

CONSTRUCTION OF ACTS AND STATUTES—*Continued.*

11. When a deed is recorded under the 11th section of the act of 1785, ch. 72, it cannot, by the express terms of that act, in any manner, effect the rights of the creditors of the party making it, who became such after the date thereof. *Gill vs. Griffith & Schley*, 271.
12. As the object of the act of 1729, ch. 8, was to protect creditors from prior secret conveyances, any such creditor who had notice of such conveyance, cannot be considered as falling in the class of those for whose benefit the act was passed. *Ib.*
13. By the act of 1729, it was intended that speedy information should be given to every person, of any transfer of personal property, when the party transferring retained the possession, and that such possession, unless the deed was acknowledged and recorded, as therein provided, of itself, as to creditors and subsequent purchasers, defeated the first conveyance. *Ib.*
14. The manifest design of the legislature to give the public notice, not only of the existence of incumbrances on lands, but of the precise amount thereof, is shown by the act of 1825, ch. 50. And the same wise policy is still further displayed by the 2d section of the act passed the same year, ch. 203. *Ib.*
15. Though the legislature has changed the law with regard to the registration of deeds, or conveyances of real estate, by the acts of 1825, ch. 203, sec. 1, and the act of 1831, ch. 304, it has never, in any respect, modified the act of 1729, to prevent secret sales, mortgages, and gifts of goods and chattels, of which the vendor, mortgagor or donor, should remain in possession, but these have continued exposed to the stern, but wholesome provisions of that act. *Ib.*
16. The 2d section of the act of 1841, authorizes the court to decree a divorce *a vinculo*, "where the party complained against, has abandoned the party complaining, and has remained absent from the state for the space of *five years*." The act of 1844, repeals "all such parts of the 2d section of the original act, as requires an absence from the state for *five years*," with a proviso, that no such decree shall be passed on account of abandonment, unless such abandonment has continued, uninterruptedly, for at least three years, and is deliberate and final, and the separation of the parties beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation. **HELD—**  
That by the latter act, the legislature clearly intended to *abridge* the period of absence from the state required by the former, but that it is not clear that they intended to *dispense* with such absence altogether, as one of the ingredients constituting the ground for a divorce *a vinculo*. *Brown vs. Brown*, 316.
17. By the 3d section of the act of 1841, a divorce *a mensa et thoro*, may be granted for abandonment and desertion, without regard to its duration, or the absence of the party complained of, from the state. *Ib.*
18. A suit for a divorce commenced in Baltimore County Court, in virtue of the act of 1841, ch. 262, which conferred upon the Chancellor and County Courts, as Courts of Equity, jurisdiction over the subject of