as the bill requires, be compelled, if called on by the plaintiff, to answer interrogatories, and to make such disclosures as may be necessary, to enable the plaintiff to obtain the relief he seeks. Brownsford v. Edwards, 2 Ves. 246; Hawtry v. Trollop, Nelson, 119; Wood v. Strickland, 2 Ves. & Bea. 158; Sanders v. King, 6 Mad. 63; Thring v. Edgar, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 457; Mitf. Plea. 302. And so too, where a bill has been taken pro confesso, the necessary discovery required of the defendant may be supplied by proofs taken for that purpose, according to the ancient English mode; Johnson v. Desmineere, 1 Vern. 223; or upon interrogatories propounded to the plaintiff, or upon his affidavit, or by proofs taken in the manner prescribed by the before mentioned Acts of Assembly. If, however, the plaintiff's bill so exactly and perspicuously sets forth the facts and circumstances of his case, as to lav a complete foundation for the relief he asks, on its being wholly taken for true, there can be no occasion for enforcing an answer in any form, from the defendant; since his tacit admission of the truth of all the allegations of the bill, as they stand, will be amply sufficient to enable the Court to do full justice to the plaintiff.

It is a general rule, that wherever a defendant submits to an answer, he must answer as fully as the bill requires. Salmon v. Clagett, post. If he puts in an answer, to which the plaintiff excepts, and the exceptions are sustained, the defendant must put in a better answer by the time appointed for his so doing. The order by which his answer is declared to be insufficient, places him exactly in the situation in which he stood immediately before his insufficient answer was filed; and makes him again liable to any proceeding which might, at that time, have been had against him; so that where an answer has been adjudged, on exceptions, to be insufficient, and the defendant has not, as ordered, filed a sufficient answer by the appointed day, the plaintiff may, according to the principles of the English practice; again take up and continue his process of contempt, just where he had left off when the insufficient answer was filed; or as at that time, if he were so entitled, have his bill taken pro confesso, and obtain a decree thereon accordingly. Recollecting * however, that when the defendant submits to answer the exceptions; or the answer upon exceptions, is held to be insufficient, and the defendant answers accordingly, the plaintiff can take no other or new exceptions, but must have the sufficiency of the whole of such answers again put to the test upon the original exceptions. Dupont v. Ward, 1 Diek. 133; Turner v. Turner, 1 Dick. 316; Gregor v. Arundel, 8 Ves. 88; Partridge v. Hayeraft, 11 Ves. 575; Williams v. Davies, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 217; Over v. Leighton, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 433; Hodgson v. Butterfield, 1 Cond. Cha. Rep. 434; 1 Harr. Pra. Cha. 321.

An insufficient answer must of necessity, be regarded as no answer; since it would be unjust or ruinous, to compel a plaintiff