in the case of personal estate, either before or after the administrator shall have passed his account.

The term "residence" as used in the statutes relating to appointment of guardians is synonymous with "domicile." The ward cannot himself change his domicile by removal because he is not *sui juris;* nor does removal of ward to another state or county by relatives or friends affect his domicile. *Quaere,* whether an uncle, after the death of both parents, may become a *natural* guardian. In view of secs. 192 and 160, a natural guardian who has not given bond cannot change domicile of a ward. Sudler *v.* Sudler, 121 Md. 48.

No appeal lies from action of orphans' court in appointing a guardian. The interest, and not the wishes, of the ward should control in such appointment. Compton *v.* Compton, 2 Gill, 241; Sudler *v.* Sudler, 121 Md. 48.

The right to appoint a guardian is not affected by fact that a court of some other state has made a similar appointment. There may be a domestic guardian having charge of infant's property, and a foreign guardian having charge of his person. A guardian appointed in another state has no authority to sue here. Kraft *v.* Wickey, 4 G. & J. 342.

The expression "lawful age" as used in a will, construed in light of this section. For many purposes a female does not arrive at her majority until she is twenty-one. McKim *v.* Handy, 4 Md. Ch. 236.

The act of 1798, ch. 101, only removes disabilities of infancy in cases therein expressly provided. Though entitled to the possession of her property, a female under twenty-one cannot dispose of it save as provided in sec. 331. Davis *v.* Jacquin, 5 H. & J. 109; Fridge *v.* State, 3 G. & J. 115; Waring *v.* Waring, 2 Bl. 674; Bowers *v.* State, 7 H. & J. 36; Greenwood *v.* Greenwood, 28 Md. 385.

This section does not affect rule that a father has legal control over his daughter, and right to her services until she is twenty-one. Greenwood *v.* Greenwood, 28 Md. 385. And see Keller *v.* Donnelly, 5 Md. 217.

In all cases where the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals falls short, equity will appoint a guardian. Waring *v.* Waring, 2 Bl. 674; Corrie's Case, 2 Bl. 500. As to the jurisdiction of equity relative to guardians and wards, see also Crain *v.* Barnes, 1 Md. Ch. 151; Barnes *v.* Crain, 8 Gill, 391.

This section referred to in construing sec. 170—see notes thereto. Thaw *v.* Falls, 136 U. S. 519.

Cited but not construed in Contee *v.* Dawson, 2 Bl. 273.

As to the jurisdiction of equity over infants, see art. 16, sec. 59, *et seq.*

As to the appointment of guardians in cases of division and election, see art. 46, sec. 10A. See also art. 46, sec. 28.

As to the powers and duties of institutions for the care and protection of minors, see art. 23, sec. 192.

As to marriages of minors, see art. 62, sec. 7, *et seq.*

An. Code, sec. 145. 1904, sec. 144. 1888, sec. 145. 1834, ch. 291, sec. 4.

150. In case any infant in this State shall be entitled to personal property by purchase or by gift, other than by last will and testament, recorded in this State, and there be no guardian appointed to such infant within this State, the orphans' court of the county in which such infant shall reside shall have the right to appoint a guardian to such infant.

An. Code, sec. 146. 1904, sec. 145. 1888, sec. 146. 1834, ch. 291, sec. 2.

151. The orphans' court shall have the right and power to appoint a guardian to any such infant as aforesaid, although such infant may have a father or mother living at the time of such appointment; provided, notice be given by the court, by publication or otherwise, to such father, or mother (if there be no father living), to show cause why such appointment should not be made; and such appointment shall be as valid in every respect as if the father and mother of such infant were both dead at the time; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the said courts from ap-