v. Weedon*, 18 Md. 326.

A usage to effect that deposits at a bank are only payable upon demand prevents running of statute against such deposits until payment has been refused or some act done dispensing with demand, which must be brought to knowledge of depositor. *Planters' Bank v. Farmers' Bank*, 8 G. & J. 467.

When bank notifies depositor that his claim will not be paid, a demand is dispensed with, and statute begins to run at once. *Farmers' Bank v. Planters' Bank*, 10 G. & J. 441; *Planters' Bank v. Farmers' Bank*, 8 G. & J. 467.

Where a contract is to be performed when same is demanded, limitations begins to run from time demand is made. An equitable qualification of this rule discussed, where demand is delayed an unreasonable time. *Rhind v. Hyndman*, 54 Md. 530.

Where debtor endorses promissory note payable on demand to his creditor in part payment of a debt, the creditor is not bound to make demand on day note is endorsed to him, and statute only begins to run after a reasonable time for making of demand has expired. *Mudd v. Harper*, 1 Md. 111.

The statute begins to run from the date of a loan to be returned "when called on to do so." *Darnall v. Magruder*, 1 H. & G. 439.

The statute begins to run in favor of a guarantor from time he is liable to suit, which may or may not be same time principal becomes so liable. Where principal makes a part payment before the statute has attached, the statutory period as against guarantor or surety, is extended. When statute begins to run in favor of guarantors. *Hooper v. Hooper*, 81 Md. 170.

In a suit for neglect of professional duty, cause of action accrues and statute begins to run from time of the breach or neglect, not from time when consequential damages result or are ascertained. Statute held a bar in suit against physician. *Hahn v. Claybrook*, 130 Md. 181.

The statute of limitations begins to run in favor of stockholder as to his liability under art. 23, sec. 146, only from date of order fixing amount to be paid by him. *Mister v. Thomas*, 122 Md. 459.

The question of whether the statute of limitations was a bar to a suit held to be a mixed question of law and fact. When statute begins to run. *W., B. & A. Elec. R. R. Co. v. Moss*, 130 Md. 204.

Where a broker instead of effecting an immediate sale, negotiates a lease, the tenant having an option to buy, statute begins to run against a suit by broker for commissions on sale from time tenant exercises option. *Coates v. Locust Point Co.*, 102 Md. 292.

The statute begins to run against provisional trustee in insolvency from time of his appointment and qualification, and when once commenced continues as against permanent trustee. *Teackle v. Gibson*, 8 Md. 87.

The statute begins to run against endorser of note, or surety, from time he makes payment. *Bullock v. Campbell*, 9 Gill, 183. As to sureties, see also *Schindel v. Gates*, 46 Md. 614; *Hall v. Creswell*, 12 G. & J. 49.

Where one joint maker of note pays it, statute begins to run as against his right to contribution, from date of such payment. *Brady v. Brady*, 110 Md. 665; *Hooper v. Hooper*, 81 Md. 155.

Where goods are sold with an agreement that a note will be given for them maturing in 90 days, but no such note is given, and a suit is brought more than three years after sale, but less than three years before note would have matured, statute is not bar. *Appleman v. Michael*, 43 Md. 279.

Where one partner pays out money in behalf of firm, limitations only begins to run as against his right to sue his co-partner from time an account is settled and a balance ascertained. *Holloway v. Turner*, 61 Md. 222.

Where a claim for services against a deceased is founded simply on an implied obligation, the statute begins to run from the time the services are performed. *Dempsey v. McNally*, 73 Md. 438.

The statute only begins to run against an administrator from the time he takes out letters. *Rockwell v. Young*, 60 Md. 566.

The statute begins to run on liability of stockholder on his subscription to stock, from time calls are made. *Glenn v. Williams*, 60 Md. 120. See also *Taggart v. Western Md. R. R. Co.*, 24 Md. 597.

Where purchaser of stock fails to have it transferred on books of company and seller is subsequently compelled to pay an assessment, statute begins to run against latter's suit against purchaser, from time of such payment. *Hutzler v. Lord*, 64 Md. 543.

In an action of trover, statute begins to run from the conversion, unless perhaps plaintiff has been prevented by fraud of defendant from knowing of conversion. (See sec. 14). *Bell v. Marriott*, 9 Gill, 338.

Incompetency to sue.

The statute begins to operate only from the time there is a competent person to sue. Where a creditor dies before a debt is due him, his administrator may recover it, provided he sues within three years from date of his letters. *Ruff v. Bull*, 7 H. & J. 16; *Fishwick v. Sewell*, 4 H. & J. 428; *Haslett v. Glenn*, 7 H. & J. 24.