ing most of the day has never been satisfactorily provided.

At the October term, 1914, the judges returned to the wearing of special judicial dress, the conventional black silk gowns.

The perceptible changes in the work of the court since 1867 have come not so much through changes in the rules of practice as through changes in the work of lawyers. There have been few changes in the rules. The successive reductions of the time allowed for arguments, until the regular maximum is now forty-five minutes, constitute a familiar one, and one which, of course, demands of counsel the increased effort required for brevity and succinctness.

In 1869, by rule of court, enacted as section 4 of article 5 of the State code, it was provided that:

> Formal writs of error shall, in all cases, be dispensed with, and the party applying to have the record removed, as upon writ of error, in cases where by law writs of error are allowable, shall, by brief petition, addressed to the court in which the case was tried, plainly designate the points or questions of law by the decision of which he feels aggrieved; which application so to remove the record, shall be allowed as of right; and no point or question not thus plainly designated in such application shall be heard or determined by the Court of Appeals.

On its face, this seems to have been designed to put an end to the use of the old writ, and is much like the seventeenth century statutes on the subject [7] except that it is prohibitory in form; but it has not been treated as abolishing the writ completely. In 1892, a statute [8] confirmed the right of appeal in the ordinary manner, without writ of

7. Supra, page 24.
8. Act 1892, Ch. 506. Code Art. 5, sec. 86.