Johnson observed at bar is certainly true, that ever since the case of Scott v. Dobson,[27] the law has been in this point looked upon to be settled;" and he argued the principle of *stare decisis*. A glance at some of the reasons which controlled decisions of the court, such for instance as those in Scott v. Dobson, as stated by Dulany on page 353, and arguments presented by counsel, such as those in Maxwell v. Lloyd, 1 Harris & McHenry, 213, will confirm the conclusion that this court in which the law was so expounded and adjudicated was nothing less than a court of justice as we now conceive it.

And as for the lack of special professional training in the judges, a fact which has often been dwelt upon in references to the old court, it has already been pointed out that this did not signify that they were entirely without equipment for their work; and it did not mark the court as one of unusual make-up in that time. Lay members took part in the decisions of the House of Lords on appeals as late as in 1834; and in the state of New York, under constitutions of 1777 and 1821, the president and members of the upper legislative chamber sat on the court of final appeal until the adoption of another constitution in 1846.[28] To be accurate, there were some few lawyers on the Maryland Court of Appeals prior to 1776, and some strong ones. Daniel Dulany, the younger, said in his observations furnished to one of the counsel in the case of West v. Stigar, reported in 1 Harris &

27. 1 Harris & McHenry, 160, 161.

28. N. Y. Const. 1777, Art. XXXII; Const. 1821, Art. V, sec. 1; Const. 1846, Art. VI, sec. 2. See note to Chancellor's Case, 1 Bland, 678.