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374 THE WHARF CASE.
erect a new public port without the sanction of the government ;
nor can he take, out of a port, any certain rates of wharfage for
landing merchandise, although he may make particular agreements
with every one who comes to his wharf or shore, by his consent,
to land goods. And so, too, a man, for his own private advan-
tage, may build a wharf in a public port, and take what rates for
the use of it, he and his customers can agree upon, for in that he
does no more than is lawful in making the most of his own. (w)
But it is otherwise of those wharves belonging to individuals,
which have been legally thrown open to the use of the public, and
also with regard to those which are entirely and properly public
wharves. As to all such as belong to individuals, or a body poli-
tic, which are affected with a public interest, the wharfage must
be reasonable; and, after having been once legally adjusted, can-
not be enhanced to an immoderate amount. Such wharves are
subject to some statutory regulations in England; (a:) and here
they are particularly alluded to in several of our acts of Congress
regulating the collection of revenue from goods imported, as places
dedicated to the use of that commerce which the federal govern-
ment alone has a right to regulate; and, consequently, no wharf-
age can be demanded for the use of any such wharf in a public
port, either to an amount, or in a manner, so as in any way to give
a preference prohibited by the federal constitution, or to interfere
with the regulation of commerce, or the collection of such revenue
by the federal government.
This I take to be the true intention of the provisions of the
federal constitution in relation to the regulation of commerce, and
the laying of duties on imports as declared by various acts of
Congress, and admitted by our own legislative enactments, (y)
And therefore, upon these principles I hold the act of Assembly
which authorizes The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to
charge and collect such wharfage as they may think reasonable,
from all vessels lying at or landing articles, other than the produc-
tions of this state, on any wharf belonging to The Mayor and (My
Council, or any public wharf of the city, to be unconstitutional and
void. (z)
Where an individual is the owner of any such wharf to which
(w) Hale de Portibus, 77; 1825, ch. 179, s, 8 and 16,—(x) Hale de Portibust 77;
1744, ch. 22, s, 2 and 15; 1817, ch, 225, s, 7; 1822, ch, 57, s. 7.—(y) 1701, ch, 60.—
(z) 1827, ch, 162, s. 4; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 190; Brown v. The State of
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 442.
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