The answer should, in general, be sworn to; but must be allowed to have full effect, as such, although made by one who is incompetent to give

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Scotten, 59 Md. 73; *Whalen* v. *Dalashmutt*, *Ibid*, 250; *Banks* v. *Busey*, 34 Md. 438. Jurisdiction in equity depends not so much upon the absence of a common law remedy as upon its inadequacy. *Bisp. Eq.* 434; *Harper's App.*, 2 Eastern Rep. 575. Where the rights involved are purely legal, equity will interpose by injunction solely to protect the property until such rights can be determined by a Court of law, and this protection will only be given in cases where the mischief threatened or impending, is likely to be ruinous or irreparable. *Lanahan* v. *Gahan*, 37 Md. 105.

As a general rule an injunction commands nothing to be done or to be undone; its intention and operation is to preserve all things in the condition in which it finds them until the equity can be heard and determined. *Cape Sable Co's Case*, 3 Bland, 636.

A bill praying for an injunction must state a case which *prima facie* entitles the complainant to the relief prayed. *Johnston* v. *Glenn*, 40 Md. 200; *Com'rs* v. *Franklin Co.* 45 Md. 473; *Heck* v. *Remka*, 47 Md. 68. And it must make a full and candid disclosure of all the facts within the knowledge of the complainant, on which his equity rests; there must be no concealment; all the *res gestae* must be represented as they actually are. *Reddall* v. *Bryan*, 14 Md. 476; *Canton Co.* v. *N. C. R'way Co.* 21 Md. 383; *Johnston* v. *Glenn*, 40 Md. 200; *Sprigg* v. *Tel. Co.* 46 Md. 75.

Where ample justice can be done, equity will interfere to prevent multiplicity of suits. *Holland* v. *Balto.* 11 Md. 186. Sometimes the apprehended danger is such as to justify the granting of an injunction. *McCreery* v. *Sutherland*, 23 Md. 481. Cf. *Myers* v. *Amey*, 21 Md. 302: *Fletcher* v. *Beaby*, 28 Ch. D. 688. The Court frequently refuses an injunction where it acknowledges a right when the conduct of the party complaining has led to the state of things that occasions the application; but in most cases it is sufficient that the question is important and doubtful. *Binney's Case*, 2 Bland, 99. As to mistake of law or fact as a ground for an injunction, see *Kearney* v. *Sasser*, 37 Md. 264; *Wood* v. *Patterson*, 4 Md. Ch. 335.

Laches, delay, or acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff is often a bar to relief by injunction. *R. R.* v. *Strauss*, 37 Md. 238; *Huyett* v. *Slick*, 43 Md. 290; *Balto.* v. *Grand Lodge*, 44 Md. 452. The running of limitations is suspended by the granting of an injunction. *Little* v. *Price*, 1 Md. Ch. 182.

Where a statute has made provision for all the circumstances of a particular case, no relief in equity can be afforded, although the provisions of the statute may conflict with the notions of natural justice and equity entertained by a Court of Chancery. *Glenn* v. *Fowler*, 8 G. & J. 347.

Injunctions will not be granted in doubtful or new cases not coming within well established principles of equity. *Hardesty* v. *Taft*, 23 Md. 530. But the absence of precedent, though not to be overlooked entirely, does not, of itself, determine questions of jurisdiction. *Hamilton* v. *Whitridge*, 11 Md. 145.

II. INJUNCTIONS AFFECTING REAL PROPERTY:

1. *Trespass.* An injunction will never be granted to restrain the commission of a mere trespass except in cases where the injury is irreparable and destructive of the plaintiff's estate, for which adequate compensation cannot be recovered at law, or is destructive of the property, in the character in which it had been used, or to prevent a multiplicity of suits, or where peculiar circumstances imperatively demand such a remedy. *Amelung* v. *Seekamp*, 9 G. & J. 468, *note* (a); and, in addition to the cases there cited, *Baugher* v. *Crane*, 27 Md. 36; *Gilbert* v. *Arnold*, 30 Md. 29; *Frederick* v. *Gro-*