

cause whatever, but shall not have been revoked or declared void, any payment or delivery to such guardian of such legacy, distributive share, or personal property by such administrator, shall have the same force, validity and effect as respects such administrator as if said guardian's appointment were regularly made, and not for any cause liable to be revoked or declared void.

For a case applying the principles of this section, see *Gunther v. State*, 31 Md. 21

An. Code, sec. 192. 1904, sec. 191. 1888, sec. 191. 1833, ch. 15, sec. 2.

198. Every such guardian so receiving money or other property belonging to his ward shall be liable to account for the same, to be recovered by suit on his guardian's bond or otherwise, as provided by law in case of guardians duly and regularly appointed.

See note to sec. 197.

An. Code, sec. 193. 1904, sec. 192. 1888, sec. 192. 1798, ch. 101, sub-ch. 12, sec. 15. 1829, ch. 216, secs. 5, 6.

199. On a ward's arrival at age, or on the marriage of a female ward, the guardian shall exhibit a final account to the orphans' court, and shall deliver up, agreeably to the court's order, to the said ward, all the property of such ward in his hands, including bonds and other securities; and on failure, his bond may be put in suit, and he shall be liable to attachment and fine not exceeding three hundred dollars; and a female shall be of age at eighteen years, for the purposes of this section.

Final account.

A ward may settle with his guardian out of court and thus be precluded from suing the bond. It is guardian's duty, however, to state a final account in orphans' court and property is taxable to him until he does so. *Baldwin v. Washington County*, 85 Md. 161.

The control of orphans' court and responsibility of guardian and his bond continue until final account is stated under this section. *Griffith v. Parks*, 32 Md. 7.

When a female becomes of age.

The expression "lawful age" as used in a will construed in light of this section. For many purposes a female does not arrive at her majority until she is twenty-one. *McKim v. Handy*, 4 Md. Ch. 236. And see *Waring v. Waring*, 2 Bl. 674.

A father provided in a deed and also in his will that entire net income of a share of his property was to be paid to a daughter upon her arrival at "legal age;" this means upon her arrival at age of eighteen. *McKim v. Handy*, 4 Md. Ch. 228, reviewed. *Perkins v. Safe Dep. Co.*, 138 Md. 299.

The act of 1798, ch. 101, only removes disabilities of infancy in cases therein expressly provided. Though entitled to possession of her property, a female under twenty-one cannot dispose of it save as provided in sec. 331. *Davis v. Jacquin*, 5 H. & J. 109; *Fridge v. State*, 3 G. & J. 115; *Waring v. Waring*, 2 Bl. 674; *Newton v. Griffith*, 1 H. & G. 137 (dissenting opinion); *Bowers v. State*, 7 H. & J. 36; *Greenwood v. Greenwood*, 38 Md. 385.

This section does not affect rule that a father has legal control over his daughter and right to her services until she is twenty-one. *Greenwood v. Greenwood*, 28 Md. 385. And see *Keller v. Donnelly*, 5 Md. 217.

Generally.

As to releases and other transactions between guardians and wards shortly after the latter's becoming of age, see *Spalding v. Brent*, 3 Md. Ch. 411.

The statute of limitations begins to run against a ward from the moment he or she becomes free under this section. This section distinguished from secs. 194 and 196. *State v. Henderson*, 54 Md. 343.