

that may be necessary and useful to him in other cases, besides the one then under consideration, an answer to such a bill is not responsive which merely asserts the fact without saying anything of the evidence, of its existence, or the means of obtaining it. And where a defendant, by his answer, asserts a right affirmatively, in opposition to the plaintiff's demand, the defendant must establish it by proof, or the assertion will be disregarded; for a defendant cannot be permitted to swear himself into a title to the plaintiff's estate. (r) But where an administrator is called upon to answer certain matters which appear to have rested exclusively within the knowledge of his intestate, it will be sufficient, that he swears as he is informed and believes; (s) but such an answer is to be taken with reference to the reasons given for his belief; for if the reasons are futile, and especially if the alleged belief be in a high degree irreconcilable with the admitted or established circumstances of the case, the answer cannot be credited, nor be allowed thus loosely to swear away the equity of the bill. (t)

A *second* general rule is, that every allegation of the answer which is not directly responsive to the bill, but sets forth matter in avoidance or in bar of the plaintiff's claim is denied by the general replication, and must be fully proved or it will have no effect.

A *third* general rule is, that if the defendant submits to answer at all, he must answer fully and particularly; not merely limiting his responses to the interrogatories of the bill; but respond to the whole and every substantial part of the plaintiff's case. He is not, however, bound to go further, and to answer any interrogatory asking a disclosure of matter no way connected with or material to the case. If the answer be in any respect evasive or insufficient, the plaintiff may except to it; and thus extract from his opponent a full and perfect answer. (u)

But to this general rule there is a modification, the nature and bearing of which may be sufficiently illustrated by one or two

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(r) *Ridgeway v. Darwin*, 7 Ves. 404; *Thompson v. Lambe*, 7 Ves. 588; *Boardman v. Jackson*, 2 Ball & B. 385; *Beckwith v. Butler*, 1 Wash. 224; *Paynes v. Coles*, 1 Mun. 395.—(s) *Carnan v. Vansant*, 1807, M. S.—(t) *Clark v. Van Riemsdyk*, 9 Cran. 160; *Tong v. Oliver*, 1 Bland, 198 —(u) *Beam's Orders*, 28, 179; *Hinds v. Dod*, *Barnard*. 258; S. C. 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 69; *Paxton's case*, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 67; S. C. Sel. Cas. Cha. 53; *King v. Marissal*, 3 Atk. 192; *Radford v. Wilson*, 3 Atk. 815; *Hepburn v. Durand*, 1 Bro. C. C. 503; *Deane v. Rastron*, 1 Anstr. 64; *Prout v. Underwood*, 2 Cox, 135; *Mountford v. Taylor*, 6 Ves. 792; *White v. Williams*, 8 Ves. 193; *Somerville v. Mackay*, 16 Ves. 382; ——— *v. Harrison*, 4 Mad. 252; *Wharton v. Wharton*, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 117.