LINGAN v. HENDERSON.

and can be considered at most as standing only as if made in
argument at the final hearing. But, as such, it is wholly inad-
missible in any way; and particularly for the purpose of excluding
any proof merely because of the inferiority of its grade, or because
of its not being such written evidence as might have been required
had the statute of frauds been specially relied upon.

In the next place, apart from the statute of frauds, the admission
of this testimony is objected to on the ground, that it cannot be
received in so far as it goes to contradict or explain the receipt of
J. M. Lingan on the deed for the purchase money, or the memo-
randum of the 10th of June, 1807. The evidence given by this
witness is, however, introduced, not to contradict or vary any part
of the entire contract, but to supply deficiencies and to prevent
fraud, by shewing that of which the deed of conveyance says
nothing, and to corroborate, explain and fortify that of which the
memorandum of the 10th of June speaks ambiguously. Taken in
this point of view, this parol proof may well and consistently stand
with the deed, and so much of the whole contract, as has been actu-
ally reduced to writing.(d) A receipt, not under seal, although it be
strong, is not, in all cases, conclusive evidence of the fact ;(e) but
a receipt for the purchase money, such as this, endorsed by J. M.
Lingan, the grantor, for the sum of five dollars, the nominal con-
sideration, on the back of the deed, looking to the usage, in such
cases, of making an absolute conveyance, of which such a receipt
is a mere formal part, leaving the purchase money in fact unpaid,
is considered, in equity at least, as being, in itself, evidence of the
lowest order.(y) This second objection, as well as the first, must
therefore be totally overruled.

It has been long and well established as a rule of law and equity,
that the plaintiff can only obtain relief upon the strength of his
own title as it existed at the time of instituting his suit, and not on
the weakness of the title of his adversary, or the imbecility of his
defence, (g) In general, if ths facts stated in the bill are not in
substance sufficient to entitle the complainant to the relief prayed,

(d) Joynes v. Statham, 3 Atk. 889; Blagdeu v. Bradbear, 12 Ves. 471f Hartopp
9. Hartopp, 17 Ves. 191; Co. Litt. 222 b. n. 2; Pow. Mort. 200.—(<r) Trialer v. WM-
liamson, 4 H. & McH. 219; Hughes v O'Donnell, 2 H. & J. 324; 4 Stark. Ev. mt.
(/) O'Neale v. Lodge, 3 H. & McH. 433; Dixon v. Swiggett, 1 H. & J. 252;
Higdon v. Thomas, 1 H. & G. 145; Knight v. Pechey, Dick. 327; Sug. Ten. & Pur.
88S; Pow. Mort. 1062; Irvine v. Campbell, 6 Bin. 118; Duval v. Bibb, 4 Hen. &
Mun. 113.—(g) Mitf. PL 141,154,232; Barfield v. Kelly, 4 Russ. 355; Watts v. Lind-
sey, 7 Wheat. 161.

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