

the 19th of April last, is it possible to conclude that such right exists on the part of the receiver himself? What is he? His character and functions are well defined by the late Chancellor, in *Williamson vs. Wilson*, 1 *Bland*, 421. He is declared to be "an officer of the Court." "He is truly and properly the hand of the Court, but his appointment determines no right, nor does it affect the title of the property in any way; it will not prevent the running of the statute of limitations." "The holding of the receiver, is the holding of the Court for him from whom the possession was taken." In *Ellicott vs. The Insurance Co.*, this definition of the office of a receiver is quoted with approbation by the Court of Appeals, and hence it is clear that he has no rights whatever, and has no more authority to ask for a revision of the order removing him, than an entire stranger to the cause.

But it is said, that though he cannot complain of the order removing him, yet as this order goes further, and directs him to deliver over property to the administrator *pendente lite*, he may, on that account, be entitled to take the judgment of the Appellate Court. But what is it to him what the Court does with the property, provided he is discharged from his responsibility as receiver? And that he would be so discharged by obeying the order of the Court, cannot be questioned. It is, moreover, conceded that the receiver has no rights himself, and of course cannot appeal or interfere in any way in the conduct of the cause, unless he can be considered as representing those at whose instance he was appointed. But to view him in that light, would be to give him a character inconsistent with the nature of his office, as defined by Chancellor Bland. How can he be the officer of the Court, and the hand of the Court, and at the same time the representative of the interests of certain of the parties to the cause? The Court must act by its officers and agents, and there is as much propriety in calling the Court the representative of any of the parties to the cause, as its agents and officers, who derive their authority from the Court, and are removable at its discretion.

If, however, there could be a doubt upon the subject, it