defendant, wherever it might be found, within any one of the counties of the state, liable to be taken in execution for the satisfaction of such judgments. No execution can be issued, under these laws, against the person of the defendant, to any county, but to that in which he resides, as directed by the previous enactments; nor can a plaintiff be allowed to issue writs of fieri facias directed to two or more counties at the same time, although it may be renewed, or continued, either on the original judgment, or on the short copy of it sent to another county, until full satisfaction has been obtained; in like manner as by a testatum fieri facias issuing, according to the English law, from the Court of King's Bench to any county of the realm, into which it may be necessary that an execution should go, in order to extract from the property of the defendant that satisfaction to which the plaintiff by his judgment is entitled. And, according to the principles of law which have been applied in all similar cases, as well here as in England, the lands and tenements of the defendant having been thus expressly made liable, by a regular course of proceeding, to be taken in execution, are all, wherever they may be, within any one of the counties of the state, bound by a lien which fastens upon them from the date of any such judgment rendered in any county court. (j)

When these laws, enlarging the operation of judgments rendered in the county courts, were passed, the General Court was in existence, the power of which, as a court of original jurisdiction, extended over the whole state; and from which, as setting on the western or eastern shore, an execution might be sent, upon its judgments, to any one of the counties of the state, against the property of the defendant. The Court of Chancery also, being then, as it is now, and always has been, a court having original jurisdiction over the whole state, having been authorized to enforce its decrees by a fieri facias, directed to any county of the state, against the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the defendant; (k) thereby had its decrees likewise made a lien upon the defendant's lands every where, to the same extent as a judgment of the General Court. (1) And the court of Appeals having been authorized to pronounce such a judgment as the inferior court of common law might have done, and to issue execution thereon to any

<sup>(</sup>j) Ralston v. Bell, 2 Dall. 159; Eppes v. Randolph, 2 Call. 186; Nimmo v. The Commonwealth, 4 Hen. & Mun. 77.—(k) 1785, ch. 72, s. 25.—(l) Coombs v. Jordan, ante 284.