right to have a writ of *scire facias* to renew or revive the same, and no judgments of justices of the peace duly recorded in the clerk's office, such writ of *scire facias* may be issued out of the superior court of Baltimore city, or the circuit court for the county, as the case may be, as if said judgment had been originally rendered by said court, and on all such judgments or decrees the plaintiff may have more than one attachment or execution to be laid in the hands of different persons, or levied on other property or effects than that taken under the first, though the first be still outstanding; provided, that but one satisfaction of the debt or demand shall be made, and that it shall be in the discretion of the court in all such cases, whether any costs, and if any, what amount of costs shall be allowed on the subsequent attachments or other executions; the provisions of this section shall apply also to attachments or executions directed to a county different from that where the judgment or decree was rendered, or to or from the city of Baltimore.

Judgments of justices of the peace.

This section referred to as giving authority to the circuit court to issue execution upon recorded judgments of justices of the peace. Union Natl. Bank *v.* Shriver, 68 Md. 437.

A judgment of a justice of the peace is not a judgment within the meaning of the act of 1874, ch. 320. Weikel *v.* Cate, 58 Md. 110.

As to execution on judgments of justices of the peace, see art. 52, sec. 59, *et seq.*

Generally.

A judgment cannot be revived by *sci. fa.* after the lapse of twelve years. An outstanding execution does not prevent the bar of the statute, unless it is renewed from term to term. Johnson *v.* Hines, 61 Md. 128. See also Mullikin *v.* Duvall, 7 G. & J. 355.

The lien of a judgment which has lapsed, cannot be revived so as to overreach an intervening lien. Post *v.* Mackall, 3 Bl. 518. See also Hodges *v.* Sevier, 4 Md. Ch. 382.

It is a general principle that where a new person is benefited or charged by the execution of a judgment, there ought to be a *sci. fa.* to make him a party; qualification of this principle. Hanson *v.* Barnes, 3 G. & J. 359.

Neither the act of 1874, ch. 320, nor the prior acts comprising this section, deal directly with the writ of *scire facias;* there is nothing in the act of 1874, ch. 320, to prevent the judgment creditor from resorting to a *scire facias* within the twelve years, there being no change of parties to the judgment. Lambson *v.* Moffett, 61 Md. 429. And as to the act of 1874, ch. 320, see Brown *v.* C. & O. Canal Co., 4 Fed. 772.

Under act of 1862, ch. 262, defendant is entitled to same defences to an execution issued eleven years after a judgment, as if a *sci. fa.* had been issued. Manton *v.* Hoyt, 43 Md. 264. See also as to act of 1862, ch. 262, First Natl. Bank *v.* Weckler, 52 Md. 38; Anderson *v.* Graff, 41 Md. 606; Johnson *v.* Lemmon, 37 Md. 343; Goldsborough *v.* Green, 32 Md. 92; Mitchell *v.* Chestnut, 31 Md. 526; Hardesty *v.* Campbell, 29 Md. 536; Brown *v.* C. & O. Canal Co., 4 Fed. 772.

This section expressly authorizes more than one attachment on judgment or decree; hence if a sheriff's return is defective, another attachment should be issued and the company properly served. See notes to art. 23, sec. 103. Sharpless Separator Co. *v.* Brilhart, 129 Md. 92.

Where a judgment is rendered on October 19, 1899, and the writ of *scire facias* is issued on October 19, 1911, the writ is in time. Parker *v.* Brattan, 120 Md. 433.

This section referred to in construing art. 93, sec. 120—see notes thereto. Newcomer *v.* Beehler, 116 Md. 651.

Act of 1834, ch. 189, places attachments on judgment on precisely the same footing so far as their issue is involved, as a *fi. fa.* Boyd *v.* Talbott, 7 Md. 407.

Act of 1785, ch. 80, sec. 1, does not apply to cases in the court of appeals. It provides against an action abating by death of either party after suit brought, and